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Much cutting-edge research has been produced in the quest to find out which metaphysical 
account of modality is best. Comparatively little rigorous investigation has been devoted to 
questioning whether such accounts are compatible with classical theism. This thesis 
remedies some of this neglect and charts some of this previously under-explored territory 
existing at the intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Such an investigation 
is important since salient among the tenets of classical theism are ones that are 
characteristically modal. Not only is the classical monotheistic deity supposed to exist and 
possess the various divine-making properties necessarily; many of these properties 
themselves seem to include a modal component. An omniscient being is one who could not 
fail to know some proposition (once it’s true); and an omnipotent being is such that, for an 
appropriate set of tasks, it could perform them. Classical theism also comprises modal 
commitments about non-divine individuals: everything distinct from God is supposed to 
be necessarily dependent upon God; and human beings are supposed to have been granted the 
freedom to do otherwise. In short, the unique metaphysical properties of a classical 
monotheistic deity burden the theist with substantial metaphysical and ethical commitments 
any theory of modality must uphold; this thesis questions which one may do so best. 
However, the discussion must be limited to a small number of theories. Those examined 
here explain modality in terms of something ultimately non-modal; either by reducing 
modality to something else (e.g., a particular ontology of possible worlds), or by denying 
that modal discourse has the function of describing, in a truth-apt way, some part of mind-
independent reality. So this project is a partial investigation into a more specific question: 
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§1 introduces the topic of modality, explains possible world theory in as broad terms as 
possible, and then explains why understanding modality should be of importance to 
philosophers of religion. §2 provides an outline of the thesis. 
 
1. Modality, Possible Worlds, & Theism 
Sarah studies philosophy. Nothing that’s wholly green is partly yellow. Both of these statements are 
true. But they’re not true in the same way. The former, most would suppose, could have 
been false. The latter, by contrast, could not. Modality, as the name suggests, is concerned 
with this distinction between modes of truth, or ways of being true. It’s concerned with the 
distinction between statements that are contingently true (true but could have been false), and 
those which are necessarily true (true and could not have been false). But modality is not just 
concerned with true statements; falsity also has modes. Squirrels smoke cigars is false; so is 
Squirrels are cigars. Yet, though in fact false, the former, unlike the latter, at least could have 
been true: its falsity is contingent. When a false statement couldn’t have been true, it’s said to 
be impossible (its falsity is necessary). So we can recognise another division, one that cuts 
across all statements. A statement is possibly true when it either is true or could have been 
true; so every statement – whether true or not – is either possible or else not, and modality 
is concerned with this distinction also. Following John Divers (2002), call these notions – 
possibility, impossibility, necessity, and contingency – cases of modality. These four cases of 
modality are interlinked: 
 
Possibility rules out impossibility and requires (exclusively) contingency or 
necessity. Impossibility rules out possibility, rules out necessity and rules out 
contingency. Necessity requires possibility, rules out impossibility and rules out 
contingency. Contingency requires possibility, rules out impossibility and rules out 
necessity. (Divers, ibid.: 3-4) 
 
Relatedly, just as there are different modes of truth – different ways sentences, or 
propositions can be true – there are also different modes of being and of property 
possession: individuals can exist and possess properties in a necessary or a contingent 
manner. For example, I could lack (or could have lacked) the property being a philosophy 
student; but I could not fail to possess the property being human (so long as I exist). The terms 
de re and de dicto mark the distinction between the types of entity modality can be said to be 
a feature of. Modality de dicto is what we’re interested in when we’re interested in modes of 
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truth (or falsity). It’s said to attach to sentences or propositions (meaning that the ‘possibly’ or 
‘necessarily’ acts as a propositional or sentential operator). Modality de re, by contrast, is said 
to be a feature of things (that is, non-linguistic things or objects); it’s what we’re concerned 
with when we’re concerned either with the manner of something’s existence (i.e., with 
whether it exists contingently or necessarily), or with the manner in which something 
possesses certain properties (does it possess them contingently, or necessarily?).1 
The meanings of modal verbs can vary between different contexts. It’s one thing to 
say You can’t talk in the library; it’s quite another to say A shape can’t be both circular and non-
circular. This is partly because the thing that rules out talking in the library (i.e., the rules of 
the library), is not what rules out any shape’s being circular and non-circular (i.e., the laws 
of logic). You can’t talk in the library is true because it’s not possible to talk in the library and 
obey the library’s rules: these two things are inconsistent. No shape can be both circular and non-
circular is true because a shape’s being circular and non-circular would contravene the law 
of logic that if a proposition is true, its negation is false. So we can recognise another 
distinction: one between different kinds of modality. Different kinds of modality amount to 
consistency with different kinds of constraints (ibid.: 4). Hence, we can talk about logical 
possibility (what’s consistent with the laws of logic); nomological possibility (what’s consistent 
with the actual laws of nature); epistemic possibility (what’s consistent with what we know); 
and so on. Likewise, we can talk about logical necessity (what follows from laws of logic); 
nomological necessity (what follows from the laws of nature); epistemic necessity (what’s 
required to be true, given what we know); and so on.  
Logical modality is absolute: any logically necessary truth is true no matter what. 
However, there are some modal truths which are true no matter what, and yet, do not 
themselves follow from any law of logic.2 Take Sarah is human if she exists. While the denial 
of this statement does not seem contradictory, it nonetheless strikes us as something that is 
absolutely and strictly impossible. So here another distinction can be made. We can 
distinguish amongst the absolute modalities between those that are required by the laws of 
logic – call these the narrowly-logical modalities, and those that are not – call these the broadly-
logical, or metaphysical modalities.3 As the names suggest, the narrowly-logical modalities are 
a proper subset of the broadly-logical modalities: we’ve seen that there are broadly-logical 
necessities whose denials are not contra-logical. (Metaphysical possibility is, however, 
                                                          
1 The qualification is needed, since we may reasonably regard propositions as objects. The distinction is also 
commonly drawn in a grammatical or syntactic way. See, e.g., Sider (ibid.: 182-3). For more on the de re/de dicto 
distinction see Plantinga (1974b: 9-13). 
2 For some famous examples see Kripke (1972: 35-8 and 99-105). 
3 ‘Broadly logical’ is Alvin Plantinga’s term (1974b: Chapter 1). 
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narrower than purely logical possibility.) Hereafter, where I speak of something as being 
strictly or absolutely necessary, I shall be using this term to mean ‘metaphysically (i.e. broadly-
logically) necessary’. 
Some kinds of modality are alethic. This just means that, for certain kinds of 
modality, something’s being necessary entails its being true in our world, and something’s 
being impossible entails its being false in our world. Others are non-alethic: the relevant 
cant’s and musts place no such requirements on the actual world. Consider the above 
examples. Even though it’s true that you can’t talk in the library, it doesn’t follow that people 
never actually do talk in the library: indeed, people are, currently, talking in the library. By 
contrast, the truth of no shape can be both circular and non-circular does rule out there being such 
things as non-circular circles in the actual world. More formally, the alethic modalities are 
the ones for which the following inferences are valid: necessarily p, therefore, actually p; not 
possibly p, therefore, actually ~p; actually p, therefore, possibly p. (ibid.: 6). The narrowly-
logical, broadly-logical, and nomological modalities are those taken to be alethic in this way. 
I’ve noted that modal talk is pervasive; but it’s also indispensable to many of our 
ordinary ways of thinking and talking. If we described the world in purely categorical terms, 
many of us would take it that our description would not be complete; that we’d have failed 
to describe an important part of reality. We have many beliefs about the ways things must 
be, can’t be, or might have been different; and we find it important to think about what 
would be true if such and such were the case. Many of us would not be prepared to give up 
on those beliefs and ways of thinking (see Melia, (2003: 1-10), and Pruss, (2011: 2)). For 
example, many would have it that an individual, x, can be held to be morally responsible 
for a certain action, A, only if it was at least possible that x not perform A, and so, modality 
is of importance to ethics. Modality also has an important role to play in scientific theorising. 
As Joseph Melia notes, ‘the laws of physics are universal truths, but not just universal truths’ 
(2003: 6-7); part of what makes the physical laws laws is that we could not break them. Science 
also has a deep interest in causation – the phenomenon of certain events and occurrences 
necessitating others. Additionally, as Aime Thomasson highlights, modality – and alethic 
modality in particular – is at the heart of almost any debate in metaphysics: 
 
No notion plays a more central role in metaphysics than modality…Debates about 
metaphysical modal facts are tacitly at issue in debates about persistence ([i.e.] 
debates about what sorts of change it is…possible for a given entity to survive), 
about reduction and material constitution (since the main barrier to reduction and 
identity theses is often said to be that the entities have different modal properties), 
and even debates about existence (since the question of the existence of objects or 
kinds is often thought to be tied to the question of whether or not there is anything 
with the relevant ‘intrinsic modal features’). (2007: 135) 
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We might add to this list the notion of supervenience (of there being no difference in A facts 
without there being a difference in B facts), and the notion of a valid argument (one whose 
premises necessitate its conclusion). (Although validity is, of course, of central importance to 
all of analytic philosophy’s sub-fields.)4 
Yet, despite the pervasiveness and indispensability of modal facts and notions, 
modality is a source of much puzzlement and controversy. One of the primary reasons for 
this is that there is no easy answer to the question of what, in reality, makes for the distinction 
between the possible and the impossible, and the necessary and the contingent. Many of us 
would have it that truth is related to reality in a certain way: it’s grounded in it, and doesn’t 
just ‘float free’ from the way the world is. Often, when some statement about the world is 
true and contains no modal vocabulary it is not so difficult to see what determines its truth. 
Sarah is anxious is true because here is Sarah, being anxious: this state of affairs actually 
obtains. But no state of affairs including the existence of tap-dancing turtles actually obtains; 
so what makes for the fact that there could have been tap-dancing turtles? What makes for 
the fact that we could have done otherwise? In virtue of what couldn’t there be square 
circles? We see very well that all the extended things we’ve come across do have a shape, 
but what part of reality grounds the fact that they must do? As Ross Cameron neatly puts it: 
‘The way things are seems only to account for what is in fact the case, not what must be the 
case, or could have been the case but isn’t.’ (2009c: 11). Hence, ‘paradoxically, talk involving 
possibility does not appear to be about anything real.’ (Pruss, 2011: 2).5  
This perplexity surrounding modality is sometimes referred to as ‘the grounding 
problem’, since it concerns how modal facts can be grounded in ontology. The question is 
just what makes for the truth of alethic modality? Or, what conditions must reality meet such that modal 
claims are true?6 Perhaps owing to the level of significance modal facts and notions have for 
                                                          
4 During the mid-twentieth century, philosophers seemed to be much more hostile to the notion of modality. 
Most notably, W. V. Quine often called into question the intelligibility of modal notions and the plausibility 
of any statement’s being true come what may. See, e.g., Quine (1951) and (1960: 195-200). However, Quine’s 
scepticism about the clarity or intelligibility of modal notions no longer holds much sway. This is partly due 
to Kripke (1972: 35-8 and 99-105)) offering persuasive reasons for thinking that the distinction between the 
a priroi and the a posteriori is not exactly the same as the distinction between the necessary and the contingent. 
The former distinction is epistemological (it concerns how a statement can be known to be true), the latter is 
metaphysical (it concerns the nature of things in reality); and as some examples show, these cases come apart. 
5 Analogous questions (concerning past and future-tensed truths) can be put to presentists – those who believe 
that only the present moment exists. See, e.g., Sider ((2001a: 40-41) and (2003: 185)). 
6 Why not say the issue is one of asking what the truthmakers for modal claims are (rather than truth-
conditions)? For the reason that, under certain understandings of truthmaking, there is no problem of 
accounting for modal truth. If one takes it that all there is to truthmaking is necessitation – that, for any entity, 
t, t is a truthmaker for some proposition, p, iff t’s existence necessitates p – then anything will be a truthmaker 
for any necessary truth since its existence will necessitate that truth. Analogous reasons also apply to truths 
concerning possibility given the commonly accepted S5 system of modal logic. This system has as a principle 
that if some proposition, p, is possibly true, then it’s necessary that p is possible (◊p → □◊p); facts about 
absolute possibility are non-contingent. So, given S5, any object will necessitate any truth of the form ‘◊p’. 
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both philosophy and for our everyday lives, modality has, especially since the latter third of 
the twentieth century, become an important area of philosophical enquiry in its own right 
as philosophers have devoted a significant amount of time both to answering both this 
question, and others related to it.7 
In answering the question of what the truth-conditions are for modal statements, 
many have seen fit to endorse a framework of possible worlds, since it provides us with a 
neat model for understanding and evaluating modal claims. Following Saul Kripke (1963), 
modal truth can be understood not (just) in terms of what the actual world is like, but in 
terms of how other possible worlds are. In possible world semantics, the modal operators 
‘necessarily’ and ‘possibly’ are taken to be quantifiers over possible worlds. Broadly 
speaking, when we are dealing with cases of absolute modality, we say that – quantifying 
over all possible worlds – a sentence of the form ‘necessarily, p’ (□p) is true iff p is true 
according to every possible world (i.e.., iff ∀w (p is true according to w)), and a sentence of 
the form ‘possibly, p’ (◊p) is true iff p is true according to at least one possible world (i.e., 
iff ∃w (p is true according to w)). Relatedly, p is contingent iff p is true according to at least 
one possible world and false according to another, and p is impossible iff p fails to be the 
case according to any possible world. When we are dealing with other kinds of modality, 
the modal operators still function as quantifiers over worlds, but we simply restrict our 
quantifiers to a relevant subclass of worlds. For example, in the case of nomological 
modality, we restrict them to those worlds where the physical laws exactly match the laws 
that hold here in our world.  
Although this discourse enables us to neatly describe the truth-conditions for modal 
claims, the original ontological problem remains. We began asking what modal facts are, 
                                                          
(See Lewis (2001: 604) and Armstrong (2003: 14).) Not all will accept this as a reason not to look for modal 
truthmakers. For example, Trenton Merricks (2007) takes this as reason to reject the idea that truthmaking 
can be trivial in this way, rather than to think there’s no problem in providing truthmakers for modal truths. 
He claims: ‘Your thumb is not a truthmaker of any sort for FLT [Fermat’s Last Theorem]. And, in general, a 
‘trivial truthmaker’ is not really a truthmaker at all. As a result, it is a mistake to say both that necessary truths 
have truthmakers and also that those truthmakers can be trivial…Necessary truths require only ‘trivial 
truthmakers’ just in case necessary truths do not require truthmakers at all. (2007: 24) Merricks (ibid.: 26). 
Others, such as Barry Smith (1999: 279), contend instead that each truth’s truthmaker is that which that truth is 
about. (Your thumb’s existence is not the truthmaker for FLT because ‘FLT is not about your thumb. And 
bona fide truthmakers are that which their respective truthmakers are about.’ (2007: 27)) (See Cameron (2008a) 
for a discussion of the issues associated with truthmaking and modality and a defence of the claim that modal 
truths do require substantive truthmakers.) However, to avoid this and other issues (e.g., concerning what 
kinds of entities truthmakers can be) which may obscure and derail the discussion, I will stick to talking in 
terms of truth-conditions. If I use the term ‘truthmaker’ in places, I will be using it accordance with the 
following characterisation: x is a truthmaker for p iff x is something (some part of reality) the existence of 
which satisfies the truth-conditions for p.  
7 Another important question associated with modality is epistemological: how do we come to know the modal 
facts? The answer to this will, of course, be linked to the metaphysical question of what modal facts are. Since 
many of us would take it that we do have modal knowledge, it better turn out that the modal facts are of a 
kind that we could have access to. 
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but now we can ask what are possible worlds? Broadly, possible worlds are supposed to be 
complete or maximal representations of spacetime; they represent different ways our entire 
universe – for all of its history – might have been. So, just as we can think about the largest 
situation of which we are a part – the situation which encompasses all times, locations, and 
objects we are in any such way related to – we can also think about largest-sized situations 
of which anything may have been (or failed to be) a part. That is, just as we can think about 
the maximal way things are, we can also think about the maximal ways things might have been. 
Possible worlds represent these largest-sized possibilities (ways things might have been); 
smaller possibilities are embedded within them. (Hereafter, I may often speak of possible 
worlds simply as ‘worlds’.)8  
Worlds are representations, then, but what are these representations? Some take 
them to be concrete, and to be the same kind of thing as our universe. Such theorists – I 
will refer to them as genuine realists – accept the existence of entities that are not actual (from 
the standpoint of our world). Other theorists – actualist realists (or ersatzists) – don’t 
countenance the existence of anything non-actual. On their view, although all worlds 
represent our universe, only one represents it accurately, and this one alone is said to be 
actualized. The worlds which misrepresent our universe are the merely possible worlds; by 
misrepresenting our universe they represent the different ways it might have been. 
Although, on this view, all worlds are actual (actually exist), they are not the same kind of 
thing as the universe (actual world) we inhabit;9 instead they are identified with certain 
constituents of it: usually as some kind of abstract entity.10, 11 Both of these stances count as 
realisms about possible world discourse because they accept that statements involving 
possible worlds terminology are truth-apt; are sometimes true; and refer to mind-
independent entities.12 The differences between the views fall out from what they take 
                                                          
8 If possible worlds are to be of use to us here, then they should provide for and respect the broadly logical 
modalities: there should be no world where any metaphysical necessity is false, and there should be enough 
worlds so that every metaphysical possibility can be accounted for. It would be of no use if there were no 
worlds where the Green party win the 2015 UK General Election, or where all that exists is a bowl of almonds 
balanced precariously on the nose of a pirouetting porcupine; nor would it be of any use if there are worlds 
where something is wholly green and yet partly yellow. (It merits mention, though, that some (e.g. Yagisawa 
(2010)) find a use for impossible worlds (ones which represent impossibilities). Those who do invoke such 
worlds must, however, have some principled way of distinguishing them from the possible worlds.) 
9 This is true of all worlds, including the one that does represent our universe accurately. 
10 E.g.: Robert Stalnaker (1976) takes possible worlds to be (complexes of) uninstantiated properties; Robert 
M. Adams (1974) explores a view whereby worlds are maximally consistent sets of propositions; and Plantinga 
(1974b) takes worlds to be maximally consistent states of affairs. 
11 Ersatzists don’t have to take worlds to be abstract entities. As we’ll later see with the divine idealist account, 
some ersatzists maintain that worlds are different in kind from our universe, but are nonetheless concrete (or at 
least, are concrete on one plausible way of drawing the abstract/concrete distinction.) 
12 ‘Mind-independent’ here should be taken to mean independent of non-divine minds. Divine idealists take 
worlds to be ideas in God’s mind, and plausibly, this still counts as a realism about worlds. 
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worlds to be. Actualist realists and genuine realists also differ with regards to whether they 
take all worlds to be possible worlds. For some actualist realists, some worlds represent ways 
the world couldn’t have been; they represent impossibilities. The most discussed versions 
of genuine realism, based on Lewis (1986a), don’t invoke impossible worlds. However, an 
exception is the version presented by Takashi Yagisawa (2010). 
Others, however, take an anti-realist approach to possible worlds discourse, either 
by denying that possible worlds terminology and sentences involving it refers to any mind-
independent entities at all (whether concrete or abstract); or by denying that statements 
involving possible worlds terminology are truth-apt (capable of being evaluated as true or 
false), instead understanding the idiom as nothing more than a useful way of talking; or by 
denying that any sentence involving possible world terminology is ever true. (We must be 
careful here to distinguish between realism about possible worlds discourse and realism about 
modality. Being an anti-realist about possible worlds or possible world discourse, for 
example, does not make one an anti-realist about modality or modal discourse. One will be 
a realist about modality – under a standard definition of minimal realism – when one 
likewise takes statements involving modal terminology to be truth-apt; sometimes true; and 
as referring to mind-independent entities or properties.13) 
There is a consequent disagreement amongst possible world theorists about what 
sentences involving the term ‘possible world’ mean. According to all possible worlds 
theorists, something is possible iff it is the case according to one or more world; and what is 
the case according to a world, w, is just what w represents as being the case. However, possible 
world theories differ in their accounts of what it is for a world to represent that something 
is the case – of what it takes for something to be true according to a world.14 Hence, just 
how, precisely, possible world talk should be interpreted depends upon the particular 
possible world theory at hand. 
Some possible world theorists claim that the idiom of possible worlds can provide 
modal statements with entirely non-modal truth-conditions, and therefore claim that it can 
offer fully reductive accounts of modality. Whether they are entitled to do so will, again, 
depend upon what ontology they provide for these worlds, and how they define the notion 
                                                          
13 One will be realist with respect to modality but anti-realist with respect to worlds if one is anti-realist about 
worlds and adopts, e.g., a version of essentialism, or dispositionalism, or modal primitivism. Modal 
primitivists, as the name suggests, take modality to be a sui generis primitive feature of the world (see, e.g., 
Hancks (2008)). Essentialists take modal facts to be grounded in the essences of things (see, e.g., Fine (1994)). 
Dispositionalists take modality to be grounded in the dispositional properties of things (see, e.g., Molnar 
(2003). See Pruss (2002; 2012) for an account whereby modal facts are grounded in divine powers). Vetter 
(2011) provides an overview of some of the recent accounts of modality which don’t appeal to possible worlds. 
14 In fact, some possible worlds theories – and Lewisian genuine realism is one such theory – do not offer a 
uniform account of how a world represents something de re and how a world represents something de dicto.  
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of truth according to a world.15 As we’ll later see, the main proponent of genuine realism 
about worlds – David Lewis (1986a) – claims to be able to accommodate a full reduction 
of modal truth and concepts, since he can define the relevant notions of ‘world’ and ‘truth 
at a world’ in non-modal terms. Most actualist realists, however, cannot; but invariably such 
theorists expressly deny that there’s a need to do so (see, e.g., Plantinga (1974b)).  
While much cutting-edge research has been produced in the quest to advance, 
develop, and compare different metaphysical accounts of modality, there’s been 
comparatively little rigorous investigation into whether such theories are compatible with 
classical theism. Classical, or Anselmian,16 theism has many elements. Chief among them is 
the conception of a God who is a perfect, divine (or holy) and in some sense eternal 
personal being. Qua perfect personal being, God not only possesses mental states of a kind 
required for personhood, but also possesses the properties thought to be constitutive of 
perfection: inter alia, omnipotence, omniscience, moral impeccability, sovereignty, and 
aseity.17 These ‘omni-attributes’ should be fairly familiar: in saying that God possesses them, 
the theist is saying of God that he is maximally powerful and knowledgeable. The latter two 
may be less familiar. To say that God is sovereign is to say that all reality distinct from God 
is in some sense dependent upon God; and to say that God possesses aseity – ‘exists a se’ – 
is to say that God possesses the highest possible level of independence. 
This conspicuous gap in the literature seems doubly unwarranted when one 
considers, not only the global prevalence of theism, but also the fact that salient among the 
divine properties mentioned above are ones that are characteristically modal. For, to say, e.g., 
that God is omniscient is not just to say that God in fact knows everything there is to know; 
it is to say that God could not fail to know some proposition (once it’s true); and, to say that 
God is omnipotent is to say that for an appropriate set of tasks, God could perform them. 
Likewise, to say God is sovereign is to say that nothing could exist (or occur) without God. 
Further, God is supposed to be necessarily existent: it’s not possible that he fail to exist. 
Nor is it possible that God lack any of the earlier mentioned perfections. God exists and is 
                                                          
15 However, see Lycan (1988) and Shalkowski (1994) for arguments to the effect that any possible world 
theory can afford us with wholly non-modal truth-conditions for modal statements. Shalkowski thinks that 
any possible world theory must fail in this respect for precisely the reason that such a theory’s reductive base 
(its worlds) must be extensionally accurate (complete and consistent) and the only way to secure its accuracy 
involves appeal to modal facts.  
16 So-called since the locus classicus of perfect being theology is Anselm’s Proslogion. Perfect being theology 
proceeds by means of a priori reflection on the concept of a perfect being (or, in Anselm’s case, from the 
concept of a being which is that than which nothing greater can be conceived) to reveal certain truths about the nature 
of such a being. 
17 Others would add to this list such properties as simplicity and immutability. Those who think God must be 
simple and immutable often do so because they believe these properties to follow from other divine 
properties, e.g., simplicity from aseity; immutability from eternity, etc. However, since these are contentious, 
I leave them off for the time being. 
- 9 - 
 
perfect in every possible world. As such, God is necessarily omnipotent, necessarily 
omniscient, necessarily independent, and so on. (We should note here that the sort of 
necessity at play in these claims is supposed to be absolute – that is, broadly-logical, or 
metaphysical. So, e.g., God exists necessarily, not relative to some thing, but simpliciter.) It’s 
surprising, then, that comparatively little work has been done to investigate how the 
properties of a classical monotheistic deity may best be accounted for by a theory of 
modality, especially since the unique metaphysical properties of a classical monotheistic 
deity burden the theist with substantial metaphysical and ethical commitments that any 
theory of modality must uphold.  
This thesis charts some of this previously under-explored territory existing at the 
intersection of metaphysics and philosophy of religion. Loosely, the primary topic of 
investigation is: which metaphysical account of modality best fits with classical theism? While this topic 
has been largely under-explored, some important ground has been covered, so I will be 
mindful to address much of the extant literature in this area in the chapters that follow.18 
Now I cannot, of course, hope to undertake anything like a full investigation of the answer 
to this question: I will have to limit myself to an assessment of the compatibility of theism 
with a small number of theories. Those examined have something in common: each takes 
modality not to be a part of the world at the fundamental level; either because it reduces 
modality to something else (e.g., a particular ontology of worlds), or because it denies that 
modal discourse has the function of describing any part of mind-independent reality at all. 
Each, in its own way, ultimately explains (or purports to explain) modality in terms of 
something non-modal. So consider this project a partial investigation into the more specific 
question: which of these modal theories which deny modality is fundamentally real best fits 
with classical theism?  
Why focus on such accounts? I explained above that one of the main motivations 
for devising a theory of modality is our desire to find something in reality that grounds 
modal truth. Something in the very nature of modal facts and properties – their being non-
categorical (or ‘hypothetical’) – makes us unable to see what this could be. Categorical 
properties comprise how an individual actually is; hypothetical properties, by contrast (such 
as causal, and past and future-tensed properties), ‘point beyond’ their instances. Our 
puzzlement with modality and other hypothetical notions suggests that we are 
uncomfortable with accepting them as primitive features of the world. This is why some 
authors, such as Ted Sider, think that ‘a proper ontology should invoke only categorical, or 
occurrent, properties and relations.’ (2001a: 41). 
                                                          
18 E.g., Leftow (2012) and Pruss (2002; 2011) propose distinctively theistic accounts of modality. 
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In metaphysics one seeks an account of the world in intelligible terms, and there is 
something elusive about modal notions. Whether something is a certain way seems 
unproblematic, but that things might be otherwise, or must be as they are, seems to 
call out for explanation. (Sider, 2003: 184)19 
 
A metaphysical picture which did not at least attempt to remove modality from the 
ontological bedrock of reality would not succeed in alleviating the initial mystery and 
puzzlement that surrounds it. Similar sentiments have been expressed by Simon Blackburn 
(1984; 1987), amongst others (e.g., Cameron (2012)). I take it, then, that there’s good reason 
for anyone perplexed by modal phenomena – theists and non-theists alike – to be interested 
in the first instance in looking at these kinds of accounts.20 
 
2. Chapter Outline 
Chapter One advances a new theistic paradox: many divine-making properties both must 
and must not be intrinsic to God. The main focus is on omnipotence, but towards the end 
analogous considerations are shown to apply to other divine attributes. Two arguments 
(utilising notions of essence and aseity) are advanced for the conclusion that any divine-
making property must be intrinsic to God, and an additional argument is given in support 
of the claim that omnipotence in particular must be intrinsic to God. Next, some necessary 
conditions on omnipotence and certain other divine attributes are shown to be extrinsic, 
meaning that a number of divine-making properties cannot be intrinsic to God. Three 
different ways of resolving this conflict are dismissed as unsuccessful. Accordingly, theists 
are urged to seek an alternative solution. 
 According to some theories of modality, the truth-conditions for modal statements 
involve entities which are internal to God – parts of God’s mind. Chapter Two suggests 
that such a theory of modality should be attractive to theism for two reasons. First, it 
complies with the sovereignty thesis: traditionally, everything distinct from God is supposed 
to depend upon God in some sense, and so, if there is an ontology for modal truths, there 
is – at the very least – a prima facie case for thinking that that such an ontology should too 
depend upon God. If the objects of such an ontology are divine mental entities, then such 
entities will not be ontologically independent of God. Second, such a theory offers theists 
                                                          
19 As another example see Cameron (2012). 
20 There are also epistemological reasons to be first interested in exploring accounts which remove modality 
from reality’s bedrock. See, e.g., Sider (2003: 184-5). Such accounts will also appeal to those who consider 
parsimony a theoretical virtue. 
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a way out of the paradox advanced in Chapter One. The contention will be that if the truth-
conditions for modal statements involve facts about God’s mind, then the set of necessary 
conditions on being divine deemed in Chapter One as being extrinsic turn out not to be that. 
The problem thus dissolves: God’s nature-making properties are required to be intrinsic to 
him, but there’s no longer any reason to think that they can’t be.  
However, this particular solution to the intrinsicness paradox depends on the 
viability of such a distinctively theistic modal theory. It will be necessary, then, to expound 
and explore one of the most prominent views which grounds modal facts in the mind of 
God: the divine idealist view of worlds. I argue that this approach to modality is untenable, 
since when taken together with the thesis that God necessarily acts for the best, this view 
entails modal collapse: the thesis that the actual world is the only possible world.21 In 
summing up this objection to divine idealism, I suggest that theists who (a) wish to analyse 
modal facts in terms of facts about possible worlds and (b) wish to avoid modal collapse 
should instead take the view that all worlds are actualized by God.  
Since any world actualized by God will be a concrete object of the same kind as the 
actual world, any theist seeking to avoid the modal collapse divine idealism seems to entail 
has good reason to adopt the genuine realist view of worlds, such as that advocated by 
Lewis (1986a). For, according to this view, all worlds are concrete entities, no different in 
ontological kind to our world. To this extent, the theist seems to be left with a dilemma: 
adopting genuine realism means the problem of modal collapse (to which divine idealism is 
held accountable) can be avoided, but then the newly proposed paradox will be left 
unresolved; adopting divine idealism, on the other hand, means that the intrinsicness 
paradox can be avoided, but only at the expense of modal collapse. To bolster the 
conclusion that theists should favour genuine realism, I therefore offer what I take to be a 
proper way of dealing with the intrinsicness paradox: imposing a restriction on divine aseity.  
Chapters Three and Four assess how theists endorsing genuine realism should view 
God’s relation to the worlds it posits: should God be viewed as inhabiting all worlds, just 
                                                          
21 I say it’s untenable, but there is historical precedent of theists (or theists broadly-considered) thinking that 
there’s only really one way reality could have been. Many have interpreted Spinoza as advocating such a view, 
since ‘Proposition 29’ in part I of his Ethics, states ‘Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the 
necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way.’ (1992: 51), and ‘Proposition 
33’ of that same text states ‘Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other 
order than is the case.’ (ibid.: 54). Others, as we’ll see in Chapter Two, also take Leibniz as being committed 
to such a view – even if unwittingly. Such a view will, however, be unacceptable for those who do hold a 
common sense opinion about what modal facts there are; and it is surely in holding such an opinion that one 
is driven to devise a modal theory. One will not be so concerned with answering the question of what grounds 
the distinction between the necessary and the contingent if one believes that no facts are contingent. A modal 
theory which forces such a drastic revision in one’s modal beliefs, thus undermines the very reason for 
adopting a modal theory in the first place. 
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some of them, or none? Chapter Three focusses on the third of these options, which 
involves adopting the transworld identity theory of representation de re. Under this view, 
God – numerically the same individual – literally inhabits, or exists in – all worlds. Lewis 
himself rejects this theory, so this chapter examines whether theists should be persuaded 
by his reasons for doing so. In addition, it questions whether there are any reasons for 
thinking that this theory is especially problematic in the context of theism.  
Chapter Four considers whether theism fares any better under Lewis’ own theory 
of de re representation: counterpart theory. Under this view, God literally inhabits only one 
world – this world. However, God still exists according to all worlds (and so is necessary) by 
virtue of being a spatiotemporal entity who is counterpart-related to certain individuals 
inhabiting other worlds. As well as seeing how well this analysis fits with theism, it examines 
how well theism fits with the view that God inhabits no world, but rather exists from the 
standpoint of all worlds as a non-spatiotemporal entity; much in the same way that Lewis 
((1968: 126) and (1983c: 40)) recommends that we view abstracta.  
The discussion across these two chapters will show that theists should eschew a 
counterpart-theoretic treatment of divine de re modality, since it (a) fails to respect the thesis 
of divine sovereignty or ‘ultimacy’, (b) compromises divine omniscience, (c) introduces a 
problem of luck, and (d) conflicts with one main motivation for theistic genuine realism. 
However, the standpoint and transworld identity views are not at fault in these same ways, 
and can also meet the particular challenges that might be raised against them. Hence, theists 
adopting genuine realism should prefer one of these options; and since each requires a 
different take on God’s relation to spacetime, it turns out that, regardless of what prior 
commitment one might have towards divine spatiotemporality, a theistically acceptable 
account of divine de re representation is available.  
Chapter Five considers whether theists should reject genuine realism on moral 
grounds. Three different authors – Robert M. Adams (1974), Andrew Beedle (1996) and 
Mark Heller (2003) – have argued that genuine realism permits us to be indifferent about 
the ethical quality of our actions. The first half of the chapter assesses each or these 
arguments and contends that, while they do not only arise under theism, their conclusions, 
if true, are more problematic under theism. While the arguments from Beedle and Adams 
will be seen to rest on faulty premises, the argument from Heller will be shown to be more 
damaging; I conclude that a response to the type of problem he introduces is not available, 
especially in the context of theism.  
The second half of the chapter deals with the modal problem of evil, i.e., the 
problem that there are worlds at which God is not morally impeccable, since there are 
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worlds containing evils of a number and kind that a benevolent God would not allow. It 
examines inter alia whether an extended free-will defence can account for worlds with 
extreme levels of moral evil; and whether worlds with extreme levels of natural (non-moral) 
evil can be shown to be theistically unproblematic by endorsing the following thesis about 
natural goods: that it is better to have them, than to lack them. I conclude the solution is 
not a good one, and so there are two moral grounds for theists to reject genuine realism. 
Having found grounds for theists to reject both divine idealism and genuine realism, 
I turn, in Chapter Six, to consider an entirely different kind of modal theory: modal 
projectivism. Unlike the former theories, modal projectivism is not what Simon Blackburn 
(1993) calls a truth-conditional approach to modality; for it does not attempt to tell us what 
conditions reality must meet such that modal claims true. Blackburn (ibid.) motivates modal 
projectivism by contending that any truth-conditional approach faces a dilemma. Robin Le 
Poidevin (2012) claims that a related dilemma gives theists in particular reason to depart 
from a truth-conditional approach to modality. I thus outline each of these dilemmas and 
explain modal projectivism before examining whether it presents a coherent and viable way 
of understanding theistic and non-theistic modal commitments. I conclude on the following 
grounds that it does not: (i) there’s an aspect of mind-dependence to the account which is 
theistically problematic; (ii) its account of theistic commitments cannot get off the ground; 
and (iii) there’s no clear way in which the mental states supposedly underlying modal 
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1 
Is God’s Nature Intrinsic? 
 
     1.  Introduction 22 
Classical theism takes God to be a maximally perfect being. Since the properties of 
omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and moral impeccability are considered to be at 
least partly constitutive of maximal perfection, any being worthy of the title ‘God’ could 
not fail to possess them: God has them necessarily. However, as sure as some theists are that 
God must have these properties, others are equally sure that he could not. Critical examination 
of these concepts, they say, reveals them to be unintelligible. Some puzzles concern whether 
certain of these properties are internally coherent. For example, could an omnipotent being 
create a stone they cannot lift? Here we find ourselves led to paradox; for whichever answer 
one gives to this question, there’s something this being cannot do. Other puzzles question 
the compatibility of the divine-making properties. For example, if God possess omniscience 
and moral impeccability necessarily, as he’s said to, then it’s not possible for him to sin; nor 
is it possible for him to forget something, once he knows it. But if God is necessarily 
omnipotent, it must be possible for him to do these things; after all, these are things we mere 
mortals can do! 
 Many are not persuaded that these paradoxes are irresolvable. All we need to do, 
they say, is reflect more carefully on ‘omnipotence’, ‘omniscience’, etc., and then offer more 
nuanced (and all too often, increasingly complex) definitions of these terms. Thus, different 
(and usually conflicting) characterisations have been offered as philosophers and 
theologians have sought to resolve these problems in different ways. Subsequently, there’s 
little agreement on just what omnipotence, omnipresence, etc. are. Here, I argue that an 
entirely new consideration threatens to render the divine-making attributes paradoxical and 
that this paradox cannot be resolved in the same way as those previously discussed. 
The paradox arises when we ask whether the divine-making properties are amongst 
God’s intrinsic properties. It’s often taken for granted that they are.23 But no arguments have 
                                                          
22 A large portion of this chapter appears in S. Adams (forthcoming). 
23 More on this in §3.1 and §4.2. 
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been offered for this view; nor has this view received any critical examination. This chapter 
tends to this hitherto neglected issue by uncovering some of the thoughts that might be 
guiding the intuition that the divine-making properties are intrinsic. It will argue that 
philosophical reflection on the concepts of essence and of aseity reveals that the divine-
making properties must, indeed, be amongst God’s intrinsic properties. However, it will 
also show that once we examine the content of the divine-making properties themselves, 
we see that they cannot be amongst God’s intrinsic properties. The conclusion, then, is that 
the supposition of classical theism entails a contradiction. For reasons of space, the 
discussion will centre on the case of omnipotence, but towards the end of the chapter, we’ll 
see how similar paradoxical results apply to other divine-making attributes. 
 
     2.  Preliminaries 
2.1. Intrinsicness  
So far, I’ve framed the central question of this chapter as one about the divine-making 
properties. This is misleading. I’m not just concerned with whether certain properties are 
intrinsic; I also want to pay attention to whether certain properties are possessed in an intrinsic 
manner. There are two separate notions here, and we must be careful not to confuse the two. 
Call the notion of a property’s being intrinsic (or extrinsic) the ‘global’ notion, and call the 
notion of an individual’s having a property in an intrinsic manner (or an extrinsic manner) 
the ‘local’ notion of intrinsicness (or extrinsicness).24 Global intrinsicness is a property of 
properties; local intrinsicness is a relation between properties and individuals. Both global 
and local notions are needed since some properties are intrinsic to some things, yet extrinsic 
to others. Consider, e.g., the property being such that there are dogs. This property is intrinsic to 
dogs, but extrinsic to non-dogs (see Cameron (2009)).25 I’ll say properties are globally 
intrinsic iff they are intrinsic to each of their possible bearers and globally extrinsic 
otherwise. To distinguish between extrinsic properties that are extrinsic to each of their 
possible bearers and those that are not, I will use the terms ‘pure extrinsic’ properties, and 
‘impure extrinsic’ properties respectively. As noted, I will, in places, be concerned with the 
global notion – I’ll ask whether the divine-making properties are intrinsic. However, since 
answers to ‘local’ questions are not always inherited from answers to their more global 
counterparts, in some places I will ask whether certain divine-making properties can be 
                                                          
24 I take the terms ‘global’ and ‘local’ from I. L. Humberstone (1996).  
25 More contentious examples involve disjunctive properties (which some many deny the existence of). Call 
the property being female-or-an-uncle ‘φ’. φ may be intrinsic to me, but extrinsic to you, if I possess φ in virtue of 
my being female and you possess φ in virtue of your being an uncle. 
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intrinsic to God. This chapter gives reasons to think that the answers to these two questions 
are incompatible. 
 Since I’ve defined the global in terms of the local notion, I need to say something 
about what it is for a property to be intrinsic to a thing. David Lewis (1983: 111-2) cites 
three platitudes which one might think could be used to describe this notion:  
 
(1) F is intrinsic to x iff a sentence ascribing F to x is entirely about x; 
(2) F is intrinsic to x iff x possesses F in virtue of how x itself, and nothing else, is; 
(3) F is intrinsic to x iff every duplicate of x possesses F. 
 
I recommend against using (3). Not all properties that are invariant between duplicates are 
intrinsic to their bearers; consider, e.g., being such that there are no round squares, or being such 
that the future is either open or closed. Nor is it true that all intrinsic properties are shared by 
duplicates, as haecceitistic properties such as being Socrates show. (Not everyone admits that 
there are such things, but most would agree that if there were, they would be intrinsic to 
their bearers.)26 The notion described in (2) is sometimes called ‘interiority’. Very plausibly, 
(1) is a consequence of interiority; so interiority seems to get at what it more fundamentally is, 
for x to be intrinsically F. Further, interiority seems to capture most accurately our intuitive 
understanding of what it is for a property to be intrinsic to its bearer. Therefore, I suggest 
we appeal to interiority in determining whether or not something possesses a property in 
an intrinsic manner.  
Presumably, interiority only serves as a platitude, not a definition, of intrinsicness 
because it doesn’t seem illuminating enough to be capable of providing a proper analysis of 
the term. With (2), we may still wonder under what conditions a thing possesses a property 
purely by virtue of the way it is in itself. Jaegwon Kim’s (1982) definition of intrinsicness 
might give us one way of spelling out what it is for x to be F purely by virtue of the way it 
itself is. Using Kim’s definition, we could say that x is F purely by virtue of the way it itself 
is iff x could possess F and exist unaccompanied by another wholly distinct contingent 
thing (or, in Kim’s words: iff x could be lonely and still possess F). However, as pointed out 
by Lewis (1982), compatibility with loneliness is not sufficient for a property’s counting as 
intrinsic to a thing.27 Indeed, the property of loneliness itself could be possessed by a lonely 
                                                          
26 Here’s a further reason why duplication may not be the best way to understand intrinsicness. Duplicates 
are defined as individuals who have all their intrinsic properties in common. (One might try to patch up the 
duplication criterion by explicating duplication in terms of the sharing of perfectly natural properties (as Lewis 
and Langton (1998) do), or in terms of the sharing of qualitative properties. However, it might be difficult to 
articulate the notion of a qualitative property without appealing to intrinsicness.) 
27 Though, it may be true that all intrinsic properties are compatible with loneliness. 
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thing, but a thing could not be lonely in an intrinsic manner. (Far from it in fact: loneliness 
is an extrinsic property par excellence.)28 So where does this leave us? Well, the observation 
made about loneliness can aid us in making the notion of interiority more informative. Why 
could nothing possess loneliness in an intrinsic manner? Because whether an individual, x, 
is lonely or not depends upon what x’s actual external circumstances are like. Generally 
then, we can say that x is F by virtue of the way it itself is iff x’s possession of F does not 
depend upon what x’s surroundings are like.29  
  
2.2. Dependence 
Having argued that x is intrinsically F iff x’s possession of F does not depend upon what 
x’s surroundings are like, it will now be crucial to pin down the conditions under which an 
individual depends upon its surroundings for its possession of F. 
 First, we can see from the discussion above that the following way of construing 
this notion would be inadequate: 
 
(4) Necessarily, for any individual, x, and any property, F, x’s being F depends (at least 
in part) on x’s surroundings iff x could not exist in isolation and still possess F.   
 
As shown above, an individual could exist in isolation and possess the property being the only 
object; yet, some x’s being the only object depends upon what x’s surroundings are like; it 
depends upon there being no individual distinct from x in the presence of x. (This is 
precisely why Lewis finds Kim’s definition of intrinsicness wanting.) This failing leads us to 
another natural suggestion: 
 
(5) Necessarily, for any individual, x, and any property, F, x’s being F depends (at least 
in part) on x’s surroundings iff there are possible variations in x’s surroundings in 
which x would lack F.30   
 
                                                          
28 Some philosophers of religion have employed Kim’s loneliness criterion as a test for intrinsicness, and have 
therefore been too quick to infer that certain properties are intrinsic to God. E.g., Leftow (2012: 176) claims 
deity is intrinsic since God would have possessed it even if he’d created nothing at all (and thus existed 
unaccompanied). 
29 I use the word ‘surroundings’ here quite loosely, and for want of a better term. For the purposes of the 
discussion, I will stipulate that something’s surroundings, or environment, includes all (and only) the 
conditions that hold true of things distinct from it or any of its parts. Thus, if God exists, or if there are, e.g., 
Platonic Forms, or abstract laws of nature, these will be classed as part of my environment. 
30 I’m also grateful to an anonymous reviewer for Philosophia for making suggestions expressed in (4) and (5). 
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It’s a consequence of (5) that counterpossible31 dependence isn’t genuine dependence. If 
the conditions under which x would fail to possess F are impossible – if there are no possible 
variations in x’s surroundings under which x would fail to possess F – then, according to 
(5), x does not depend upon its surroundings for its being F.  
However, theists by their own lights cannot accept this. Suppose that ‘F’ denotes the 
property being such that God exists and that classical theism is true. In that case, God exists 
necessarily, and it is de dicto necessary that all things distinct from God depend upon God. 
It follows from these suppositions that no non-divine individual, x, is such that there are 
possible variations in its surroundings such that it lacks F, even though every x depends upon 
what its surroundings are like for its possessing F. In other words, classical theists endorse 
a counterexample to (5).  
Theists cannot, then, claim that where a putative dependency claim specifies an 
impossibility in its antecedent clause, the putative dependency is only that; i.e., putative. For, 
if they did, ‘necessarily, all things distinct from God depend upon God’ would be false. 
Indeed, because, according to them, it is de dicto necessary that all things distinct from God 
depend upon God, classical theists cannot accept any modal characterisation of dependence 
in terms of possible worlds. ‘All things distinct from God depend upon God’, can’t be 
understood as ‘if God didn’t exist, then neither would anything else’, since, under the 
standard semantics for counterfactuals invoking possible worlds,32 it would be true that all 
things distinct from God would exist even if God didn’t. (Of course, under this semantics, 
‘if God didn’t exist then neither would anything else’ will also be true, but its truth will be 
vacuous. The dependency of all other things on God is, however, meant to be a substantive, 
not vacuous, matter.) So theists require a hyperintensional notion of dependence, and must 
accept that counterpossible dependence is genuine dependence.33 
 Our initial question thus remains unanswered. Under what conditions does an 
individual depend upon its surroundings for its possession of F? In light of the forgoing 
points, it seems that the best thing to say is this: 
 
                                                          
31 A counterpossible is a counterfactual conditional whose antecedent clause involves an impossible state of 
affairs. 
32 The canonical presentation of which is given in Lewis (1973a) and Stalnaker (1968). On this semantics, any 
counterpossible is trivially true. More on counterfactual dependence and the possible worlds analysis of it in 
Chapter Three §11. 
33 It may be that two facts, F1 and F2 are intensionally equivalent ( it may be that any metaphysically possible 
world in which F1 obtains is world in which F2 obtains, and vice versa), but it may be that ‘F1 metaphysically 
depends upon F2’ is true while ‘F2 metaphysically depends upon F1’ is false, and vice-versa. E.g., the fact that 
Socrates exists is intensionally equivalent to the fact that {Socrates} exists, but while the fact that {Socrates} 
exists metaphysically depends upon the fact that Socrates exists, the converse is not true. More on this in §3.1. 
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(6) Necessarily, for any individual, x, and any property, F, x’s being F depends (at least 
in part) upon x’s surroundings iff either the presence or the absence of something 
or some things distinct from x partially grounds x’s being F. (Where y is distinct 
from x iff y has no part in common with x.) 
 
What does ‘grounds’ mean in (6)? Following recent work on grounding, this term should 
be understood to specify an explanatory relation: if the fact that a is F is grounded in the 
existence of some individual, y, or in the obtaining of some further state of affairs, S, then 
y or S account for, or make true, Fa. (See, e.g., Fine (2001); Litland (2013); and Dasgupta 
(2014).)  
 (6) avoids the problems with (4) and (5). (4) is inadequate because, contra (4), an 
individual can depend upon there being an absence of certain things in its surroundings for 
its possession of a property. (6) is not inadequate in this respect since it is built into (6) that 
if the fact ‘x is F’ is even partially grounded in there being no things of kind K in x’s 
environment, x will depend upon its surroundings for its possessing F. (In particular, it will 
depend (at least in part) on its environment being such that it lacks Ks.) (5) is inadequate 
since it doesn’t allow that ‘necessarily, all things distinct from God depend upon God’ is 
true (or at least, it doesn’t allow that it’s substantively true). (6) is much more amenable to 
theism in this respect. Unlike (5), (6) does allow this claim to be substantively true. Further, 
since we’ve seen that metaphysical dependence is (or at least, that theists must accept that 
it is) hyperintensional, expressing metaphysical dependence in terms of grounding looks 
like a good way to go. For, there are good reasons to think that explanatory relations – and 
so grounding relations – are also hyperintensional. (See Bliss and Trogden (2014).) 
Now that we have an adequate explanation of what it is for some thing to depend 
upon its surroundings for its possession of some property, we are finally in a position to 
offer a more informative characterisation of intrinsicality:  
 
(7) Necessarily, for any individual, x, and any property, F, x is intrinsic to F (i.e., x’s 
being F does not depend even in part upon x’s surroundings) iff neither the 
presence, nor the absence of something or some things distinct from x partially 
grounds the fact that x is F. (Where y is distinct from x iff y has no part in common 
with x.) 
 
It’s important to make as explicit as possible consequences of (7) that are crucial to the 
discussion that follows. First, any property, F, will be extrinsic to God if either of the 
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following holds true: (a) the presence of something distinct from God partially grounds the 
fact that God is F; (b) the absence of something distinct from God grounds partially grounds 
the fact that God is F. Second, should (b) hold true, F will be extrinsic to God even if the 
things (or states of affairs) whose absence is required for God to be F are impossible. That 
is, F will be extrinsic to God even if God’s being F involves counterpossible dependence 
upon God’s surroundings. 
I should also mention that the paradox presented here depends upon the 
assumption that each of the divine-making properties must be one or the other: intrinsic or 
extrinsic to God. But absent any apparent counterexamples to the general principle that for 
every property, F, and for every individual, x, if x is F, either F is intrinsic to x, or F is extrinsic 
to x (this distinction is exhaustive) and no F is both intrinsic and extrinsic to x (the two are 
mutually exclusive),34 I take this assumption to be entirely uncontroversial. 
 
2.3. Strategy  
The remainder of the chapter proceeds as follows. §3 argues that properties that constitute 
God’s essence must be intrinsic to God simply because they constitute God’s essence. §4 
likewise argues that all divine-making properties must be intrinsic to God, but instead 
utilises the theistic notion of aseity. §5 argues that a fact about power-possession requires 
omnipotence, in particular, to be intrinsic to God. §6 identifies four necessary conditions 
on being omnipotent and argues that each of these renders omnipotence a pure extrinsic 
property. §7 considers three different attempts to resolve this conflict, but finds each to be 
unsuccessful. §8 shows that similar paradoxes arise for other divine-making properties. §9 
concludes that the supposition of God’s existence thus entails a contradiction: God’s nature 
both must and must not be intrinsic to him; and since this is something theists cannot 
accept, a different kind of solution is needed. Since the question of whether the various 
divine perfections can be intrinsic has received little to no critical examination in analytic 
philosophy of religion, much of what I say here is an attempt to plug some of that gap.  
 
     3.  An Argument from Essence 
3.1. The Argument 
I suggested above that theists and philosophers of religion often take for granted that the 
divine-making properties are intrinsic. One such philosopher is Jeffrey Brower, who 
remarks during his discussion of the theistic doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) that ‘the 
                                                          
34 I also take it that a similar principle applies to the more global notion of intrinsicness. 
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doctrine requires that God is identical with each of his intrinsic properties…goodness, power 
and so on’ (2009: 108, emphasis added). While Brower names God’s power and the like as 
God’s intrinsic properties, he does not justify his doing so, and he’s not alone in this.35 Why, 
then, might someone be naturally inclined towards the view that the properties constitutive 
of God’s essence are intrinsic? Perhaps it’s precisely because of that: these properties are 
constitutive of God’s essence. The thought, then, would be that all essence-comprising properties 
are intrinsic to their bearers, and omnipotence, moral impeccability, and so forth, are 
comprised by God’s essence. Put more formally, the thought is as follows: 
 
P1. Omnipotence is part of God’s essence.  
P2. For any individual, x, and any property, F, if F is part of x’s essence, then F 
 is intrinsic to x. 
C1.  Omnipotence is intrinsic to God. 
 
To assess this argument, we first need to clarify what’s meant by the term ‘essence’. 
Some take a thing’s essential properties to be all (and only) those it possesses as a matter of 
necessity: F is essential to x iff it is necessary that x possesses F if x exists.36 (On this 
construal, the essence of a thing, x, will be the collection of all and only the properties it 
possesses as a matter of necessity.) This is not the notion of essence I’m appealing to here. 
As contemporary authors such as Kit Fine (1994) have shown, there’s a sense of ‘essence’ 
that cannot be assimilated to any de re modal notion; one according to which essential 
properties are a proper subset of those that are possessed as a matter of necessity.37 Consider 
the following. I am (if I exist) necessarily human. I am also (if I exist) necessarily such that 
everything is self-identical and necessarily a member of my singleton set. But there’s an 
intuitive sense in which my being human is somehow more important to me than my being 
such that everything is self-identical and my being a member of my singleton set. As Fine 
says: 
 
Strange as the literature on personal identity may be, it has never been suggested 
that in order to understand the nature of a person one must know to which sets he 
belongs. There is nothing in the nature of a person…which demands that he 
                                                          
35 Divine immutability has been often understood as covering all and only God’s intrinsic properties. 
Traditionally, immutability requires that God undergoes no intrinsic change (but does not require that God 
undergoes no extrinsic change). (See, e.g., Gale (1986) and Leftow (2012b).) The view that immutability covers 
God’s perfections has also been common. Those who endorse these two views implicitly accept that God’s 
perfections are intrinsic.   
36 The ‘if it exists’ qualification is needed to allow that contingent beings can have essential properties. 
37 Indeed, Fine argues that the converse is in fact true: (metaphysical) necessity is reducible to essence. 
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belongs to this or that set or which demands, given that the person exists, that there 
even be any sets. (1994: 5) 
 
Thus, authors such as Fine suggest that we need a hyperintensional notion of 
essence, one according to which an essential property of x is not one that x merely possesses 
as a matter of necessity, but that also makes up x’s nature. This enables us to say that, for 
instance, while I’m both a member of my singleton set and a human in every world where 
I exist, being human is essential to me, but being a member of my singleton set is not. For, intuitively, 
the former is part of my nature – part of what it is to be me; the latter is not.  
Now, when theists say that God is essentially omnipotent, they are not meaning to 
convey merely that God is omnipotent as a matter of necessity; partly, they also intend to 
convey that omnipotence is part of God’s nature. For theists, being omnipotent, etc., is 
somehow more important to God, than, e.g., being such that Fermat’s last theorem is true. 
A world where God is not omnipotent is, despite this stipulation, just not a world that 
contains God, because part of what it is to be God, is to be omnipotent38 (see, e.g., Rowe (2005: 
21)). Therefore, I take it as uncontroversial that theists are de facto committed to P1 (where 
the notion of essence involved is hyperintensional) and will not consider it in need of any 
further support.  
What about the second premise? As noted, genuinely essential properties are those 
that have their source in the identity, or nature, of their bearer. As Fine would say, essential 
properties are those an individual has by virtue of which it is the thing that it is. However, an 
individual, x, may possess a property, F, as a matter of necessity, irrespective of whether x’s 
nature or identity is the source of its possessing F. This is why Fine finds the modal account 
of essence unsatisfactory: modality is insensitive to source (1994: 9). This gets us so far: essential 
properties are those a thing possesses in virtue of its nature. But why think that the 
properties a thing possesses in virtue of its nature, or identity, are all intrinsic to it? Well, I 
am, for example, a member of my singleton set, and necessarily so, but I’m not so in virtue 
of the way I myself am; rather, I am so in virtue of the way my singleton set is. It’s because my 
singleton set has a certain nature that I’m a member of my singleton set in every world 
where I exist. Likewise, I’m necessarily such that the product of 6 squared is 36, but not 
because of the way I am; but because of the way the number 6 is.39 And while I’m necessarily 
such that everything is self-identical, and necessarily such that there are no round squares, 
nothing about me requires that I possess these properties. I suggest that what informs the 
                                                          
38 As an exception to this see Geach (1973). Geach instead advocates ascribing to God the property of being 
almighty (which is the property of having power over all things). 
39 Whatever the number 6 ends up being. I don’t mean to endorse Platonism about numbers.  
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intuition that properties such as these are not part of my nature is the fact that we see them 
as not being intrinsic to me: intuitively, I possess them in virtue of the way things distinct 
from me are. In contrast, we’d happily say that it’s part of my nature to be human. Plausibly, 
that’s because being human is a matter of possessing such and such DNA structure (or 
something of that kind), and possessing such and such DNA structure is an internal matter: 
it’s a matter of how the bearer of this property, and nothing distinct from it, is. I’m 
contending, then, that we endorse the general claim specified in P2: if a property, F, is part 
of an individual, x’s, nature, then F is intrinsic to x. P2 accounts for our unwillingness to 
accept certain properties and admit others into the essence of particular individuals.40 
 
3.2. Counterexamples to P2  
Nonetheless, P2 is not free from potential counterexamples. I deal with what I take to be 
the most obvious ones here.  
Origin. Saul Kripke (1980) makes the case that human beings have their parents 
‘essentially’. Having a certain origin is certainly not a property a thing could possess in a 
manner consistent with interiority. Therefore, if it is part of the essence of any individual 
that it has a certain origin, P2 will be false.  
I don’t think we should accept that any individual has the origin it does as part of 
its nature. Kripke’s arguments certainly don’t force us to say otherwise. Although Kripke 
uses the word ‘essence’, at most, his arguments suggest a (mere) necessary connection 
between a person and their particular ancestry; nowhere does Kripke mention anything 
about it being a part of a person’s nature that they have the origin they do. We have said of 
genuine essential properties that something about their bearer should require that they 
possess them. It doesn’t sound right to say that something about me demands that I have the 
origin I do; that it’s part of what I am that I have a certain ancestry. Further, nothing seems 
to be lost by saying that we have the origins we do merely as a matter of necessity, and not 
as part of our very natures. Perhaps intuitions will diverge on this point. But since there’s 
no strong case to be made for the contrary assertion, I do not think cases involving of 
necessity of origin should move us to reject P2.  
Shape. Very plausibly, certain objects – e.g., statues – have their shapes necessarily, 
and as part of their nature. Yet, according to some authors (e.g., Hudson (2005)) material 
objects have their shape in virtue of occupying a spatiotemporal region which itself has a 
                                                          
40 It’s subsequently been brought to my attention that David Denby (2014) also argues that all essential 
properties are intrinsic. 
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particular shape, and so have their shapes extrinsically. If such accounts are right, there will 
be many counterexamples to P2. For example, statue a, which has shape S essentially will 
depend for its being S-shaped on something external to a, i.e., some spatiotemporal region 
R’s being of a certain shape (and its bearing an occupation relation to R).  
A view whereby physical objects have their shape in virtue of occupying 
spatiotemporal regions which themselves have a certain shape, however, is undesirable. 
Such a view commits us to a particular metaphysical thesis about spacetime: substantivalism. 
According to substantivalism, spacetime is an entity in its own right; it does not depend for 
its existence upon the existence of particular objects and events.41 Now, if substantivalism 
were false, physical objects could not have their shape in virtue of their occupying 
spatiotemporal regions which themselves have a certain shape: there would be no 
spatiotemporal regions over and above the objects that occupy them. It would certainly be 
a strange thing if our account of something’s shape committed us to a particular 
metaphysical thesis concerning spacetime. Thus, we should accept a different account. One 
option is to define shapes by means of internal relations. A circle is defined as being a two 
dimensional figure such that every point on its circumference is equidistant from its centre. 
Other shapes could be defined in similar ways; i.e., by focussing on the distances and angles 
holding between different internal features of the figure, or object. By adopting an account 
such as this, we needn’t commit ourselves to a particular, substantial, and controversial 
metaphysical thesis about spacetime. Since this seems the most sensible route to take, we 
should not be worried that cases involving necessity of shape threaten P2. 
Haecceities. Consider again haecceitistic properties such as being Socrates. Earlier I 
noted that most would take such properties to be intrinsic to their bearers. However, since 
one feature of these properties is that they are individuating; they could not be possessed 
by any individual besides their bearer, some may find cause to disagree. For possession of 
them is partly outward looking – imposing constraints on their bearer’s external 
circumstances. Now, if individuals do possess haecceities, they will possess them not only 
as a matter of necessity, but also as part of their nature (e.g., it’s part of Socrates’s nature to 
be Socrates). So, one might think that haecceities threaten P2. 
For the many who are simply unwilling to accept that there are such things, 
haecceities will, of course, pose no problem for P2. But even granted that there are such 
things, a different response is available. The role of natures is to characterise their bearers: 
genuine essential properties – as opposed to ones possessed merely as a matter of necessity 
                                                          
41 In contrast, the relationist about spacetime believes that spacetime is nothing over and above the relations 
that hold between objects and events. 
- 25 - 
 
– do more than tell you something trivial about their bearer. Individuating properties, such 
as being Socrates, merely specify the identity of their bearer. I suggest that any property that can 
properly be said to (at least partly) be comprised by an individual’s nature, or essence, should 
have a genuinely characterising role. Call properties which do not shed any light on what 
their possessor is in fact like ‘trivial’ properties. Trivial properties are not the right sort of 
property to be classed as essence-contributing. As further support for this claim, consider 
that many of us would find it counterintuitive to suppose that being human or a goldfish is part 
of any particular human being’s essence. Intuitively, this is because if an individual, x, 
possesses being human or a goldfish in virtue of their being human, then being human or a goldfish 
doesn’t confer any character on x. All the relevant character is conferred on x by their 
possessing being human. As with the above cases then, I don’t think we’ve any reason here 
to reject P2. 
Maximal properties. Ted Sider (2001b) contends that certain maximal properties 
are extrinsic. ‘A property, F, is maximal iff, roughly, large parts of F are not themselves F’ 
(ibid.: 357). Most sortal predicates specify maximal properties, with one such example being 
being a rock.42 This property is maximal, says Sider, because large parts of rocks are not 
themselves rocks. Suppose Rocky is a rock. Now consider a large arbitrary proper part of 
Rocky, call it ‘Rocky-minus’. Rocky-minus is not a rock because she is (seamlessly) 
embedded within something which itself is a rock, i.e., Rocky. However, if we were to chip 
away at Rocky to reveal Rocky-minus, Rocky-minus would fall under the predicate ‘…is a 
rock’. This shows us that whether something is a rock partly depends upon the surroundings 
in which it is situated; partly, it depends upon whether it is a proper part of something which 
is itself a rock: ‘Apparently, then, the property being a [rock] is not an intrinsic property. For 
inspection of a thing–for example, [Rocky-minus]–will not reveal whether it is a [rock]’ 
(ibid.). Now, it’s certainly true that many of the things that possess maximal properties do 
so, not merely as a matter of necessity, but as part of their nature (i.e., essentially): Rocky is a 
rock by nature, it’s essential to this chair that it be a chair, and so on. Thus, maximal 
properties pose a threat to P2.  
It seems perfectly reasonable to deny, though, that it’s part of Rocky’s nature to be 
a rock and to instead maintain that it’s part of Rocky’s nature to be disposed to be a rock. Of 
course, whether this disposition is manifested or not depends upon whether Rocky is a proper 
part of something else that is a rock; but since, very plausibly, Rocky’s possession of the 
dispositional property is grounded in certain of Rocky’s intrinsic categorical properties (e.g., 
his particular molecular make up), the dispositional property itself will be intrinsic to Rocky. 
                                                          
42 This is one of Sider’s own examples. 
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Similar moves could be made, mutatis mutandis, for other maximal properties things possess 
essentially.43  
To summarise: any property that is essential to an individual is part of that 
individual’s nature, and that any property that’s part of an individual’s nature is intrinsic to 
that individual.44 Hence, omnipotence along with the other divine-making properties must 
be intrinsic to God. 
 
     4.  An Argument from Aseity 
Above I argued that examination of the concept of essence reveals to us that the divine-
making properties must be intrinsic to God. In this section, I argue that examination of the 
concept of divine aseity will do the same.  
 
4.1. Aseity 
The God of classical theism is supposed to exist a se – that is – entirely from himself, and 
is entirely self-sufficient. It is thought that an entirely perfect being must possess the highest 
possible degree of metaphysical independence, since any way of being dependent makes for 
an imperfection. So strong is the notion of independence involved in divine aseity, that 
some theists have been compelled to uphold the widely contentious doctrine of divine 
simplicity (DDS).45 DDS says that God does not exhibit any kind of metaphysical 
complexity and is not in any way a composite. As such, God is not distinct from his 
existence; not distinct from his essence; and does not have any spatial or temporal parts. If 
God did have parts then – contra the aseity doctrine – God would depend upon his parts as 
any composite thing does.46 Likewise, if the relation between God and his essential 
attributes were not one of identity, God would be dependent upon entities numerically 
                                                          
43 By ‘categorical’ I mean ‘not-dispositional’. The distinction between categorical and dispositional properties 
is hard to define but, roughly, a dispositional property is one the having of which implies certain counterfactual 
truths, whereas a categorical property does not. No part of the ensuing discussion hinges on our drawing this 
distinction in a particular way. §6.3 discusses dispositions and their relation to categorical properties further. 
44 Cameron (2008a: 271) seems to have in mind a similar way of viewing essence, though he doesn’t appeal to 
intrinsicness. According to him, whenever we ask what makes it true that some thing is essentially some way, 
we should answer that it’s ‘the very thing itself that makes this true’. 
45 While many pre-modern theologians (Aquinas, Anselm, and Augustine) endorsed DDS, and while some 
thus consider it a key part of classical theism, the doctrine has come under much philosophical scrutiny in 
more recent times; see, e.g., Plantinga (1980). See also Brower (2008; 2009) and Leftow (2006) for some recent 
attempts to make sense of the doctrine. 
46 There’s an assumption, then, that no whole is prior to its parts. This is itself metaphysically contentious; 
see, e.g., the priority monism as defended by Jonathan Schaffer (2010). Utilising Schaffer’s kind of priority 
monism, Gregory Fowler (2015) presents an interesting and viable alternative to the doctrine of divine 
simplicity a ‘doctrine of divine priority’. He contends that such a view can equally well respect the aseity thesis 
whilst avoiding the numerous metaphysical absurdities simplicity entails. 
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distinct from him for his existence. So God has no distinct properties that are his goodness, 
his omniscience, and so on. And we better not say that God is good, omniscient, and so on 
in virtue of bearing some kind of relation, such as instantiation, to certain Platonic entities; 
for elsewise, God would depend upon things distinct from him for his existence and 
nature.47 Indeed, the existence of abstracta more generally has been widely thought to be 
incompatible with God’s aseity. For, abstracta, if they exist, exist necessarily, and this means 
that, under the popular Lewis-Stalnaker semantics mentioned earlier, it is true – though 
trivially so – that if (per impossible) any abstract object failed to exist, God would fail to exist.48 
Those who would have it that the trivial truth ‘if (per impossible) abstracta failed to 
exist, God would fail to exist’ diminishes God’s aseity, and those who would have it that 
God’s aseity requires the truth of DDS in the form expressed above, accept, at least 
implicitly, that dependence on a necessary state of affairs, and hence, dependence on the 
absence of an impossible state of affairs (e.g., the non-existence of God’s nature or the non-
existence of abstracta) is a genuine kind of dependence. They also accept that for God to 
be a se, God must not depend even on necessary facts involving entities distinct from him 
(nor, thereby, on the absence of impossible ones involving things distinct from him). For 
those endorsing, e.g., DDS, the fact that God’s nature exists necessarily is, apparently, by 
the by when we are considering whether God’s having a nature distinct from himself would 
impugn his independence. 
All this is just to say, then, that according to the classical doctrine of divine aseity, 
God is independent in every way imaginable: God depends neither upon contingent, nor 
upon necessary entities distinct from himself for his existence or nature; God depends not 
even upon the absence of impossible states of affairs.  
 
4.2. The Argument 
Only one author has been particularly explicit in endorsing the view that omnipotence is 
intrinsic, and that is Brian Leftow. Leftow (1990a: 581), like Brower, expresses his 
endorsement of the view that the divine attributes are intrinsic through his characterisation 
of DDS. Leftow claims that DDS requires God to be identical to his intrinsic attributes,49 
and then cites omnipotence, omniscience, and moral perfection as the ones meeting this 
criterion. He also claims that ‘being made omnipotent would mean being granted a new 
                                                          
47 Such reasoning can be found in Aquinas (1947: Ia q.3 a.7). See also Plantinga (1980).  
48 Indeed, so many are assured that there really would be a threat to God’s aseity here, that the issue of God 
and abstracta has recently spawned a wide array of literature (see, e.g., the entries in Gould (2014)).  
49 Although, importantly and unlike Brower, Leftow restricts the thesis to God’s necessary intrinsic attributes. 
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intrinsic property in virtue of which one henceforth has that much power’ (2009: 173, 
emphasis added). Importantly though, Leftow is the only author to pay close attention to 
whether particular definitions of omnipotence respect the idea that omnipotence is intrinsic. 
For example, Leftow finds Thomas Flint and Alfred Freddoso’s (1983) definition of 
omnipotence wanting because it renders omnipotence a partly extrinsic attribute. The 
definition allows the powers to persuade and to weakly actualize to (partly) constitute 
omnipotence. (A person, P, weakly actualizes a state of affairs, S, only if P strongly actualizes 
it that some person P* is in circumstance C such that if P* is in C then P* freely strongly 
actualizes S. A person, P, strongly actualizes S if P directly causes S to obtain.) Yet, says 
Leftow: 
 
[P]owers to persuade or weakly actualize are not of the right sort to help constitute 
a being as omnipotent…‘Persuade’ is a success term: I persuade you only if I 
succeed in my attempt to do so. How much persuading I can do depends on the 
hearts around me. So power to persuade is not intrinsic: having it depends on what is the case 
outside of the agent…But omnipotence is an intrinsic attribute…[I]f a being can achieve an 
effect only by exercising a power whose possession must be partly determined 
extrinsically, it necessarily needs the help of those extrinsic circumstances that help 
give it the power to achieve that effect. This is true even if the circumstances obtain 
necessarily. [And if] the relevant circumstances can fail to obtain, lack of those 
circumstances is another impeding factor to which it is subject…Power to weakly 
actualize is power to accomplish things only be means of extrinsic helps…[s]o it 
can’t help constitute an intrinsic attribute. (2009: 180-1, emphasis added.)50 
 
It’s clear, then, that Leftow is strongly committed to the claim that omnipotence is 
intrinsic.51 But again, there’s no real argument for that claim; rather, Leftow takes the claim 
as something of an axiom which he can utilise in arguments for other conclusions. 
Nonetheless, a closer look at the above passage reveals that a particular thought might at 
least implicitly underlie Leftow’s commitment to this view, and I suggest that it’s the idea 
of God as an independent being. Leftow denies that the powers to persuade and to weakly 
actualise constitute omnipotence on the grounds that these powers are extrinsic to their 
bearers. Leftow seems to be suggesting that none of God’s powers could be extrinsic to 
him for the reason that God’s possession of them would otherwise (and thereby) be 
dependent. Thus, the implicit thought appears to be that God’s powers should be entirely 
independent. Something like the doctrine of divine aseity is informing Leftow’s view that 
omnipotence is intrinsic.  
                                                          
50 I’ve highlighted the phrase ‘This is true even if the circumstances obtain necessarily’ so as to draw the 
reader’s attention back to the points made in §4.1 regarding the strength of the aseity doctrine. 
51 Explicit endorsements of the view are also littered throughout his (2012a). 
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I believe Leftow’s guiding thought is right: God’s power(s) should be intrinsic to 
him. But I don’t think aseity requires just that God’s power(s) be intrinsic to him; I think it 
requires that all of the divine-making properties be intrinsic to him. Recall that, for any 
individual, x, and for any property, F, x possesses F in an extrinsic manner iff x depends 
upon external factors for its possession of F. And, as we saw in §4.1, God is independent 
to the highest possible degree. We can put this reasoning more formally as follows: 
 
P3. God possesses the highest possible degree of independence. 
P4. Any individual who possesses the highest possible degree of independence 
  possesses the properties that constitute its nature in an independent  
  manner. 
P5. God possesses the properties that constitute his nature in an independent 
  manner.  
P6. If a property, F, is possessed by an individual, x, in an independent manner, 
  then F is intrinsic to x. 
C2. The properties that constitute God’s nature are intrinsic to him.  
 
Thus, once we add that omnipotence partly constitutes God’s nature, we gain the more 
specific result that omnipotence is intrinsic to God.  
 
4.3. A Spurious Reply 
Alexander Pruss makes the point that dependence in respect to an extrinsic property is not 
real dependence:  
 
The doctrine of aseity says that God is entirely independent of anything other than 
himself. Dependence in respect of an extrinsic property is not real dependence, just 
as change in respect of an extrinsic property is not real change…Extending aseity 
to extrinsic properties makes aseity entail complete sovereignty, the claim that every 
proposition p is entailed by what God wills in the productive sense of ‘wills’. For if 
some proposition p were not entailed by what God wills, then God would be 
dependent in respect of the extrinsic property being such that p…But such an 
extension of aseity appears excessive…Aseity is more naturally thought of as a 
denial of God’s having any real dependence on anything other than himself, and the 
further claim that every contingent proposition has its truth value determined by 
what God wills seems a separate claim, one that can be rejected by someone who 
denies that God has real dependence on anything other than himself…[D]ivine 
aseity [should be] restricted to intrinsic properties[.]’ (2008: 165) 
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In taking this view to heart, one might think it impossible for the argument from aseity to 
gain any traction. Since aseity concerns God’s intrinsic properties, it’s useless to argue that 
certain divine properties can’t be extrinsic on the basis that there would otherwise be a 
conflict with aseity. Should God possesses omnipotence in an extrinsic manner, there 
wouldn’t be any conflict with aseity: this concerns God’s intrinsic properties. 
Now, Pruss is of course right that to expect aseity to encompass even God’s 
extrinsic properties would be to expect the impossible. However, one who supposed that 
this prevents the argument from aseity from getting off the ground would be missing the 
point. The point is that aseity requires all God’s nature-comprising properties to be intrinsic to 
him. Part of what it is to be God is to be wholly independent, and if omnipotence etc. were 
not intrinsic to God, this would not be true. 
 
     5.   An Argument from Power Possession 
5.1. The Argument 
In this section, I show that the notion of power-possession can be utilised to formulate a 
second and more direct route to the conclusion that omnipotence, in particular, is intrinsic 
to God. This argument relies on the assumption that an individual who possesses their 
power in an extrinsic manner is less powerful than one who possesses their power in an 
intrinsic manner. Suppose Armstrong and Gunner both have the power to kill anyone we 
like, but Armstrong possesses this power in virtue of her degree of personal strength 
(suppose she can kill everyone using only her bare hands); while Gunner does not (suppose 
she possesses this power only because she owns (and is able to use) a gun).). While we might 
not deny that the powers themselves are equal, it certainly seems right to say that Armstrong 
is the more powerful individual. Intuitively then, an individual who depends for its power 
on things external to itself is not as powerful as one who does not.52 Now, earlier we said 
that when an individual, x, possesses a property, P, in an extrinsic manner, x’s possession 
of P is dependent. It follows, therefore, that individuals who possess their power properties 
in an extrinsic manner are less powerful than those who possesses theirs in an intrinsic 
manner. With this thought in mind, and considering also that God, qua omnipotent being, 
is the most powerful being possible, it now seems unquestionable, that part of what it is to be 
omnipotent is to be able to achieve effects unaided, and to depend on nothing else for your 
power. (This point, I take it, implicitly underlies Leftow’s criticism of Flint and Freddoso’s 
                                                          
52 For a defence of extrinsic powers see Jennifer McKitrick (2003a). 
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definition of omnipotence.) Given the link between intrinsicness and independence, we can 
argue as follows: 
 
P7. God possesses omnipotence. 
P8.  Any individual who possesses omnipotence is the most powerful being 
  possible. 
P9. God is the most powerful being possible.  
P10. Individuals who depend on their surroundings for their powers are less 
  powerful than individuals who do not depend on their surroundings for 
  their powers. 
P11. Individuals who depend on their surroundings for their powers possess 
  their powers in an extrinsic manner; individuals who do not depend on their 
  surroundings for the powers possess their powers in an intrinsic manner. 
P12. Individuals who possess their powers in an extrinsic manner are less  
  powerful than those who possess their powers in an intrinsic manner.  
P13. The most powerful being possible will possess its powers in an intrinsic, 
  rather than extrinsic, manner. 
C3. God possesses omnipotence in an intrinsic manner.  
 
5.2. A Reply 
It might be objected that there’s a distinction between (a) how powerful something is and (b) 
how stable or secure something’s power is, and that if it is at all intuitive that individuals who 
possess their powers intrinsically are in any sense superior to individuals who possess those 
same powers extrinsically, then this stems from the fact that individuals who possess their 
powers intrinsically possess their powers more securely than those who do not. In the case 
described, it’s not that Armstrong and Gunner are not equally powerful (with respect to 
killing others), it’s just that Armstrong’s power is more stable or secure than Gunner’s. (Of 
course, it may be conceded that God’s omnipotence is maximally stable – but that rather 
seems to be a consequence of God’s aseity, which is the basis of the argument in §4).53 
 The would-be objector must be thinking along these lines: Gunner’s power to kill 
is more unstable than Armstrongs’s because Gunner could lose her gun, or have it jam, etc. 
The fact that Gunner’s power to kill depends on something external to her seems to entail 
                                                          
53 I thank an anonymous referee for Philosophia for raising this objection. 
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that Gunner could become unattached from that external factor. Yet, equally, Armstrong 
could lose her arm or hand in a tragic accident, or be struck down by a debilitating illness, 
or what not. Hence, there doesn’t seem to be any link between the stability of a property’s 
possession, and the manner of its possession (i.e. its intrinsicness). Now there may, of 
course, be some who don’t find P10 prima facie compelling at all; for those, the argument 
from power-possession will have no force (but no problem: the other two arguments will 
suffice); however, if P10 is intuitive, then this fact cannot be attributable to the purported 
feature of intrinsic powers that they are more stable. 
 
     6.  What is it to be Omnipotent?  
So far, I’ve argued that omnipotence must be intrinsic to God. In this section, I show that 
an examination of the concept of omnipotence leads us to the opposite conclusion: 
omnipotence could not be intrinsic to anything (it is a pure extrinsic property). Now, there’s 
no more agreement concerning what the correct analysis of omnipotence is than there is 
concerning what the correct analysis of intrinsicness is. So how can we go about 
determining whether something could possess omnipotence in an intrinsic manner? We 
can’t just look at the definition of omnipotence to determine what conditions must be 
satisfied in order that an individual be omnipotent. To go about this task, we’ll instead need 
to ask what facts competing analyses of omnipotence should be aiming to capture. As I go 
along, I’ll ask whether the conditions on omnipotence I identify are consistent with (7). 
That is, I’ll question whether they could be satisfied by a being purely by virtue of the way it itself 
is and so independently of the circumstances in which it is situated. To recap, it will do so 
iff neither the presence, nor the absence of something (or some things) distinct from x 
partially grounds the fact that x is omnipotent. 
 
6.1. The Irrelevance of Scope 
As noted, omnipotence is traditionally taken to be a power, or a set of powers. But what is 
the scope of this power, and what is its strength? I’m not convinced that the scope of a power 
can inform us as to whether the power itself must be possessed in an intrinsic manner. This 
might seem surprising. One might think that omnipotence involves bearing of some sort of 
‘can do’ relation to certain actions, or ‘is able to actualize’ relation to certain states of affairs, 
and that we can therefore know that it’s a pure extrinsic power-property. But that thought 
would be misguided. When one specifies a power’s scope, one simply specifies information 
about that power’s possible manifestations, and information about a power’s manifestations 
sheds no light on the manner in which the power-property itself is possessed. Take, for instance, 
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opium’s power to induce sleep. The scope of this power encompasses beings of a relevant 
sort. But knowing this fact only informs us of the circumstances in which this power can 
be manifested. It does not tell us that opium’s power to induce sleep cannot be intrinsic to 
it. Indeed, we may well say that this power is intrinsic to opium if we attribute it to opium’s 
molecular make up. Thus, to think that omnipotence must be possessed in an extrinsic 
manner merely because the circumstances of its manifestation are often external to its 
bearer would be to confuse the circumstances of this power’s manifestation with the 
circumstances of its possession.  
Since the scope of omnipotence has no bearing on the central question with which 
I’m concerned in this chapter, I won’t be addressing that matter here. Facts about the 
strength of omnipotent beings, however, do have relevance. I turn to discuss these next.  
 
6.2. Strength 
Suppose a being, x, could will that a certain state of affairs, S, obtain, and it nonetheless be 
possible that S fail to obtain. In that case, x would be powerless to ensure that S obtains, 
and so there would be a diminution in x’s power. Thus, Richard Swinburne is far from alone 
in maintaining that ‘God is omnipotent in that whatever he chooses to do, he succeeds in 
doing.’ (1994: 129). I take as a first condition on being omnipotent, then, that ‘wills’ is a 
success term: 
 
(i) Necessarily, if x is omnipotent, then for any state of affairs, S, if x wills that S, 
S comes to fruition. 
 
Now, that whatever x wills comes to fruition holds only if there are no defeaters to x’s will. But 
that there are no defeaters to x’s will is not something any x could make true in virtue of 
the way it is in and of itself alone; that (i) is fulfilled depends upon what x’s actual surroundings 
are like. Thus, while it might be acceptable that some powers are intrinsic, it’s highly doubtful 
that powers with ‘essential-success’ conditions could be. For, these require an absence of 
defeaters to their being manifested in a way that powers not-of-this-kind do not. Further, 
(i) doesn’t require just that there are no actual defeaters to an omnipotent being’s will; it also 
requires that there are no possible defeaters to its will. So (i) makes possession of 
omnipotence dependent upon the nature of its possessor’s possible (as well as actual) 
surroundings. Hence, whether some x meets (i) is not only a matter of what x is like 
intrinsically; this makes (i) an extrinsic criterion. 
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(i) doesn’t capture everything we’d want to say about the strength of an omnipotent 
being. It’s not enough that (necessarily) whatever an omnipotent being wills comes to 
fruition; an omnipotent being is one for whom actualizing any of the states of affairs it can 
actualise is no way a struggle. A being who could accomplish every performable task, but 
had to struggle to get them done, wouldn’t be as powerful as one who could accomplish 
those same tasks with little effort. Thus, we have a second necessary condition on 
omnipotence: 
 
(ii) Necessarily, if x is omnipotent, then for any state of affairs, y, which x can 
actualise, actualizing y is in no way a struggle for x (x can do y with the minimum 
possible effort).54 
 
A being could not satisfy (ii) purely in virtue of the way it is in and of itself alone. How 
much of a struggle a particular task, T, is does not depend only upon intrinsic facts about 
T’s performer. At least one factor that has a bearing on how hard it is for an individual to 
perform T is the question of whether anyone is trying to stop them from performing T. 
Thus, for any x to meet (ii) there must be no being(s) in x’s actual or possible surroundings 
capable of making the performance of any T a struggle for x, and hence, (ii) is an extrinsic 
condition. 
 
6.3. Maximality & Exclusion of Competition 
There are, I contend, (at least) a further two necessary conditions on omnipotence that are 
inconsistent with (7). One is a maximality constraint. An omnipotent being is not just as a 
matter of fact overall more powerful than any other being; an omnipotent being is as powerful 
as it is possible to be. According to Graham Oppy (2005: 78), this claim should be accepted 
as an analytic truth. Oppy seems right about that. To say that x is omnipotent, even though, 
possibly, something is or could be more powerful than x sounds like something of a 
contradiction. Thus, that no other being could be overall more powerful than an omnipotent 
being is another necessary condition on being omnipotent. Before I state this formally, I 
will note the following point recently made by Martin Lembke (2012). It’s not just that an 
omnipotent being is more powerful than it’s possible for any other agent to be; an 
omnipotent being should be significantly more powerful than it’s possible for any other agent 
                                                          
54 This condition rules out that an omnipotent being can have the ‘ability’ to find a task hard. However, I 
concur with Leftow (2009) and Lembke (2012) that the ability to find a task hard is a pseudo-ability. 
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to be; otherwise, another being could vie with God for supremacy, and this should be 
impossible: 
 
Envision two beings: X and Y. Suppose that X is maximally powerful and that Y is 
less powerful – but only infinitesimally so. That is to say, Y is, to all intents and 
purposes, as powerful as X. But then it is gravely inadequate to call X ‘omnipotent’. 
Whatever omnipotence is, it excludes competition[.] (Lembke, 2012: 438, emphasis added) 
 
If another being was equal in – or closely matched in terms of – power and strength to 
God, then that being could vie with God for dominance, so we should state our third 
necessary condition as follows: 
 
(iii) Necessarily, if x is omnipotent, then there can be no y such that y is overall more 
powerful than x, equal in power to x, or closely matched in power to x. 
 
As with (i) and (ii), it’s likewise true that no being could satisfy (iii) purely in virtue of the 
way it is in and of itself alone; so (iii) also makes omnipotence globally extrinsic – extrinsic 
to each of its possible bearers. Being the most powerful is a comparative attribute. In other cases 
where a comparative predicate applies to a thing, the predicate applies partly in virtue of 
what holds true of other things in the relevant comparison-class. Being the tallest person, for 
example, depends not only how tall you are, but also on how tall everyone else is. Of no 
particular height is it true to say that your being that height guarantees that no one is taller. 
So no way a person intrinsically is could suffice for their being the tallest person. Likewise, 
if a (putative) omnipotent agent were in the presence of a more powerful, equally powerful, 
or almost-equally powerful agent, the former could not be omnipotent. But that there is 
and can be nothing overall more powerful than, just as powerful as, or almost as powerful 
as x isn’t satisfiable by any x in virtue of the way it itself is; no way a being intrinsically is 
could guarantee its being the (singularly) most powerful being. Equally, that omnipotence 
‘excludes competition’ renders it a partly outward-looking attribute. So, whether an 
individual meets (iii) depends upon what its actual and possible surroundings are like, 
meaning that we have a third extrinsic condition on omnipotence.  
 
6.4. Uniqueness  
(iii) points us towards a further fact about an omnipotent being: that, necessarily, it must be 
unique in its being omnipotent. For, while there may be no incoherence in supposing that 
more than one being possesses the other divine attributes – omniscience, moral perfection, 
etc., it would not make sense to suppose that two or more omnipotent beings could coexist. 
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For, should these beings ever have a conflict of will, one of them would, per impossibile (and 
contra (i)) have their intention thwarted. Often, it’s replied to this point that an omnipotent 
being is necessarily divine, and that, necessarily, a divine being is morally perfect and 
omniscient. Hence, every omnipotent being will always correctly identify and will for the 
best course of action, meaning that two omnipotent beings could never have a conflict of 
will. However, this is to ignore the fact that there isn’t always a single best possible course 
of action to be taken in every situation where a divine being could act. Two omnipotent, 
omniscient, morally perfect beings may, for instance, wish to create exactly qualitatively 
identical worlds, save for the fact one of them wishes to give Jupiter an additional moon; 
and thus we’d have the willing to exist of states of affairs which, though incompatible, do 
not differ in value.  
 Now, if an omnipotent being, b, wills that the state of affairs that Jupiter has exactly 
sixty-two moons be actualized, then it’s not possible for the state of affairs that Jupiter has 
exactly sixty-three moons to be actualized. For, by (i), necessarily, whatever b wills to be the 
case is the case, and the former state of affairs is incompatible with the latter. Therefore, 
another omnipotent being, a, could not will for Jupiter to have exactly sixty-two moons. 
But should we expect of a that it have the ability to do so (in this situation)? An omnipotent 
being can actualize only those states of affairs that could be actualized. So, to argue that a 
can’t be omnipotent if b is, seems to mistakenly expect of a that it be able actualize an un-
actualizable state of affairs. Since this expectation is unwarranted, one might consider that 
there’s not really a possible conflict of will after all.  
 This response may well work in cases where there’s a putative non-simultaneous 
conflict of will. However, it won’t cut any ice in cases where the willings are simultaneous. 
For, suppose that two omnipotent agents, a and b, simultaneously will incompatible states 
of affairs. In that case, we cannot say that, e.g., since b has willed otherwise, a cannot will 
that Jupiter has exactly sixty-two moons. For we could equally well say that b cannot will 
that Jupiter has exactly sixty-three moons, given that a has willed otherwise. If willing that 
Jupiter has exactly sixty-two moons is impossible for a, because b is, at that moment, willing 
otherwise, then willing that Jupiter has exactly sixty-three moons should be impossible for 
b, since a is, at that moment, willing otherwise. Yet, if a is, after all, unable to will that Jupiter 
has sixty-two moons, then b is able to will otherwise! Likewise, if b is unable to will that 
Jupiter has sixty-three moons, then Jupiter’s having sixty-two moons is a state of affairs a 
could actualize. This is paradoxical. 
 I contend, then, that if (ii) is true – if an essentially omnipotent being is one who 
could not possibly be prevented from exercising its will – then, given the extremely plausible 
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assumption that there’s at least two equal-best performable actions in at least one situation 
where an omnipotent being could act, it’s not possible for there to be more than one 
omnipotent being.55 Indeed, Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz (2002: 168) 
maintain that the impossibility of there being two omnipotent agents is the very reason the 
monotheist is right to say there’s at most one God. Here then, is a fourth necessary 
condition on omnipotence: 
 
(iv) Necessarily, if x is omnipotent, then it’s impossible for there to be another 
individual, y, such that y is omnipotent.  
 
I suggested in §2 that loneliness is an extrinsic property par excellence because whether 
something possesses it or not depends only upon what the conditions are like outside that 
thing. For the same reason, (iv) is a paradigm case of a condition that could only be satisfied 
in an extrinsic manner. Whether something meets it depends only upon what else is in its 
presence. Further, and as with the other conditions, whether an individual satisfies (iv) 
depends upon what its possible (as well as actual) surroundings are like: (iv) requires that 
there be no other omnipotent agent in any possible world. 56 Thus, since (iv) is not satisfiable 
by any x in virtue of the way it itself is, we have a fourth reason why omnipotence could 
not be intrinsic to anything.57 
 
     7.  Replies 
In §3, §4 and §5 I argued that facts about essence, aseity, and power-possession demand 
that omnipotence be intrinsic to God. In §6, I argued that some necessary conditions on 
omnipotence require certain things to be absent from God’s surroundings, and that, by (7), 
this shows omnipotence cannot be intrinsic to God. In §2 we saw that theists cannot resist 
this paradox by simply denying that dependence on the absence of an impossible state of 
affairs is genuine dependence. In this section, I consider three alternative ways of 
responding that seem prima facie more promising. 
 
                                                          
55Swinburne (1994 and 2010b), in advocating social trinitarianism, maintains that multiple omnipotent beings 
could coexist, since each member of the trinity is omnipotent. However, to make sense of this, Swinburne 
concedes that two members of the trinity are dependent, and that all three members are confined to separate 
spheres of activity – ones delimited by God the Father. I thus ignore what Swinburne says, since he’s clearly 
working with a different and somewhat restricted notion of ‘omnipotent’. 
56 None of the other divine attributes imply uniqueness, so none could fail to be intrinsic for this reason 
(though I leave open whether they fail for other reasons). 
57 (iv)’s needed in addition to (iii) since being overall most powerful might be insufficient for being 
omnipotent. 
- 38 - 
 
7.1. The Relevance of (i) -  (iv) 
Here’s a first response, which, if successful, would provide a counter to the argument made 
in §5. (i) - (iv) follow of necessity from an individual’s being omnipotent, but why think that 
fulfilment of these conditions is (partly) what being omnipotent consists in? Consider: 
whenever we have a true predicative statement of the form ‘a is F’, ‘a is F’ will entail any 
number of other true predicative statements involving a; but it’s not true of for all of those 
further facts involving a, that they ground, or partially ground, ‘a is F’. For example, if Tina 
is a triangle, then, necessarily, Tina is such that she has three sides. But it’s also necessary 
that, if Tina is a triangle, Tina is such that numbers exist (if, indeed, they do). So Tina must 
be such that she has three sides and such that numbers exist if she’s to be a triangle. But 
while we’d happily agree that being three-sided is (at least partly) what makes Tina a triangle, 
we’d fervently deny that being such that numbers exist is part of what makes Tina a triangle; 
that it’s part of what it is to be triangular. So, in response to the argument of §5, theists might 
argue that merely showing that (a): an individual must satisfy (i) - (iv) if it is to be 
omnipotent; and that (b): (i) - (iv) are extrinsic conditions does not give licence to the 
conclusion that omnipotence is globally extrinsic. If (i) - (iv) are to have a bearing on 
whether omnipotence is extrinsic, we must also show that (c): satisfying (i) - (iv) is at least 
partly what makes a being omnipotent – that fulfilment of these criteria is partly what being 
omnipotent consists in. The thought, then, is that while ‘a is omnipotent’ entails ‘a fulfils (i)’; 
‘a fulfils (ii)’ and so on, ‘a fulfils (i)’; ‘a fulfils (ii)’, etc., are not what really makes ‘a is 
omnipotent’ true.  
 I think we should take issue with this move. To recap, whenever we have a true 
predicative statement of the form ‘a is F’, ‘a is F’ will entail any number of other true 
predicative statements involving a. Call each of the conditions specified in these predicative 
statements ‘necessary conditions on a’s being F’. Just how we can fully distinguish between 
those necessary conditions, C, on a’s being F that genuinely constitute a’s being F, and those 
that don’t is a hard question to answer. At least, it’s difficult to specify what might suffice 
for some C’s being constitutive of a’s being F (for any a, and any F). But I think we can 
specify at least one necessary condition on some C’s counting as constitutive of a’s being 
F, and that is that the truth of ‘a fulfils C’ should not be attributable to something other 
than a being F. For example, Tina’s being such that numbers exist is not constitutive of her 
being a triangle, even though Tina must be such that numbers exist if she is a triangle. The 
reason for this, I submit, is that ‘Tina is such that numbers exist’ mainly owes its truth to 
(or its truth is grounded in) the existence and nature of numbers. 
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Now, let’s ask the would-be objector: what’s the real source of the truth of 
‘necessarily, a fulfils (i) - (iv) if a is omnipotent’? Unlike the cases just discussed, where we 
were able to identify some other source of an individual’s having to fulfil a certain condition 
in order to possess a certain property, there is no other identifiable source of an omnipotent 
individual’s having to meet conditions (i) - (iv). Some individual’s meeting (i) - (iv) doesn’t 
follow of necessity from their being omnipotent for some other – non-omnipotence-related 
– reason. Now, in cases where ‘a meets C’ is entailed by ‘a is F’, and ‘a meets C’ can be 
accounted for by something other than a’s being F, we have grounds for claiming that a’s 
meeting C is not constitutive of a’s being F. However, if ‘a meets C’ is entailed by ‘a is F’ 
and ‘a meets C’ can be accounted for by nothing other than a’s being F, we have no such 
grounds. So, the objector is in a weak dialectical position unless they can provide grounds 
for the following claim: (i) - (iv) follow of necessity from the fact that God is omnipotent 
only because of some necessary fact that doesn’t involve God’s being omnipotent. 
 
7.2. An Acceptable Dependence? 
In a second attempt to dissolve this paradox, theists might admit that an omnipotent being 
is, qua omnipotent being, required to fulfil certain extrinsic conditions, but deny, 
nonetheless, that this requires God to be dependent in any objectionable sense. God does 
depend upon his actual and possible surroundings for his omnipotence, but everything 
external to God depends upon God, so there really is no problem after all. As Leftow says, 
‘in God’s case there is…no external environment not of His own making.’ (2012a: 148) 
Thus, even if God depends upon his surroundings for his omnipotence, this does not really 
diminish his aseity.  
 There are a few points of response here. First, all that’s been said is that there’s a 
mutual dependency, not that there’s no dependency. The would-be critic has merely pointed 
out that certain factors on which God depends also depend upon God. But a mutual 
dependence relation is still a dependence relation. Any theist subscribing to the (extremely 
strong) traditional notion of aseity (as described in §4.1) would resist this move. 
Nevertheless, even if mutual dependencies are compatible with aseity, not all tensions will 
be alleviated. The argument from aseity might be thereby shown to be based on a false 
premise (contra P5, aseity will not demand that God’s essence making properties are 
intrinsic to him), but the argument from essence still stands.  
Suppose then, to fully dissolve the paradox, theists insist the following. That 
everything external to God depends upon God means that God’s having to meet conditions 
(i) - (iv) does not, after all, entail that God depends upon his surroundings in any sense. Not 
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even a mutual dependency holds between God and his surroundings; somehow, the fact 
that God’s surroundings depend upon God means the dependency holding in the opposite 
direction is only apparent. Omnipotence – despite what was said in §6 – will not, in that 
case, be extrinsic to God, since x possesses F in an extrinsic manner only if x depends upon 
its surroundings for its possession of F. Conflict with the argument from essence is thus 
avoided, since this argument demanded that omnipotence – being constitutive of God’s 
nature – be intrinsic to him.  
However, this move rests on an unwarranted assumption. That God fails to depend 
ontologically upon certain external factors simply because these factors depend causally 
upon him amounts to nothing more than bare stipulation. Moreover, even if – in an extreme 
act of charity – we did grant theists this claim, a bigger theistic problem arises. For, theists 
can no longer admit that any property is extrinsic to God, as this argument illustrates:  
 
P14. All things external to God depend upon God. 
P15. If P14 is true, then for any property, F, even if God’s surroundings must 
  being a certain  way in order for God to possess F, it is (somehow) not true 
  that God depends upon his surroundings for his possession of F.  
P16. God does not depend upon his surroundings for his possession of any 
  property.  
P17. x possesses F in an extrinsic manner only if x depends upon its surroundings 
  for its possession of F.  
C4.  No property is extrinsic to God.  
 
However, contra C4, God clearly does possess some properties in an extrinsic manner; were 
this not true, theists would be committed to some kind of pantheism: all God’s relations will 
be internal ones, and this requires the relata to be internal to God. For most, this would be 
too high a price to pay.  
 
7.3. Powers, Bases,  & Necessary Connections 
Omnipotence is a power, or set of powers. Powers produce certain effects, and are closely 
linked with certain counterfactual conditionals.58 Not everyone agrees that powers must 
always be grounded in the intrinsic categorical properties of their bearers – call this thesis 
Categorical Realism. But to illustrate why some do endorse this thesis, consider the following 
                                                          
58 Powers are sometimes called dispositions. 
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hackneyed example. Opium has the power to put people to sleep. But, as an answer to the 
question ‘why does opium put people to sleep?’, ‘because it has a dormative virtue’ is 
unsatisfying. We want to know why opium has a dormative virtue. Thus, the thought 
continues, an adequate answer must appeal to something beyond opium’s sleep-inducing-
power; likely, it will specify the substance’s molecular make-up (and how it relates to certain 
receptors in the brain).59 Now, opium’s molecular structure is amongst its categorical 
properties, and so, as in this instance, the Categorical Realist says that whenever we have a 
power, P, which causes manifestations of type M, there must be a further categorical 
property, C, such that P is ultimately had in virtue of C, and C explains why P produces M-
type manifestations.60 In these cases, C is said to be the causal base of P. When Categorical 
Realism is denied and a putative power is said not to have a causal base, the power is said to 
be a ‘bare’ or ‘baseless’ one.  
 If theists are willing to accept (at least) a weaker form of Categorical Realism – one 
whereby powers are sometimes grounded in the intrinsic, categorical properties of their 
bearers – they could reply as follows. In most cases, where a power-property, P, is grounded 
in a categorical base, C, the relation between C and P is not one of logical entailment. For 
example, salt’s power to dissolve in water is grounded in its molecular structure. However, 
while salt’s molecular structure gives rise to its being water-soluble in all nomologically 
possible worlds, its molecular structure does not give rise to its being water-soluble in all 
worlds simpliciter. There are worlds where salt exists and yet is not water-soluble, owing, 
perhaps, to the fact that the laws of nature are sufficiently different in those worlds. This 
shows that salt’s water-solubility is dependent upon the nature of its surroundings: partly, 
it depends upon what laws of nature obtain. There is a good case then, for thinking that 
salt’s possession of water-solubility is partly extrinsic. Extrapolating from this example, 
theists could say that in all cases, if the connection between possession of C and possession 
of P is weaker than that of logical entailment, possession of P is partly extrinsic. Thus, in 
these cases, it doesn’t follow from the fact that C is possessed in an intrinsic manner that P 
is too. In other words, being possessed in an intrinsic manner is not transitive across the relation 
being the causal base of if the connection between C and P is not one of logical entailment. 
                                                          
59 Some consider this argument unsatisfying. Attributing opium’s sleep-inducing power to its having a 
dormative virtue isn’t wholly uninformative, for it does rule out rival causal explanations, e.g., that in every case 
where opium is ingested, sleep is induced not because opium has in itself some relevant characteristic, but 
because God intervenes to put the individual ingesting the opium to sleep. Nonetheless, even if the 
explanation isn’t wholly uninformative, the point still stands. The very fact that we’re still left wondering in 
virtue of what something has a dormative virtue shows that the dormative-virtue explanation does little more 
than give ‘sleep-inducing-power’ another name, and tells us, in addition, that it’s possessed by opium in itself. 
60 I say ‘ultimately’ so as to cover cases in which dispositions are grounded in other dispositions. The claim, 
then, is that all dispositional chains must ultimately bottom out in categorical bases. 
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(Perhaps we can say that the weaker the entailment relation, the stronger the dependence 
upon external factors.) However, suppose x possesses C in an intrinsic manner; that C 
subvenes P; and that possession of C does logically entail possession of P. In that case, one 
might think there’s good reason to say x possesses P in an intrinsic manner. For, x not only 
possesses P in virtue of the way it is in and of itself – that it does because it possesses P in 
virtue of C, and it possesses C in an intrinsic manner – x possesses P in virtue of the way it 
is in and of itself alone. For, if being C is, by itself, enough to guarantee being P, then there could 
be nothing (in terms of being P) for anything besides C to do.  
If theists could show, then, that omnipotence is based in a categorical property God 
possesses in an intrinsic manner, and that there’s a logical entailment between God’s 
possessing that categorical property and his possessing omnipotence, they’ll have a possible 
counter to the argument in §6. In most cases, being as F as you are is not a guarantee of your 
being ‘top dog’ with respect to F. In these cases, your being top dog with respect to F 
depends upon what your surroundings are like (it depends upon how things stand with 
regards to other things in the class of Fs.) However, if being as F as you are is a guarantee 
of your being top dog with respect to F, then, arguably, being top dog with respect to F is 
not a matter of what your surroundings are like.  
 There are three problems with this reply. First, for it to be viable, theists must be 
able to name a property of God that is a good candidate for serving as the subvenienet base 
of omnipotence. What could it be? Leftow suggests that ‘[t]he underlying categorical is deity. 
It is not clear or at all intuitive that any other underlying nature could support omnipotence.’ 
(2009: 173). But this makes little sense if omnipotence partly constitutes deity; and the 
traditional view is that omnipotence does partly constitute deity, not vice-versa.61 Suppose, 
then, that the traditional view is wrong. We could then say deity subvenes omnipotence. 
But what grounds could theists then have for maintaining that deity is intrinsic?62 Once the 
traditional view is abandoned, the predicate ‘…is divine’ will need to ascribe some character 
to God other than the various perfections; but when we ask what this could be, we draw a 
blank. What other quality deity could confer is entirely mysterious. 63 In that case, the claim 
                                                          
61 One plausible way of viewing deity is as something like a conjunctive property that includes all God’s 
perfections. But as Leftow (2012a: 204-5) says, it would be a contradiction to say that deity is a conjunction 
including omnipotence, if deity is a base-property for omnipotence.  
62 Leftow provides no such reasons. He merely assumes that it is, when he says ‘being made omnipotent 
would mean being granted a new intrinsic property in virtue of which one henceforth has that much power…In 
God’s case, the underlying categorical is deity.’ (2009:173) (Also, he’s assuming Categorical Realism without 
argument.) 
63 John Hick (2006: 75) makes a similar point when addressing the suggestion that the only property essential 
to God is being divine. Hick says divinity can’t consist merely in being divine, since this flies in the face of the 
traditional Christian view and robs divinity of its content.                                                                        
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that deity is intrinsic lacks grounds: one cannot claim that F-ness is intrinsic unless one has 
at least some grip on what F-ness is. 
What categorical property besides divinity could subvene omnipotence is also, as 
Leftow suggests, completely mysterious. Theists might want to simply insist that there must 
be some categorical property subvening omnipotence – we just don’t know what it is. But 
without some independent motivation for positing such a property, this dialectical move is 
extremely weak. An argument that omnipotence is intrinsic to God that ultimately relies on 
an ad hoc stipulation that there is some – we know not what – intrinsic property in virtue of 
which God is omnipotent would not really be an argument at all; it would simply be begging 
the question.64 
 The second problem with this reply is that the transitivity principle it relies on is 
unmotivated. As is often said, one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, and 
in this case, modus tollens wins. If the transitivity principle is true, God can fulfil (i) - (iv) 
in an intrinsic manner. The objector claims that the transitivity principle is true and God 
can, therefore, fulfil (i) - (iv) in an intrinsic manner. However, it cuts against all sensible 
intuition to admit that (i) - (iv) could be satisfied in an intrinsic manner, and so, we have 
reason to deny the transitivity principle: (i) - (iv) are counterexamples to it. Now, if we could 
think of other (preferably, non-theistic) cases where we would be willing to accept, simply 
because of the transitivity principle that an otherwise seemingly pure extrinsic property is, after 
all, not that, then we’d have independent reason to accept it. However, no such cases are 
forthcoming. At the least then, the argument is not strong enough to get past people’s 
intuitions. (Perhaps we can imagine cases where a property that we otherwise think of as 
pure intrinsic turns out not to be that (recall, e.g., Sider’s argument concerning maximal 
properties); but it’s very hard to imagine cases where a property that we otherwise think of 
as pure extrinsic turns out not to be that.)  
Third, and finally, the claim that ‘if possession of C is, by itself, enough to guarantee 
possession of P, then there could be nothing (in terms of possessing C) for anything besides 
C to do’ that partly underlies the transitivity principle itself seems misguided. There are 
some properties things possess in all worlds where they exist and yet are nonetheless pure 
extrinsic (think, e.g., of being such that God exists). Thus, that a condition is fulfilled (or a 
property is possessed) necessarily is no guarantee that it is fulfilled in an intrinsic manner. 
 
                                                          
64 As a consequence of this discussion one may doubt whether omnipotence could be a based power property. 
Prior et al. (1982) deny that any power could lack a causal base. For a defence of baseless powers see McKitrick 
(2003b). This issue’s tangential to my discussion, so I don’t address it here. 
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     8.  Extending the Argument 
The arguments given in §3 and §4 show that any property that constitutes the divine essence 
must be possessed in an intrinsic manner. Theists therefore have a problem if any such 
properties cannot be intrinsic to God. §6 argued that omnipotence presents such a problem 
since it could not be intrinsic to anything. This section points to some other divine-making 
properties that are globally extrinsic, thus showing the paradoxical results to extend beyond 
the case of omnipotence. 
 
8.1. Omni-benevolence & Creatorship 
It’s central to traditional theistic orthodoxy that God is perfectly good and loving (exhibits 
omni-benevolence). But what is it to be perfectly good and loving? Giving a comprehensive 
answer to this question might seem near impossible given that an omni-benevolent being 
will, of course, be morally perfect and so impeccable (free from sin), and just what moral 
perfection amounts to depends at least in part upon what particular moral theory is 
endorsed. However, one feature about goodness (or at least, about the goodness of agents) 
that is to a fair degree less controversial is that it is essentially communicative of itself, 
meaning that a perfectly good and loving being cannot – or cannot for all eternity at least – 
be a solitary being: love must have an object, and goodness must be expressed. A perfectly 
good god then, must create in order to manifest their love. Such a view has a strong 
pedigree: Aquinas makes many appeals to the Dionysian65 principle that goodness is by its very 
nature diffusive of itself and (thereby) of being in order to support some key aspects of his theology; 
and this, in Norman Kretzmann’s view, is evidence for the fact that Aquinas must have 
endorsed this principle (1983: 633-4).66 For example, Aquinas says: 
  
The sharing of being and goodness proceeds from goodness. This is of course 
evident, both from the nature of the good and from its definition…It is for this 
reason that the good is said to be diffusive of itself and of being. Now this diffusion 
is attributable to God, for it was shown above [I.13] that he is the cause of being 
for other things. (1264/1995: I, 37.307) 
 
And Kretzmann himself thinks that  
 
this Dionysian principle expresses an important truth about goodness, one that 
distinguishes it from other divine attributes…which are not essentially diffusive of 
themselves. (There is no obvious inconsistency in the notion of knowledge that is 
                                                          
65 Dionysius (or ‘pseudo-Dionysius’) is a sixth century author of four Christian Neo-Platonist treatises.  
66 Aquinas explicitly denies that producing things other than himself is a necessary consequence of God’s 
nature. However, Kretzmann (1997: 223-5) and Rowe (2004: 49-50) argue convincingly that despite his explicit 
opposition to this view, Aquinas is mistaken in thinking that this is a commitment he can avoid.  
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never expressed, even though united with omnipotence, as there is in the notion of 
goodness that is never shared although united with omnipotence.) (ibid.: 633) 
 
Omni-benevolence will also then bear a structural dissimilarity to omnipotence considered 
on its own, for there’s likewise nothing problematic in supposing that an omnipotent being 
fails to ever utilise its power (in the way that it does seem problematic to suppose that an 
omni-benevolent being fails to ever express its love).  
However, might the perfect goodness of God be adequately expressed in the 
continual mutual sustenance of the three ‘consubstantial’67 divine persons who make up the 
Holy Trinity? Although this suggestion has had advocates, including, inter alia, Swinburne 
(1994: 178-9), I think we should take issue with it. If there really is only one divine essence, 
then that divine essence, being triune, should be compelled to communicate its goodness 
beyond itself. Kretzmann seems to be in agreement with this when he argues that the 
‘Trinitarian application’ of the Dionysian principle can’t by itself dispel the principle’s 
tendency to require a necessitarian view of creation: 
 
even if the Son’s being begotten and the Holy Spirit’s proceeding can be considered 
an essential intrinsic diffusion of goodness and being, in Aquinas’s system it is the 
triune God whose essence is goodness itself. Unless there is some further intrinsic 
diffusion, beyond the pluralizing of persons, the essential self-diffusiveness of 
goodness remains intact and calls for extrinsic diffusion. And in that case creating 
something or other besides himself is essential to God’s diffusion of his goodness. 
(ibid.: 634)68 
 
To be clear, I’m not suggesting that goodness is communicative of itself,69 but that, 
for the many who do hold this view, it follows that part of what omni-benevolence consists 
in is an outwardly expressive and creative act; and so, another aspect of God’s nature will turn 
out to be globally extrinsic.70 The following would be a necessary condition on omni-
benevolence: 
 
(v) Necessarily, if x is omni-benevolent, then it’s impossible for x to exist 
unaccompanied by some non-divine existent.  
                                                          
67 This term is used to express the idea that each of these persons share one substance or essence. 
68 See also Kretzmann (1991: 219-20). 
69 To do so would require argumentation I haven’t the space for. Note also that this view is not un-
controversial. There are some (e.g., Aquinas) who take a much more libertarian view of creation and deny that 
God is essentially productive, citing Biblical texts as support for their view. One such text could be James 1: 
18, which contains the line: ‘Of his own will [God] begat us…’ 
70 Indeed, some such as Rogers (1996) and (2000), hold that all there is to God’s nature is one single act of 
creation. 
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8.2. Omnipresence & Omniscience  
A prima facie more obvious candidate for an extrinsic essential divine attribute is 
omnipresence. For, ‘[p]resumably’, says Hud Hudson, for God to be omnipresent ‘is for 
God to bear a certain relation – the ‘being present at’ relation – to every place.’ (2009: 198). 
And it certainly seems undeniable that nothing could bear the being present at relation to any 
place purely by virtue of the way it is in and of itself. (Not, that is, unless á la Spinoza, we 
endorse some kind of pantheism according to which God is identified with the most 
inclusive spatial region.) 
But how does God bear the being present at relation to every place? This is an 
important question to ask since the conclusion drawn above would have been too quick if 
there is cause to say that what makes God present at every place is something that turns out 
to be intrinsic to him. However, while not all agree on the answer to this question, many 
medieval and modern philosophers have understood omnipresence not as something which 
explains God’s power and knowledge, but as something which just is that power and 
knowledge (Everitt, 2010: 86). It’s easy to see why: since God is incorporeal, divine 
omnipresence cannot be grounded in the familiar external occupation relation that holds 
between material objects and locations. (See, e.g., Mawson (2005: 26); Swinburne (1994: 
150) and (1977: 99-105).)71 Importantly, though, as we’ve already seen, certain conditions 
on omnipotence are extrinsic, so it’s of no help to point out that God’s omnipresence 
consists in his knowledge and power to act. Further, it’s commonly accepted that ‘to be 
omniscient is to know all there is to know.’ (Webb, 2010: 231). So, an omniscient being, x, 
is such that, for any knowable fact f, x knows that f, and knowledge is of course, factive.72 
It would probably be best to add to this that an omniscient being is also one who has no 
false beliefs (see, e.g., Plantinga (1980: 142)). Hence, part of what it is to be omniscient is 
to have an appropriate range of beliefs correspond with the facts – and this is quite 
obviously an extrinsic matter:  
 
(vi) Necessarily, if x is omniscient, then for all knowable facts, φ, x has the belief 
that φ, and if x has the belief that φ then it is a fact that φ. 
 
                                                          
71 To this list we could add the names of Anselm (1948), and Hartshorne (1941). Aquinas (1264/1995) offers 
an understanding of God’s omnipresence only in terms of his power. 
72 Patrick Grim (2007) argues that it is contradictory to suppose that something could know all knowable 
truths. To avoid this complication, a different phrasing would be preferable. However, in the absence of an 
easy way to specify the relevant range of knowledge, and to keep things simple, I stick to the somewhat cruder 
characterisation. I don’t think anything hangs on this point. 
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In short, if this commonly accepted view of divine omnipresence is accepted, then 
it’s sufficient to show that divine omnipresence is globally extrinsic that omnipotence and 
omniscience be shown to be globally extrinsic.73  
 
8.3. Divine Eternity 
Talk of God’s relation to place inevitably prompts consideration of God’s relation to time. 
I noted in the introduction to this thesis that traditionally, God is supposed to be in some 
sense eternal. This is because what it means to be eternal has been variously understood. 
Broadly, opinion divides into two camps. There are those who maintain that God’s 
eternality consists in his existing at all times (being ‘sempiternal’ or ‘everlasting’); and there 
are those who maintain that God’s eternality consists in his existing outside of time (being 
timeless).74 On the latter construal, although God does not exist in time, there is no time at 
which it’s false to say that God exists.  
It should be clear that the property of being sempiternal could not be intrinsic to a 
thing. If time is a substance in its own right, eternity will consist in bearing the being present 
at relation to each part of it; if time is nothing over and above the changes in things (events), 
eternity will consist in bearing the being present at relation to each event. Just how God 
manages to bear such a relation may be expressed in terms similar to above – with reference 
to God’s knowledge and/or power. If so, God’s eternity will turn out to be an extrinsic part 
of his nature.  
 
(vii) Necessarily, if x is sempiternal, then for all times (and/or all events) x bears the 
is present at relation to that time (and/or event).  
  
If we are inclined towards divine timelessness, something different will need to be 
said. In virtue of what is it true to say at each time that God (timelessly) exists? Hoffman 
and Rosenkrantz offer the following plausible account: ‘a substantial being, x, has atemporal 
eternity if and only if (i) x does not exist in time, and (ii) x is a necessary being.’ (2002: 98). 
In saying that God transcends time, theists might mean that God literally bears some 
transcendence relation to time. If so, then it’s clear that being eternal is an extrinsic matter. 
For being eternal consists in meeting the following condition:  
                                                          
73 Hudson (2009) proposes an account whereby God is omnipresent in virtue of bearing the external relation 
of being wholly located at every sub-region of the maximally inclusive region (by entending). Hudson accepts that 
since spacetime might not have existed, this relational attribute is only a contingent one and is not part of 
God’s nature.  
74 For alternative accounts see Stump and Kretzmann (1981), and Craig (1978). 
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(viii) Necessarily, if x is timeless, then x bears the transcends relation to time. 
 
However, divine eternity turns out to be an extrinsic part of God’s nature even in the case 
where theists want to avoid reifying God’s transcendence. For, God’s being eternal in this 
case depends upon his bearing no temporal relations:  
 
(ix) Necessarily, if x is timeless, then it’s impossible for there to be a temporal 
relation, φ, such that x bears φ to any time or event.  
 
     9.  Conclusion 
There are at least two compelling reasons to think that the divine perfections must be 
intrinsic to God (and an additional reason to think that omnipotence must be intrinsic to 
God). First, the very notion of essence suggests that the properties individuals possess as 
part of their nature are intrinsic to them, and God possesses the divine perfections as part 
of his nature. Second, properties individuals possess in an intrinsic manner are ones they 
possess independently of their surroundings, and God is entirely independent. However, at 
least four (relevant) necessary conditions on being omnipotent are extrinsic conditions, 
meaning that God could not possess omnipotence in an intrinsic manner (indeed, no being 
could). In addition, a number of other divine perfections could not be possessed in an 
intrinsic manner. Three attempts to resolve this conflict have been found wanting, so where 
does this leave us? I’ve said it would be something of a contradiction to deny that something 
could fail to satisfy (i) - (iv) and yet be omnipotent; likewise, it would be something of a 
contradiction to deny that something could satisfy (v) - (ix) and yet possess omni-
benevolence, omniscience, or omnipresence. (An eternal being must satisfy either (vii) or 
(ix).) Hence, as I claimed in the introduction, any attempt to escape this paradox by making 
revisions in these concepts would be futile. If there is a way out here, it will dissent from 
the route commonly taken to avoid the existing theistic paradoxes. Consequently, a different 
kind of solution is needed. In the next chapter, we encounter a distinctively theistic account 
of modality – divine idealism concerning possible worlds. One of the virtues of this theory, 
as we will see, is that it offers one such route out of the paradox.75 
 
                                                          
75 To show just how little attention has been paid to the kind of issues here discussed, I’ll note that some have 
even defined divine-making properties such as omnipotence in purely extrinsic terms. See, e.g., Taliaferro 
(1983: 99) and Hoffman and Rosenkrantz (2002: 16-8). 
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2 
The Nature of Possible Worlds 
     
 1.  Introduction 
We’ve seen that the framework of possible worlds provides an extremely useful tool for 
understanding the nature of modality and a number of other philosophical notions. 
However, in the previous chapter we saw that, under classical theism, one philosophical 
notion this framework cannot be used to provide a satisfactory analysis for is metaphysical 
dependence. Nonetheless, theists may still want to adopt this framework on account of its 
ability to provide a model for understanding, e.g., possibility, necessity, and non-
counterpossible conditionals. If so, then theists, like anyone else, owe us a theory of its 
worlds. Such a theory will tell us something about the nature of these worlds and will tell 
us how to understand the notion of ‘truth at a world’. This chapter assesses the motivations 
for adopting – and for rejecting – two particular accounts of possible worlds and the nature 
of possible worlds discourse. The first view, divine idealism (‘DI’) places possible worlds in 
the mind of God. The second, genuine realism (‘GR’), as we’ve already seen, takes worlds to 
be the same kind of thing as our concrete universe. While this chapter focusses primarily 
on DI, some conclusions will be made about GR towards the end.  
  §2 begins by characterising DI and explaining some of its potential virtues. One 
such virtue is that it offers a solution to the paradox advanced in Chapter One. However, 
in subsequent sections, we’ll see that, despite what can be said in favour of the view, theists 
who want to endorse a possible worlds account of modality and who wish to hold on to a 
common sense opinion about what modal facts there are should endorse GR instead. This 
result means that the paradox remains unresolved. §6 thus offers what I take to be its correct 
solution (one which is available to GRists). Prior to that, I first evaluate a similar line of 
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     2.  Divine Idealism & its Virtues 
2.1. Sovereignty 
As mentioned, the classical Western monotheistic religions take sovereignty to be one of 
the necessary conditions on maximal perfection. To say that God is sovereign, recall, is just 
to say that everything distinct from God is in some sense dependent upon God. There is a 
strong and venerable tradition amongst theists and philosophers of religion for taking the 
quantification involved in this characterisation to be entirely unrestricted. One such 
proponent is Descartes, who, in his replies to the sixth objections of his Meditations states 
that ‘[it] is evident to those who consider the immensity of God that there cannot be 
anything at all that does not depend on him, not only anything that subsists but even any 
order or law, or any reason for what is good or true.’ (2003: 101) The many who do take 
the quantification to be entirely unrestricted usually cite passages from biblical and pre-
modern theological texts as support. Consider, for example, Colossians I: 17, where, 
speaking of God, Paul says ‘He is before all things, and in him all things hold together.’ One 
of the most ardent supporters of the widest-possible-scope reading of the sovereignty thesis 
– William Lane Craig – claims that ‘[t]he biblical witness to God’s unique aseity is both 
abundant and clear’ (2014: 113). For Craig, the following texts are amongst those which 
‘carry the weighty metaphysical implication that only God and His Logos exist a se; 
everything else exists ab alio, namely, through the divine Logos… God is…the ground of 
being of everything else…’ (ibid.): ‘There is one God, the Father, from whom are all things 
and for whom we exist, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and 
through whom we exist’ (1 Cor. 8.6 NRSV); ‘For just as woman came from man, so man 
comes through woman; but all things come from God (1 Cor. 11.12 NRSV). 
 If we are to take such passages at face value, then indeed we can be in no doubt that 
there is much exegetical support for this ‘widest-possible-scope’ interpretation. However, 
it’s worth noting that opinions diverge on the question of whether we should be taking 
these passages at face value. Some question what types of objects the authors of these texts 
had in mind when they made these claims: they almost certainly didn’t have in mind abstruse 
metaphysical entities (e.g., sets, numbers, propositions, and possible worlds). But some, 
such as Craig, do not think this is sufficient for us to conclude that these authors would 
have been happy to restrict their quantifiers, should they have got around to thinking about 
the existence of such things. As Craig points out, ‘neither did [these authors] have in mind 
quarks, galaxies, and automobiles; yet they would take such things and countless other 
things, were they informed about them, to lie within the domain of their quantifiers.’ (ibid.: 
114). But this reasoning is far from persuasive. In contrast to abstracta and the like, these 
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kinds of entities – being physical and concrete – have far much more in common with the 
objects these authors would have been familiar with. Hence, others such as Keith Yandell 
have expressed support for restricting the scope of the quantifiers. In Yandell’s view, ‘Paul’s 
point seems to be that God is sovereign over “thrones or powers or rulers or authorities” 
that might pose a threat; abstract objects have no such possible role.’ (2014: 24). And one 
would not be hard-pressed to find many biblical passages where we’d be cautioned against 
taking too literal a reading (for otherwise, the texts would be saying something either 
patently absurd, or else plain false). And to those who would point to the writings of 
premodern theologians for support, it seems equally sensible to caution against staying true 
to the letter of their writings at all costs, as Scott Shalkowski notes: ‘We are entitled to 
wonder whether Augustine or Aquinas were correct on matters of neo-Platonic or 
Aristotelian metaphysics, so we may wonder whether the theological claims they or their 
predecessors made against the backgrounds of those metaphysics stand up to sustained 
scrutiny.’ (2014: 133). Nonetheless, despite the fact that there is a debate to be had here, we 
can at least say that for the many who do adhere to the orthodox view (and so take 
themselves as entitled to the wide-scope reading) possible worlds (if they exist) will need to 
be viewed as depending upon God in some way.  
 
2.2. Divine Idealism 
One way for possible worlds to depend upon God would be for them to be ontologically 
dependent upon God. Such ontological dependence could consist in their being essentially 
housed within the divine mind. Hence, theists who are committed to the existence of 
possible worlds could respect the unrestricted sovereignty thesis by embracing DI. Leibniz 
most famously adopts such a conception when he argues in his Monadology that God is the 
‘source’ of modal truth: 
 
43. …God is not only the source of existences, but also that of essences insofar as 
they are real, that is, or the source of that which is real in possibility. This is because 
God’s understanding is the realm of eternal truths or that of the ideas on which they 
depend; without him there would be nothing real in possibles, and not only would 
nothing exist, but also nothing would be possible. (1991: 74)76  
 
Indeed, Leibniz took the existence of modal truth itself to require the existence of 
God. In his view, necessities must be grounded by a part of reality that is itself necessary, 
and since God exists necessarily, God’s mind was perhaps the only suitable home for 
                                                          
76 Leibniz (ibid.) calls this a proof of the existence of God ‘by the reality of eternal truths’. 
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them.77 But as we can see from the above passage, not only did Leibniz take necessary truths 
to be God’s thoughts, or ideas, but (maximal) possibilities (possible worlds) were taken to 
be divine-mind-dependent entities too: mental representations of universes.78, 79 The reason 
for this, as Pruss notes (2011: 31-2), is that Leibniz appears to accept the S5 principle of 
modal logic, according to which ◊p → □◊p. Possibility, then, as well as necessity, ontologically 
depends upon God’s understanding. However, it was not Leibniz’s view that possibility is 
also dependent upon God’s will; God does not decide what the possibilities are. So we should 
not see Leibniz as endorsing the Cartesian view (referred to by Plantinga (1980) as ‘universal 
possibilism ’) that anything is possible because God could have made it so.80 
The DIist could begin by giving an account of the ontology of propositions: 
identifying them with divine ideas. Then, an ontology of possible worlds could be 
constructed out of these propositions: the DIist could define worlds as maximally speciﬁc, 
consistent thoughts (or sets of concepts or ideas) in the mind of God of ways for the world 
to be. Now, if God were to make a decision about what the possibilities should be, the theory 
would preclude S5. This is why it may be easiest to picture God not as bringing into being any 
possible world. It may also be why, as noted above, Leibniz pictured worlds as being 
ontologically dependent upon God, but not God’s will. What God definitely does create, 
however, is our cosmos. By creating our cosmos, one world (alone) is actualised – that is, 
gets to be concretely instantiated – by means of God’s activity (see Plantinga (1974a: 39) and 
(1974b: 169)). The actualized world is the world that represents our cosmos entirely 
accurately.  
 The ability DI has of doing justice to the sovereignty thesis has meant that, in 
relatively recent times, the theory has had something of a revival. As a sample: Alvin 
Plantinga (1980: 140-6) suggests the possibility of (and highlights motivations for) building 
such a view. Robert M. Adams (1983: 751) notes Plantinga’s suggestion and explains that a 
view such as DI could yield an ‘attractive’ account of the ontological status of the objects 
                                                          
77 Although I won’t examine this argument, I will note that some criticisms have been raised by Leftow (1989), 
and ably defended against by Adams (1994: 177-83).  
78 Though I’ve called Leibniz’s view ‘Divine Idealism’, Nicholas Rescher (1973: 180) refers to it as 
‘Conceptualist Realism’.  
79 Leibniz wasn’t the first to identify possibilities and necessities with divine ideas. Stump and Kretzmann 
(2001: 181) quote Augustine as taking such a view towards not only these things, but to the rest of the Platonic 
horde) in Question 46: ‘concerning ideas’ (de ideis) of his De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, and there has 
been a theological tradition of doing so ever since. See also Augustine (1982: 79-81). 
80 Descartes can be seen as expressing this view in many places. See again, e.g., his replies to the sixth 
objections of his Meditations: ‘[God didn’t] will that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right 
angles because he knew that it was impossible to have it otherwise…On the contrary…it was because he 
willed that the three angles of a triangle should be equal to two right angles that…it is impossible for it to be 
otherwise.’ (2003: 100). 
- 53 - 
 
of logic and mathematics. Leftow (2012) argues for something akin to DI, but advocates 
substituting possible worlds for divine mental events, rather than divine ideas.81 Greg Welty 
(2014) argues that all putative abstract objects, including possible worlds, can be constituted 
by divine ideas. And Pruss (2011) develops a hybrid such account, combining Aristotelian 
views about the powers of substances with the Leibnizian view of worlds. 
 
2.3. Actualism 
DI bears some structural similarity to, e.g., the Platonic accounts of Adams (1974) and 
Plantinga (1974b); ‘Platonic’, since their accounts take worlds to be abstract in kind. Adams 
defines worlds as maximally consistent sets of propositions; Plantinga defines them as 
maximally consistent states of affairs.82 The structural similarities stem from the fact that 
the accounts are actualist in kind: each takes possible worlds to be parts of the actual world, 
and exactly one of these worlds is actualised by representing our universe entirely accurately. 
(On Adams’ account, the actualized world is the one whose propositions are all true; on 
Plantinga’s account, the actualized world is the one whose state of affairs obtains.) Since, 
under theism, God actually exists, God’s thoughts actually exist; hence, DI is also a form of 
actualism. According to this theory, the truth-conditions for modal truths are fulfilled by 
some part of the actual world.  
For some, e.g. Plantinga (1976: 256-7)83 and Lycan (1979: 287-92), actualist accounts 
of possible worlds are the only viable option: the person who believes that there are things 
(possible worlds) that do not actually exist is contradicting themselves, or, in Lycan’s words, is 
saying something ‘crazy’ (1979: 288). Being actual, some say, is part of the very meaning of 
existence; as such, the concept of something that exists but does not actually exist plainly 
                                                          
81 Leftow’s God and Necessity (2012) offers us a 500 page treatment of the topic of theism and modality. Since 
I will not be engaging with the view Leftow advances there, I should say something about why; here would 
be a good place to do so. Leftow’s view is what he calls ‘a thin partial deity theory’ (ibid.: 247). In terming his 
view this way, Leftow is making it clear that his is a disjunctive account of modality. A deity theory of modality 
grounds modality entirely in God’s nature. Hence, Leftow’s view counts as a thin partial deity theory because 
according to it, God’s nature only grounds the modal facts which count as what Leftow calls ‘non-secular’ 
(see chapter 9). Non-secular modal truths are modal truths about God. By contrast, a secular modal truth ‘is 
roughly one whose content when used assertively in normal circumstances, on its own, on the surface, take 
at face value, provides no information about God.’ (ibid.: 248). In Cartesian spirit, Leftow proposes (chapter 
10) that secular necessary truths – ones which concern non-divine individuals – are ‘fixed’ by God’s 
unconstrained imagination and choice. Since there’s overlap between the side of Leftow’s account which 
accounts for non-secular truths and the theistic approach to modality I will be considering in this chapter, to 
offer a separate treatment of Leftow’s view would to some extent be overkill. This isn’t to say that I don’t 
think there are interesting things to say about Leftow’s account; just that there’s only space in to consider a 
handful of sufficiently dissimilar views. 
82 States of affairs are things like Sarah’s feeling hungry, and the laptop’s being low in battery.   
83 Page references refer to the reprint in Loux (1979). 
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makes no sense. Not all will share these sentiments, but for those who do, DI and its 
conspecifics are at a significant advantage over possibilist accounts.84 
 Additionally, there’s a case for thinking that actualist accounts fare more favourably 
than possibilist ones in terms of their ability to do justice to the original grounding problem. 
What drives the original grounding problem for modality is our inability to find something 
here in the actual world that grounds possibility and necessity. If the thought is that truth is 
grounded in parts of the actual world, then DI and its Platonic counterparts give us the kind 
of answer that, pre-theoretically at least, we wanted. Modality’s grounds, we’re told, are in 
this world. The grounding problem arose because we failed to see that actuality comprises 
more than we originally thought. 
 
2.4. A ‘Safe &  Sane’ Ontology 
While DI shares with its rivals the advantage of being actualist, there are features its rivals 
do not share, and some of these give DI significant advantages. Firstly, unlike its rivals, DI 
doesn’t posit any kind of abstract entity; according to it, worlds are concrete.  
Why do they count as such? After all, concreteness is another notion which has 
been variously understood, and under some understandings, a lack of spatiotemporal 
location is not only necessary, but is also sufficient for abstractness. If God is not 
spatiotemporal, then neither, presumably, are his thoughts; doesn’t that mean that, by some 
lights at least, DI’s worlds count as abstract? In Chapter Four (§4) I discuss the 
abstract/concrete distinction in more detail and provide reasons for taking a lack of 
spatiotemporal location to be insufficient for abstractness. I ask, therefore, that the reader 
bear with me until then. I will simply note here that there are good reasons (later to be 
advanced) to think of God and his thoughts as concrete, and that, as such, DI is more 
ontologically parsimonious than its Platonistic rivals in the sense that it can make do without 
abstracta. Indeed, from the theist’s perspective at least, DI is also more ontologically 
parsimonious than its possibilist rivals. Theists already believe in God and his cognitions. If 
there are possible worlds of any kind, God will have thoughts about them. So theists, if they 
believe in possible worlds at all, are already committed to the existence of divine thoughts 
which have as their subject those worlds. DI makes do with just these thoughts; for it identifies 
them with worlds. DI does not require, then, that theists expand their ontology in any way. 
Further, since thoughts are something we already have at least some pre-theoretical 
understanding of (unlike abstracta), for theists at least, this account eliminates at least one 
                                                          
84 More on this in §4.3. 
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source of metaphysical weirdness. (Of course, as Pruss notes, we have to admit that ‘mystery 
is introduced by the fact that these are the ideas of a divine mind…But at least we do not 
have the dark mystery of the Platonic propositions, whose ontological status is almost 
completely opaque – for what indeed are “abstract” things?’ (2011: 32).)85 
 
2.5. Representation & Reduction 
This last point immediately leads to another serious consideration in favour of DI. We’ve 
seen that representation is a key notion for any account of modality which invokes possible 
worlds. Such accounts analyse the de dicto necessity of some proposition, p, in terms of every 
world’s representing that p, and the de dicto possibility of p in terms of p’s being represented 
as true by some world. Indeed, for actualist accounts, worlds ‘represent in a double sense. 
(1) They are representations, so that it somehow makes sense to speak of what is the case 
according to them; and thereby (2) they are representatives, taking the place of what they 
purport to represent.’ (Lewis, 1986a: 137). They take the place of what they purport to 
represent, of course, because the concrete universes they purport to represent don’t exist.86 
Further, each actualist world, whether actualized or not, is actualised according to itself (but 
not according to others); that is, each world represents itself as being the unique actualised 
world. As Lewis explains, each actualist world, w, represents the cosmos ‘to be a certain way 
such that, if it were that way, then [w] would be the [actualist] world that represents correctly; 
and thereby [w] implicitly represents itself as actualised’ (ibid.: 138).) Any account that can 
be deemed adequate then, owes us at least some explanation of how its worlds represent 
something as being the case.  
 Lewis takes the question of how worlds represent to be a crucial one, and is highly 
critical of authors such as Plantinga, Stalnaker, and Adams for remaining silent on just this 
point. There are three ways, Lewis says, that actualist (ersatzist) worlds might represent (or 
misrepresent, but for ease, I will speak in terms of representation), and so there are three 
possible answers authors ersatzists might give, if they were to answer this question. One is 
that worlds represent by means of linguistic representation – a world represents that p by 
saying ‘p’. A second is that worlds represent by means of idealised pictorial representation – a 
world represents that p by containing a part that is isomorphic to p. In these cases, what worlds 
represent (what is true at them) is a function of what is true of them (what their internal 
structure is like). The third answer completely eschews talk of inner-world structure and 
                                                          
85 Pruss himself takes worlds on DI to be concrete (2011: 127). 
86 Hence, merely possible actualist worlds don’t, strictly speaking, represent anything. Rather, they misrepresent 
our cosmos in various ways, and in so doing, they represent other possibilities for it. 
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simply says that worlds represent in a primitive and so inexplicable way: a world, w, 
represents that p iff, necessarily, if w is actualized, then p is the case.  
Lewis is critical of each type of answer. In reverse order, and in condensed form, 
his criticisms are as follows. The third of these answers, which involves adopting what Lewis 
terms magical ersatzism, is not really an answer at all. The magical ersatzist is one who limits 
herself to saying only this: her worlds represent what they do simply because it’s their nature 
to do so. There’s no informative explanation, then, of why the actualized world is the 
actualized world (i.e., of why one of the other worlds does not represent our cosmos with 
perfect accuracy). Nonetheless, we are entitled to ask of this relation that holds between the 
actualized world and our cosmos whether it is an internal one, so that its holding between 
the relata depends upon the intrinsic nature of the relata, or not (i.e. is it external)? If external, 
then, says Lewis, we are left with an ‘especially repugnant’ primitive modality (1986a: 179). 
We want it to be necessary that if the cosmos (as it actually is) exists, then a particular world, 
w1, is actualised. But if the ‘actualizes’ relation is external, then just why there should be such 
a necessary connection is left entirely unexplained. To illustrate by way of analogy, Lewis 
says:  
 
[i]t cannot be, for instance, that there is an absolutely necessary connection… 
whereby every charged particle must be exactly a certain distance from another 
particle. It’s one thing for the particle to be charged, another thing for two particles 
to be at a certain distance – the common involvement of the same particle is not 
enough to make the alleged connection intelligible…No matter what novel external 
relations there may be, it remains unintelligible that the intrinsic nature of a thing 
should constrain the external relations in which it stands. (ibid.: 181) 
 
However, if the relation is internal, then since, by hypothesis, the worlds are devoid 
of any internal structure, it will be equally mysterious why the relation somehow depends 
upon the intrinsic natures of the relata. If w1 has no internal structure, then what internal 
nature does it have, such that, if our universe exists, w1 is actualised? We aren’t offered an 
explanation. So the relation looks like a ‘magical’ one; hence the name (see Lewis, ibid.: 182). 
The second, what we might call pictorial ersatzism, says Lewis, cannot really be 
ersatzism. For, if its worlds are to provide fully adequate representations of possible 
universes, then they would have to be perfectly isomorphic to such universes, and in that 
case, there would in effect be no qualitative differences between them and the universes they 
represent. Of course, because the universes these worlds are supposed to represent do not 
in fact exist, these worlds aren’t isomorphic to anything. Rather, Lewis says, they are only 
isomorphic in a counterfactual sense: they would have been isomorphic to certain universes, 
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had those universes existed. However, this leads to a second point of objection: we now 
have a failed analysis. For what is supposed to make it true that there could have been a 
tap-dancing turtle is not that there is some part of a world which is isomorphic to a tap-
dancing turtle, but rather, that there could have been a tap-dancing turtle isomorphic to some 
part of a world. But that there could have been a tap-dancing turtle is exactly what we 
wanted to explain! (See Lewis, 1986a: 165-74.) 
The first, linguistic ersatzism, views worlds as constructed out of the words of some 
actual language.87 The words of this language have meanings and thus, so too do the 
sentences built up out of them. Each world is a certain maximal and consistent set of such 
sentences, and each world represents whatever its constituent sentences mean or describe. 
Such a language would have to be a sufficiently rich one; it would, e.g., need a name for 
every possible individual, property, and relation. It would also have to be very precise; 
allowing for no vagueness, indeterminacy, or ambiguity. Lewis’ objection to this account of 
worldly representation is twofold. First, if this is how worlds represent, then primitive 
modality is needed because not just any collection of sentences make for a world; worlds 
are collections of sentences which are both maximal and consistent, and these are modal 
properties. The other objection is that the relevant ‘worldmaking’ language would be 
expressively inadequate. It wouldn’t, e.g., have names for alien properties (i.e., properties 
neither instantiated in the actual world nor constructible out of properties so instantiated). 
So, at most, the linguistic ersatzist can account for the de dicto possibility that there could 
have been a property not identical to any of those which are instantiated in the actual world; 
there will be no way for the linguistic ersatzist’s worlds to represent de re of different alien 
properties that they could have been instantiated. Now, the linguistic ersatzist could simply 
stipulate that the language contains predicates for alien properties, but, says Lewis, just how 
each such predicate refers to one alien property rather than another will again be left 
mysterious. Thus, in allowing herself this stipulation, the linguistic ersatzist succumbs to the 
position (and so inherits faults) of magical ersatzism (see Lewis, ibid.: 142-65).88 
However, if it’s imperative that whatever entities an ersatz account postulates as its 
worlds are capable of representation, then it seems DI can meet this challenge. DI can appeal 
to the fact that cognitions (whether divine or otherwise) are mental objects with certain 
semantic properties: DI’s worlds represent because they are thoughts, and hence have 
intentionality: a certain content, directedness, or aboutness. Of course, as Pruss notes (2011: 
                                                          
87 An actual language is needed to maintain actualism. 
88 There’s a further worry that if the sentences of some language provide the truth-conditions for modal claims 
then any particular such language we chose would seem objectionably arbitrary. 
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208-11), philosophers of mind have a difficult time answering how a thinker’s mental states 
can manage to be about things; but we at least do know that they can be about things, since 
they are. So, DI has at least a gesture towards an explanation here, which makes for another 
advantage over its actualist rivals.  
 We’ve seen, though, that DI’s rival actualist accounts do not claim to be (indeed, 
cannot claim to be) offering us the resources to reduce the modal to the non-modal. 
Possibility (or consistency) is (must be) taken as a primitive. For example, Plantinga’s worlds 
are not just states of affairs which can co-obtain, but maximal ones; and maximality too is 
explicated in modal terms. A state of affairs is maximal just when it is as complete as possible. 
Plantinga explains it thus: 
 
Let us say that a state of affairs S includes a state of affairs S* if it is not possible 
that S obtain and S* fail to obtain; and let us say that S precludes S* if it is not 
possible that both obtain. A maximal state of affairs, then, is one that for every state 
of affairs S, [it] either includes or precludes S. And a possible world is a state of 
affairs that is both possible and maximal. (1974b: 258)89 
 
(Likewise, under Adams’ view, worlds are maximally compossible sets of propositions, 
which is just to say, maximal sets of propositions which can be true together.) So, won’t DI 
have to offer a similar explanation? We’ve said that worlds are mental representations of 
universes; composites of divine thoughts. But not just any collection of divine thoughts will 
do. The thoughts need to be both maximal and consistent; but these are modal features.  
There are two ways the proponent of DI might try to meet this challenge. One 
would be to say that worlds are simple non-structured divine ideas. However, this way we lose 
the neat explanation that propositions are divine thoughts, and worlds are more complex 
constructions thereof. Another, and I think better, way would be to say that worlds are 
thoughts God collects. There are some groups of thoughts God collects; there are others he 
does not. The reason primitive modality must be introduced to explain worldmaking under, 
e.g., Plantinga and Adams’s accounts is that there are (if there are propositions at all) sets of 
propositions which are non-maximal and inconsistent, and there are (if there are abstract 
states of affairs at all), sets of states of affairs which are non-maximal and non-compossible. 
However, if the proponent of DI simply denies that there is a divine mental collection of 
thoughts corresponding with every set of Plantingan state of affairs (or with every set of 
Adamsonian propositions) and goes on to identify worlds with the divine thoughts which 
                                                          
89 Hence, ‘[i]nclusion among states of affairs is like entailment among propositions; and where a state of affairs 
A includes a state of affairs B, the proposition corresponding to A entails the one corresponding to B.’ 
(Plantinga, 1974a: 35). 
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do constitute divine mental collections, then no such primitive modality need be invoked. 
Worlds are a certain type of divine mental collection, and these collections need not 
correspond to the axioms of set theory. 
 Of course, the objection will almost certainly be raised here that something must 
explain why God collects the thought he does (why these and not others?), and that whatever 
explanation is given here will ultimately be modal. Pruss expresses such sentiments when 
he says: 
 
The Leibnizian account [that is, DI] does not help there at all, since those divine 
ideas that are singled out for being dubbed “worlds” are singled out in virtue of 
being consistent – that is, possible. Their possibility is prior in the order of explanation 
to their being known by God to be possible… And so this approach is not relevantly 
different from [Platonic accounts] in singling out some collections of propositions 
for being dubbed “worlds” on the grounds of their being consistent. (2002: 331)90 
 
However, the proponent of DI should simply dig their heels in here and reiterate 
that it’s precisely their view that the direction of explanation is reversed. The objection is 
belied by a failure to grasp how this reductive programme is supposed to work. God collects 
some thoughts and not others. That’s where explanation stops. It’s not that God collects 
some thoughts because they’re the compossible ones, and God, being omniscient, grasps this. 
Rather, certain thoughts get to be the compossible ones just because they’re the ones God 
collects. That modal facts are something external to God for God to apprehend is precisely 
what the DIist denies: modality is grounded in facts about God’s mind; not vice-versa. (This 
is one advantage DI has over an account which grounds possibility in conceivability by mere 
mortals. God does in fact conceive everything he can conceive, so the modal-looking phrasing 
‘conceivability’ gets replaced with God’s actual conceiveings.) 
It’s strange that Pruss should raise this objection, since, if it works, it counts equally 
against his own view, which grounds modality in God’s powers. On Pruss’ (2002) account, 
it’s de dicto possible that p iff it’s in God’s power to actualise a world in which p. ‘Tu quoque’, 
DIists might say, ‘to say that God is omnipotent is to say that God has the power to do 
what’s possible. So shouldn’t possibility explain God’s powers, not vice-versa?’ Pruss will 
insist that this is precisely what his view denies (and rightly so). However, Cameron notes 
that, in pushing this line, Pruss seems to be taking a particular horn in what might seem to 
be a dilemma analogous to that raised by Socrates in Plato’s Euthyphro dialogue. The 
dilemma is one concerning the order of explanation: does God command the actions he 
                                                          
90 See also Pruss (2011: 32): ‘in virtue of what is the idea that is identical with a possible world consistent?’ 
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does because they are the good actions, or does the goodness of the actions God commands 
consist solely in the fact that they are commanded by God? Cameron explains that  
 
Pruss’s position regarding possibility is analogous to the divine command theorist’s 
position regarding goodness. The divine command theorist holds that an action is 
good because God commands it (as opposed to God commanding it because it is 
good). This immediately leads to the following worries: (i) if God had commanded 
us to rape, the divine command theorist has us believe, it would have been good for 
us to commit rape. But this is counter-intuitive, (ii) the theist asserts that God’s law 
is good, but if the divine command theorist is right, this is simply a trivial truth: it 
doesn’t say anything substantial about God’s law, because what it is to be good just 
is to be God’s law. (2008a: 274) 
 
Analogously, someone might argue that, if Pruss’ view is right then the modal facts would 
have been different, had God had different powers. But (unless we are Descartes) we won’t 
want to accept that, e.g., 6 squared could have equalled 0, and so would deny that it is (or 
could have been) in God’s power to make it so. Further, if what’s possible is just what God 
has it in his power to do, then the truth that God is omnipotent becomes an entirely trivial 
one. Likewise, if we adopt DI as our account of modality, don’t we get the consequence 
that God could have collected different thoughts? If so, they would have been the 
compossible ones, meaning we (again) forfeit S5 as modal facts are rendered contingent. 
An analogous triviality objection concerning God’s ability to conceive also arises: intuitively, 
it’s a praiseworthy feature of God that he can conceive everything that it’s possible to 
conceive. But that God can conceive everything it’s possible to conceive is trivial, given that 
possibility is grounded in God’s conceiveings.   
However, the worry that if God had commanded rape, rape would have been good 
only has bite if what God commands is a contingent matter.91 As Cameron goes on to note: 
‘Who cares that rape would have been good had God, per impossibile, commanded us to 
rape?’ (ibid.). Perhaps God’s commands are contingent; that’s up for debate. But, what’s 
important for us to consider here is that on Pruss’ account, and likewise, on DI, modality 
itself is (respectively) grounded in divine powers, and collections of divine ideas (or a 
specific class of them). So we only get the result that the modal facts could have been 
different if God could have had different powers, or if God could have collected different 
thoughts. Yet, on Pruss’ account, there’s a determinate fact about what powers God 
                                                          
91 This needs some qualification. The divine command theorist could respond that this worry misrepresents 
their position. The nature of the relevant moral characteristic, the divine command theorist might say, is that 
it is what God has commanded/permitted/prohibited. That’s what, say, the good is; that is its nature. Its nature 
isn’t what God would have (or could have) commanded; it’s what God actually did. Hence, even if God had 
commanded rape, rape still would have been impermissible. 
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unrestrictedly has; whatever powers God has is fixed. So God’s powers are essential to him, 
and modal facts are non-contingent. Likewise, what ideas are gathered into divine mental 
collections is fixed. So, what ideas God collects is essential to him; meaning, again, that 
modal facts are non-contingent. So who cares that the modal facts would have been different 
if, per impossibile, Go had collected different thoughts? When we apply a Euthyphro-style 
dilemma to this modal context, what we might call the ‘contingency horn’ fails to get a grip. 
All this is to say, then, that the DIist should brush off the question of why God collects 
some thoughts and not others as ill-conceived. The question only makes sense in a context 
where God has the option of collecting together some other combinations of thoughts. But 
it’s in God’s collecting together the thoughts he does that the possibility of such contexts 
is precluded.92  
Nonetheless, it might be objected that the more ideas God has, the better God 
would be; a god who collected (and so could collect) together combinations of his thoughts 
in such a way so as to provide for common sense modal truth, but in addition, had an idea 
of a universe where say, it doesn’t exist (i.e., collected together its idea of itself as not existing 
with an appropriate range of other ideas to make for a world) would be better than a god 
who didn’t (and so couldn’t). If so, God should have an idea of a world which fails to 
include himself. Otherwise, he experiences some sort of imaginative failing. After all, we are 
capable of imagining a world where God doesn’t exist. In reply, the proponent of DI should 
say this: God does have an idea of himself as non-existent. (This provides an ontology for 
the proposition God doesn’t exist.) It’s just that, God does not collect together this idea to 
make for the possibility of his not existing. Perhaps we can have an idea of God’s not 
existing at our world, but that’s an imaginative error on our part: we are conceiving of an 
impossibility. (Conceivability is, after all, only a fallible guide to possibility.) In any case, it’s 
wrong to think that all of what’s possible for us to do is a subset of what it’s possible for 
God to do. There are plenty of other things we can do – lie, forget, commit adultery, etc. – 
which God cannot, and we don’t consider these to make for a diminution in God’s 
perfection. So, the DIist should not be moved by this line of thought. 
                                                          
92 To take an analogy, suppose we ask the person who, like Lewis, adopts a GRist view of worlds “Why those 
worlds, not others?” The GRist will no doubt be confused. “There was no other option”, they will reply. “What 
worlds there are is fixed; I take what concrete spacetimes there are as brute.” The DIist answer is no different: 
what divine-mental-collections exist is also taken as brute. (If there is any objection to be made here, it will 
have to take the form of that advanced by Shalkowski (1994) and Lycan (1988). However, this objection, if it 
works at all, is no more serious under DI than it is under, say, Lewisian GR. For a compelling response to 
Shalkowski and Lycan see Cameron (2012).) 
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What can be said to address the concern that it’s supposed to be a substantive matter 
that God can conceive all conceivable thoughts? Cameron suggests that Pruss respond to 
this triviality worry in the following way:93 
 
it doesn’t follow from the fact that to be possible is to be within God’s power that 
‘being within God’s power’ means ‘is possible’ – we are concerned with the 
metaphysical grounding of the modal, not with giving an analysis of modal language – 
and so Pruss is not committed to the claim that ‘God is omnipotent’ is an analytic 
truth. (ibid.: 275, emphasis added) 
 
Cameron seems right about this. If successful, the objection would count against all 
proposed reductions. As Cameron notes (ibid.), it doesn’t follow from the fact that, say, 
goodness turns out to be φ-ness that Is goodness φ-ness? is a closed question. A similar 
response could be given by DIist. It doesn’t follow from the fact that God can conceive 
everything it’s possible to conceive that God can conceive everything it’s possible to conceive is 
analytic, simply because DI tells us that the part of reality which grounds what God can 
conceive is God’s conceiveings. God can conceive of everything it’s possible to conceive is still an 
informative and substantial truth. 
However, Cameron argues that a more substantive worry about triviality remains: 
 
When the theist says that God could not make a square circle [etc.]…she does not 
tend to think of this as being any serious limitation on God’s powers precisely 
because such things are impossible, whereas on Pruss’s account they are impossible 
because they are beyond the limits of God’s powers. (ibid.) 
 
An analogous worry faces DIists. When we say God can’t conceive of a world where 
he doesn’t exist (can’t collect his thoughts together so as to represent this state of affairs 
obtaining), we don’t think that a serious limitation on God’s imaginative capabilities, 
precisely because such a thing is impossible. However, on DI, it’s impossible precisely 
because it’s beyond the scope of God’s cognition.  
Here I think we should take issue with what Cameron says. The spirit of the theistic 
response to worries that might be raised by someone’s pointing out that it’s beyond the 
scope of God’s power to make a male vixen, or to make a pie too big for him to eat, doesn’t 
depend on the scope of possibility being ontologically independent of God. What matters 
– indeed, all that matters – is just that such things be outside the scope of possibility. But it 
                                                          
93 And Pruss does in fact make such a response (2011: 267-9). 
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doesn’t follow from DI (or from Pruss’ account) that certain actions are no longer outside 
the scope of possibility. So there really is no problem here.  
Recall that alien properties pose a problem for some of DI’s rivals. For example, 
since there’s no actual language which contains predicates for properties not instantiated in 
the actual world, the representational resources of the linguistic ersatzist (who think that 
worlds represent by saying) will be inadequate. However, now we have divine cognitions 
on the scene, this worry is alleviated. God, with his superior mind, conceives of properties 
not instantiated in the actual world. This makes for the de re possibility that each of the 
different alien properties could have been instantiated; and this is a significant advantage 
DI has in its favour. 
However, even if the nature of representation can be better explained (and make 
for a more adequate modal ontology), the worry still remains that the worlds DI posits only 
represent in a counterfactual sense. Mirroring Lewis’ objection against other actualist 
accounts: the universes DI’s worlds purport to represent don’t exist; so, strictly speaking, 
DI’s worlds don’t represent anything. Rather, they would represent such universes, were such 
universes brought into being. A primitive modality thus lurks in the background of the 
account.  
The assumption that representation only works in cases where the thing represented 
exists should be questioned. When, for example, I conceive of a unicorn and a mental image 
of a unicorn is thus present to me, would we say that my mental image represents a unicorn? 
I think we can take as a datum that most of us would. Of course, a philosophical account 
will be required to explain how, exactly, it manages to represent a unicorn, in the absence of 
any unicorns, but that’s a question for philosophers of mind to answer independently of 
this account. So, to alleviate the worry that their worlds only represent in a counterfactual 
sense, the proponent of DI should appeal to the fact that we already accept that ideas have 
intentionality and can represent something even in the absence of that thing. God’s ideas 
have certain representational properties; that they do seems uncontroversial given platitudes 
we otherwise accept about mental phenomena, and it’s in virtue of those representational 
properties that certain ideas (and/or collections thereof) would be actualised, were the 
universes they represent to exist; not vice-versa. 
In summary of this subsection: DI has a fair claim on its ability to offer a reductive 
account of possibility and necessity. What’s true at a world is a matter of what God’s ideas 
represent, and we needn’t think of this representation as modal. Further, worlds themselves 
are defined in non-modal terms – as sums of divine thoughts collected together in the mind 
of God. Any thoughts that bear the collected together with relation to each other are parts of 
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the same world, and no thoughts that fail to bear this relation to each other are parts of the 
same world. This, coupled with the fact that DI can account for the full range of alien 
possibilities, puts DI at a significant advantage over rival actualist accounts. 
 
2.6. The Intrinsicness Paradox: A Resolution  
In Chapter One we saw that theists often think of God’s nature as intrinsic to him. If the 
arguments from essence and aseity are sound, then they are correct to do so. However, we 
saw that a paradox arises. For, there are equally good reasons for thinking that at least some 
of the attributes constitutive of God’s nature cannot be intrinsic to him. Viewing possible 
worlds as ideas (or collections of ideas) in the mind of God has another significant virtue 
in its favour: it can offer theists a solution to this paradox, which for ease, I’ll refer to as 
‘the intrinsicness paradox’.  
To see why, recall how we saw that possession of certain divine attributes involves 
the absence of certain kinds of impossible entities. For example, God’s omnipotence depends 
upon there being an absence of defeaters to God’s will (as specified in condition (i)), an 
absence of peers (as specified in conditions (iii) and (iv)), and so on; such entities are strictly 
impossible under theism. Now, suppose that we adopt DI. The truth-conditions for modal 
claims then involve possible worlds, which, this account tells us, are divine cognitions. In 
that case, what it is, say, for God to be such that there are no (possible) defeaters to his will 
is for each of the divine mental collections which make for worlds to be such that they do 
not represent God’s will as defeated; what it is for God to be such that it is not possible for 
there to be another omnipotent being is for each of the relevant divine mental collections 
to be such that they do not represent another omnipotent being as existing, and so on. 
God’s meeting these conditions, then, involves facts only about him. Hence, by (7), the 
conditions turn out to be intrinsic ones, avoiding the result that omnipotence is globally 
extrinsic.  
Analogous results apply mutatis mutandis to the other divine-making properties 
discussed as problematic. Consider, for example, divine eternity. We saw that there are a 
number of ways this property can be understood: in terms of sempiternity, and thus, in 
terms of satisfying condition (vii); or, in terms of timelessness, and thus, in terms of 
satisfying either condition (viii) or condition (ix). Now, it’s sufficient for God’s satisfying 
(vii) that there be an absence of any times God fails to bear the is present at relation to. 
Likewise, it’s sufficient for God’s satisfying (viii) that there be an absence of times God fails 
to bear the transcends relation to; and it’s sufficient for God’s satisfying (ix) there be an 
absence of times or events which bear any kind of temporal relation to God. These entities 
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– i.e., those whose absence is required for God to be eternal – are not possible ones. Hence, 
what makes for the fact that God is eternal is, again, the absence of certain kinds of 
impossibilia (e.g., times God’s not present at, or times and events God bears a temporal 
relation to); and since, under DI, facts about impossibilia are grounded in divine cognitions, 
divine eternity – whether it amounts to being timelessness or being sempiternal – turns out 
to be a property God possesses in an intrinsic manner. As a final example: it’s sufficient for 
God’s satisfying condition (vi) on omniscience that there be an absence of knowable facts 
not known about by God; since these entities (whose absence is required for God to be 
omniscient) are impossible, their non-existence is, under DI, grounded in God’s cognitions. 
Hence, there’s no more pressure to think that omniscience cannot be intrinsic to God.94  
 
     3.  An Argument Against Divine Idealism 
DI is, then, not without its virtues. However, in this section, we will see that a dilemma can 
be levelled against it which renders the view untenable. It runs as follows. The theist should 
accept the principle of the best – ‘PB’, hereafter. PB is the principle that God only and 
always acts for the best (it will be argued for in §3.1). DI has as a component the claim that 
God actualizes (i.e. concretely instantiates) just one world. For, under DI, all merely possible 
worlds are simply uninstantiated ideas in the mind of God.95 For ease, call this thesis ‘AO’ 
(to stand for actualizes one world). The first half of the argument will show that PB together 
with DI and its component claim AO require theists who hold a common sense opinion 
about what modal facts there are to accept there is no single best actualizable world – 
‘NSBAW’, for short. However, the second half of the argument shows that there are only 
three ways NSBAW can be true, and each of these is equally untenable for theists who hold 
a common sense opinion about what modal facts there are given PB, DI, and its component 
claim AO. Yet, it cannot be that both NSBAW and its negation are false: this is contrary to 
the law of excluded middle. Therefore, DI should be rejected.  
Why isn’t it an option, in light of this argument, for theists to simply accept that 
their common sense opinion about what modal facts there are is mistaken? Well, theists 
could do this. However, to do so would be counterproductive. For, as I will reiterate 
throughout the discussion, if the modal theory we adopt requires us to reject a significant 
                                                          
94 It’s false then that these properties are extrinsic to each of their possible bearers. A property like omniscience 
might be extrinsic to some of its possible bearers, but it is not necessarily extrinsic to God. For here is a model 
according to which it is not. These divine-making properties are therefore impure extrinsic ones. 
95 The claim that DI is wedded to AO will be further bolstered in §4.1. 
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portion of the very same truths we are seeking a metaphysical account of, then that 
undermines the very reason we had for adopting that modal theory in the first place. 
 
3.1. The Principle of the Best  
We’ve seen that it is a central tenet of classical theism that God is essentially omnipotent, 
omniscient, and morally perfect. Theists should accept PB because if they do not, then at 
least one of these claims must be rejected. To see why, suppose that there is an objectively 
best course of action for God to take in a certain situation and that God fails to take it 
(suppose, that is, that God fails to act in accordance with PB). In that case, at minimum, 
one of the following scenarios must hold: 
Scenario one:  God discerns the morally relevant differences between the different 
available courses of action and is capable of undertaking any one of them. However, God 
ignores the morally relevant differences and chooses to undertake a less-than-best course 
of action. 
Scenario two: God discerns the morally relevant differences between different 
courses of action and doesn’t choose to ignore them. However, God is incapable of 
undertaking the best course of action and, hence, does not undertake the best course of 
action.  
Scenario three: God is capable of undertaking any one of the available courses of 
action, and does not wilfully ignore any of the morally relevant differences between them. 
However, there are some morally relevant differences between the courses of action God 
fails to discern. So, unwittingly, God does not undertake the best course of action.96 
It should be obvious that not one of these scenarios is theologically acceptable. 
Wilfully ignoring morally relevant differences between different available courses of action 
constitutes a moral imperfection. So, under scenario one, God is not morally perfect. Failing 
to discern any facts which are there to be known constitutes an imperfection in knowledge. 
Thus, under scenario two, God is not omniscient. Lacking the ability to undertake a possible 
course of action constitutes an imperfection in power, or ability. Hence, under scenario 
three, God is not omnipotent. Yet, classical theism has it that omnipotence, omniscience, 
and moral perfection are essential properties of God; so it’s impossible that one of these 
three scenarios should hold. Therefore, God must act in accordance with PB.97 
                                                          
96 I said that ‘at minimum’ one of these holds since God could, e.g., discern the relevant differences and choose 
to ignore them, and it still be the case that were God not to choose to ignore them, God would lack the ability 
to act upon them. 
97 Later, in §5.3 I will deal with one attempt to deny PB made by Adams (1972). 
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 Under DI, God surveys an incredibly vast number of worlds (atemporally 
contemplates his own ideas) and chooses to actualize just one. So, why, we might reasonably 
ask, did God actualize the particular world he in fact did? Well, if, as we’ve just established, 
God always acts in accordance with PB, then the answer (if, indeed, there is best actualizable 
world) should be that God actualized the particular world he did because it was the best 
world he could actualize. Leibniz, perhaps most famously, affirmed exactly this: that there 
is a best possible world, and that God, being constrained by PB, actualized it because, after 
comparing it to all others, he considered that it was the best:  
 
53. Now, since there is an infinity of possible universes in God’s ideas, and since 
only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for God’s choice, a 
reason which determines him towards one thing rather than another.  
 
54. And this reason can only be found in fitness, or in the degree of perfection that 
these worlds contain, each possible world having the right to claim existence in 
proportion to the perfection it contains.  
 
55. And this is the cause of the existence of the best, which wisdom makes known 
to God, which his goodness makes him choose, and which his power makes him 
produce (Leibniz, 1991: 75) 
 
3.2. DI, PB, & Modal Collapse  
Leibnizian DI – that is, DI coupled with PB and the thesis that there is a best possible world 
– has not been accepted without opposition. One of the most frequent objections raised 
against it is that it forces upon us a claim that seems plainly false: that our universe, with all 
of its suffering, disorder, and other kinds of natural and moral evils, really is the best of all 
universes creatable by a perfect personal being. One can easily imagine God making this 
world such that, somewhere in it, one isolated instance of suffering occurred for a fraction 
of a second less than it in fact did, without thereby forfeiting some greater good.  
However, an objection such as this would only be decisive against Leibniz’s view if 
we were in possession of conclusive reasons for thinking that the ‘bestness’ of a world 
consists in its being the one most abundant in happiness. Leibniz himself did not hold the 
view that this is what the bestness of a world would consist in. He thought, rather, that the 
most perfect world would be the one most abundant in variety, concurrently governed by 
the simplest laws capable of producing such variety. He was of the view that ‘[God] 
chooses…to create men as happy as it is possible to be in this system [of variety and simplicity].’ 
(Leibniz, 1985: 431).98 
                                                          
98 For a discussion of this see Blumenfeld (1995). 
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Fortunately though, we needn’t digress into an examination of the various notions 
of ‘bestness’, nor need we consider which of these notions the actual world might fit with. 
For, there is a more decisive line of objection against the Leibnizian picture. The objection 
is that Leibnizian DI entails modal collapse: the thesis that there is really only one possible 
world. The argument runs as follows. Under DI, one world alone is actualized. Under 
theism, a world, w, is actualized if, and only if, God actualizes w. For, a world, w, is actualised 
when the cosmos represented by w comes into being, and, on theism, no cosmos could 
have come into being but for the creative activity of God. Now, if just one world is actualized, 
and it is actualized because it is the best, then, given that God’s nature makes it strictly 
necessary that he actualizes the best world, it won’t be the case that any other world could 
have been actualized.  
However, if a world w is not possibly actualised, then it is not a genuinely possible 
world. Consider a world, w, which represents our cosmos (concrete universe), u, and 
suppose that w is not possibly actualised. In that case, u could not possibly exist. In such a 
case, to say that u is possible, even though u could not possibly exist would be 
straightforwardly contradictory. On an actualist possible world theory, being possibly actualised 
looks to be a necessary condition on – indeed, seems to be partly constitutive of – a world’s 
counting as a possible one. So it’s simply false to say that w is a genuinely possible world. 
(Likewise, on a possibilist theory, it’s a necessary condition on a world’s counting as a 
possible one that it be possibly actual.)99 Yet, here we have a denial of that principle. For, less-
than-best worlds are being considered here (by those who accept Leibnizian DI) as possible, 
even though they are not possibly actualized. With this in mind, we can form the following 
argument against the view (where I take ‘@’ to serve as the predicate ‘is actualized’):  
 
P1.  w [◊w → ◊@w]. (Premise)100 
P2. Merely possible worlds (less-than-best worlds) are not possibly actualized. 
  (Premise, DI with PB and the assumption that there’s a best actualizable 
  world.) 
C1. Therefore, merely possible worlds are not possible.  
   
Merely possible worlds (i.e., less-than-best ones) are not really deserving of the name. A 
world that could not possibly be actualized is not a genuine way the world might have been; 
                                                          
99 I’ve subsequently found that Adams (1974: 222) and Resnick (1973) also explicitly endorse the intuition 
that underlies P1. 
100 The diamond is usually taken to be a propositional operator. Here I’m instead taking it to serve as a 
predicate ascribing the property of being possible to worlds. 
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rather, it only appears to be so. This is disastrous. According to possible world theorists of 
all types, worlds are supposed to represent the different ways things might have been. Since 
putatively possible worlds on Leibnizian DI do not do so, their existence is entirely 
redundant from a modal perspective; unactualizable worlds are ones which serve no modal 
purpose at all. We get the result, then, that there is only one genuinely possible world, and 
that world is the actual world.  
Now, if the actual world is the only possible world, then a significant portion of our 
firm intuitions about what might have been will turn out false; possibilities unrepresented 
in the actual world will turn out not to be possibilities at all. For, the possible world analysis 
tells us that it’s possible that p iff p is represented at some world. Hence, dragons turn out 
to be impossible because the actual world (and so reality) fails to contain them; backwards 
causation turns out to be impossible because there is (if the actual world is the only possible 
world) no world at which there is backwards causation, and so on. Further, since it’s 
contingent that p iff p is not represented at some world and represented at some other, a 
significant portion of our beliefs about what must be the case also turn out false. It’s 
necessary that the world contains as many individuals as it actually does; it’s necessary that 
there are actually squirrels but none that smoke cigars, and so on. So we can see then, that 
if one (and only one) world is actualized, and that world is actualized of necessity; much of 
what is ordinarily deemed as possible disappears, leading to a severe kind of modal collapse. 
However, given Counterpart Theory (Lewis’ theory of representation de re), it won’t 
be the case that absolutely no modal truth is contingently true. Counterpart Theory will be 
outlined and discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four; briefly, however, this theory says 
that ‘a world represents (de re) of x that it is F by having a part which is a counterpart of x 
and is F.’ (Divers, 2004: 674); and some thing, y, is a counterpart of some x if it is sufficiently 
similar to x in certain relevant respects. Hence, even if there is no non-actual world containing 
counterparts of me who are geniuses (who can thus represent the possibility of my being a 
genius), the possibility that I’m a genius is not left unrepresented in modal space. For it’s 
true of the actual world that it contains counterparts of me who are geniuses. Thus, even if 
there is only one world in reality, it still doesn’t follow that my failing to be a genius is 
necessary: alternative possibilities for actual world individuals will be represented by other 
individuals located within the actual world (see, e.g., Divers (2004: §5)). 
Nonetheless, even if we are not left with total modal collapse given the existence of 
just one world, the large number of intuitively true de dicto modal claims concerning 
possibility and contingency which turn out false given DI (with PB) is sufficient for pushing 
us into rejecting the theory. If a particular modal theory has the result that a very large 
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number of our thoughts about what truly might have been turn out false, then the primary 
motivation we could have had for adopting that theory – accounting for grounds of those 
modal truths – is undermined. In other words, Leibnizian DI is, to this end, self-defeating. 
 
3.3. No Moral Obligation to Actualize the Best World  
Adams argues that even if there is a best world, God has no moral obligation to actualize 
it: ‘God could [actualize] another instead of it, and still be perfectly good.’ (1972: 317) If 
Adams is right, we could endorse DI without accepting that God’s creative choice is based 
on considerations of merit, and modal collapse could then be avoided; so let’s examine his 
reasoning. Adams claims that one would only suppose that, if there is a best world, God 
must actualize it, if one also thought that either of the claims stated below were true, but 
both of these claims are false: 
 
(A) God would wrong some individuals if he didn’t actualize the best world.  
Or, that: 
(B) Even if God didn’t wrong some individuals by failing to actualize the best 
 world,  failing to actualize the best would entail an imperfection in the 
 divine nature.  
In response to (A), Adams asks us to consider who God might wrong, were he to 
actualize a less-than-best world. It cannot, says Adams, be the merely possible creatures, 
since merely possible creatures are not part of the moral community. Nor, does it necessarily 
follow that actualizing a less-than-best world, w, involves God wronging any creatures in w. 
For, there’s a possible scenario in which God actualizes w and doesn’t thereby wrong any 
creatures. That scenario would be one in which w meets the following criteria: none of w’s 
inhabitants exists in the best possible world; none of w’s inhabitants is so unhappy that, 
overall, it would’ve been better for them not to have existed; and every inhabitant of w is, 
overall, at least as happy as it is in any other world in which it exists (ibid.: 320). For in such 
a scenario, even if there is a best world, things wouldn’t have been better for the inhabitants 
of w if God had actualized it.  
Let’s grant, for the sake of argument, that (A) is false and turn to (B), since 
defending its truth will be sufficient for my purposes. Earlier, when arguing for PB, I gave 
reasons in support of it. However, quite the opposite of concluding that God’s choice of a 
less-than-best world could only be accounted for by an imperfection in God’s nature, Adams 
claims it’s accounted for by a perfection in God’s nature; namely, God’s graciousness. Adams 
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takes grace to be a virtue and an important part of perfect goodness.101 He defines it as ‘a 
disposition to love that is not dependent on the merit of the person loved’ (ibid.: 324). A 
gracious god will love all of his creatures equally, irrespective of their value or degree of 
moral character. Now suppose one world, w, is better than another, w*, because the beings 
in w are morally better than those in w*. God can’t choose to actualize w because he loves 
morally better beings more than the less morally good beings. Since God loves all of his 
potential creations equally, he isn’t obliged to actualize the best ones.         
Yet, we should find Adams’ reasoning here to be quite beside the point. First, given 
that many theists maintain that free will and having the chance to develop one’s moral 
character are intrinsic goods, it’s unlikely that theists would consider that the best world 
would contain the best (i.e. most moral) creatures. Second, even supposing that the best 
world would contain the best creatures, Adams doesn’t show that God isn’t obliged to create 
it. Adams says: ‘God’s graciousness implies that there is nothing in God’s nature or 
character which would require Him to act on the principle of choosing the best possible 
creatures to be the object of His creative powers.’ (ibid.: 324). But this claim is unwarranted. 
Divine graciousness doesn’t imply that there’s nothing in God’s character that would require 
him to create the best universe. It only implies that one aspect of God’s character wouldn’t 
require him to create the best universe, namely, his gracious love towards all creatures 
irrespective of merit. So although we know God can’t choose to actualize the best world 
because he loves its inhabitants more than the inhabitants of other possible creations, this doesn’t 
rule out God’s having some other reason for selecting the best world for actualization.102 
And there is another reason: God’s desire to do his best. Now, if there’s an objectively best 
thing to be done in a certain scenario, and you are capable of doing it, then doing it would 
be to do your best. And, as I have argued, God, qua perfect being, will always do his best. So, 
it still follows that God would actualize the best world even if he did love its inhabitants 
more than the inhabitants of his other possible creations. And, as I’ve suggested, it’s unlikely 
that the best world will be best by virtue of containing the best creatures.103 Hence, Adams’ 
argument is a non sequitur. 
 
3.4. Sub-Conclusion 
Where have we got to so far? I’ve explained why if DI and PB are true – if God selects a 
single world for actualization based on merit – and if there is a best actualizable world, then 
                                                          
101 To be precise, this is what he thinks the Judeo-Christian tradition asserts. 
102 This point has also been made by Rowe (2004: 84-5).  
103 Steven Grover argues that the notion of a best non-divine creature is incoherent, and that this is the ‘deepest’ 
problem with Adams’ argument (2003: 155). 
- 72 - 
 
there is only one creative option, meaning that modal collapse ensues. This is because the 
following conditional holds true:  
 
MAB:  If there is a best possible world, God must actualize it. 
 
In light of the above, I preliminarily conclude that if theists accept PB (as I have suggested 
they should) and wish to preserve the intuition that the actual world isn’t the best and only 
world God could have created, they should deny the antecedent of MAB. Partisans of PB 
and DI (and its associated claim AO)104 should reject Leibniz’s claim that there is a best 
possible world and endorse NSBAW (the thesis that there is no single best actualizable 
world) instead. 
 There are three ways NSBAW could be true:105 
 
(1) There’s more than one best actualizable world. (Hence, no single best 
 course of action for God to take.) 
(2) There’s an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds. (Hence, for every 
 actualizable world, there is at least one actualizable world which is better.) 
(3) Worlds contain incommensurable goods. (Hence, worlds aren’t comparable 
 because there is no single value scale on which one could be ranked above 
 all others.) 
 
I will address each option in turn.  
 
3.5. More than One Best World? 
If there’s more than one best actualizable world then there will be some number greater 
than one of worlds which are all on par in terms of goodness: call this group of worlds G. 
There will be no world better than any in G. God could actualize any world in G, and it 
would constitute no diminution of his perfect goodness, power, or rationality if he were to 
actualize one world rather than another, since there are no morally relevant differences 
between such worlds, and hence none to be discerned nor acted upon.  
                                                          
104 Later I explain why theists need only endorse NSBAW if they believe AO. 
105 Obviously NSBAW would be trivially true if there were no actualizable worlds. However, on theism that 
thesis is false, since there’s at least one universe God created, and, under DI, a world is actualized when a 
universe gets created. 
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At least two serious problems face this view. First, since worlds are equally good, 
God lacks a reason to actualize one world rather than another, since it’s hard to see what 
feature of a world (that did not have a bearing on its goodness) could guide God’s choice. 
Yet, that God’s choice was brute and reasonless would surely be anathema to theists, 
according to whom God is the paradigm rational agent.  
What do we mean, though, when we say that God is the paradigm rational agent? 
Would it be enough to understand perfect rationality in purely negative terms, as never being 
irrational, never acting illogically, contrary to reason? If so, then that would enable a perfectly 
rational being to sometimes act arationally. And, since on (1) God acts arationally rather 
than irrationally, that would be fine. However, I don’t think theists would accept that this 
is what perfect rationality consists in. This weaker condition is one a non-divine creature 
could fulfil. Theists, rather, seem to mean something stronger in mind: they mean to say 
that there’s a positively rational basis for all God’s actions.  
Even supposing that some theists are happy to accept the weaker condition of 
perfect rationality, theists (who venerate God for his act of creation) should at least be 
resistant to the suggestion that the stronger condition doesn’t at least apply to God’s creative 
act. For, if God’s decision to actualize this world rather than another was entirely arbitrary, 
it would be strange to be especially thankful for God’s particular creative act; it’s an arational 
choice which yielded a result as good as any other would have.  
Second, that all worlds must be on a par in terms of goodness is going to leave the 
plurality of worlds (‘pluriverse’) so severely impoverished that many of our modal claims 
(concerning what is, intuitively, possible) are going to come out false. As with the Leibnizian 
picture, any world not in G is not actualizable by God, and so is not genuinely possible; nor 
does anything that occurs in a world not in G and in no world in G count as possible.106 
Again, this is problematic because it undermines the primary motivation for adopting a 
possible world theory. Since (1) forces theists to deny the very same truths they were seeking 
an account of, they should not accept that NSBAW is true in virtue of it. 
 
3.6. Improving Worlds? 
Let’s see if NSBAW is better accounted for in virtue of (2): the claim that that there are 
infinitely many worlds arranged into a hierarchy with no upper bound according to their 
value, and that for any world, wn, in the sequence, there is another, wn+1, which is overall 
                                                          
106 I thank an anonymous referee for American Philosophical Quarterly for pointing out the need for this 
qualification. 
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better in value.107 Following Michael Almeida (2008: 13), we could call such a series a series 
of ‘improving worlds’. Under the improving worlds view, there’s no single best world, nor 
is there a number greater than one of best actualizable worlds for God to choose from. 
Hence, it can’t be expected of God that he actualize the best world. God must actualize a 
world inferior to some other. (2) might seem quite plausible once one considers that any 
upper bound there might be on the amount of goodness a world can contain would seem 
entirely arbitrary. It’s at least conceivable that for any world, w, one cares to imagine, w could 
either have contained one more good action, one more sentient being, or a type of sentient 
being that was one degree (be there such a thing) closer in likeness to God than the beings 
already contained in w. In fact, since theists believe the goodness of God to be infinite, they 
already accept that it’s possible for a thing to manifest an unbounded level of goodness. 
Now, expecting God to actualize a best world in a scenario where for any world, there is one 
better, amounts to expecting God to do the strictly impossible. And no-one can be culpable 
for failing to do the strictly impossible.  
However, William Rowe (2004) advances an argument to the effect that those 
endorsing AO and (2) will not be able to maintain that God is the greatest possible being.108 
For, on (2) it will always be true that, for any world God creates, God could have created 
one better. And, if one’s goodness is a function of one’s actions, then, since God could 
have created a better world, God could have been a morally better being. Yet, if God could 
have been a morally better being, he isn’t unsurpassable in his moral goodness, and God is 
supposed to be essentially morally unsurpassable. Therefore, since on AO and (2) God 
necessarily lacks this property, on (2), God cannot exist.  
Rowe’s argument depends on the following assumptions: 
 
(C) If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better world that it 
 could have created, then it is possible that there exists a being morally better 
 than it. 
And: 
(D) If a being is essentially perfectly good then it is not possible that there exist 
 a being morally better than it. (Rowe, 2004: 91) 
 
                                                          
107 Aquinas expresses support for this view in his Summa Theologica. 
108 Rowe himself does not explicitly mention AO, but, that he accepts it is at least implicit in his argument. In 
any case, if he were not willing to accept it, his argument would be invalid. Why this is the case will become 
clear in subsequent parts of this chapter. 
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 I take it as non-negotiable for theists that God is an unsurpassable being. Therefore, 
I will assume that (D) is true. What about (C)? It clearly depends upon the assumption that 
if a being’s act is surpassable, then the being who performs that act is surpassable. Immanuel 
Kant would certainly have accepted this assumption as true; he takes it that 
 
indisputably that will is better which chooses what is better. But if a better will is 
possible, then so is a being who could express this better will. And therefore this 
being would be more perfect and better than God. But this is a contradiction. (1978: 
137)  
 
However, Daniel Howard-Snyder and Frances Howard-Snyder (1994) argue that 
we have cause to deny assumption (C). Their argument is as follows. Suppose there are 
three gods and each of them must actualize just one world. Because there’s an infinite series 
of increasingly better worlds, each god must actualize a surpassable world. Subsequently, the 
gods each stipulate a cut-off point among the worlds to separate the ones they deem good 
enough for actualization from the ones they don’t. The first god, Jove, uses a randomizing 
machine to select a world among those he has deemed acceptable for creation. It selects the 
world of value ‘777’, which consequently gets created. The second god, Juno, adopts the 
same procedure as Jove, but her device selects the world of value ‘999’. Juno creates a world 
better than Jove’s, but, say the Howard-Snyders, Juno is not morally better than Jove, 
because individuals can’t be deemed to be more or less good on the basis of factors outside 
of their control. A third god, Thor, doesn’t select a world using a randomising device, but 
instead straightforwardly chooses to actualize the world of value ‘888’. Thor, they say, can’t 
be morally better than Jove solely by virtue of the fact that his world surpasses Jove’s. Why? 
Because Thor is not better than Juno, and Juno and Jove are ‘morally equivalent’. If Thor 
were better than Jove, then since Jove is just as good as Juno, Thor would be better than 
Juno. But Thor can’t be better than Juno if the world Juno creates is better than Thor’s. 
This is taken to show that even if God’s creative act is surpassable, that does not entail that 
God is a surpassable being. 
For the Howard-Snyder’s scenario to present a possible counter-example to (C), it 
must be one in which all of the deciding factors are outside of each god’s control. Only if 
God has no control over which world he selects can he create a surpassable world without 
himself being morally surpassable. But how plausible is it that a scenario such as this could 
exist? A line indicating a level of acceptability must be drawn somewhere, otherwise, it will 
be possible for a god to select a very bad world. Now, either there’s an objective minimum 
standard of goodness for a world, or there isn’t. Recall, though, that one of the motivations 
for accepting (2) was that there being an upper bound on the level of goodness a world can 
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contain seems entirely arbitrary. Likewise, there being a lower bound on the acceptable 
amount of goodness a world can contain also appears arbitrary. But suppose for the sake 
of argument it isn’t arbitrary. In that case, on (2) we’re supposed to accept that God, being 
omnipotent and benevolent, is happy to settle for a minimally good world, and that the act 
of creating a minimally good world is just as good as the act of creating one far above the 
minimum, and these assumptions seem to be plainly false.  
It appears much more likely that one of the following two scenarios will hold. Either 
each god draws the line of acceptability somewhere above the minimum standard, or there 
is no objective minimum standard. In either of these cases, it’s going to be up to each god 
to decide which world is ‘minimally acceptable’. Suppose that Juno decides only worlds 
above 10,000 are acceptable, and Thor decides only worlds above 10,500 are acceptable. 
Clearly, Thor is better than Juno by virtue of having higher standards. So, we can see that 
even if a god selects a world at random, not all of the deciding factors are ever going to be 
out of their control: any god will need to draw some level of acceptability. Therefore, if (2) 
is true, there is a way to pass moral judgement on God’s creative act (namely, by appealing 
to where God drew the line of acceptability). Further, since for any way of drawing a 
minimum level of acceptability there will be a better, a response akin to the one made by 
the Howard-Snyders will only succeed in pushing back the problem. Option (2) is not, then, 
an attractive picture for theists to accept. If an alternative picture concerning God’s creative 
choice is available that does not leave us able to criticise God for not having done better – 
for not having higher standards – theists should accept that picture instead. And we will see 
below that one such alternative is available.  
 
3.7. Incommensurable Worldly Goods? 
Our last option to consider is whether NSBAW is better accounted for by (3): the claim 
that worlds contain incommensurable goods. If (3) were true, there could not be a single best 
world. For, one world, w, may be better than another, w*, in one respect, R, and w* may be 
better than w in a different respect, R*, but there would be no fact of the matter concerning 
whether w is better than w*, or vice-versa, because there is no value scale according to which 
the features which are good in respect of R can be pitched against those which are good in 
respect to R*.  
In such a scenario, God couldn’t be held wanting from either a moral or rational 
perspective, for the same reasons he couldn’t be held wanting under (1) or (2). Further, (3) 
is plausible for two reasons. Firstly, it’s hard to see how there could be any kind of value-
scale on which worlds could be ranked against one another in terms of their overall goodness. 
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Secondly, it’s unclear precisely what superlative adjectives such as ‘best’, ‘greatest’, and ‘most 
perfect’ mean when applied to worlds; they appear to be semantically incomplete. So there’s 
good reason to say NSBAW is true in virtue of (3).  
However, in this scenario, just as in scenario (1), God lacks a reason to actualize 
one world rather than another, since his choice couldn’t be based on the degree of overall 
goodness of a world, and, again, it’s hard to see what merit-independent-feature of a world 
could guide God’s choice. Theists accepting (3) must deny that God’s most important act 
– his act of creation – has a positively rational basis, and it’s hard to see how theists could 
be praiseworthy of that act in particular. More importantly though, under (3), only worlds 
at the top of each value scale will be actualizable. Modal collapse therefore ensues on each 
value scale. The only genuine possibilities will be ones which occur in worlds displaying 
some feature of merit to the maximum degree, meaning that modal space is once again left 
severely impoverished. As with (1), (3) leaves modal space so severely impoverished that it 
could not be deemed acceptable. Theists should not, then, accept that NSBAW is true in 
virtue of it.109 
 
     4.  A Way Out of the Dilemma 
4.1. Rejecting AO 
There are, then, only three ways for NSBAW to be true. Since each is untenable under DI, 
theists endorsing DI should deny NSBAW. However, the conclusion stated in §3.4 was that 
theists should endorse NSBAW. They can’t do both, so where does this leave them? 
 Theists can prevent this dilemma from ever arising. The dilemma arises only when 
one accepts AO, and it’s possible to reject that assumption. As I hope will be visible from 
the foregoing discussion, the dilemma only arises under the assumption that AO is true 
because NSBAW and its denial are untenable (for the reasons discussed) only when they are 
coupled with it. This can be made clearer by examining how theists, if they accept instead 
that God actualizes all worlds (AA, for short), are free to endorse either NSBAW or its 
denial without any problem.  
Let’s start with its denial. Suppose there is a best actualizable world and AA is true. 
Does God’s actualizing the best world entail modal collapse? No. For, while it’s true that, 
if there is a best actualizable world, then, necessarily, God will actualize it, it’s also true that, 
necessarily, God actualizes all other worlds in addition. So, this model allows us not only to 
preserve some contingency, it also allows us to preserve the full range of the modal claims 
                                                          
109 See Almeida (2008) for a book-length treatment of the problems discussed in this section. 
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we pre-theoretically took to be true. The reason? If all worlds are actualized, all worlds must 
be actualizable, and hence can count as genuinely possible. If there is a best actualizable 
world, need it be our world? If someone asks “why did God create our world?” does the 
answer have to be that our world is the best? No. Perhaps our world is the best of all worlds, 
perhaps it isn’t. If it is, there’s no problem metaphysically speaking, for its being so wouldn’t 
entail modal collapse (see above). If it isn’t, there’s no problem theologically speaking, for 
it would not imply any moral, rational, or competence failing on God’s part. God couldn’t 
be guilty of failing to create a universe better than ours, nor for failing to actualize the best 
possible world, if he does, in fact, do so. 
Suppose there isn’t a best actualizable world and AA is true. In that case, theists will 
need to find some way of accounting for NSBAW. Can NSBAW be true in virtue of (3): 
the claim that worlds contain incommensurable goods? Yes. The problems discussed with 
this scenario only arose when we held AO as true. Modal space will not be depleted if (3) 
and AA are true, because God doesn’t only (and of necessity) have to ‘choose’ to actualize 
the world at the top of a single arbitrarily chosen value scale, nor does God (have to) choose 
to actualize the world at the top of every value scale. Can NSBAW be true in virtue of (2): 
the claim that there is an infinite hierarchy of increasingly better worlds? Yes. For, in such 
a scenario – (2) and AA – God needn’t make a choice regarding which world to actualize, 
and hence, cannot arbitrarily select a world. Can NSBAW be true in virtue of (1): the claim 
that there’s more than one best actualizable world? Yes. The problems encountering this 
scenario only arose when we held AO as true.110 Modal space is not left impoverished if (1) 
is true and AA is true, because God doesn’t actualize (or have to actualize) only one member 
of this group of equally best worlds. God actualizes all, but not only, members of G.  
In summary: if theists adopt AA, they are free to endorse either NSBAW or its 
denial. If they wish to endorse NSBAW, they are able to account for its truth in terms or 
either (1), (2), or (3). For, (1), (2), and (3) are all viable on AA. Therefore, theists should 
replace AO with AA.111 
                                                          
110 There may of course be other reasons for rejecting these positions which have not had a bearing on our 
discussion. 
111 Some authors have recently advocated something similar in spirit to AA in response to the (related) ‘less-
than-best problem’ – the problem that PB entails our world is as good as any other actualizable by God). See, 
e.g., McHarry (1978) and Almeida (2011). This chapter provides a different and significantly more detailed 
argument for the claim that theists should accept GR than the one Almeida gives. Almeida’s paper is mainly 
a defence of that thesis, rather than a positive argument for it. Also see Hudson (2006), whose response is similar 
in spirit, if not in letter. The argument offered here is stronger than the ones these authors offer because 
(unlike theirs) it is buttressed against the response that we could simply deny there’s a best actualizable world. 
Mine shows that problems ensue even if we deny this, given AO. Also, mine differs in that it’s presented as 
an argument against DI. My argument also bears some similarities to that made by Kraay (2010; 2011). §5 
explains why I take his to be invalid and how it differs from mine.  
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Could it be said, though, that the move from the conclusion that AO is untenable 
to the further conclusion that AA is true was too quick? Perhaps there’s a third, yet 
unconsidered, option on the table: that God actualizes more than one, but not all worlds. I 
think we can dismiss this option quite swiftly. If God actualizes some worlds and not others, 
then either there is some principled reason underlying God’s decision to actualize the 
worlds he does, or there isn’t. If there isn’t, then there will be an intolerable arbitrariness in 
God’s choice. However, if there is, then although contingency doesn’t disappear completely, 
we will again leave modal space significantly depleted, which isn’t what we want from a 
modal theory. 
 
4.2. From DI to GR 
The preceding argument was presented as one against DI. However, the main dilemma that 
NSBAW and its negation are both untenable result from AO. Couldn’t partisans of DI 
embrace my argument and reject AO without giving up on their view? At the beginning of 
§4 I said that AO is a commitment of DI since, according to this view, merely possible 
worlds are uninstantiated divine ideas. But, the argument only goes through if the 
proponent of DI has to think this. Why can’t the proponent of DI just say that, after all, the 
collections of divine ideas that make for worlds are not, in the main, uninstantiated? Why 
not say that all worlds are concretely instantiated? Well, if the proponent of DI does say this, 
then they have the worlds (collections of divine cognitions) actualized by God in addition 
to their actualizations: the concrete universes they accurately represent. Only one 
(sufficiently abundant) set of entities is needed to fulfil the truth-conditions for modal 
statements: we need there to be a representation of the way the world could be for every 
way the world could be. Here though we have two sets of entities suitable to play this role. 
If DI and AA are true, then either one of these sets of entities is entirely modally redundant, 
or the truth-conditions for modal statements are doubly met. However, since, in the 
imagined scenario, the universes are explanatorily posterior to the divine cognitions which 
represent them (the divine cognitions explain why the universes are as they are) the right 
thing to say is that the former is true: from a modal perspective at least, God has no reason 
to create universes besides our own. Given this, theists should give up a picture whereby 
universes are concrete instantiations of some sort of prior models and worlds qua divine 
ideas should be rejected. 
 Now, of course, modal semantics doesn’t give us reason to postulate divine mental 
representations of universes, but isn’t there another reason to posit them: so that God’s 
creative intention has content? Plausibly, God’s creation must have been made to instantiate 
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a model, because any genuinely creative and purposive act is the outcome of some (logically) 
prior idea the creator had. If so, these entities are not an unnecessary posit. 
Is the claim that any genuinely creative and purposive act must be the instantiation 
of some prior idea the creator had fully general? It seems not. Consider some of the artwork 
produced by abstract expressionists. Such artworks are often described as ‘spontaneous’, 
‘unplanned’ and ‘subconscious’ – but creations nonetheless; and while it may be retorted 
that even though some abstract expressionist art is in fact carefully planned, there do appear 
to be at least some counterexamples to the claim, suggesting that it can’t be a necessary 
condition of something’s counting as a creation that it be the realization of some fully 
determinate prior intent. So perhaps God spontaneously created the universes which make 
up modal space and never looked to anything as the archetype of his act.  
However, while realization of some prior intent needn’t be a necessary condition of 
human creative acts, it is more plausibly a necessary condition of divine creative acts. For, as 
we said in §3, God is the paradigm rational agent; it just makes no sense to speak of him 
acting without intention and purpose: ‘[d]ivine ideas ensure the full rationality of creation – 
[they ensure that] God knows what he is doing when he creates’ (Robson, 2008: 13).112 Nor 
would it make sense for us to view God as morally impeccable, or to praise him for his 
creative act, if it was ‘spontaneous’ and not wholly intentional. We saw above that such 
intuitions motivate the Euthyphro dilemma: it’s pointless to praise God if it’s trivially true 
that he chose the good. One who agrees with this may well find the claim that the source 
of any value attributed to God’s choices lay in their according with some reason 
compelling.113  
The following should be accommodated by this view. First, while it’s often the case 
that for lesser beings, such as humans, intentions and the results thereof come apart, this is 
not so for God. God is omnipotent and independent. As such, God doesn’t depend on 
there being an absence of defeaters to his intentions for their coming to fruition (we saw 
this in Chapter One). Anything God wills is so, and will be exactly (qualitatively) as he wills 
it to be. Further, if God is timelessly eternal as the classical model has him be, then there 
could be no temporal priority of God’s intentions to their results – God’s creative act is 
timeless. So there are two good reasons to deny that God’s creative act is subsequent to 
antecedent knowledge of a prior model. 
                                                          
112 This assumption is implicit in a dilemma raised by Sheehy (2006). See below. 
113 If one thinks that the moral value of action lies in the intentions of the perpetrator, then one would have 
to think that if God is to be praised for his creation then he must have intended for those consequences to 
come about. If one is a consequentialist on the other hand, and thinks that the value of any action lies entirely 
in its consequences, then it’s hard to see why we should praise God at all. 
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There is another line of argument that we can use to counter the thought that God 
must look to some exemplar to know what to create. That is to appeal to the classical 
theological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, according to which, God created out of sheer 
nothingness. Now, we mere mortals may be able to create things in some ways novel, we are 
rarely able to create anything wholly novel, and we do not ever create wholly from nothing. Aside 
from requiring tools to create with, we mere mortals rely heavily on the world around us 
for inspiration. Even the abstract expressionist who lacks a fully determinate prior idea of 
what they create will be influenced by, e.g., certain colours or emotions. God however, is 
able to create ex nihilo, and needn’t rely on anything to aid his creation, including any kind 
of prior inspiration. So, it would be wrong to impose constraints on human creative action 
onto a being who can create ex nihilo. Once we see that God is, what Mark Ian Thomas 
Robson describes, ‘the radical artist par excellence’ (2008: 187), and recognise the ‘full glory’ 
of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo, we realise we have positive reason to believe that God 
needn’t look to an exemplar to know what to create. ‘Creation is amazing, not because God 
is a good copier, but because creation arose entirely from God’s love and power without 
exemplars and mental mediative material.’ (ibid.: 207). If God were 
 
simply copying from His mind[,] He would be giving external extra-mental reality 
to something that was previously entirely mental. Under this conception of creation, 
God copies out what is in His mind and by doing so gives it an external extra-mental 
reality it once lacked…this account of creation [is] deeply unsatisfying. The notion 
that creation is simply the replication of ideas in actuality seems to reduce God 
merely to a species of photocopier…Where is the novelty or serendipity in that? 
One wonders why God would want to create anything at all, its determinate 
reality…is already there in the region of His understanding…[Hence while] human 
creativity squeezes newness from so much, God pours novelty out of nothing. 
(Robson, ibid.: 11-14.)114 
We’ve said that God should be seen as actualizing all worlds, and that divine mental 
representations of worlds should be dispensed with. Strictly speaking, these two claims are 
inconsistent. If there are no mental (nor abstract) representations of worlds, then there is 
no such thing as world actualization: we do not have many universes and a set of separate 
entities which accurately represented them. So, under the proposed model, we shouldn’t 
say that God actualizes any world. Rather, God just creates a set of universes; these are all 
the possible ones; and they play exactly the same role divine cognitions play under DI. We 
can see, then, that for theists looking to adopt a possible world theory, GR looks well-suited 
to take the place of DI. For, recall that GR (whose canonical presentation is given by Lewis 
                                                          
114 Some working in aesthetics have even advanced a priori arguments to the effect that in a genuinely creative 
process, the end cannot be known by the creator; for in knowing the end, creativity is precluded. See, e.g., 
Tomas (1958), and Beardsley (1965). 
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(1986a)) is a view according to which there is no ontological difference between the cosmos 
we inhabit and those that are merely possible: all possible universes really exist; not just this 
one; and worlds represent different universes by being those universes. This allows theists 
to respect the important result gained from the argument of §3: that God should be seen 
as creating universes besides this one. It just made sense to frame the conclusion in terms 
of multiple worlds being actualized under DI simply because, under DI, by actualizing a 
world, God makes it the case that a particular universe exists.115 
 
4.3. Actuality  
Usually – outside the philosophy room at least – we don’t distinguish between actuality and 
existence. If I say, for example, “no tap-dancing turtle actually exists”, most would take me 
to mean that no such things exist simpliciter. Actualist accounts of worlds make no such 
distinction: according to them, all worlds are parts of actuality. However, unlike actualist 
accounts, possibilist accounts, such as GR, deny that what actually exists and what exists 
simpliciter coincide. Hence, in accepting that multiple universes really exist, the proponent of 
GR is not committed to the claim that more than one universe actually exists. To see this, 
we need to explain that GR takes the term ‘actual’ to be an indexical one: the world which 
is actual to some individual, x, is merely the one x inhabits. Just as the place which is here 
for me is the one I happen to be at, the world which is actual to me is the one which I 
happen to be at. All worlds are ontologically on par, so by saying (truly) that this one is 
actual, one is not saying something which singles out one world (our world) as ontologically 
privileged; one is simply signifying that this is their place in modal space. To say e.g., of a 
tap-dancing turtle that it’s possible but not actual is just to say that a tap-dancing turtle exists 
elsewhere – in some other universe. It’s akin to saying that there is such a thing, but it just 
happens not to be here.  
                                                          
115 In making the above points we undercut a dilemma advanced by Sheehy (2006), which he believes shows 
that theists cannot consistently say of God that he is creator of all worlds whilst adopting GR. His dilemma 
hangs on the assumption that God must create the worlds with some knowledge of their histories; and such 
knowledge requires God to look to some exemplar as archetype of his act – one which is either internal to 
God or external to God. If external, then, says Sheehy, ‘[d]ivine knowledge is dependent on worlds independent 
of the creative role and action of God, thereby suggesting a limitation on the nature of divine knowledge and 
on the nature of God’s creative role.’ (ibid.: 315). That is, since the possibilities are already represented by the 
external model, contra GR, the worlds are (or rather, their existing concretely is) entirely superfluous from a 
modal perspective. God is creating something that is (for want of a better phrase) already there. Further, contra 
theism, something – modality – is independent of God. If internal, then ‘[d]ivine knowledge is not knowledge 
of worlds as they stand independently before God; the worlds do not determine the content of what God 
knows’ (ibid.: 320). By undercutting the thought that God need look to an exemplar for his creative act, the 
dilemma doesn’t get off the ground. 
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Lewis disagrees that the claim that there are things that are not actual renders his view 
incoherent. According to him, the common sense usage of actuality can be sufficiently 
captured by the following three claims: 
  
(4) Everything is actual. 
(5) Actuality consists of everything that is spatio-temporally related to us, and 
 nothing more (give or take some ‘abstract entities’). It is not vastly bigger, 
 or less unified, than we are accustomed to think. 
(6) Possibilities are not parts of actuality, they are alternatives to it. (1986a: 99) 
 
Lewis takes each of these to be on an ‘equal footing’. We saw in §2.3 that some take it to 
be analytic that existence implies actuality. Lewis disagrees. In his view, the above three 
claims taken together ‘fix the meaning of ‘actual’, but they go far beyond just fixing 
meanings. [And Lewis does not] see any evidence that the analyticity is concentrated more 
in some of them than in others.’ (ibid.: 100). If these ‘theses of common sense’ are on an 
equal footing, then the possibilist is no worse off than the actualist in terms of doing 
violence to our ordinary ways of thinking. For, while the possibilist, such as Lewis denies 
(4), they do not deny (6). The actualist, on the other hand, does not deny (4), but they do 
deny (6). And Lewis certainly seems right in saying that our intuition that everything is actual 
is at least no more secure than our intuition that what might have happened doesn’t concern 
how some part of the actual world is.   
 
4.4. GR: Some Further Details  
I’ve said that theists who want to adopt a possible world theory of modality should accept 
GR. I’ve also said that GR is a possibilist account: it takes merely possible worlds to be 
entities that aren’t part of actuality; and which are exactly the same kind of thing as our 
universe. But this far from tells us all we need to know about the account. Here, then, are 
some more details. 
Following Lewis (1986), GR defines its worlds using two key notions: that of being 
an individual, and that of being spatiotemporally related. Suppose that for any collection of 
objects, there is a sum composed of those objects. Further, suppose that any sum of 
individuals is itself an individual. A possible world (universe) is a particular kind of 
individual, and a particular kind of sum of individuals at that. Under GR, an individual, w, is 
a world iff every part of w is spatiotemporally related to every other part of w, and nothing 
spatiotemporally related to w fails to be a part of w (Lewis, ibid.: 1-3). An individual, x, is, 
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then, part of a world, w, iff each part of x is spatiotemporally related to each part of w (ibid.: 
69-81). Anything not spatiotemporally related to x is not part of the same world as x (ibid.). 
Putting this together with the points made in §4.3, any utterance of the form “this world is 
actual” therefore signifies that the world in which the utterance occurs is the one 
spatiotemporally related to the performer of that utterance; what is actual for an individual 
is just whatever is spatiotemporally related to them (ibid.: 92-6). Defining worlds in this way 
is supposed to give us a completely non-modal account of what it is to be a possible world. 
The fact that the word ‘possible’ appears in the name ‘possible world’ does not undermine 
this; as Cameron explains: ‘[t]he fact that the string of letters ‘possible’ appears here is no 
more significant than the fact that the string ‘ham’ appears in ‘hamburger’’ (2012: 2). The 
point is that the key world-defining notions – individual, is spatiotemporally related to, sum, and 
part – are not in any way modal. An individual which is itself a sum of individuals all of 
whom are spatiotemporally related to each other may be labelled with the name ‘possible 
world’, but this is just a matter of stipulation.116 
 How do GR’s worlds represent? De dicto representation is simple. A world w 
represents that p (i.e., p is true at or according to w) iff p is the case at w (ibid.: 5-8).117 For 
example, a world represents that tap-dancing turtles exist by having turtles tap-dance exist 
there: it has them as a part. So, to see what’s true at a world, we just look at a world, and 
see what exists and goes on there. There will, then, be some world at which there are tap-
dancing turtles is true, even though there are some worlds, such as our own, where such things 
fail to exist. This is because in ordinary cases, our quantifiers are restricted to a particular 
portion of reality. However, sometimes we might want our quantifiers to range over 
everything; that is, over all worlds, rather than one. We might do so when we want to talk 
about reality as a whole. Hence, depending upon context, there are tap-dancing turtles may 
                                                          
116 It’s important to note, however, that Lewis (ibid.: 71-8) recognises that, since this spatiotemporality criterion 
has some ‘unwelcome consequences’, it might need to be improved upon. For example, it rules out the 
existence of worlds at which there are disunified spacetimes, or nothing at all. However, the biggest problem 
with the spatiotemporality criterion as it stands, says Lewis (ibid.: 74-5), is that it depends upon there being 
one such thing as the spatiotemporal relation; and perhaps there is no such thing. For example, it could be 
that our world (along with certain others) is relativistic while others are Newtonian. In that case, if this means 
that the spatiotemporal relations we refer to in this world are different to those which exist in the Newtonian 
worlds, then those ‘Newtonian imposters are not to be called ‘spatiotemporal relations’, because that is the 
name we gave to the different relations which hold between the parts of our world.’ (ibid.: 75). Generally, then, 
what we call ‘spatiotemporal relations’ might not be what unifies all worlds; some worlds might be unified by 
analogous, yet different, external relations. In this case, Lewis may instead say that each worlds is analogically 
spatiotemporally unified – i.e., is unified by some set relations which are analogous to the spatiotemporal 
relations which hold in this world (and each other) in being natural, pervasive, discriminating, and external 
(ibid.: 75-6). A second option would involve saying that worlds are unified by some not strictly or analogously 
spatiotemporal natural external relation. This is simpler than the first option, but in being skeptical about the 
existence of the kind of relation it requires, Lewis (ibid.: 77-8), nonetheless finds the first more favourable. 
(More on this issue in Chapter Four.) 
117 De re representation is not so straightforward, but this will be discussed at length in later chapters. 
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express a truth, even when uttered in this world. It may do so when the ‘there are’ is taken 
to range over everything simpliciter; for, there will, of course, be some portion of reality 
where there are such things. The nature of representation, then, also appears to be non-
modal: a world represents that p by having a part at which p; no obvious modality here. 
There is, of course, much more detail we could give to the theory, and more will be added 
across the next few chapters, but this much will suffice for now.  
 Now, there are good reasons to think that theism is incompatible with GR; some 
such reasons are moral, others are metaphysical. However, since theists (who wish to adopt 
a possible world theory) have been given a compelling reason to prefer GR to DI, there is 
good reason for them to seek to reconcile the two positions. I turn, then, to deal with some 
of the most serious of these issues in the chapters that follow. Prior to that, I pause, in §4.6 
below, to flag up one worry with the above argumentative strategy, before assessing an 
argument in some ways similar to it in §5. 
 
4.5. A Tu Quoque? 
I’ve argued that PB is true and considered at length what theists should say in light of PB if 
they accept AO. However, in the interests of fairness, I should likewise consider what theists 
should say in light of the PB if they accept AA. Indeed, it’s important that I should do so, 
for it’s not at all obvious that AA is consistent with PB. Plausibly, the claim that God only 
and always acts for the best is compromised when we suppose (as we do on AA) that God 
creates universes (actualizes worlds) that contain little to no happiness, unimaginably high 
levels of suffering, and other horrendous evils. If PB is true, then shouldn’t it be 
impermissible for God, qua morally perfect and omnipotent being, to actualize worlds that 
don’t meet some minimum standard of goodness? If so, God could not actualize all worlds. 
So modal space will be at least partially depleted after all.118 Some work needs to be done, 
then, to show that it’s possible for both AA and PB to hold. This is one of the problems I 
alluded to above, and it deserves a discussion in its own right. I’ll just note then, that it 
needs to be addressed, and will delay discussion of it until Chapter Five, where some of the 
moral issues facing theists adopting GR will be discussed in more detail. 
   
4.6. Summary of the Argument Against DI  
I’ll sum up the argument. Theists should accept PB. Because of PB, if there is a best 
actualizable world, God must actualize it. This, when – and only when – coupled with AO, 
                                                          
118 I thank an anonymous referee for American Philosophical Quarterly for raising this objection. 
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entails that there’s only really one possible world, and this conclusion will be unacceptable 
to anyone who holds a common sense opinion about what modal facts there are. However, 
each of the three ways it might be false that there’s a best actualizable world are also 
untenable when – and only when119 – coupled with AO: (2) is theologically unacceptable, 
and (1) and (3) are philosophically unacceptable (since they deplete modal space). To avoid 
this dilemma, I recommend that theists favour AA over AO. Since AA sits much more 
favourably with GR than DI, I consequently urge theists to favour GR over DI. 
 
     5.  Kraay ’s Argument for Modal Collapse  
Klaas J. Kraay (2010 and 2011) argues that if there is a best possible world then theism 
entails modal collapse – the thesis that the actual world is the only possible world. He also 
argues that if theism is true, there will be a best possible world, but such a world will be a 
theistic multiverse – a world ‘featuring all and only universes worthy of being created and 
sustained by God’ (2011: 361). The first part of Kraay’s argument thus bears some 
similarities to the one given above. This section explains how Kraay’s argument differs from 
mine. It shows that (i) Kraay’s argument for modal collapse is invalid because it is missing 
a crucial premise; that (ii) Kraay is committed to denying that missing premise, and hence 
cannot supplement his argument with it; and that (iii) Kraay’s argument for the existence of 
the theistic multiverse is no stronger than the arguments against it. The discussion will reveal 
that what I advocate above is an easier and much less controversial route out of the problem 
myself and Kraay are engaging with than the one Kraay offers.120 
 
5.1. Kraay’s Argument  
Below is Kraay’s argument for his first claim – that theists should embrace modal collapse: 
 
If there is a unique unsurpassable world, it is reasonable for the theist to expect 
that…it would be morally unacceptable for God to allow any other world to be 
actual…But if it is morally unacceptable for God to permit any world other than 
the unique best to be actual, it seems that this is the only world that could be actual 
– which is just to say that it is the only possible world. And this means that (if theism 
is true) nothing could possibly be otherwise than it is: total modal collapse ensues. (ibid: 
364) 
 
                                                          
119 To be precise, these positions are untenable for the reasons discussed. 
120 Turner (2003) offers a position which is similar to Kraay’s in several relevant respects. I take the points 
here to apply equally to him. For a detailed critique of Turner see Almeida (2008: 146-53). 
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Kraay (ibid.) suggests that we should take the following set of propositions to be 
inconsistent, and that their inconsistency helps to elucidate his argument: 
 
A1.  Necessarily, there exists a being (God) who is essentially unsurpassable in 
  power,  knowledge, and goodness. 
A2. Every possible world is actual at itself. 
A3.  Necessarily, if w is a possible world, then it is true at w that God permits w 
  to be actual. 
A4.  Necessarily, if it is true at w that God permits w to be actual, it is morally 
  acceptable for God to do so. 
A5.  There is a unique best of all possible worlds. 
A6.  It is not morally acceptable for God to permit a worse world to be actual 
  when a better alternative is available. 
A7.  There are possible worlds other than the unique best.  
 
Some clarification is in order. To begin with, A2 is ambiguous. It might mean to 
express that ‘actual’ is an indexical term: that from the standpoint of each possible world, that world 
(and that world alone) is actual. If GR as presented by Lewis (1986a), this reading of A2 is 
correct; otherwise, it is false. Under any version of actualism, A2 will mean something 
different since, as we’ve seen, under these theories ‘actual’ does not function as an indexical. 
Since these theories identify all worlds with certain constituents of the actual world, all 
worlds are actual (actually exist). However, one world alone is actualized: this is the world 
that represents our concrete universe entirely accurately. All worlds – whether actualised or 
not – do, however, represent themselves as actualised.121 A second possible reading of A2 then, 
one compatible with actualist realism, is that every possible world represents itself as actualised. 
Now, as it turns out, both possible interpretations of A2 – when taken together with the 
right kind of possible world theory – are true. However, since actualist realists do not accept 
the indexical theory of actuality, and since advocates of GR do not employ the predicate ‘is 
actualised’, there is no univocal meaning of A2. That is, there is no possible interpretation 
of A2 that could be accepted by possible world theorists of all types. We will, then, have to 
pick one interpretation and move on. Let’s go with the second reading and construe A2 as 
B2, stated below: 
 
                                                          
121 Indeed this turns out to be a theorem of actualist realist theories such as Plantingian actualist realism. 
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B2. Every possible world represents itself as actualised. 
 
Since that which some world represents as being the case is possibly the case, what B2 tells 
us – and this, I take it, is what Kraay’s B2 is meant to tell us – is that every possible world 
is possibly actualised.  
If B2 is the taken reading of A2 then some form of actualist realism will need to be 
accepted. Now, as noted, under actualist realism, all worlds (abstract representations) 
actually exist, and what actually exists exists simpliciter. Thus, saying that God permits worlds 
to be actual is equivalent to saying that God permits worlds to exist. The worlds (abstract 
representations) do exist, so it can’t be God’s ability to permit worlds to be actual that is at 
issue here, but his ability to permit them to be actualised. What is of concern is what kind of 
concrete universe God could create; and by permitting a certain concrete universe to exist, God 
permits a certain world (abstract representation) to be actualised.  Thus, in A3, A4 and A6, 
we must read Kraay as saying actualised where he says ‘actual’: 
 
B3.  Necessarily, if w is a possible world, then it is true at w that God permits w 
  to be actualised. 
 B4. Necessarily, if it is true at w that God permits w to be actualised, it is morally 
  acceptable for God to do so. 
 B6. It is not morally acceptable for God to permit a worse world to be actualised
  when a better alternative is available. 
 
I will refer to the new set of clarified statements as B1 - B7 (B1, B5, and B7 remain 
unchanged from A1, A5 and A7, respectively). Kraay doesn’t offer an explanation as to why 
A1 - A7 are inconsistent, so we can’t reconstruct his reasoning to explain why B1 - B7 
should be taken as such. However, Kraay must have had in mind something along the 
following lines: by B5 there is a unique best possible world w*; by B7 there are possible 
worlds other than w*; by B3 it’s true at these worlds that God permits them to be actualised; 
and by B4 it’s morally acceptable for him to do so. Yet, by B6 (which, presumably, is 
supported by B1), it’s morally unacceptable for him to do so.122  
B2 didn’t feature in the above explanation and it’s far from clear how it could have 
possibly done so. B2 tells us that all possible worlds represent themselves as actualised and 
hence tells us that all possible worlds are possibly actualised. Yet, ‘…is possibly actualised’ 
                                                          
122 To be more precise, I’m assuming that Kraay would have reasoned through A1 - A7 in a parallel fashion. 
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is a monadic predicate and the predicate ‘…permits…to be actualised’ which features in B3, 
B4, and B6 is dyadic. Since it is the dyadic predicate that does all the work in this argument, 
we should ignore B2 as irrelevant.123  
Since B1 - B7 are jointly inconsistent, theists who accept B5 face a dilemma: reject 
B6, or reject B7.124 Rejecting B7 requires a dramatic revision in modal intuitions, since it 
follows from the denial of B7 that everything that is the case is necessarily the case – total 
modal collapse (2011: 364). Rejecting B6 either requires a dramatic revision in the traditional 
conception of God, or it requires the theist to ‘give up compelling moral intuitions’ (ibid.). 
For, if B6 is false, then it is acceptable for God to do less than best. On the face of it, both 
of these options have consequences theists would want to resist. However, Kraay later 
makes the case that ‘modal collapse may well be less serious than might initially be 
supposed’ (2011: 365), and therefore urges theists to accept the second horn and reject B7. 
Theists who believe B5 and B6, says Kraay, should accept that the unique best world is the 
only possible world. 
The argument takes a conditional form: if B5 and B6 are true, then B7 is false (modal 
collapse). To get us to accept the consequent, then, Kraay must get us to accept B5 which 
features in the antecedent. Kraay (2011: 365-6) offers the following support for B5. First, 
multiverses – worlds that comprise more than one universe – are logically possible;125 
second, God, being unsurpassable in knowledge, power and goodness, will ‘create and 
sustain all and only those universes worth creating and sustaining’ (2011: 365); third, there’s 
one possible world at which God does do so – call such a world a theistic multiverse; fourth, 
by the identity of indiscernibles, at most one world is a theistic multiverse; lastly, the theistic 
multiverse is an unsurpassable world. For, any world distinct from it must fail to comprise 
all and only universes worth creating and sustaining.  
Since Kraay has argued that the theistic multiverse is the best possible world and 
that, under theism, if there is a best possible world, it is the only possible world, it therefore 




                                                          
123 If B2 did have a role to play, the argument would be invalid. 
124 For, Kraay is of the opinion that theists are committed to B1, and that B2, B3 and B4 ‘seem unimpeachable’ 
(2011: 363). 
125 Multiverses are not to be viewed as containers for universes (2011: 365). Rather, each multiverse comprises 
a collection of God-created universes together with whatever uncreated entities there may be (e.g., numbers, 
and, of course, God himself); and no multiverse is anything over and above those entities it comprises. 
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5.2. How Does Kraay Propose to Recover Contingency?  
Kraay suggests that the fact that the only possible world turns out to be a theistic multiverse 
provides the theist with a way of avoiding the dissolution of contingency modal collapse 
initially appears to require. For, the universes the theistic multiverse comprises can be 
utilised to provide a semantics for modality: 
 
[T]o say that things could be otherwise is just to say that there is another 
spatiotemporally distinct universe in which things are otherwise. Universes…can 
vary in all sorts of ways…and these variances can perhaps anchor many of the 
familiar modal claims whose intelligibility seemed threatened by the claim that there 
is only one possible world. In fact, this picture of modality – on which modal claims 
are understood to refer to concrete, spatiotemporally isolated universes – is 
strikingly similar to a well-known theory of modality: David Lewis’s modal realism. 
(2011: 366-7)  
 
Now, Kraay maintains from the outset that possible worlds are multiverses 
(collections of universes). He cannot, then, be meaning to suggest that universes now be 
understood to be possible worlds: to say that possible worlds are both multiverses and the 
universes they comprise would be incoherent.126 Kraay is telling us that modal truth should 
now be evaluated in terms of what concrete spatiotemporally isolated universes there are, 
even though those universes aren’t possible worlds.  
It’s hard to know what to make of this suggestion, especially since it’s not developed 
in any detail in either of Kraay’s papers. A possible world theory of modality usually tells us 
that possible worlds represent the different ways things might have been and thereby provide 
a grounding for modal truth. Kraay’s way of recovering contingency forces him to part ways 
with this: universes, not possible worlds, are doing the work here.127 Firstly, then, since 
possibility and contingency have nothing to do with what possible worlds exist, but with 
what universes exist, one may well wonder in what sense Kraay’s ‘possible worlds’ are really 
deserving of that name. Kraay began speaking as if possible worlds represent ways things 
might have been, but now he’s telling us that universes do. Perhaps Kraay has in mind that 
possible worlds represent possibilities for modal space itself (though, if this is his view, he 
doesn’t make it clear that it is). If that is what Kraay intends, however, we should be reluctant 
to accept that the position he claims to have reached is really modal collapse. At best, the 
position reached would be best described as meta-modal collapse: the thesis that total modal 
space could not have been otherwise. But this would not be a new position to have reached; 
                                                          
126 Consider: any proposition would then be possibly true iff it’s the case according to a universe or a 
multiverse, thereby leading us to contradictions. 
127 For Lewis worlds are universes, but not so for Kraay. 
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indeed, this thesis has already been advocated (see, e.g., Divers (1999)). Perhaps Kraay 
would respond that there really is no problem here: that there being only one possible world 
no longer requires modal collapse is precisely the line he’s advocating. However, the point 
remains that, if it’s universes, not worlds, that do the modal work, then Kraay is wrong to 
describe the position as modal collapse; at the very least, this is false advertising.128 
A further quandary arises when we consider what is supposed to be ‘actual’ on 
Kraay’s view. Kraay has said that the actual world consists of many universes. The universe 
of which we are a part, then, is not (as we normally suppose it is) the full extent of actuality: 
actuality includes universes besides our own. This has unacceptable consequences. When I 
say, e.g., “I’m actually writing this sentence”, my utterance will be both true and false: true 
according to this part of actuality (our universe); false according to another. To avoid this, 
two different notions of actuality could be admitted: universe-relative-actuality (what’s 
actual from the perspective of the universe of which one is a part), and actuality-simpliciter 
(what’s actual from the perspective of the world one’s a part of). Again, it’s hard to tell 
whether this is what Kraay in fact intends, since he says nothing about this issue; but it 
certainly seems Kraay should say this, if contradictions are to be avoided. Is there a problem, 
then, if Kraay can make this kind of move? Perhaps not. But it should be noted that here 
we have another way in which Kraay’s theory will be much more revisionary than he would 
have us believe. Put more generally, the second point is this: if Kraay’s multiverse view is 
to be shown to be a coherent and viable option for theists, much more needs to be done to 
spell out, inter alia, precisely what role worlds are supposed to play; whether a two-tier 
system of modality is what is intended; to what the ‘actuality’ operator applies, etc. 
 I will momentarily postpone further assessment of Kraay’s attempt to recover 
contingency; other critical points I wish to raise tie in with my assessment of his argument 
for modal collapse, which I now turn to discuss. 
 
5.3. Objections to Kraay’s Argument  
Has Kraay successfully shown that theism entails modal collapse? I suggest not. Firstly, 
there is not a relation of entailment between the antecedent and the consequent of Kraay’s 
conditional claim that ‘if B5 and B6 are true, then B7 is false’. Suppose there is a unique 
best world, w*. Can there be possible worlds other than w* even if it’s morally impermissible 
for God to permit a worse world to be actualised when a better alternative is available? In 
                                                          
128 Perhaps, if all we mean by ‘modal collapse’ is that there’s only one possible world, and a possible world is 
allowed to be anything we bestow with that name, regardless of whether it is identified with a most inclusive 
way things might have been, then we may concede that it’s true to the letter that what we have here is modal 
collapse; but it will certainly not be true to the spirit of the phrase that that’s what we have.  
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other words, can it be that – contra what Kraay says – B7 could be true, even when B5 and 
B6 (and B1 - B4) are? Well, yes. As we saw in §3 and §4, if God can permit at most one world 
to be actualised, then, if B5 (there is a unique best world), and B6 (it’s morally impermissible 
for God to permit a worse world to be actualised when a better alternative is available), it 
certainly would follow that there are no possible worlds other than the unique best (B7 would 
be false). For, if God can permit only one world to be actualised, then, if there is an 
objectively best possible world, w*, God could not permit any world distinct from w* to be 
actualised on pain of failing to do the best thing. (And God as characterised by B1 can’t fail to act 
for the best.) Now, since God can’t permit worlds distinct from w* to be actualised, then 
since – by B3 – a world is only possible if God permits it to be actualised, worlds distinct 
from w* are not possible.  
However, if God can permit more than one world to be actualised, then, even though 
B6 and B5 are true, God can permit worlds distinct from w* to be actualised without 
contravening B6 because such worlds are not alternatives to w*: such worlds may be 
actualized in addition to w*. Less-than-best does not supplant the best in such a scenario, 
meaning that God’s permitting worlds distinct from w* to be actualised (B7) is not 
inconsistent with B6. Therefore, B1 - B7 are only incompatible when coupled with the 
further assumption that:  
 
B8.  God can permit at most one world to be actualised.  
 
Since Kraay’s argument doesn’t include B8, it’s invalid.  
 Put another way, what modal collapse (MC) requires is that: 
 
      MC: There is a world w* such that God must actualise w*, and there is no world, 
  w, distinct from w* such that God could actualise w.  
 
Yet, as we can see, MC is true (when and) only when, not only is there a world such that 
God must actualize it, but B8 is also true.  
Kraay’s argument could be made valid by inserting B8. However, Kraay makes 
assertions that are at odds with B8. Recall that Kraay said God will ‘create and sustain all 
and only those universes worth creating and sustaining’. Any reason for thinking that God 
would create all universes worth creating would count equally in favour of God creating all 
multiverses worth creating. On the one hand then, Kraay’s attempt to recover contingency 
puts B8 off limits. On the other hand, if Kraay does accept B8, he won’t be able to recover 
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ordinary modal distinctions in the way he suggests. B8 tells us that God can permit at most 
one world (multiverse) to be actualised. If God can permit at most one multiverse to be 
actualized, then we should equally expect that God can permit at most one universe to be 
actualized. Yet, absent a principled reason for thinking that the principle won’t apply when 
Kraay identifies ways things might have been with universes, the very problem Kraay was 
seeking to resolve will re-arise: we’ll get modal collapse at the level of universes. Since no 
such reason is forthcoming, Kraay is left with a dilemma: accept B8 as a premise and have 
a valid argument, but then ordinary modal distinctions can’t be recovered (leaving Kraay 
unable to avoid the problem he initially introduced); or, don’t accept B8, in which case, the 
argument is invalid and so doesn’t give theists reason to accept modal collapse. (Further, 
although the above shows that Kraay has (by his own lights) reason to deny B8, in Chapter 
Five we’ll examine a separate argument to the effect that theists have reason to deny this 
assumption Kraay needs.) 
 
5.4. B5 is Unmotivated 
The second objection is that theists have no more reason to accept B5 which occurs in the 
antecedent of Kraay’s conditional premise than to reject it. Kraay’s only reason for thinking 
that such a theistic multiverse is possible is that such a multiverse is conceivable. However, it’s 
equally conceivable that there is no such multiverse. To begin with, it’s conceivable that 
disconnected spacetimes are impossible.129 Further, Kraay has simply stipulated that it’s 
possible that there’s a multiverse that contains all and only universes worth creating. But 
it’s epistemically possible that no multiverse does so. It’s conceivable that for every 
multiverse that comprises universes worth creating, there’s another multiverse that 
comprises one more universe worth creating; so that there’s no single best multiverse 
(world); rather, there is an infinite sequence of improving worlds. Kraay has failed to rule 
out these epistemic possibilities, so the case for thinking a theistic multiverse is possible is 
at least no stronger than the case for thinking a theistic multiverse is impossible; theists have 
been given no compelling reason to accept the antecedent of Kraay’s conditional premise.130 
 
 
                                                          
129 See Almeida (2008: 146-64) for some doubts concerning the possibility of a multiverse and the possibility 
of a theistic multiverse. 
130 Further, although Kraay has given us one necessary condition on something’s counting as a possible world 
(he says its contents (constituent universes) must be logically compossible), he has failed to specify what the 
world-making relation is on the view that worlds are multiverses. What could it be? By hypothesis, 
spatiotemporal-relatedness won’t do. Further, since multiverses are comprised of spatiotemporally disjoint 
universes, what principled reason could there be for taking one particular combination of spatiotemporally 
disjoint universes to make for a multiverse, and another not? 
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5.5. Another Tu Quoque 
Suppose Kraay’s arguments were successful. In that case, Kraay would not be able to provide 
theists with a way out of the problem he initially introduced. For (and this relates back to a 
point made in §4.1), the arguments Kraay gives could be run again to give us the conclusion 
that there is only one universe. Any reason the theist could have for thinking there is a best 
possible multiverse would be an equally good reason for thinking that there is a best possible 
universe; and if it’s morally unacceptable for God to permit any possible multiverse other 
than the unique best to be actualised, then equally again, it should be morally unacceptable 
for God to permit any possible universe other than the unique best to be actualized, meaning 
that modal collapse ensues once more. Conversely, if theists have reason to think that 
there’s a multiplicity of possible universes worthy of creation by God, then they should 
have equal reason to think that there’s a multiplicity of possible multiverses worthy of 
actualization by God. Unless, of course, there’s a principled reason for thinking that the 
cases are relevantly disanalogous. But Kraay has provided us with no such reason; and it’s 
hard to see what reason there could be. 
 
5.6. A Better Solution 
Theists who believe there is a best possible world are not thereby left without a solution to 
the initial problem (that, since it’s not morally acceptable for God to permit a worse world 
to be actualised when a better alternative is available, we get modal collapse). The solution 
was outlined in §4: deny B8. Once theists take exception to B8, then, even supposing that 
there is a best possible world and God must actualise it, since God may actualise other 
worlds in addition, modal collapse needn’t ensue. That way of resolving the problem is 
much simpler, and much less controversial, than Kraay’s. 
 
     6.  The Intrinsicness Paradox Revisited  
Having argued that theists should reject DI in favour of GR, something now needs to be 
said to redress the paradox of intrinsicness advanced in Chapter One. There we saw that 
there are two general reasons to think that the various divine perfections must be intrinsic 
to God; but, as it turns out, many divine perfections could not be intrinsic to anything. DI 
was advanced as a way of circumventing this problem: if modal truths are grounded in 
divine cognitions, then possession of the divine-making properties no longer depends upon 
fulfilment of certain extrinsic conditions. However, if theists cannot accept DI (given PB), 
then the intrinsicness paradox remains unresolved. In this section, I advance a different 
solution, one which is available to those who don’t accept DI. 
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6.1. Aseity Again 
Since the doctrine of divine aseity is part of what drives the intrinsicness paradox, we should 
subject it to some scrutiny. It’s important to ask: just what does it take for a thing to be 
absolutely independent? 
Surprisingly, this question’s received little by way of detailed investigation in the 
contemporary literature.131 While it’s a commonplace that aseity is, as Leftow puts it, the 
property of being ‘in some sense independent of all else’ (2003: 270, emphasis added), this is 
not particularly informative. A little more helpfully we might characterise the doctrine of 
aseity as the conjunction of the claims that ‘God does not depend on anything distinct from 
Himself for his existing’ (Gould 2014: 2) and that God is ‘independent from all other things 
for his being the being he is’, (Mann 1983: 268). Still, though, detail is lacking. In order to 
have a genuine understanding of aseity we require, at a minimum, an understanding of 
precisely what kind(s) of independence is (or are) relevant here. Certainly, God must be 
causally independent, but this is clearly insufficient for genuine aseity. After all, it’s 
consistent with an individual’s being uncaused (or self-caused) that it later be destroyed by 
something outside of itself, or be the subject of some non-causal dependence relations.  
While most of those discussing aseity happily stop at the general outline offered 
above, a small number of authors have recently attempted to clarify precisely what it is for 
God to be independent in the relevant sense(s). Walter Matthews Grant (2015), Jeffrey 
Brower (2009) and Alexander Pruss (2008) all say that it’s sufficient for God to be a se that 
he does not depend on anything else for what he is intrinsically. Again though, more needs 
to be said here. As seen previously, it’s a commonly accepted platitude about intrinsic 
                                                          
131 We should be surprised since the aseity doctrine has played such a central role in the development of 
classical theism. The idea that a perfect being must be maximally independent is often employed as a 
justification for postulating numerous other divine attributes. An a se being, it has been claimed, must not only 
be eternal, uncreated, and self-sufficient, but also necessary, omnipotent, simple, immutable, and free. The 
following reasons are often cited. Created entities depend causally on their creators; and facts concerning the 
existence of contingent beings must be explained; this means contingent beings depend for their existence 
upon whatever it is that explains them. Further, since God exists in a non-contingent manner, it follows that 
he is eternal; and so God’s eternality too is explained by his aseity. Think also of God’s being incorporeal. 
Leaving aside the complications of the trinity, God is without physical form because – unlike less perfect 
individuals – whose existence, presence, and ability to act in the world relies on their material bodies – God’s 
does not. Perhaps even the more familiar divine properties can be thought to follow from aseity. Plausibly, 
what makes God free is that he exists independently of any constraints; and what makes God omniscient is 
that he exists independently of any possible barriers to possible types of knowledge. A second reason we 
should be surprised is that aseity is also a key component in many of the problems discussed within philosophy 
of religion: as we’ve seen, it underlies one half of the Euthyphro dilemma (we don’t want to say that God 
depends on The Good); it’s also, as noted, the chief motivation for simplicity, and therefore for all the 
problems that go with it. To this list we could add the problems associated with divine immutability and 
timelessness; Platonism; and so on. Most discussions associated with aseity tend to focus on these issues – i.e., 
its relation to other divine attributes and theistic paradoxes, rather than on how to analyse the term. 
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properties that they are possessed independently of an object’s surroundings. Hence, if this 
is all these authors intend, their claim is a mere truism insufficient for characterising aseity.  
Beyond these remarks, most other characterisations have included the claim that 
for God to be a se is for God to bear absolutely no dependence relations.132 For example, Brower 
reports Aquinas as being of the view that ‘[i]f God exists entirely a se, he cannot depend on 
anything in any way at all.’ (2009: 107); Brian Davies says that something is a se if ‘it does not 
depend for its existence on anything else…[I]f anything is God, it owes its existence to 
nothing...’ (1985: 111); Leftow says that for God to be a se is for nothing outside God to explain 
God’s existence (2010: 27); and Plantinga also takes it that an a se being possesses 
‘uncreatedness, self-sufficiency, and independence of everything else…’ According to him, ‘[m]ost 
Christians claim that… God…depends upon nothing at all.’ (1980: 1-2); most strongly, 
Douglas Pratt claims that ‘[a]seity denies any form of dependence’ (1989: 14), ‘God exists in 
a unique way – not because anything else exists or because any conditions are met, but absolutely 
independently of any other thing or state of affairs…There are no causes or conditions for God’s existence’ 
(1984: 42). Why might these authors have made these claims? Brower notes that ‘both 
Augustine and Anselm defend divine aseity on the grounds that dependency on another is always 
an imperfection, and hence must be excluded from our conception of God’ (2009: 107). 
For example, in his Proslogion, Anselm reasons that a thing is more perfect to the extent that 
it is self-sufficient. So it’s taken as something of an axiom, then that any dependence relation 
confers an imperfection on the dependee, and this is supposed to explain why God – being 
maximally perfect – must be in absolutely no way dependent.  
 Is the property of bearing absolutely no dependence relations one that could 
possibly be instantiated, though? A simple argument by reductio ad absurdum shows that it is 
not; this way understanding of aseity renders it an incoherent attribute: 
 
P3.  An a se being bears absolutely no dependence relations; it is unqualifiedly 
  independent. (Supposition for reductio)  
P4.  Being unqualifiedly independent is an extrinsic property. 
P5.  Properties possessed in an extrinsic manner are possessed in a dependent 
  manner. 
P6.  Any individual who possesses the property being unqualifiedly independent bears 
  at least one dependence relation.  
C2. An a se being is not unqualifiedly independent.  
                                                          
132 Emphasis added to the quotes that follow. 
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To remove the contradiction, one of the initial assumptions must be rejected. P5, 
being something of an analytic truth, is definitely safe. P4 is also undeniable: some x’s 
bearing absolutely no dependence relations is at least partially grounded in how things stand 
in x’s surroundings. So the only remaining option is to deny P3. This premise is motivated 
by the thought that for any individual, x, and for any way of being dependent, D, x’s bearing 
D constitutes an imperfection in x. However, if it’s necessarily true that nothing could bear 
absolutely no dependence relations, then it’s false that any way of being dependent 
constitutes an imperfection in the dependee; elsewise, absolute perfection would be 
incoherent. So aseity should not be characterised in terms of something’s bearing absolutely 
no dependence relations; and we shouldn’t consider it incompatible with God’s perfection 
were he to feature as a dependee in at least some dependence relation(s). Indeed, the above 
argument shows that God must stand in at least some such relation(s). Most importantly, 
though, it shows that aseity itself is a globally extrinsic attribute: it at least partly consists in 
its bearer’s lacking some kinds of dependence relations to things outside of itself. To see 
why this is important in addressing the intrinsicness paradox, recall that the following was 
a key assumption in the argument from aseity which partly motivated it: 
 
IA:133 Any individual who possesses aseity possesses the properties that constitute 
  its nature in an independent (and so intrinsic) manner. 
 
Since aseity is part of God’s nature (indeed many view it as the very cornerstone of God’s 
nature), and since aseity is itself globally extrinsic, IA must be false. It cannot be that for 
any x, x possesses aseity only if x possesses the properties that constitute its nature in an 
intrinsic manner if aseity is also part of that x’s nature! Hence, the argument from aseity 
must be unsound.  
In his discussion of divine aseity, Mann writes that ‘[r]easonable theists can wrangle 
philosophically about some of [the] dimensions of aseity. Some of these quarrels will, I 
suspect, begin with the question, Do we really need to think of God as independent in that 
respect?’ (2005: 57-8). I suggest that here is an appropriate place to end by asking that 
question. We’ve identified some dependence relations God must bear in order to be 
maximally perfect. But, certainly, we should not prefer that God does not bear them. As 
we’ve seen, these kinds of dependencies just are what makes for perfection, not imperfection. 
 
 
                                                          
133 ‘IA’ stands for ‘Independence Assumption’. 
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6.2. Essence Again 
The argument from aseity wasn’t the only argument advanced for the claim that the divine-
making properties must be intrinsic, though. The argument from essence was also given in 
support of this claim. This argument had the following as its key premise: 
 
EA:134 If any F is essential to some x (is part of x’s nature), then F is intrinsic to x.  
 
§6.1 shows that aseity is another part of God’s nature which turns out not to be intrinsic to 
him. Given EA, this result could be viewed as adding to the problems for theism. However, 
another way to view the result would be to say that it provides additional evidence against 
EA. Again: one person’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens, and this may simply be 
a case where theists have overwhelming reason to think that modus tollens wins. If EA is 
true, then aseity, omnipotence, etc., must be intrinsic to God (hence: paradox). However, 
since aseity, omnipotence, etc., are not intrinsic to God, EA must be false (paradox 
dissolved). EA might seem well motivated before we examine the various divine 
perfections, but since it flies in the face of some of the most central theistic commitments, 
theists have good reason to think it false. The argument in §6.1 showed not only that the 
additional reason for taking God’s nature-making properties to be intrinsic to him must be 
misguided, it also showed that it’s strictly impossible for aseity etc., to be intrinsic to God. 
Hence, since EA is now the only reason theists have for thinking that God’s nature-making 
properties are intrinsic to him, and, since that God possesses these properties is absolutely 
unassailable for theists, EA has to go. 
 
6.3. Powers Again 
Finally, something needs to be said to address the argument from power-possession. I 
argued that omnipotence must be intrinsic because if it weren’t, God wouldn’t be as 
powerful as he could possibly be. However, since the argument shows that omnipotence 
must be intrinsic to its bearers (and since the notions of essence and aseity no longer give us 
any reason to think otherwise), the most powerful that anything could possibly be is 
extrinsically omnipotent. Therefore, since there’s no possibility of being more powerful than 




                                                          
134 ‘EA’ stands for ‘essence assumption’. 
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6.4. How Should We View God’s Nature?  
There’s significant philosophical reason for theists to abandon the commonplace 
assumption that God’s nature is intrinsic to him. The orthodox view should be replaced 
with one whereby God’s nature is seen as deeply and importantly bound up with the world 
that surrounds him. Part of what it is for something to be God is for it to stand in certain 
relations to its surroundings, so it’s wrong to think that God’s nature can be properly 
understood without taking into consideration how the world is apart from him. Aseity, then, 
should rather be seen as the property of being free from certain kinds of dependence 
relations.  
 This type of strategy – restricting the scope of a divine property in the face of certain 
paradoxes – should not be unfamiliar to theists. Consider omnipotence. I said in the 
previous chapter that almost no-one accepts that possession of this property amounts to 
having the power to do anything simpliciter; for otherwise, problems loom. Similarly, others 
deny that divine omniscience must be taken to be the property of knowing everything 
simpliciter (see, e.g., Leftow (1990b: 314-5)). It’s surprising that analogous moves haven’t 
been made in the face of the difficulties which arise out of taking divine independence to 
be unrestricted. On the contrary, theologians and philosophers of religion have been keen 
to uphold the unrestricted independence thesis at all costs. However, we’ve seen that it’s 
wrong to do so. Considering God to be independent without qualification is at least as 
incoherent as supposing that God can do anything without restriction.135 For some kinds 
of dependence relations, then, the bearing of them no more constitutes an imperfection 
than does the inability to perform certain specifiable tasks. 
The question of which types of dependencies maximal perfection does preclude thus 
remains unanswered. Although it’s beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a 
comprehensive answer that question, there will later be discussions where the notion of 
divine aseity will have a bearing. For the purposes of those discussions, then, we should say 
at least something positive about what aseity might require.  
One thing we could usefully note here is that the divine-making properties have 
been shown to be extrinsic in the following sense: possession of them depends upon (is at 
least partly grounded in) an absence of certain kinds of impossibilia. So we might be tempted 
to say that God’s nature is independent in the following sense: possession of it is 
independent of the presence of any particular kinds of possibilia. However, the impossibility 
                                                          
135 Perhaps it’s even more incoherent than that. There’s an easy answer to the ‘can God create a task he cannot 
do?’ type of question, and that’s to say that if God can do anything, including the impossible, then of course 
he can create a task he cannot do and yet still be omnipotent! 
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(and so absence) of any particular impossibilia depends on what modal space is like most 
globally: something is impossible iff it doesn’t appear in any possible world. (This is 
precisely what enabled the DIist response to the intrinsicness paradox described in §2.6.) 
So, given that the impossibility (and hence absence) of any particular impossibilia depends 
on what possibilia are possible, we can’t drive a wedge between the two and say that God 
is dependent upon the absence (impossibility) of certain kinds of impossibilia but not upon 
the presence (possibility) of possibilia.  
Nonetheless, my contention is that aseity can sensibly be seen as demanding that 
God’s nature be intrinsic in the following respect: it doesn’t depend on the actuality or non-
actuality of any possibilia. This does drive a wedge, and filters out the dependencies which we 
have described God as having to bear, for those required the actual absence of certain 
impossibilia (and the absence of certain impossibilia from non-actual worlds). Further, this 
captures what is surely (at least one of) the key senses in which God is more independent 
than non-divine things. What separates God from non-divine things in terms of 
independence is that non-divine things are, by their very nature, ontologically dependent upon 
God: so any non-divine thing, x, is by nature such that God is actually present. God, 
however, is not by his very nature, ontologically dependent on any non-divine thing, and 
so, is not by his nature such that any particular non-divine thing is present.  
If I’m right that this is, after all, what was really important for us to capture, then 
since we have, thus far, not had any reason to think that God’s nature isn’t independent in 
this respect, we could just introduce a new term – call it *-intrinsicness defined thus: 
 
(8) F is *-intrinsic to x iff neither the actual presence of something(s), nor the actual 
absence of any possible thing(s) distinct from x partially grounds the fact that x is F.  
 
Given this, whilst it’s strictly-speaking false to say that the divine-making properties are 
intrinsic to God (and so, wrong to think that aseity demands this), we can speak truly when 
we say that aseity requires God’s nature-comprising properties to be possessed *-intrinsically 
as defined by (8). 
 
     7.  Conclusion 
§2 showed that DI has a number of virtues in its favour which make it look prima facie more 
amenable to theism: in addition to giving theists wanting to adopt a possible world theory 
of modality a way to respect the sovereignty thesis; it also offers theists a solution to the 
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paradox of intrinsicness advanced in Chapter One. DI also has certain theoretical 
advantages over other ersatz accounts of possible worlds: its worlds are concrete, rather 
than abstract; and there’s less mystery surrounding the question of how its worlds represent. 
Most importantly though, it looks to have an at least not implausible claim on being able to 
reduce the modal to the non-modal. However, §3 showed that theists should accept PB, 
and this makes DI untenable: PB requires that, if there is a best actualizable world, God 
must actualize it; and this, when – and only when – coupled with AO, gives rise to modal 
collapse. However, each of the three ways it might be false that there’s a best actualizable 
world are also untenable when – and only when – coupled with AO. §4 argued that to avoid 
this dilemma, theists should replace AO with AA. Since AA fits better with GR than DI, 
theists should accept GR over DI. §5 evaluated a similar line of argument from Kraay and 
found it wanting. This discussion highlighted that the ‘multiverse’ solution to the ‘less-than-
best’ problem is not preferable to the proposal that theists adopt GR; it also showed 
precisely what would be needed to reach the conclusion that theism entails modal collapse.  
Theists adopting GR cannot respond to the intrinsicness paradox in the same way 
as proponents of DI. However, §6 showed that the paradox can nonetheless be dissolved 
in a different way: by restricting divine independence. Nonetheless, a number of issues must 
be worked through before we can conclude that GR is viable under theism. We turn then, 














     1.  Introduction 
If theists subscribe to a GRist theory of worlds of the kind Lewis advocates, then they must 
decide what God’s relation is to the worlds it posits. There are at least two types of relation 
we might be interested in. One, given classical theism’s commitment to the thesis of divine 
sovereignty, we might wonder whether God can be in any sense causally responsible for the 
existence of these worlds; if not, might there be some form of non-causal dependency of 
the worlds upon God? Two, we might ask where God is located in respect to these 
worlds.136 There are three available answers to this second question: (i) God exists in – that 
is, literally inhabits – all worlds, (ii) God exists only in some worlds, and (iii) God exists in 
no worlds. How can theists decide which is true? At least two factors will bear on the answer 
given. First, since it’s a central tenet of classical theism that God exists necessarily, the 
answer given must allow for the truth of the following proposition: 
 
N:  God necessarily exists. 
 
It must also, of course, allow that God (necessarily) possesses the other divine perfections. 
Second, what answer can be given might be constrained by the theist’s prior commitment 
(should they have one) to the question of God’s spatiotemporality. For, as we’ve seen, GR 
defines worlds as maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally related individuals; these 
spatiotemporally related individuals are its parts. Hence, an individual, x, exists in a world, 
w, iff x is a part of w; and x is a part of w iff x is a spatiotemporally related individual – one who 
has all of its parts spatiotemporally related to other parts of w and none of its parts 
spatiotemporally related to anything not in w. As such, if the theists takes God to be non-
spatiotemporal, only option (iii) is available to them; if the theist takes God to be 
spatiotemporal then they must maintain either (i) or (ii). 
                                                          
136 I use the term ‘where’ loosely, since if God is non-spatiotemporal, he’ll have no location in the ordinary 
sense of the word. 
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What are theists to do, though, if these two guiding factors come into conflict? 
What if, for example, they take God to be spatiotemporal, but neither (i) nor (ii) is 
compatible with N; and what if they take God to be non-spatiotemporal, but (iii) is 
incompatible with N? I think that, in such scenarios, accommodating the truth of N should 
take precedence over any prior commitments to the question of God’s spatiotemporality. 
For, while there have been some (e.g., J.N. Findlay (1948)) who’ve found the concept of a 
necessarily existing being absurd, necessary existence is traditionally thought to be contained 
in the very concept of an absolutely perfect being,137 and this fact plays an important role 
in natural theology.138 The question of God’s spatiotemporality, however, is not so easily 
decidable. For, while divine timelessness has a strong pedigree: Boethius, Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Anselm all advocated the view; as have a number of prominent contemporary 
philosophers of religion – such as, Leftow (1991), and Stump and Kretzmann (1981); and 
while such authors take it that being non-spatiotemporal follows from perfection just as 
divine necessity does (see, e.g., McCann (1993) for some unwelcome features of divine 
temporality),139 if God is non-spatiotemporal, then one faces significant difficulties in 
explaining how God can be related to the world, act within it, cause anything, respond to 
free creaturely action, or perhaps even experience thought.140 For this reason, in advocating 
divine atemporality, Leftow, Stump, and Kretzmann have made sure to insist that God’s 
timeless eternity possesses some of the features of temporal duration. However, despite 
their efforts, the idea of a timeless duration looks plainly contradictory.141 So, we can say that, 
in comparison to necessary existence, if divine timelessness does follow from absolute 
perfection, it is at the least not so obvious and uncontroversial that it does. With this in 
mind, I submit that N is not – and divine spatiotemporality is – negotiable for the theist. 
Over the next two chapters, I examine what the theist’s answer to the question of 
what God’s relation to the worlds GR posits should be solely by considering which of (i), 
(ii) or (iii) best accounts for N and the other divine perfections. I will leave aside the debate 
concerning divine spatiotemporality. Across these chapters, we will witness that whether 
                                                          
137 See Leftow (2009a: 23-25) for arguments for God’s necessity. 
138 That necessary existence is contained in the very concept of perfection underlies all versions of the 
ontological argument, and that God exists necessarily underlies some versions of the cosmological argument. 
139 Briefly: a perfect being exists a se, and by some accounts, is immutable. If temporal, God persists through 
time either by perduring (having different temporal parts located at different times), or by enduring. If God 
endures, he will be subject not only to time’s passage but also to change and, hence, will not be immutable; if 
God perdures, he will not be independent if wholes depend ontologically on their parts. 
140 An additional worry is this: once God is accepted as atemporal, it’s hard to resist the thought that temporal 
reality comprises a four-dimensional block. On such a view it’s hard to see how any actions can be free: God 
eternally observes all times and hence eternally knows what goes on at those times; since knowledge is factive, 
what happens at all times is eternally fixed. See Rogers (2007) for a response to this. 
141 See Rogers (1994) for an excellent critique along these lines.  
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one agrees with (i), (ii) or (iii) depends upon what account of de re representation is adopted. 
I will also examine in what sense (if any) GR’s worlds can be said to depend upon God. 
 
     2.  Interpreting N 
Assuming GR, how should we interpret N? N is a de re modal claim, since it concerns a 
particular individual. So we should start our enquiry by considering what the neutral 
possible world analyses of de re modal assertions are. Then, we can proceed and determine 
what the appropriate GR interpretation of the neutral analysis is. The neutral possible world 
analyses are as follows: an individual, x, is possibly F, iff there is a world, w, according to 
which x is F; is necessarily F iff for any world, w, x is F according to w; x necessarily exists 
iff for all worlds, w, x exists according to w; and x contingently exists iff there exist two 
distinct worlds, w and  w*, such that x exists according to w and x does not exist according 
to w*. Hence, the neutral possible world analysis of N is: 
 
 N1:   According to every possible world, God exists. 
 
Recall that GR tells us that there are worlds that don’t actually exist. GR will tell us, then, 
that N1 is true iff for every world, w, actual or not, w represents God – the divine individual 
existing in our world – as existing at w. So how, on GR, does a world, w, actual or not, 
represent de re of an individual that it exists at w? 
Let’s start by considering how the actual world represents. On GR, what’s true 
according to our world is a direct function of what is true of our world: our world represents 
exactly what is true of it; and what is true of a world, w, is a matter of what w’s parts are 
(since worlds just are maximal mereological sums of their parts). Thus, our world represents, 
e.g., me as existing at it by containing me (and the whole of me) as a part. What we might 
reasonably expect then, is that for any world, w, to represent, de re, of me that I exist at w, w 
must contain me as a part. If that thought’s right, GR would say that an individual, x, exists 
at (at least) one world iff the whole of x is identical to a part of some world, and that x 
exists at more than one world iff the are at least two worlds, w1 and w2, such that whole of 
x is identical to a part of w1 and the whole of x is identical to a part of w2. Let’s call this view 
– that an individual exists according to more than one world by virtue of being numerically 
identical to parts of more than one world (which are thus, by transitivity of identity, identical 
to each other) transworld identity (‘TI’). Under TI, de re modal claims concerning an individual, 
x, are analysed in terms of what happens to x (numerically the same x) in other worlds. If 
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representation de re does work by means of TI, then the GR interpretation of N1 is: ∀x[Wx 
→ y[Pxy & x=God]].142 Or, in ordinary terms: 
 
N2:   God is a part of every world.  
 
If N2 is the correct way for those who subscribe to GR to interpret N1, then (i) will 
be true: God’s existing necessarily will be grounded in God’s being a part of every world; 
and this in turn will mean that God is wholly present and wholly located in each and every 
world. To use Lewis’ phrasing (1986a: 198), God will lead many different lives. This theory 
(of what it means to exist according to multiple worlds) is the modal analogue of the 
temporal theory of endurance and of the spatial theory of entention. Under endurance 
theory, objects persist through time by being wholly present at each moment at which they 
exist. Under the theory of entention, at least some things extend across space by being 
wholly located at every spatial region at which they are located. Here, things exist across 
modal space by being wholly present at multiple worlds.  
The above reasoning shows why TI has prima facie plausibility; it seems to be the 
simplest, most uniform way of interpreting a claim like N1. Indeed, Lewis himself notes 
(ibid.: 198) that this would be the simplest way for representation de re to work. However, 
in its present form, Lewisian GR does not dictate that in order for a non-actual world, w, to 
represent that an actual-world inhabitant, x, exists, at w, w needs to contain numerically the 
same x as a part;143 in fact, as Lewis presents it, GR explicitly precludes one and the same 
(possible) individual being (wholly) in (part of) more than one world.144 Lewis states ‘there 
are no spatiotemporal relations at all between things that belong to different worlds... Nor 
do they overlap; they have no parts in common’ (ibid.: 2). But why should GR preclude TI?  
 
     3.  TI & Accidental Intrinsics 
Here’s one reason why GRists might want to deny TI. If individuals with intrinsic accidental 
(contingent) properties (or parts) did have transworld identity, they would contravene 
Leibniz’s principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, according to which, if two things are 
                                                          
142 Where ‘W’ denotes the property being a world and ‘P’ denotes the parthood relation. 
143 Rather, what the theory does maintain is that in order for a non-actual world, w, to represent that one of the 
inhabitants of our world, x, exists, w must contain a counterpart of x as a part. What is meant by this will be 
explained in the next chapter, where we’ll explore counterpart theory more fully. 
144 It follows from Lewis’ acceptance of unrestricted mereological composition that there are individuals which 
are partly in more than one world but are not wholly in any. However, while these individuals can rightly be 
referred to as transworld individuals, they are not possible ones, since, as Lewis notes (1986a: 211), an individual 
is possible iff it exists wholly in some world.  
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numerically identical, they have all of their intrinsic properties in common. Suppose that in 
world w1 Pegasus exists and has the intrinsic accidental property having four legs. The TI 
theory of representation de re analyses this as follows: there is a world, w2, which is not 
identical to w1, in which Pegasus (numerically the same individual as exists in w1) is wholly 
present and has three legs. By the Indiscernibility of Identicals, Pegasus in w1 can’t be the 
numerically same individual as the Pegasus who we’re referring to in w2, call them Pegasus*, 
since Pegasus and Pegasus* don’t have all of their intrinsic properties in common. 
Therefore, TI conflicts with the Indiscernibility of Identicals.145, 146 
Nonetheless, Cameron suggests that ‘[s]ince God plausibly has His intrinsic 
properties essentially [that is, non-contingently], there is thus no barrier to even the [GRist] 
claiming that He literally exists in more than one world – indeed, that He exists in every 
world.’ (2009a: 100). For, there’s no reason to think that God’s existing in every world would 
contravene the Indiscernibility of Identicals. If Cameron’s right, the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals gives theists adopting GR no reason not to interpret N1 with N2. Indeed, this 
point might well be one that Lewis would agree with. For, Lewis appeals to the same 
reasoning in the case of universals: 
 
If indeed there are no accidental intrinsics to raise a problem, then overlap confined 
to the sharing of universals seems entirely innocent. And also it seems inevitable, if 
there are universals at all. So my rejection of overlap must be qualified: whatever 
the universals may do, at any rate no two worlds have any particular as a common 
part…[Hence,] what is true of a universal according to a world is what is true of it, 
when we restrict quantifiers to that world.147 (1986a: 205) 
 
 It seems entirely plausible that universals have no intrinsic accidental properties. But 
is it true that God has none? Pre-modern theologians, such as Augustine and Aquinas, would 
certainly take this as true.148 However, one potential reason to think it false comes from 
God’s beliefs. Plausibly, for any proposition, p, such that God believes that p, God possesses 
the property believing that p in an intrinsic manner. Since each world varies, some of God’s 
beliefs will vary between different worlds. Problematically, then, God’s mind will exemplify 
                                                          
145 TI is compatible with the Indiscernibility of Identicals so long as one adopts the hyper-essentialist theses 
that (a) every individual has its intrinsic properties essentially and (b) every individual has all of its parts 
essentially. However, endorsing TI was invoked to provide us with an analysis of the claims that particular 
individuals could have had different properties or parts. Lewis discusses these points (1986a: 198-209), as does 
McDaniel (2004: 139). 
146 Responses have been offered to this problem, I postpone discussion of them until later. 
147 In that case, worlds would need to be unified by the spatiotemporal interrelation of their particular parts 
only (Lewis, 1986a: 209). 
148 Aquinas (1264/1995: Chapter XXIII, Book 1) gives several arguments in support of the claim that there is 
no accident in God. 
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a very large number of contingent belief-related properties. In w1, for example, God will 
have the intrinsic property believing that Pegasus has four legs; but since Pegasus might not have 
had four legs, there’s a world in which God lacks this property. 
Nonetheless, so long as theists are willing to maintain that whenever God has a 
belief about an individual, x’s, possessing a certain property, F, that belief always involves a 
further qualifying belief about where in the pluriverse x exemplifies F, the contention that 
some of God’s beliefs must be possessed in a contingent manner can be resisted (and thus, 
any conflict with the Indiscernibility of Identicals can be avoided). For example, theists can 
say that God doesn’t just believe that Pegasus is four-legged; God believes that Pegasus is 
four-legged at w1. In all worlds, God can (and will) have this property; including those at which 
Pegasus exists and is not four-legged. So, in world, w2, where Pegasus has three legs, God 
will believe that Pegasus is four-legged at w1, even though he will also believe that Pegasus 
is three-legged at w2, and so on.  
There’s no reason to think that this kind of move would be ad hoc. Theists who take 
it that God has no intrinsic accidental properties must already accept that some of God’s 
belief-related properties are similarly qualified, for otherwise God would have contradictory 
beliefs about the temporary properties of individuals. God doesn’t plain believe both that 
Sarah is awake and that she’s asleep. God believes that Sarah’s awake at such and such times 
on such and such days, asleep at others. 
 
     4.  GR, TI, & Modal Collapse 
There are, however, bigger worries. We’ve seen that ‘actuality’ functions as an indexical 
under GR – it simply signifies one’s place amongst the worlds. If God is literally present in 
(is spatiotemporally related to) all worlds, then all worlds are actual from God’s viewpoint. 
This means that God will have contradictory beliefs about what is actually the case. God will 
believe, e.g., both that Pegasus is, and that Pegasus is not actually four-legged because God 
will be present in world w1 where Pegasus is four-legged, and he will be present in w2 where 
Pegasus is not four-legged: both worlds are actual from God’s viewpoint.149 But if there’s 
anyone we can be sure of as not having contradictory beliefs, it most certainly would be 
                                                          
149 Suppose the theist preferred an actualist view about worlds, and wanted to adopt the transworld identity 
account of representation de re. Would the same problem arise? Well, since, for actualist realists, all worlds are 
actual (actually exist), we should rephrase the question: would God have contradictory beliefs about what is 
the case at the actualized world? The actualist would have to say that he does: it will be true according to every 
world that God believes that what goes on at that world is what goes on at the actualized world, because every 
world, w, represents itself as actualized, even if is de facto false that that w is actualized. Otherwise, it would turn 
out as possible that God believes he doesn’t exist at the actualized world. 
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God! Further, since God’s beliefs are factive, it follows that for God, nothing is merely 
possible. Of course, these problems aren’t limited to God. For any transworld individual, 
everything that exists and occurs in any world in which it exists will be actual from its 
viewpoint. For example, from my perspective, I will actually be both a professional 
footballer and not a professional footballer, since in one part of modal space I’ll be wholly 
present and a professional footballer, and in another I’ll be wholly present and not. Football, 
then, won’t be a merely possible career path I could have chosen.  
To avoid these contradictions, beliefs and facts about actuality could be world-
relativised. For example, we could say that I am, rather, actually a professional footballer in 
w1 and actually not a professional footballer in w2. Likewise, we could say that God believes 
that Pegasus is actually four-legged in w1, is actually three-legged in w2, and so on. However, 
this avenue is blocked off. For, these problems associated with actuality are really but a 
consequence of the fact that, in its current form, GR together with TI entails a loss of a 
distinction between worlds. We’ve seen that GR stipulates that, ‘[a]n individual x is a world 
iff any parts of x are spatiotemporally related to each other, and anything spatiotemporally 
related to any part of x is itself a part of x’ (Divers, 2002: 46). Given that the Lewisian GRist 
defines their worlds in this way, if any individual, whether it has intrinsic accidental 
properties or not, is (wholly) present at more than world by virtue of being part of more 
than one world, then both of those worlds will be spatiotemporally related; but GR dictates 
that distinct worlds are spatiotemporally (and causally) isolated. Hence, the particular 
individual in question does not exist at distinct worlds after all, meaning that there will be no 
distinct worlds to which facts about actuality could be relativised. 
That Lewisian GR precludes TI can be shown more clearly by putting this reasoning 
into a formal argument from reductio ad absurdum: 
 
P1.    Worlds are maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally related  
  individuals. (Premise, Lewisian GR) 
P2.    Worlds are not spatiotemporally related. (Premise, Lewisian GR) 
P3.    The spatiotemporal relatedness relation is transitive.  
P4.    There exists an individual, x, such that there exists a world w1 and there 
  exists a world w2; w1≠w2; x is part of w1 and x is part of w2. (TI, assumption 
  for reductio) 
P5.    x is spatiotemporally related to the parts of w1, and x is spatiotemporally 
  related to the parts of w2.  
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P6.  w1 and w2 are spatiotemporally related.  
C1. Lewisian GR is incompatible with TI. (Contradiction derived from P2 and 
  P6) 
 
In short, because GR identifies the worldmate relation with the spatiotemporal relatedness 
relation, no possible individual can be part of more than one world.150 Indeed, if theism and 
TI were held together in conjunction with the GR analysis of a world, then it 
straightforwardly follows that there is only really one world: all individuals across all worlds 
(otherwise presumed distinct) will be spatiotemporally related to each other through God.151 
But, to be sure, it seems GR with TI entails total modal collapse even if God doesn’t exist; 
it will just be the case that the spatiotemporal relatedness of all worlds will come about in a 
less simplistic way. 
For these reasons, Cameron is wrong to say that since the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals poses no barrier to the theist’s acceptance of N2 (God is a part of every world), 
there is therefore no barrier to it. If N2 is to viable, one of the following (incompatible) 
theses must be rejected: 
 
(a) TI; 
(b) For at least one individual, x, x, inhabits more than one possible world; 
(c) Possible worlds are maximal mereological sums of spatiotemporally related 
 individuals; 
(d) The spatiotemporal relatedness relation is transitive. 
 
Theists who want to account for God’s necessity in a way consistent with TI cannot 
reject (a) or (b). (d) seems prima facie compelling,152 so that just leaves (c). Could theists reject 
it? Well, there’s no obvious reason why all who take possible words to be concrete entities 
no different in kind from the actual world must accept Lewis’s precise definition of a world. 
Perhaps, then, theists can try make a TI analysis of N viable by redefining this term.153  
                                                          
150 Lewis (1986: 208-9) makes a similar argument when he dismisses the possibility of there being branching 
worlds (worlds that share a common initial segment).  
151 It is, though, hard to picture how certain individuals would be related: how far away would I be from a 
merely possible individual like Pegasus, and in what direction?! 
152 Though there may well be reasons to deny that it is a necessary truth, as we shall see in §5. 
153 Indeed, Lewis (1986a: 209) himself notes that overlap could easily be accepted if a different, though less 
straight forward, account of how worlds are unified were endorsed. 
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    5.  Redefining the Notion of a World  
Kris McDaniel (2004) advocates abandoning Lewis’s definition of ‘world’ in order to make 
sense of GR with overlap (i.e., GR involving transworld individuals, and so worlds with 
overlapping parts – GRO, hereafter). It will be useful, then, to consider whether McDaniel’s 
strategy is consistent with theism. If it is, there will be a way to make N2 viable.  
On McDaniel’s proposal, worlds are defined as isolated maximal regions of 
spacetime; they are not the maximal mereological sums of objects those spacetimes contain:  
 
w is a possible world if and only if (i) w is a region of spacetime, (ii) every part of w 
is spatiotemporally related to every other part of w, (iii) no part of w is 
spatiotemporally related to anything that is not part of w. (ibid.: 147) 
 
This means that spacetimes (worlds) are spatiotemporally isolated substantival Newtonian 
containers; spacetimes don’t ontologically depend on the existence of objects and events. 
Since spacetime regions alone are parts of worlds, unlike on Lewisian GR, material objects 
are not parts of worlds. Instead,  
 
[a]n object x exists at a world w iff there is some region R such that (i) x is wholly 
present at R and (ii) R is a part of w; a region R exists at a world iff it is a part of 
that world (ibid.). 
 
GRO invokes compositional pluralism: the thesis that there are two different 
fundamental part-whole relations. The first part-whole relation is a two-place relation for 
spacetime regions: a region of spacetime, x, can be part of a region of spacetime, y, simpliciter 
(not relative to anything). The second part-whole relation is a three-place relation for 
material objects. Part-whole relations for material objects are indexed to spacetime regions 
‘such that, for any region of spacetime R, it makes sense to ask of two objects x and y 
whether x is a part of y relative to R’ (ibid.: 141). Property possession for material objects is 
also indexed to spatiotemporal regions: an object x has a property, F, iff there is a region of 
spacetime, R, such that x is wholly present at R, R is part of w, and x is F relative to R. For 
world occupants, then, but not for world-parts, there is no such thing as having a part or 
having a property simpliciter. There is only such a thing as having a part or having a property 
relative to a spatiotemporal region. 
McDaniel explains that compositional pluralism needs to be invoked for two 
reasons. First, the part-whole relation (and property possession) for material objects (world 
occupants) needs to be world-indexed in order to overcome the problem of accidental 
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intrinsics discussed in §3. Suppose again that numerically the same Pegasus literally inhabits 
two distinct worlds, w1 and w2, and that Pegasus has four legs and in w1, and three legs in w2. 
Since parts (and properties) are had relative to worlds, Pegasus does not have the 
incompatible properties being three-legged simpliciter and being four-legged simpliciter. Rather, 
Pegasus has the entirely compatible properties being three-legged at w1 and being four-legged at w2. 
Formal contradiction is removed because properties are world-relativised. Second, the part-
whole relation (and property possession) for spacetime regions (world parts) must be non-
world-indexed in order that a non-circular definition of the term ‘worldmate’ can be given. 
For, suppose that the part-whole relation for space-time regions were world-indexed. In that 
case, says McDaniel, the GR analysis of ‘possible world’ is as follows:  
 
w is a possible world if and only if (i) there are some xs such that each one of the xs 
is spatiotemporally related at w to every object that is one of the xs, (ii) none of the 
xs is spatiotemporally related at w to any object that is not one of the xs, and (iii) w 
is the fusion at w of the xs. (ibid.: 140) 
 
And, if the GR analysis of a possible world is as expressed above, then GR can’t afford us 
with a reductive modal analysis. For, now an object, x, will be possibly F iff there exists a 
world w such that x exists at w and has the property being F-at-w. But, says McDaniel, the 
property being-F-at-w is modal, since it involves a possible world. Moreover, ‘endorsing [the 
above definition] is no better than saying that the xs belong to the same world if they are 
worldmates of each other.’ (ibid.).154  
 With these aspects of the account in place, GRO proceeds to analyse de re modal 
claims as follows. Individual, x, is possibly F iff there is a world, w, such that x exists at w 
and is F at w; x exists at w iff x is wholly present at a region R that is itself a part of w. x is 
necessarily F iff for every world, w, x itself exists at w; x exists at w iff x is wholly present at 
a region R that is itself a part of w.155 GRO thus interprets N1 in the following way:  
 
N3:  For every world, w, there is a region of spacetime, R, such that God is wholly 
present at R, and R is part of w.  
  
                                                          
154 Issue could definitely be taken with this last claim, but I won’t digress to consider it. I’ll note, though, that 
McDaniel does accept (2004: 140, fn 6) that the analysis may well be not wholly uninformative – but that it 
cannot offer a proper reduction of modality even so; and that was supposed to be one of GR’s main selling 
points. 
155 McDaniel has to invoke a different account of de re representation for spacetime regions since these 
definitions imply that these entities – being worldbound – have all their properties essentially. McDaniel 
suggests using counterpart theory. 
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Crucially, N3 departs from N2 in denying that God himself is a part of every world. Under 
GRO, only spacetime regions are parts of worlds and spacetime regions are worldbound. 
(Hence, no two worlds have any parts in common on this view.) So we can accommodate 
(i) and have God literally inhabiting every world whilst avoiding modal collapse. 
 To fully assess whether N3 is a viable interpretation of N1, however, we must first 
clear up some of the immediate problems facing GRO – the theory which supports it. 
Before doing so, it should first be noted that theists who adopt GRO will have to accept as 
necessarily true the following claims: that (a) God is a material object, and (b) God occupies 
regions of spacetime. (a) must be true because only material objects (on this view) can 
occupy regions of spacetime; (b) must be true because it’s necessarily true on this view – 
given how existence at a world is defined – that every material object occupies a region of 
spacetime. It should also be noted that since TI was earlier defined as the thesis that 
individuals exists according to more than one world by virtue of being numerically identical 
to parts of more than one world, McDaniel’s view cannot, strictly speaking, accommodate 
TI. However, since McDaniel’s view embodies the spirit of TI, I will stick with calling it a 
TI thesis. We can instead redefine TI as the thesis that individuals exists according to more 
than one world by virtue of being numerically identical to inhabitants of more than one 
world. This allows McDaniel’s view to count as a TI thesis. It’s just that, on Lewis’ view, 
world inhabitants are parts of worlds; on McDaniel’s view, they’re not. 
 
     6.  Modal Collapse Again? 
One of the initial worries with GRO is that even the appeal to compositional pluralism will 
not avoid modal collapse. Consider: material object O exists at w1 by occupying region r1 
which is itself a part of w1. O also exists at w2 by occupying region r2 which is itself a part of 
w2. O may not itself be a part of w1 or w2, but the fact still remains that, by virtue of bearing 
different occupation relations, O is spatiotemporally related to w1, and is spatiotemporally 
related to w2; since spatiotemporal relatedness is transitive, w1 and w2 (in addition to any 
other world O occupies) will be spatiotemporally related to each other.  
 There are two different responses McDaniel could make here. The first is to nuance 
the definition of a world. We can see from the above that there are two ways in which two 
things, x and y, might be spatiotemporally related. One way is for x to be a material object, 
for y to be a spatiotemporal region and for x to bear the occupies relation to y. Another is for 
x to bear an external distance relation to y which is unmediated by any material object. 
Suppose two spatiotemporal regions, r1 and r3, are one metre apart at their closest point, 
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and that spatiotemporal region r2 is the most inclusive spatiotemporal region existing 
between them (suppose r2 is immediately to the left of r3 and immediately to the right of r1). 
Further suppose that material object O occupies r2. r1 and r3 are thus spatiotemporally related 
to each other through both O and r2. That is, it could be seen that both O and r2 mediate 
spatiotemporal relations between these two regions.   
Now, instead of using plain spatiotemporal relatedness to unify worlds, worlds 
could be unified by the transitive closure of distance relations which are unmediated by material 
objects occupying certain regions (in personal correspondence, McDaniel refers to such 
relations as ‘perfectly natural external distance relations’). Thus, while O might wholly 
occupy r1 and r2, unless r1 and r2 instantiate an external distance relation unmediated by a 
material object (or are elements of a chain of such unmediated distance relations), they won’t 
be parts of the same world, even if they are (by virtue of being occupied by O) in some sense 
spatiotemporally related.156 This way, parts of what are putatively distinct worlds won’t 
collapse into a single world. 
The second option is to deny that spatiotemporal relatedness is transitive. In §4 I 
noted that the transitivity of spatiotemporal relatedness is prima facie compelling, but it 
cannot be an a priori truth; if it were, then the possibility of branching time would be ruled 
out, but many would have it that branching time is possible, or at least, is not ruled out a 
priori. On models of branching time, time has a fork-like structure or topology, meaning 
that time is partially temporally disunified. There will be times t1 and t2 such that t1 and t2 lie 
on distinct branches of a tree-like structure, and there will be a third time t0 such that it 
bears a temporal relation to both t1 and t2: t0 will be past with respect to both t1 and t2, and 
so t1 and t2 will both be future with respect to t0. However, since t0 is the point of branching 
that connects t1 and t2, t1 and t2 will bear no temporal relation to each other (neither is past, 
nor present, nor future with respect to the other). So, while at t1 it was the case that it will 
be the case that t2, this is just to say that an earlier time – t0 – is (or was) temporally related 
to t2; it’s not to say that t1 is temporally related to t2. In the case of branching then, temporal 
relatedness is linearly transitive but non-linearly non-transitive.  
With this is mind, what McDaniel could say is that (a) material objects have 
spatiotemporal properties and relations only in a derivative sense, and that as such, (b) 
they’re incapable of mediating spatiotemporal relations. That is, material objects can be 
spatiotemporally related to regions, but they play no part in mediating spatiotemporal 
relations between regions. Hence, spatiotemporal relatedness is only sometimes transitive: 
                                                          
156 Thanks to McDaniel for this suggestion.  
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transitivity holds when the relata are entities of the kind spatiotemporal region, but does not 
hold when at least one of the relata is of the kind material object.157 To take the above example, 
we are now imagining that O fails to mediate any distance relation between r1 and r3: all the 
work is done by r2. Thus, since material objects are deemed incapable of mediating 
spatiotemporal relations, even if some O occupies two different regions which form parts 
of two distinct worlds, O will fail to relate those worlds. 
Just to be clear how the two responses differ, then: under the first, world-collapse 
is avoided because worlds are defined in such a way that only a particular kind of 
spatiotemporal relation unifies worlds. Under the second, world-collapse is avoided because 
spatiotemporal relatedness is taken to be intransitive. Both responses seem adequate. 
However, it seems that the second is the one McDaniel should take because it’s the very essence 
of the substantivalist view GRO posits that material objects cannot mediate spatiotemporal 
relations. If substantivalists did think of material objects as being capable of supporting 
spatiotemporal relations, then spacetime considered as an entity in its own right would be 
an unnecessary posit.158  
 
     7.  Analysing De Re Modal Claims 
A second immediate worry with McDaniel’s account concerns its analysis of de re modal 
claims. Suppose Fred has transworld identity, occupies w1 and w2 and is a father relative to 
w1 and is childless relative to w2. From the perspective of w1 we want to say that Fred could 
have failed to be a father at w1 (on this view it makes no sense to say Fred could have been 
childless simpliciter because, on this view, there is no such property). Under GRO, Fred’s 
being childless relative to w2 is supposed to make this true. But we might reasonably wonder 
whether it can: Fred’s being childless relative to w2 only makes it true that Fred could have 
been childless at w2 – not that he could have been childless at w1. If the only relevant property 
in play is being childless at w2 (at no world does Fred possess being childless at w1), then there’s 
nothing to make true that Fred could have possessed being childless at w1. So by relativising 
properties, many de re modal claims will come out false.  
McDaniel does not anticipate this objection to his theory in either of his papers, but 
perhaps that’s because there’s a simple enough response: in virtue of being childless relative 
                                                          
157 Hence, there’s a principled way of dividing the transitive from the intransitive spatiotemporal relatedness 
relations: transitive such relations hold (and only hold) between entities of one particular fundamental 
ontological category. It might look suspect if spatiotemporal relatedness were supposed to be only sometimes 
transitive between entities within the same fundamental kind, but that’s not what is being proposed here. 
158 More on this in §8. 
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to w2, Fred is childless relative to some world, and in virtue of being childless relative to some 
world, Fred is possibly childless at w1. Although this isn’t the neatest way of doing things, 
there’s no obvious reason why McDaniel should be forbidden from employing this strategy.  
 
     8.  Dualistic vs. Monistic Substantivalism 
I noted that on McDaniel’s view, worlds are ontologically independent Newtonian 
containers. The reason this view is otherwise known as substantivalism is because, according 
to it, spacetime is an entity (substance) in its own right: it is fundamental; not reducible to any 
other kind of entity, or derivative from relations holding between other kinds of entities. 
However, substantivalism comes in different forms. One thing distinguishing different 
forms of substantivalism is their particular stance on what the relation between material 
objects and spacetime is. On dualistic substantivalism, material objects are a substance 
(fundamental entity) distinct from spacetime regions; the relation between material objects 
and spacetime is one of occupation, or containment, and this relation too is fundamental. 
On monistic (or supersubstantival) views, the relation between spatiotemporal regions and 
material objects is one either of identity, or of constitution; otherwise, the monist maintains 
that there’s no real relation between spacetime and material objects at all because the 
existence of material objects is denied. Jonathan Schaffer (2009) makes the case that, if we 
have reason to believe that substantivalism is true, then the monistic view – in particular 
the monistic view according to which material objects are identical to spacetime regions – 
the ‘identity view’ – is preferable to the dualistic one. If Schaffer’s arguments stand up to 
scrutiny, then GRO is in trouble, for the dualistic version of substantivalism is built into its 
very fabric (this is what avoids world collapse).  
 To show that what he calls the ‘identity’ view is the preferable version of 
substantivalism, Schaffer offers no less than seven different arguments, which can be briefly 
summarised as follows. First, the primary role for material objects is to serve as a ‘pin 
cushion’ for properties. However, if substantivalism is true, spacetime can support 
properties on its own; ‘spacetime is pincushion enough to support a propertied world.’ (ibid.: 
138). (This is the argument from parsimony.) Second, material objects possess exactly the 
same geometrical and mereological properties as the spacetime regions that support them. 
Under dualism, this seems an ‘amazing’ or perhaps even ‘miraculous’ coincidence; and it 
won’t do to dissolve the mystery by denying that material objects have shapes in themselves 
because (a) shapes are paradigm cases of intrinsic properties, and (b), once we start 
relocating the properties of material objects in spacetime regions, material objects begin to 
look more and more superfluous (ibid.: 139). (This is the argument from harmony.) Third, 
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fourth, and fifth, respectively: each spacetime region contains at most one material object 
(the argument from monopolization); material objects must occupy spacetime regions (the 
argument from materialization); and material objects occupy at most one spatiotemporal 
region (the argument from exhaustion): the dualist, but not the identity theorist, must accept 
that these facts impose brute necessary connections on the world’ (ibid.: 141). The final two 
arguments appeal to fundamental physics. Schaffer explains that the ‘distribution of matter 
in General Relativity is not given via a list of material objects in occupation relations to 
regions. Rather the distribution is given by the stress energy tensor, which is a field, and 
thus naturally interpreted as a property of the spacetime.’ (ibid: 142). It’s also the case in 
Quantum Field Theory that what we might call material occupants are in fact idealisations: 
really, all there is are excitation properties of spacetime (ibid.: 142-3). 
 If one is going to adopt GRO, one will need to have something to say by way of 
response to these arguments. One response to the argument from parsimony is this. 
Parsimony is a theoretical virtue other things being equal; we should prefer the simpler theory 
if we can. But parsimony can be trumped by other considerations. Considered on its own, 
dualistic substantivalism might look to be making unnecessary additions to our ontology. 
We might think that there’s no need to posit material objects in addition to spatiotemporal 
regions in order to explain property instantiation. However, if GRO did prove to be the 
best modal theory, then since dualistic substantivalism is a commitment of it, its extra posits 
wouldn’t count so much against it.  
What to say about the other arguments? Schaffer notes that  
  
[t]he [first] five arguments…are interconnected. Monopolization, materialization, 
and exhaustion are really just further aspects of the harmony between material 
objects and spacetime regions—each object gets a region, and no region gets more 
than one object. All of this harmony is suggestive of a unified phenomenon at root. 
It is the dualist’s lack of parsimony, in doubling the substances, which forces her to 
impose all manner of brute necessities, so that her two sorts of substances can act 
as if they were one. (ibid.: 42) 
 
So the real source of the complaints here is just that the dualist takes the relation 
between spatiotemporal regions and material objects as fundamental. Again, this makes 
monistic dualism the more ideologically parsimonious theory: it can make do with fewer 
primitives. But this is a ceteris paribus concern. That GRO requires us to accept a theory that 
invokes more primitive necessary facts concerning the nature of spacetime counts as a mark 
against it, but it’s no decisive objection. 
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The final thing to say is that the final two of Schaffer’s arguments, in appealing to 
fundamental physics, are hostage to empirical fortune. In so far as we have reason to believe 
these physical theories, we have reason not to adopt GRO. However, simply because the 
hypotheses they employ are open to falsification by empirical evidence, they cannot count 
decisively against GRO. Of course, it may well seem a bad feature of GRO that it fails to be 
neutral with regards to the nature of spacetime and the relation it bears to material objects. 
But, again, whether we want to accept the theory despite its lack of neutrality here will 
depend on how attractive it otherwise is.  
 
     9.  GRO, Transworld Identification , & the Transitivity of 
   Identity  
Roderick Chisholm (1967) argues that the fact that identity is a transitive relation leads to 
absurd consequences when coupled with TI. His argument is as follows. Suppose that two 
inhabitants of our world, x and y, gradually exchange their properties with one another as 
we move from our world, w1, to the next, w2; from w2,to w3, and so on. Eventually, we’ll 
reach a world, w200, say, where x plays exactly the same role that y plays in our world and y 
plays exactly the same role that x plays in our world. Because identity is transitive, and 
because there’s much pressure to say that x and y retain their identity through the very slight 
changes they undergo as we move from world to world, we should conclude that in w200, 
the individual playing the y role (i.e. the one which we would name ‘y’ in w200) is one and the 
same individual as the entity named ‘x’ in our world. Likewise, it follows that the individual 
we would call ‘x’ in w200 is the y of our world. But for this fact, w200 will be indiscernible from 
our world.159 Problematically, however, it also seems that the individual playing the x role 
in w200 has just as much claim to being one and the same individual as the individual playing 
the x role in our world. For, these two individuals have all of their properties in common 
(and likewise for the individual playing the y role in w200 and the individual playing the y role 
in our world). Yet, it’s absurd to suppose that x could have all of y’s properties and 
nonetheless not be (identical to) y. Chisholm says:  
 
There is a certain ambiguity in “discernible” and in “indiscernible.” The two [xs] 
could be called “discernible” in that one has the property of being [x] and the other 
does not, and similarly for the two [ys]. But in the sense of “indiscernible” that 
allows us to say that “Indiscernibles are identical” tells us more than merely 
“Identicals are identical,” aren’t the two [xs], the two [ys] and the two worlds 
indiscernible? (ibid.: 4) 
                                                          
159 In addition to any changes that result from this switching of roles. 
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So, by the Identity of Indiscernibles, it seems we should say that the individual we call ‘x’ 
in our world and the individual we are now referring to as ‘x’ in w200 are identical. Yet, by the 
transitivity of identity, we should also say that the individual called x in this world and the 
individual called x in w200 are not identical. TI coupled with the transitivity of identity thus 
leads to paradox.  
The fact that GRO requires property possession (for material objects) to be indexed 
to parts of worlds means that, under this view, Chisholm’s role-switching paradox can’t get 
started. As we move from imagining x in w1 to imagining x in w2 – where, in the original 
paradox, x lacks one of the properties it possesses in w1 and gains one of the properties y 
possesses in w1 – x is not really losing one of the properties it possesses in w1 and gaining 
one of the properties y possesses in w1 at all. In w1, x possesses, say, the property being F at 
r1 and y possesses the property being G at r1. As we move to w2, x and y can be imagined to 
switch the more basic properties being F and being G but x and y do not really switch these 
properties, since, under GRO, they do not have them: there is no such thing as world 
occupant’s plain having a property. Rather, in w2, x possesses being G at r2 and y possesses 
being F at r2. However, it’s also the case that, in w2, x possesses being F at r1, and y possesses 
being G at r1. Likewise, in w1, x possesses being G at r2 and y possesses being F at r1. Hence, x 
and y do not really switch properties as we move from world to world at all: there is no role 
switching paradox because there is no role switching. The properties being F at r1 and being 
G at R1 are not switched since these are possessed by each individual in each world; the 
properties being F and being G are not switched because they do not exist. So, the individual 
we call ‘x’ in w200 and the individual we call ‘x’ in our world do not have all of their properties 
in common under GRO. x has one set of properties indexed to a region of w1 and another 
set of properties indexed to a region of w2 and it has the set containing all of these sets of 
properties at every world. So there’s no longer strong pressure to deny that the entity called 
‘y’ in w200 really is the x of our world. 
 There’s an additional reason to think that the paradox presents no problem for divine 
transworld identity. For, there are properties God possesses in the actual world that he does 
not lack even in the most remote and distant (dissimilar) worlds, and that no other individual 
possesses, even in very distant worlds. God has some properties such that he alone can 
possess them and cannot fail to possess them. So, if we were to imagine God being involved 
in some role-switching, we would soon reach a world where the role switching would have 
to stop before all the properties had been switched. Even if Chisholm’s paradox presents a 
barrier to the possibility of things in general having transworld identity, it would not, then, 
present a barrier to the possibility of God’s having transworld identity.  
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Another worry sometimes raised is epistemic, since it concerns transworld 
identification: how can we identify a single individual across worlds, given that individuals 
may vary in numerous and significant ways across them? Sarah may differ between w1 and 
w2 by having a different eye colour, but in a world much less close (that is, similar) to the 
actual world, say w996, Sarah may resemble the Sarah in the actual world in no obvious way 




Yet, as with Chisholm’s paradox, this problem doesn’t arise on GRO. No 
transworld individual changes in its spatiotemporally relativized properties from world to 
world. True, each individual bears different properties to different spacetime regions from 
world to world, but no individual is such that which particular properties it bears to which particular 
spacetime regions varies. So we can identify individuals across worlds by focussing on their 
total set of spatiotemporal region-indexed properties. And again, since there are many 
properties God alone has in every world, God will be easily identifiable from world to world, 
even if other individuals are not. So transworld identification in the least will not turn out 
to be a problem in God’s case. 
 
     10.  GRO, Aseity, & the Intrinsic/Extrinsic Distinction 
While Chisholm’s Paradox, accidental intrinsics, and transworld identification pose no 
barrier to GRO and so N3, one might find GRO objectionable on the grounds that by 
relativising properties to spatiotemporal regions, the theory entails that no individual can 
any longer truly be said to possess a property in an intrinsic manner. In Chapter One I 
settled on the following account of what it is for a property to be intrinsic to a thing: 
 
(7) F is intrinsic to x iff neither the presence, nor the absence of some thing or some 
things distinct from x partially grounds the fact that x is F. (Where y is distinct from 
x iff y has no part in common with x.) 
 
Given this characterisation, what one may intuitively class as an intrinsic property, will, 
under McDaniel’s view, turn out to be an extrinsic one. For if, e.g., any x’s being awake is 
partly grounded in the way the way x is relative to a spacetime region, then something distinct 
from x (namely, the spatiotemporal region x happens to be present at) partially grounds x’s 
                                                          
160 Kripke (1972: 49-53) takes the view that the problem of transworld of identification is something of a 
‘pseudo-problem’. He thinks we can simply stipulate that we’re referring to a certain individual in another 
possible world. 
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being awake. Hence, the fact that x is awake does not solely depend on the way x itself is.161 
In a later paper, McDaniel notes that this might be an ‘unpleasant’ feature of his theory 
(2006: 308). For, whether one endorses my characterisation given in (7) above, or some 
other, the fact still remains that if an individual can only possess a certain property in relation 
to a spatiotemporal region, property possession can never be a purely internal matter.  
 Lewis takes this the point to be more than unpleasant. For him, this way of dealing 
with the problem of accidental intrinsics construes intrinsic properties as relations (to worlds)), 
and this is so unsatisfactory that the problem of accidental intrinsics is a decisive reason for 
rejecting GRO, or the ‘leading of double lives’: 
 
So Humphrey, who is part of this world and here has five fingers on the left hand, 
is also part of some other world and there has six fingers on his left hand. Qua part 
of this world he has five fingers, qua part of that world he has six. He himself – one 
and the same and altogether self-identical – has five fingers on the left hand, and he 
has not five but six…That is double-talk and contradiction. Here is the hand. Never 
mind what else it is part of. How many fingers does it have? What shape is it?…If 
you say that a shape…is just what we always thought it was, except that it is a 
relation which something may bear to some but not all of the wholes of which it is 
part, that will not do. What would it be to five-finger one thing while six-fingering 
another? How can these supposed relations be the shape of something? They 
cannot be; and so there is no solution. (1986a: 199-201) 
 
This consequence is especially problematic under theism. For, although I argued in 
§6 of Chapter Two that – contra the argument of Chapter One – the doctrine of divine aseity 
does not require that God’s nature-making properties are intrinsic to him, we should, 
nonetheless, do our best to preserve the idea that God’s nature-making properties are *-
intrinsic to him. To recap:  
 
(8) F is *-intrinsic to x iff neither the actual presence, nor the actual absence of some 
thing or some possible things distinct from x partially grounds the fact that x is F.  
 
On GRO, however, none of God’s properties is *-intrinsic to him because at no 
world does God have any property independent of a spatiotemporal region. The actual 
presence of some possible things distinct from God (the spatiotemporal regions) partially 
ground God’s possession of his properties. In and of himself – viewed independently of all of 
the relations he bears – God is not omnipotent, not omniscient, and so on. (Though of 
course, God does not thereby have the complements of these properties either.) Moreover, 
                                                          
161 Lewis (1986a: 204) raises exactly the same objection against endurantism. 
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since some of God’s properties are essential to him, it follows that God depends upon the 
spacetime regions not only for his nature, but for his very being. It seems then, that GRO is 
ruled out by even a pared down doctrine of divine aseity. 
McDaniel has told us that, for world occupants, there is no such thing as plain 
possessing a property: property possession is a three place relation holding between world 
occupants, properties, and spatiotemporal regions. But do we have to agree with McDaniel 
on that? Following suggestions made by E. J. Lowe (1988: 73) in response to Lewis’s raising 
of parallel arguments against endurantism, there are other ways we might view things. One 
option is to deny that there are, under GRO, any such properties as being F simpliciter for 
world occupants (where ‘F’ includes no information about which spatiotemporal region F 
is possessed at) – or that if there are, they are not the kinds of properties that could possibly 
be instantiated by world occupants. Instead, properties are relational, and always include 
information about the particular spatiotemporal regions they are had in relation to. On this 
way of viewing things, I do not possess being awake in relation to a particular spacetime 
region, r (there is no such property), rather, I plain possess the relational property being awake 
at (or relative to) r.  
A second option – adverbialism – is to retain the familiar properties (e.g., plain being 
awake) but instead say that there are different ways to possess them. Here, there is, e.g., such 
a thing as plain being awake, but nothing has it simpliciter, a thing may have it r-ly or r*ly 
(where r and r* denote different spatiotemporal regions). Under the first alternative, rather 
than possessing one single property such as being awake relative to those regions (parts of 
worlds) where I’m wholly present, I possess a very large number of being-awake-related 
properties: being awake relative to r, being awake relative to r1…etc. Under the second alternative 
(adverbialism) I possess a property such as being awake in a number of different ways. I am 
r-ly awake, r1-ly awake, and so on. Do either of these alternatives help to avoid the 
intrinsicness issue? It seems not. Really, we have only fiddled with the semantics. It’s still 
the case that a world occupant, O, can’t possess being awake relative to r or be r-ly awake if r 
does not exist and O doesn’t bear the occupation relation to it: the spirit of the problem 
remains. This worry could be circumvented if we were willing to identify every 
spatiotemporal region, r, with, e.g., the set of all r-ly instantiated (or r-relativised) properties; 
but this avenue is blocked off for those who accept McDaniel’s characterisation of GRO. 
The reason for this is that GRO takes a substantival view of spatiotemporal regions, and the 
strategy just suggested takes an inherently relational stance on these matters. 
It’s not open to theists to respond to the intrinsicness worry that God’s identity and 
existence are independent of all that exists apart from him on the grounds that God is (one 
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and the same entity as) the spacetime regions. For, (amongst other reasons) on the view 
under discussion, spacetime regions are and God is not, world-bound. Could the proposal 
work, though, if we deny that God is a transworld individual and instead say that God is 
partly at w1 by having a part of himself that is identical to the region comprising w1, is partly 
at w2 by having a part of himself that is identical to the region comprising w2 and so on? It 
could not, for then God would not possibly exist for the reason that, under GR, an individual 
possibly exists iff that individual is wholly present in at least one world and on this proposal, 
God is wholly present in none; he is only partly present in many.162  
All is not lost, however, for there are two ways the worry can be successfully allayed. 
First, we should note that, in cases where a property is always possessed as a matter of 
necessity, there is just no need for its possession to be spatiotemporally indexed. So, we 
could say that the only properties whose possession must, for world occupants, be 
spatiotemporally indexed are those which can be possessed contingently. McDaniel hints at 
making such a distinction when he explains:  
 
There are two ways that an object might have a property relative to a world. First, 
the object might just plain have the property and be wholly present at some region 
that is part of that world. So, for example, every object is just plain self-identical. 
Objects are not self-identical relative to regions of spacetime, even though some 
self-identical objects occupy regions of spacetime. Some of the essential properties 
of objects are had in this fashion. Second, the object might have the property relative 
to some region that is part of that world. (2004: 148) 
 
Following this, since God’s nature-making properties are essential to him, they needn’t be 
spatiotemporally indexed. GRO does not, then, rule out that God’s nature making 
properties are *-intrinsic to him. 
Presumably, though, we still want to allow that some non-essential properties be 
intrinsic to their bearers. Fortunately, there is something we can say to speak to this concern. 
For, we can make the more general point that it needn’t follow from the fact that world 
occupants possess their properties relative to spacetime regions that they thereby don’t 
possess them in an intrinsic manner if we re-characterise what it is for a property to be 
intrinsic to a world occupant under GRO:  
 
                                                          
162 A different strategy is available if theists want to identify God with the spacetime regions. Theists could 
admit that God is wholly present in just one world by being identical to that world, but nonetheless exists 
according to many in virtue of having counterparts existing at other worlds by being identical to them, but 
then this would be to abandon TI as our account of divine de re representation. 
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(9) For any individual, x, which is F according to a spatiotemporal region R, F is 
intrinsic to x (i.e., x’s being F does not depend even in part upon x’s surroundings) 
iff neither the presence, nor the absence of something or some things distinct from 
x partially grounds the fact that x is F relative to R.  
 
(9) allows that, under GRO, what are intuitively pure intrinsic properties such as 
being awake can indeed be possessed in an intrinsic manner, and that what are intuitively 
pure extrinsic properties such as being more clever than Sarah cannot.163 I suggest that there’s 
no compelling reason not to accept (9) if we are looking to endorse GRO. For, as Fraser 
MacBride notes: ‘[w]hat our knowledge of intrinsic properties, like shape, clearly bans is 
intrinsic properties being relations to other things located.’ (2001: 84).164 And if that’s right – 
if what the notion of an intrinsic property is intended to capture is that of an individual 
possessing a property independently of its relation to other things located, and independently 
of what other things located are like, then (9) is perfectly adequate. What’s intuitive is that my 
being awake does not depend on my bearing relations to other material objects in my 
surroundings – to other world occupants. What’s less intuitive (or obvious) is that my being 
awake does not depend on my bearing relations to certain times and locations: can I really 
be awake if I’m not located at a region of spacetime? To answer ‘yes’ to any of this type of 
question seems crazy. Now, if material objects can only exist in relation to spacetime regions 
– a thesis GRO not only requires, but which also seems entirely plausible independently of 
it – why should it be any less plausible that material objects can only possess properties in 
relation to spacetime regions? I can’t see any good reason why it should. In fact, what would 
look weird, is if material objects could not exist independently of spacetime regions and yet 
could possess properties independently of them.  
Further, consider why it is that we draw a distinction between types of property 
possession. It’s characteristic of a pure intrinsic property – but not of a pure extrinsic 
property – that its ‘effects’ are experienced in the immediate vicinity of its bearer. (Here 
‘effects’ should be understood non-causally, just a term for characterising what’s involved 
in possessing a certain property.) For example, it is only me who experiences any effects of 
my being awake: there are no necessary connections between my being awake and anything 
located outside of the spatiotemporal region I occupy. In contrast, there is a necessary 
connection between my being less clever than Mike, and something outside of me: 
                                                          
163 I’ve subsequently found that Paul Teller (2001) makes a similar line of response. 
164 I’ve also found that Katherine Hawley (2001: 17) takes this line of response against Lewis’s attack on three-
dimensionalism. 
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something’s required to be true of Mike. One of the main reasons for drawing a distinction 
between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is to signify this contrast; and endorsing (9) does 
not fail to do justice to it. In any case, while it’s true that some x’s ability to possess any 
properties at all is explained by his bearing certain relations to spatiotemporal regions, that x 
has the very character it does is not explained by its bearing those relations.  
 
     11.  What Does God Create? 
11.1. A Dilemma  
On GRO, worlds are empty containers. A second problem, which takes the form of a 
dilemma, arises when we ask: is God responsible for creating just the (non-divine) material 
objects which inhabit those containers (the world occupants), or is he responsible for 
creating the containers which house those objects in addition? If, in each world, God is 
causally responsible for the occupants of that world, but not for the world itself, then we 
seemingly contravene another classical theistic doctrine of traditional theism: divine 
sovereignty, which has it that everything existing external to God depends upon God for its 
existence. As explained previously, theists normally understand this dependence claim in 
terms of God’s creative and sustaining activity. As Mann notes, ‘[i]f asked to articulate the 
sense in which things depend on God for their existence, theists are apt to respond that 
God created things. Cashed in this way, dependence as being created is a causal notion.’ 
(2005: 37). Further, much divine aseity, divine sovereignty is traditionally understood to be 
completely unrestricted: (widest possible quantification) all things distinct from God 
depend upon God because God creates and sustains all things distinct from him. As Leftow, 
explains, ‘[t]heists believe that…necessarily, for any x, if x is God, x creates and maintains 
in existence whatever is not identical with x.’ (1990a: 582). However, if God does create each 
world in addition to its occupants, then we have an objectionably circular chain of existential 
dependence: God depends upon each spacetime region he exists at for his existence (on 
this view, he is necessarily a temporal being); yet, each region likewise depends upon God 
for its being, because it (we are now supposing) would not exist but for his creative and 
sustaining activity. (God also depends upon the spacetime regions for some of his 
properties (i.e., his non-essential ones, see above).) 
 The complaint here is not that a mutual existential dependence relation holds 
between two distinct relata. For, although the philosophical orthodoxy does seem to have 
it that ontological dependence is an asymmetric relation, this asymmetry is often taken for 
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granted,165 and, as Elizabeth Barnes argues in her recent paper entitled ‘Symmetric 
Dependence’ (in draft), there’s good reason to call this assumption into question. Firstly, 
mutual existential dependence relations often do hold between distinct relata; consider, e.g., 
the dependence relations that hold between Socrates and Socrates’s life.166 Further, if theists 
believe that there are such things as particularised properties, then they must already accept 
that a symmetrical existential dependence relation holds between God and God’s essential 
goodness.167 Nor can the complaint be that there’s an objectionably circular chain of causal 
dependence: we’re supposing the regions depend causally on God; we’re not supposing 
God depends causally upon them. The absurdity lies here: since God is only possible if he 
wholly occupies some world, then his possessing the attribute being at a spatiotemporal region 
is a necessary condition of his creating the spatiotemporal regions. Thus, the existence of 
each region is a necessary condition of its being brought into existence, which seems plainly absurd. 
Further, since this view has God be necessarily temporal, it follows that, by creating each 
region, God creates some of the entities which are preconditions for his own existence. 
 This problem is not, of course, particular to GRO. It is a problem for anyone who 
thinks that God is temporal. As Hugh McCann notes: 
 
Both in Scripture and in cosmological proofs for the existence of God, [God] is 
portrayed as the creator of everything but himself and as ruling the universe with 
complete power and authority. But if God is in time, his sovereignty is restricted: 
There is something other than himself that he did not create – namely – time itself… 
Better, then, if possible, to have a God who in creating the world creates time, but 
whose own being lies beyond it. (1993: 92)168 
 
However, there’s an additional problem which does turn out to be more particular 
to the theory at hand. In the thesis introduction I noted that causation seems to be a modal 
notion: usually, we think of a cause as being something that necessitates an effect – it ‘makes 
it happen’ (Loux, 2002: 188). Further, we typically associate causal claims with certain 
counterfactual conditionals: most often we take it that if c caused e (‘c’ for cause, and ‘e’ for 
effect), then, had c not occurred, e would not have occurred. (And, on the fact of it, these 
counterfactuals appear modal too.) Part of the theoretical utility of the possible worlds 
framework is that it provides us with the means of using these counterfactuals to analyse 
causation: we begin by understanding causal dependence in counterfactual terms, and then 
                                                          
165 See, e.g., Cameron (2008a), Schaffer (2010), and Rosen (2010). 
166 Example from Lowe (2005). 
167 I’m taking it that particularised properties don’t exist uninstantiated.  
168 See also Everitt (2010: 85). 
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we proceed to specify truth-conditions for those counterfactuals in terms of similarity 
relations between worlds. The best known account of precisely this kind is that given by 
Lewis’ (1973a). Indeed, because of the way the GRist – like Lewis – defines possible worlds, 
when these counterfactual truth-conditions get put together with the GRist take on worlds, 
counterfactual (and so causal) dependence ultimately turns out to be non-modal.  
To understand Lewis’ account, we first need to grasp the relation of comparative over-
all similarity which holds between different worlds: a world, w1, can resemble another world, 
w2, more than some other. Hence, ‘one world is closer to actuality than another if the first 
resembles our actual world more than the second does, taking account of all the respects of 
similarity and difference and balancing them off one against another.’ (1973a: 559). Since 
Lewis takes this relation as primitive, he doesn’t give a formal definition of it. However, he 
does say that relations of comparative over-all similarity depend on what laws hold in 
different worlds, as well as what events and individuals exist and take place there. Further, 
he stipulates (ibid.: 560) that the relation of comparative over-all similarity meets two formal 
constraints: one, it enforces a weak ordering on the worlds: any two worlds are comparable, 
but there may be cases where there are ties in closeness; two, any world resembles itself 
more closely than it does any other. (Further, it may be that there is (or are) no world(s) 
which most closely resembles (or resemble) a certain world, w: there may be an infinite 
sequence of worlds such that for any world, wn, in the sequence, there is a world distinct 
from wn which resembles w more closely.) Given this relation, counterfactual conditionals 
of the form ‘if A were true, then C would also be true’ (symbolised: ‘A □→ C’) are given 
the following truth-condition: 
 
A □→ C is true (at a world w) iff either (1) there are no possible A-worlds (in which 
case  A □→ C is vacuous), or (2) some A-world where C holds is closer (to w) than 
is any A-world where C does not hold. In other words, a counterfactual is 
nonvacuously true iff it takes less of a departure from actuality to make the 
consequent true along with the antecedent than it does to make the antecedent true 
without the consequent. (ibid.)169 
 
As described above, causal dependence is often understood in terms of a 
counterfactual relation between events. Roughly, the truth-condition for ‘e causally depends 
upon c’ specifies that whether event e occurs or not depends on whether event c occurs or 
not. (ibid.: 563). However, since each event can be paired with a proposition – ‘[t]o any 
possible event e, there corresponds the proposition O(e) that holds at all and only those 
                                                          
169 In cases where there is more than one closest A-worlds, A □→ C is non-vacuously true when (and only 
when) C holds at all the closest A-worlds (ibid.). 
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worlds where e occurs.’ (ibid.: 562) – causal dependence can be defined in terms of a 
counterfactual relation holding between propositions as above. Lewis (ibid.) states that e 
causally depends upon c iff the following counterfactuals are both true: (1) O(c) □→ O(e), 
and (2) ~O(c) □→ ~O(e). The truth-conditions for those counterfactuals are then given in 
terms of possible worlds: O(c) □→ O(e) iff in the closest world where c occurs (O(c) is true), 
e occurs (O(e) is true); and ~O(c) □→ ~O(e) iff in the closes world where c does not occur 
(O(c) is false), e does not occur (O(e) is false). In cases where c and e are events which occur 
in the actual world, condition (1) is, of course, automatically true; hence, the truth of ‘e 
causally depends upon c’ in these cases then hinges on whether ‘if c had never occurred, e 
would never have occurred’ is true.  
Now, suppose that, in a bid to stay true to the sovereignty thesis, we say that in each 
world, w, God creates the spatiotemporal region w’s comprised by (in addition to w’s 
contents): we want to say that each spacetime depends causally on God. The possible world 
analysis tells us that there should be two counterfactual truths associated with each 
spacetime (at least, there should be if causation has a uniform nature): ‘if God had willed 
that spacetime exists, then spacetime would have existed’, and ‘if God had not willed the 
existence of spacetime, then spacetime would not have existed’. The first of these is 
automatically true since (a) the actual world is the world closest to the actual world and (b) 
it’s true at the actual world that God will the existence of spacetime and that spacetime 
exists. What about the second? Its truth-condition will be met only if at the closest worlds 
where God does not will spacetime to exist, no spacetime exists. But there is no world at 
which God does not will spacetime to exist; nor is there any world at which no spacetime 
exists: ipso facto, there no closest worlds where such things hold. For the worlds just are the 
spacetimes on this view. 
This gives the dilemma an additional bite: if the sovereignty thesis is true in its 
unrestricted form, then each world, in addition to its non-divine material occupants should 
depend causally upon God. However, one of the very reasons for adopting a GRist theory 
of worlds is that it can provide us with a non-modal reduction of the causal facts; and by 
the very reductive analysis of causal dependence those worlds can provide, it turns out that 
the claim that each world depends causally upon God is trivially or vacuously true at best. 
(For, recall that under this semantics, any counterfactual with an impossible antecedent is 
trivially true, and here we have a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent since there 
are no worlds where the antecedent holds.) What to do? 
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11.2. Blunting the Dilemma 
Let’s reconsider divine sovereignty. Why should it so commonly be understood in terms of 
absolute creatorship as McCann, Mann, and Leftow describe? The ‘absolute creatorship’ 
interpretation, as I will call it, has – as we’ve seen – much biblical support. In Colossians 
I:16, for example, Paul says: ‘For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on 
earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things 
have been created through him and for him.’ And in 17: ‘He is before all things, and in him 
all things hold together.’ It is scriptures such as these which have given many contemporary 
philosophers of religion reason to adopt the interpretation. In arguing that Platonism about 
abstracta is incompatible with classical theism, Craig says:  
 
A theism according to which God is not the creator of all reality apart from Himself 
but is just one uncreated being amidst an incomprehensible multitude of uncreated, 
independently existing beings is both unbiblical and far too weak to be a plausible 
conception of maximal greatness. (2014: 161) 
Central to biblical theism is the conception of God as the only self-existent being, 
the creator of all reality apart from Himself…everything else has been created by 
God and is therefore contingent and temporarily finite…[T]he unrestrictedness of 
the domain of the quantifiers [in the ‘God created all things’ type claims] is rooted, 
not in the type of objects thought to be in the domain, but in…who or what God 
is[.] (ibid.: 113) 
 
But why should the Church Fathers have been so concerned with making these 
absolute creatorship claims? I noted above that divine sovereignty in itself – i.e., in its 
simplest form – is just the doctrine that everything that exists distinct from God depends 
upon God. Given that being the cause of something is one way to have something depend 
on you, perhaps it’s just that the Church Fathers were (a) looking for a way to characterise 
the thought – which they took to be of high importance – that everything depends upon 
God in some way, and (b) saw the language of causality as providing the only means of doing 
this. Since, however, being causally dependent is only one way to be dependent – since we 
recognise types of non-causal dependence – the second horn of the dilemma could be 
blunted: divine sovereignty – even if its quantifiers should be taken as having widest possible 
scope – needn’t demand that in each world, that world is caused by God, so long as each 
world is still dependent upon God in some way.  
Of course, in making this move, the sovereignty thesis is being reinterpreted in 
order to make GRO acceptable; it’s otherwise thought that God is creator of all things external 
to him. However, we shouldn’t think that this makes the move ad hoc. That the move from 
divine sovereignty to absolute creatorship might be unwarranted is a point which could 
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have been made outside the context of the present discussion. Indeed, we can bolster this 
line of thought by asking another question which could quite justifiably be raised outside of 
the present context: we’ve said that, quite plausibly, the Church Fathers were keen to say 
that everything is caused by God in order to ensure that everything distinct from God is in 
dependent upon God in some way, but should it have been important for the Church 
Fathers to ensure that? Most plausibly, it was to ensure that God is the ultimate stopping point 
for explanation. For, when we have a relation of dependency – when some x depends in some 
way upon some y – y provides us with some kind of explanation for x. My contention, then, 
is that by claiming that God creates all things external to him, the Church Fathers were not 
only ensuring that nothing’s existence was left unexplained, they were also ensuring that 
God is the point at which explanation stops.  
Nicholas Everitt, after noting the various problems associated with the concept of 
divine causation per se (i.e., rather than those associated with the concept of God causing a 
particular set of entities, as we are considering here), makes a similar suggestion: 
 
Perhaps a better way for theism to explain the idea of divine creation is to avoid 
analogies with human creation, and to focus instead on explanation. To say that 
God created the universe would mean only that God provides the ultimate 
explanation of why there is a universe. Theism could then accept the claim (which, 
construed in normal temporal terms, is self-contradictory) that God caused himself. 
This would mean not (absurdly) that God did something as a consequence of which 
he came into existence, but rather that he is his own explanation: to understand 
what he is, is to understand why he exists (the thought that underlies the ontological 
argument). (2010: 81) 
 
And, even Leftow (who treats the claim that God creates literally everything with such 
seriousness) takes it that one way of clarifying this claim is by means of the further claims 
that ‘there is no going past this level [i.e. that of God] in any explanation of other things’ 
existence: explanations that reach here, stop here, and [so]…God is the ultimate explainer 
of all explained existence…there is no digging deeper than God.’ (2012: 5-6, emphasis added). 
Given this, we shouldn’t take the above described dilemma to be an unsurpassable one: 
once we see more accurately what divine sovereignty demands, the first horn loses its bite.  
The additional problem was that the possible worlds analysis of causal dependence 
is at odds with the thought that God creates the world (and so everything). However, given 
what’s been said above, this also loses its bite. Indeed, we might even turn it to our 
advantage: the person who wants to insist that causal dependence is the right relation to 
characterise how spacetime is related to God owes us an explanation of why it is that this 
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relation counts as causal, given that it does not meet the characterisation other causal 
relations are uniformly given.170 
 So what other dependence might be in play? We’ve already seen, from Chapter One, 
that metaphysical dependence cannot analysed in terms of similarity relations between 
possible worlds if theism is true, so perhaps the relation is one of metaphysical dependence, 
and this explains why it can’t be so reduced. Of course, the fact the relation can’t be 
understood in counterfactual terms shouldn’t force us to think that it can’t be one of 
dependence. There are other, non-theistic cases where we would want to want to accept 
that a relation of metaphysical dependence holds, and yet, are unable to explain in terms of 
the possible worlds counterfactual analysis. Think, e.g., of the relation between the modal 
facts and the worldly facts; of one necessary thing upon another. Better, then, to keep the 
possible world analysis of causal dependence, and accept that the relation between God and 
spacetime is not causal, but of another kind, one which must either be accepted as a 
primitive, or else explainable in terms of some other kind of theory.  
 Before leaving this section, I will deal with one possible line of resistance, which 
will come from those who would take issue with my recommended interpretation of the 
sovereignty thesis – or at least, with what I identify as the core motivation for it. I have said 
that the core motivation is just the idea that God should in some way (ultimately) explain all 
that exists apart from him. However, some will say that the core motivation is rather the 
idea that everything should be under God’s ultimate control. Plantinga (1980) is one advocate 
of this. Indeed, he takes it that the primary reason for taking God to be entirely independent 
is that otherwise, some things would be outside of God’s control (that aseity is a condition 
on sovereignty thus considered), and that would in some way limit God.  
 Having some things outside of God’s control should not, though, be considered 
problematic in this way – should not, that is – be considered as limiting or constraining 
God. For, as Shalkowski (2014) convincingly argues, in cases where a supposed ‘limit’ is 
imposed by something that is necessary, that ‘limit’ is no real limit at all. In responding to the 
in some ways similar question of whether theists should worry that the existence of abstracta 
would impugn God’s aseity by making him dependent upon something distinct from him, 
or somehow impugn God’s sovereignty by limiting what he can do, Shalkowski writes: 
 
                                                          
170 Gould and Davis (2014) give an account of how God can be understood to create abstracta. However it is 
not particularly illuminating since it’s ‘anti-reductionist’: it does not explain causation in non-causal terms. 
They simply say that God causes an abstract – here we might just say necessary – object if that object is brought 
about by an act of divine willing. 
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It is…mistaken to think that the limits of possibility are akin to chains that bind 
anyone, even God. If it is not possible for things to be or have been otherwise; there 
is nothing God could have done otherwise…[So] how is it any failing of any divine 
attribute that God is unable to do it?  
 It makes sense to worry that God might be inappropriately limited by the 
existence and character of abstracta, if there were something on the other side of 
the limit, but there is nothing metaphysical that is like a fence that prohibits God 
from exploring some territory. There is nothing on the other side of the fence. (ibid.: 
151-2) 
 
And that seems exactly right. If God’s lacking the ability to control something 
implied that there was a possible thing to do that God could not do, then that might be a 
problem. However, things like spacetime regions and abstracta – being necessary – are not 
the types of things it is possible to control. So there is just no cause for concern if God 
can’t control them: of course God is constrained by the realm of possibility; but – and this 
is the crux of Shalkowski’s point – that is no real constraint at all. (Compare: should the 
theist worry that God can’t divide by zero? Seemingly not, since it’s not a possible thing to 
do.)171 Likewise, the ways God is supposed to be dependent here don’t make God’s 
existence or nature contingent, or unimpervious; which, presumably, is one of the things 
we’re aiming to preserve. After all, these are some of the key differences between God and 
mere creatures. This mirrors exactly the line of thought I advocated in Chapter Two §6: 
there are some kinds of dependencies God can bear which shouldn’t be taken to 
compromise his perfection. In summary then: theists who accept GRO should not admit 
that God creates spatiotemporal regions; God creates world occupants, and that’s enough 
to do justice to the doctrine of divine sovereignty. 
 
     12.  Actuality Again 
Let us reconsider the actuality objection raised in §4. Lewisian GR together with TI implied 
that everything is actual from God’s viewpoint (or, to put it another way, implied that to 
say that anything is actual from God’s viewpoint would involve a misuse of the word 
                                                          
171 Moreover, the widest possible scope reading – if it means that God must explain the existence of even 
necessary things – entails that God’s necessity is no longer sufficient for his being an appropriate stopping 
point when it comes to explaining the existence of things. So perhaps there’s good reason not to think that it 
especially problematic if some things were unexplained by God, so long as those things were necessary, as 
Shalkowski explains: ‘When it is recognized that something exists necessarily or is necessarily thus-and-so, it 
is not a deeply insightful question to ask about its cause or explanation. It is to invite properly the return 
question, “What part of ‘necessary’ don’t you understand?” Necessity really is the ultimate stopping place… 
If it is not possible for things to be or have been otherwise; there is nothing God could have done otherwise.’ 
(ibid: 151-2). However, since further revising the sovereignty thesis would require further departure from the 
theistic orthodoxy, and since it’s not necessary for our purposes here to do so, I simply flag the issue up as 
one for possible discussion.  
- 132 - 
 
‘actuality’). Does GRO have such a consequence? It seems it does. Supposing we again said 
that actuality is an indexical and that what is actual to a world occupant, x, is just what is 
related to x by means of external distance relations. In that case, if God is present at every 
region simpliciter, all worlds and all world occupants simpliciter will be actual to God. So for 
God, again, nothing will be merely possible. Likewise, for any non-divine world occupant, 
many worlds will be actual from their viewpoint (just those worlds at which they exist). 
Everything that is possible for them will be actual for them. We want to say ‘Sarah, the 
individual in w1 could have been a footballer, but is not’. So in some other world, w2, Sarah 
is wholly present and is a footballer at w2. But then, since Sarah is in w2, Sarah is 
spatiotemporally related to the occupants of w2 and so, is actually a footballer. This is a 
problem. If nothing is merely possible for any world occupant, contingency for world 
occupants will be lost.  
 To avoid this problem, we will have to say that individuals have world-relative 
thoughts and experiences, and that these are worldbound. From the perspective of any 
world, w, an individual x occupies, x has certain thoughts about what goes on at w, but no 
individual has at any world experiences of being at more than one world, or is conscious of 
being at more than one world. So, at w1, individual, x is conscious of being at w1, and is not 
conscious of being at any world other than w1. What is merely possible for x consists in 
what x undergoes at the worlds which it is not, at w1, conscious of being at. 
 
     13.   GRO & Class Nominalism 
A final worry with GRO concerns the thesis of class nominalism: the thesis that properties 
are sets172 of (possible) individuals; redness, for example, is identified as the cross-world set 
of red objects. One of the motivations for Lewisian GR is this ability to reduce properties 
to the set of (widest possible quantification) all their instances (see Lewis 1986a: 50-69). But 
can properties still be identified with sets of possible individuals, if individuals don’t have 
properties simpliciter, but relative to spatiotemporal regions? Lewis makes some comments 
which suggest they could not be:  
 
Often it is said that things have some of their properties relative to this or that… 
Relative to the number 18, the number 6 has the property of being a divisor; but 
not relative to 17…A property that is instantiated in this relative way could not be 
the set of its instances. For when something has it relative to this but not to that, is 
the thing to be included in the set or not? (ibid.: 50) 
                                                          
172 Lewis prefers to use the term ‘set’ rather than ‘class’ so that properties (sets) themselves may have properties 
by being members of other sets (1986a: 50, fn 37). 
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If we rephrase Lewis’s words to reflect the case at hand: “Relative to region r, Fred has the 
property of being a father, but relative to spacetime region r*, Fred has the property of 
being childless. Is Fred to be included in the set of fathers or not?”  
How to answer the question? Well, on the view we are considering, although Fred 
is a transworld individual, this does not mean that Fred is both a member of the father set 
and also a member of the non-father set. GRO says that properties are world-relativised. 
So Fred rather has the properties being a father relative-to-r and being childless relative-to-r*, and is 
thus a member of the father-relative-to-r set and the father-relative-to-r* set.  
 Yet, once we make these qualifications, there is no longer any (easy) way for class 
nominalism to work. We no longer have one single set of fathers (no set of things which 
possess being a father simpliciter) with which to identify the property being a father. We instead 
have numerous non-identical father-relative-to-rn sets. But, with only property-relative-to-
region sets, we can no longer use the theory of class nominalism to do what it was intended 
to do: explain how many things have one thing in common. This is, after all the primary 
purpose of a theory of predication: it is, in David Armstrong’s words, to explain sameness of 
type (1980: 441).) 
Perhaps we can make an adjustment to rescue class nominalism. Rather than 
identifying, say, the property redness with the set of red things (i.e. red-relative-to-a-world world 
occupants), we could instead identify the property redness with the property redness at a world, 
i.e., with the set of things red-relative-to-a-spatiotemporal-region. So, now we have the property 
being red-relative-to-a-spatiotemporal-region which many things across worlds may bear, and which 
may thereby be used to account for sameness of type. But how are we to deal with that 
property on GRO? GRO stipulates that any property instantiated by a world occupant is a 
property instantiated relative to a spacetime region. So, anything, x, which instantiates being 
red-relative-to-a-spacetime-region must bear this property relative to a spacetime region. But to 
what spacetime region will x bear this property? It won’t help to say that x bears it relative 
to a spacetime region which is part of the world x inhabits, for if it does, then the property 
will no longer be one x has in common with other individuals, and we’ll be back to where 
we started. The problem is, there is no common spacetime region to which all red things 
could bear the property.  
It seems, then, that GRO must abandon class nominalism. Just how much this 
counts against the view will depend upon how much one values the reduction of properties 
to sets of individuals. Some other theory of predication will be needed: Platonism or austere 
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nominalism, for example. Perhaps, though, trope theory is the one that might sit most easily 
with the view. Indeed, McDaniel himself seems to agree with this, since in his (2006) paper 
he goes to the effort of outlining how some more sophisticated versions of the view can 
make use of tropes. (Indeed, these views identify worlds with sets of tropes!) Objects could 
be said to have particularised properties (particularised because they are spatiotemporally-
indexed), and these particularised properties may resemble one another to certain degrees.  
 
     14. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether, under GR, God’s necessity could be understood in 
terms of TI. We saw that TI is incompatible with GR as Lewis presents it, but the version 
of GR McDaniel presents (GRO) makes overlap possible. As well as defending against 
some more general objections to the theory, we saw how God’s modal properties would be 
analysed under GRO and determined that this analysis is not inconsistent with divine aseity. 
The discussion also showed that GRO is also compatible with divine sovereignty. Since 
classical theism does not require God to create everything simpliciter in order to be sovereign 
simpliciter, a purported dilemma concerning what God can be said to create is avoided: God 
creates world occupants but not the regions that contain them. In the next chapter, we will 
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4 
Counterpart Theory & the Standpoint View 
 
     1.  Introduction 
In Chapter Three I noted that Lewis rejects TI and claims instead that ‘[t]hings that do 
inhabit worlds – people, flames, buildings, puddles, concrete particulars generally – inhabit 
one world each, no more.’ (1968: 126). So how, if individuals are worldbound, can GR make 
sense of there being worlds such that they represent de re of an individual, x, that it exists 
and has a certain property, F, even though they are not literally inhabited by x? According 
to Lewis, a world may do so by containing a counterpart of x – that is, an individual, y, 
numerically distinct from x, that bears sufficient similarities (resemblances) to x and is F. 
For Lewis, it is the existence of such counterpart (not identity) relations that make for the 
truth of de re modal statements. In his view, ‘[t]he realm of essence and accident is the realm 
of the vicarious.’ (ibid.: 127). In §2, I explain this counterpart-theoretic framework (‘CT’) as 
characterised by Lewis (1968 and 1986a) in a little more detail. Through §3 to §6, I examine 
whether its treatment of de re modal claims involving God is consistent with the central 
tenets of classical theism. In §7, I examine a different view – (‘SV’) one according to which 
God exists according to every world by virtue of existing from the standpoint of every world, and 
is neither a part of any world (as CT says he is), nor a material occupant of every (or indeed 
any) world (as TI says he is). Finally, §8 sums up the discussion from this and the previous 
chapter and draws some final conclusions about how theist GRists should view God’s 
relation(s) to the worlds GR posits. 
 
     2.  Counterpart Theory 
Under CT – as is the case under transworld identity theory – de re modal truth is analysed 
by quantification over possible individuals. However, what makes it true that certain things 
must be, might have been, and can’t have been true of x is not the existence and character 
of x in other worlds, but the existence and character of x’s counterparts in other worlds. What 
makes something the counterpart of something else? Put roughly: your counterparts 
‘resemble you more closely than do other things in their worlds’ (Lewis, 1968: 114); put 
more precisely: the counterpart relation is context-dependent, since it is a matter of being 
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most similar in certain respects – respects that have been deemed important – that determines which 
individual(s) count as the (relevant) counterpart(s) of another.173 Thus, some x is a possible 
individual iff there exists some world, w, such that every part of x is a part of w and no part 
of x is a part of any world besides w. An individual, x, exists according to a world, w, iff w 
contains a counterpart of x.174 De re modal claims are thus analysed as follows: x is possibly 
F iff in some world, x has a counterpart that is F; x is contingently F iff x exists in w, x is 
F, and there is at least one world distinct from w that contains a counterpart of x that is not 
F; x is necessarily F iff x exists in w, x is F, and for every world distinct from w where x has 
a counterpart, that counterpart is F; x exists contingently iff x exists in w, and there is at 
least one world distinct from w which fails to contain a counterpart of x; finally, x exists 
necessarily iff there is no world that fails to contain a counterpart of x.  
 Unlike the identity relation, the counterpart relation is not transitive. Take three 
worlds: w1, w2, and w3; and take three individuals: x1, x2, and x3. Suppose x1 exists in w1, x2 
exists in w2, and x3 exists in w3. Of all the individuals existing in w2, x2 may be the one who 
resembles x1 most closely, and of all the individuals existing in w3, x3 may be the one who 
resembles x2 most closely, but it does not follow from this that of all the individuals existing 
in w3, x3 is the one who resembles x1 most closely (ibid.: 115). (Nor is there any guarantee 
that it resembles you closely enough to be your counterpart even if it is the individual which 
resembles you most closely.) Likewise, the counterpart relation is not symmetric (ibid.: 116); 
there is no guarantee that every individual will have a counterpart in every world, and there 
is no guarantee that every individual will have a unique counterpart in every world. It may 
be, for example, that there are worlds where nothing resembles you closely enough to count 
as your counterpart, and it may be that there are worlds where two distinct individuals both 
resemble you equally as much, and yet both resemble you more than anything else in their 
world (ibid.).175 
Following the above, under GR with CT, N1 (the claim that God exists according 
to every possible world) thus becomes: 
 
N4:  In every possible world, God has an (appropriate) counterpart.  
 
                                                          
173 More on this in §4. 
174 In Lewis’s words: two individuals are worldmates only ‘if every particular part of one is spatiotemporally 
related to every particular part of the other that is wholly distinct from it…This formulation avoids 
difficult[ie]s that might be raised concerning partial spatiotemporal relatedness of trans-world mereological 
sums’ (1968: 70, emphasis added). 
175 Lewis thinks this is necessary if we are to account for the full range of standard modal intuitions. 
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 Where does N4 leave us with regards to an answer to the question of where God 
exists in relation to the worlds GR posits? Clearly, since GR with CT (a) does not allow that 
individuals are part of more than one world, and (b) states that an individual is a possible 
individual only if the whole of it is part of one world, on this option, God exists in some 
worlds, but not in others (i.e., what we identified in Chapter Three as option (ii) is true). 
Further, since an individual is a part of a world iff it is spatiotemporally related to that world 
(and no other), under N4, God is, just as he is under N3, necessarily spatiotemporal.176 
 
     3.  Unsuitable Counterparts? 
What troubles might face this account? Paul Sheehy raises the worry that God’s closest 
counterpart – that is, the individual most similar to God – in some possible worlds might 
not possess just the same great-making properties as God (2006: 319). Presumably Sheehy’s 
reason for taking this as problematic is that it would entail that God possess such putatively 
essential attributes only accidentally. Yet, no explanation is forthcoming from Sheehy as to 
why some of God’s counterparts might lack his great-making properties. Indeed, it’s strange 
that Sheehy should raise this objection, given that he himself grants that one great-making 
property – necessary existence – is non-negotiable (this is precisely what motivates him to 
investigate whether God’s possessing it can be accommodated within the GR framework), 
and there is no telling reason as to why any other traditionally considered great-making 
properties should not be equally non-negotiable for theists. Theistic commitments demand 
that there be a necessary being in every world: equally, they demand that there be an 
omniscient, omnipotent, etc., being in every world. We aren’t able to view each world and 
discover one in which a God counterpart is, e.g., less-than-omniscient, so is there any 
theoretical reason to think that some of God’s closest counterparts might lack some of his 
great-making properties? That is, is there any reason to think that GR with CT somehow 
rules out God’s possessing his great-making properties necessarily? 
 Perhaps one thing does force us to accept that there will be worlds such that, in 
those worlds, the individual most similar to God fails to possess the required range of great-
making properties. Recall that if GR is to offer an adequate (accurate and non-circular) 
                                                          
176 Here it is important to recall the observance made in note 116 – that – as recognised by Lewis – there is a 
probable need to improve on the spatiotemporality criterion. If analogical spatiotemporal relatedness is the 
best way to go, then God need only be analogically spatiotemporally related to the world in order for CT to 
work as a theory of divine de re representation. This may be helpful to those who take God to be 
spatiotemporal, since even if there are difficulties with accepting that God is spatiotemporally related to the 
world in the same way that non-divine individuals are, CT could still be adopted. If not, then provided some 
non-spatiotemporal natural external relation is available, CT could work as a theory of divine de re 
representation even in the case that God is non-spatiotemporal. As interesting and potentially helpful as these 
considerations may be, I leave them aside for reasons of space. 
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reduction of modal facts, it must have enough objects in its reductive base to represent each 
and every possibility. Therefore, Lewis asserts the Principle of Plenitude. This principle says 
that there are no gaps in logical space: it says that ‘(1) absolutely every way that a world 
could possibly be is a way that some world is, and (2) absolutely every way that a part of a 
world could possibly be is a way that some part of some world is.’ (1986a: 86). Though, as 
Lewis himself notes, this statement is trivial, given his analysis of possibility. Worlds are 
identified with these ‘ways’, meaning that the principle would be true no matter how many 
worlds there are (ibid.). So, to give some proper content to the claim that modal space is 
complete, Lewis asserts a Principle of Recombination. ‘Roughly speaking, the principle is that 
anything can coexist with anything else, at least provided they occupy distinct 
spatiotemporal positions. Likewise, anything can fail to coexist with anything else.’ (ibid.: 
88). Further, any number of possible individuals should admit of combination, and any one 
possible individual should admit of combination with itself (ibid.: 89). However, because 
Lewis rejects transworld identity, the principle of recombination would be more accurately 
stated in terms of duplicates. Duplication is defined in terms of the sharing of perfectly natural 
intrinsic properties: two individuals are duplicates iff they are perfectly alike in terms of 
their perfectly natural, intrinsic character.177 §4 will contain further discussion about the 
nature of ‘perfectly natural’ properties. Here though, I will limit myself to noting just that 
natural properties are supposed to be those such that sharing of them makes for qualitative 
resemblance ‘they carve at the joints…they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are 
ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise things 
completely and without redundancy.’ (1986a: 60). Thus, Lewis’ principle of recombination 
can be stated as follows:178 
 
PR:  For any individuals, wholly existing in any worlds, there is a world  
  containing any number of duplicates of each (so long as there is a spacetime 
  big enough to hold them all)179, 180 
                                                          
177 More specifically, Lewis suggests that x and y are duplicates ‘iff (1) they have exactly the same perfectly 
natural properties, and (2) their parts can be put into correspondence in such a way that corresponding parts 
have exactly the same perfectly natural properties, and stand in the same perfectly natural relations.’ (1986a: 
61). Lewis also finds it plausible that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic to their bearers. (In fact, Lewis 
defines intrinsic properties as those that never vary between duplicates (individuals exactly alike in terms of 
their perfectly natural properties.) Hence, For Lewis, the ‘intrinsic’ in the definition of ‘duplicates’ is 
redundant. 
178 The characterisation below is similar to that given by Divers and Melia (2002). I’m using the statement 
given by these authors because it’s more precise and succinct than the one Lewis (1986a) provides. 
179 PR only quantifies over individuals who are wholly in worlds to avoid duplication of cross-world sums. 
The ‘space and time permitting’ proviso is necessary due to an argument given by Forest and Armstrong 
(1984). More on this below. 
180 For those accepting the GRO outlined in the previous chapter, the principle will instead need to be phrased 
along the following lines: (PR*) For any individual, x, wholly present at any region of spacetime, r, such that r 
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At first glance, it appears that PR has the implications that there will be worlds 
where God lacks counterparts, others where he has more than one counterpart, and others 
still where his counterparts are less than omniscient, less than omnipotent, and so on. For, 
PR entails that there’s worlds that contain more than one duplicate of God, that there are 
worlds containing no duplicates of God,181 and that there are worlds containing God-
duplicates who are less than omniscient, less than omnipotent, and so on. The trouble is, 
PR is designed to express the idea that any kind of thing could coexist with (or without) 
anything of any other kind, and also with many other things of the same kind. PR ‘stands 
or falls with that of the Humean denial of necessary connections between distinct 
existences’ (Divers and Melia, 2002: 19), and yet, theism admits a number of necessary 
connections. For example, there is supposed to be a necessary connection between all non-
divine things and God, and, as we’ve seen, an omnipotent thing could not coexist with 
others of that kind. So PR and theism look straight-forwardly incompatible. 
However, to see why the worry here may only be superficial, we need to bear in 
mind that, as noted above, PR is expressed in terms of duplication, and duplication is a 
matter of sharing of intrinsic character. Now, PR will certainly require that there be worlds 
at which there is more than one duplicate of God and worlds at which there are no 
duplicates of God etc., but it doesn’t follow from this that there are worlds containing more 
than one thing worthy of the title ‘God’, or worthy as counting as his counterpart. For, if 
what matters to something’s counting as God – that is, as counting as divine – is that certain 
extrinsic conditions be fulfilled (that is, if God’s perfections turn out not to be intrinsic, as I 
have argued), then it does not matter if PR requires that there exist worlds in which there 
are multiple (or no) individuals exactly like God in terms of their intrinsic character. What 
matters is that there not exist worlds in which there are multiple (or no) individuals worthy 
of being divine. Indeed, the principle must be expressed so that it is only (perfectly natural) 
intrinsic properties which get recombined precisely because it would otherwise duplicate 
individuals individuated by extrinsic properties such as being the sole divine being and thereby 
yield contradictory states of affairs in modal space (see Nolan (1996: 240)).182 
                                                          
is part of some world, w, there is another region of spacetime, r*, such that r * is part of some world w*, x is 
wholly present at r *, any number of duplicates of x are also wholly present at r * (so long as there is a 
spacetime region (world) big enough to hold them all), and w≠w*. 
181 For those adopting GRO, there will be worlds failing to contain God himself. 
182 This adds support to my arguments in Chapter One: Lewis’ thought is that intrinsic properties are ones 
that could be duplicated any number of times; the theist takes it that the divine-making properties could not 
be duplicated – that they are (or at least some of them are) unique to God – so, theists should not think of 
these properties as intrinsic. 
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 Nonetheless, we’re not out of the woods yet. Firstly, PR does not, as it stands, allow 
that God has any intrinsic essential property, F. By PR, there will be worlds where nothing 
has F (that is, there will be worlds at which there are zero intrinsic duplicates of God). Two, 
PR does not ensure that God has his extrinsic properties essentially unless the divine-
making properties supervene on the intrinsic properties of any world, and it’s hard to see 
how they could do. Go to a world where all that exists is a tap-dancing turtle, an ice cream 
cone, and two intrinsic duplicates of God. What is there to ensure that at least one – and 
that at most one – of these intrinsic duplicates possesses the divine-making properties? 
Nothing, it seems. Hence, from the perspective of classical theism, PR is still extensionally 
inaccurate. The only way to ensure that PR does capture the requisite modal truths (and 
meets its reductive ambitions) is to build their non-modal descriptions into it. Thus, we 
have below a theistic principle of recombination (TPR): 
 
TPR:  Excluding God, for any individuals wholly existing in any worlds, there is a 
 world containing any number of duplicates of each, (so long as there is a 
 spacetime big enough to hold them all), and at each one of those worlds 
 there is any number ≥1 duplicates of God, and exactly one of those 
 duplicates is divine. 
 
But should these restrictions be permitted? On first appearances, one might think 
they shouldn’t. We are simply redefining PR in order to preserve certain pieces of modal 
data we took to be true about God; but PR is supposed to delimit the modal facts. Here, 
some modal facts are restricting the scope of PR. So one might think that this type of move, 
aside from being ad hoc, compromises GR’s reductive ambitions. As Shalkowski puts it: 
‘[p]ossible worlds must constrain facts of modality; facts of modality must not restrict the 
number and nature of possible worlds.’ (1994: 675). However, such a worry is misguided. 
What the GRist wants, or, rather, needs, is a principle that is extensionally accurate. Of 
course, one can only judge whether a principle, P, which is proposed to account for the 
reductive base of a modal theory, is extensionally accurate by considering whether P accords 
with a significant enough portion of the modal claims which, pre-theoretically, we took to 
be true. If P didn’t accord with a wide enough portion of our strongest modal commitments, 
we wouldn’t be epistemically justified in accepting it. Lewis himself says that we should 
accept PR because it accords with a wide enough range of our pre-theoretic modal beliefs 
about the extent of possibility. For Lewis, justification for PR amounts to prior modal 
beliefs coupled with theoretical benefits. However, no theist will concur with Lewis that PR 
(without the theistic clause) is extensionally accurate since it doesn’t allow for their pre-
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theoretic modal beliefs about the extent of possibility and necessity.183 So what makes Lewis 
justified in accepting PR, but the theist unjustified in accepting TPR? Nothing does. All that 
matters to the success of GR’s reductive project is that there be a way to state PR in non-
modal terms, so the addition of the theistic clause seems harmless.  
Further, recall that PR already contains a proviso: it says there’s a world containing 
any number of duplicates of individuals size and shape permitting. Lewis (1986a: 101-4) is 
forced to include this proviso in order to avoid a paradox forwarded by Peter Forrest and 
David Armstrong (1984), which, they claim, faces an otherwise unqualified version of the 
principle. According to them, PR entails that there are (unrestrictedly) more individuals than 
there are. Daniel Nolan (1996) argues that Forrest and Armstrong’s argument is invalid, but 
suggests that there is a similar, valid argument in the vicinity that can give us the same 
conclusion. Nolan’s statement of the argument (ibid.: 246-7) is as follows:  
 
P1. There is a set, S, of all the possible individuals. (Assumption for reductio) 
P2. S must have a cardinality (number of members), C. (From the definition of 
  cardinality) 
P3. If S has a cardinality, then there must be a greater cardinality than it, e.g. the
  cardinality of its power-set, call this C*.  
P4.  For any individual, there is a world that contains C* duplicates of that 
  individual. (The unrestricted principle of recombination) 
P5.  There are at least C* objects to be found in worlds.  
P6. The set of all the possible individuals must have at least C* members.  
P7. The set of all the possible individuals has cardinality is larger than itself 
  (because, by set theory, C* is larger than C).  
C. There’s no set of all possible individuals. (Contradiction in P7 derived from 
  P1) 
 
To avoid the conclusion of this argument, the ‘size and shape permitting’ clause ‘if 
spelled out, would have to put some restriction on the possible size of a spacetime’ (Lewis, 
1986a: 103). Of course, the phrasing ‘there is some maximal size of spacetime’ is modal, but, 
as Divers (2002: 102) explains, the proponent of GR could easily offer a non-modal 
characterisation such as this: 
 
                                                          
183 The theist isn’t the only one though. The essentialist, for example, will also disagree. 
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There is some number N such that no spacetime is larger than N, and for all 
individuals, x, y, and for all numbers, n, m such that (n + m)) < N, there is a world 
in which there are at least n duplicates of x and at least y duplicates of m.  
 
Nolan suggests that the correct response to the argument is not to restrict PR, but 
to deny that there is a set of everything and to admit instead that there is a maximal sum of 
individuals, but that these form a proper class. ‘[A] proper class usually being construed as a 
set-like entity that has members but is not itself a member of anything.’ (Divers, 2002: 
102).184 However, Divers (ibid.: 103) shows that this response threatens to undermine the 
coherence and utility of GR, and it is clear that Lewis (1986a: 101-4) would prefer to impose 
a restriction on the principle.185 Now, if we outline the reasons Lewis and Divers have for 
thinking that the ‘size and shape permitting’ clause is permissible, we might be able to see 
more clearly why the theistic clause would likewise be permissible. 
Forrest and Armstrong object that any particular size supposed to be the maximum 
size of worlds would be arbitrary and ad hoc. However, Lewis (1986a: 103) replies that any 
restriction to a principle is going to seem ad hoc, but some restrictions are more ad hoc 
than others. There will be some natural break, says Lewis, in the mathematical models we 
might offer as representations of possible spacetimes, and that break, wherever it lies, can 
be used to demarcate the maximum spacetime size (and therefore to give us a non-modal 
principle of maximality). What would look arbitrary, is if the restriction were ‘to four-
dimensional, or to seventeen-dimensional, manifolds…a restriction to finite-dimensional 
manifolds looks much more tolerable.’ (ibid.). And Lewis does appear justified in claiming 
that his is the least arbitrary restriction that could be made.186 Likewise, to avoid the charge 
that their restriction is ad hoc, theists can appeal to the ‘natural break’ between divine and 
non-divine individuals. Paraphrasing Lewis: what would look arbitrary, is if the restriction 
were to bananas, or beach balls, or bubble-gum; a restriction to omnipotent, independent, 
divine beings looks much more tolerable. Consider also that on theistic GR, God is supposed 
to be in some sense responsible for each world, or at least, each such thing is supposed to 
depend on him in some sense. A being on whom the truth of PR would thus somehow 
depend could hardly be expected to be subject to it.  
                                                          
184 Efird and Stoneham (2008) also recommend against restricting PR. They argue that PR can be formulated 
more precisely so that such restrictions are unnecessary. 
185 For example, he says ‘we have no notion what could stop any class of individuals...from comprising a set’ 
(1986a: 104). 
186 Nolan, (1996: 257) expresses doubts that there is such a natural break. However, says Nolan, ‘if the 
[maximal spacetime size] thesis is restricted to the claim that there is some maximum size, and that for all we 
know that size would seem arbitrary to us should be consider it, I do not see what theoretical failing the theory 
would have suffered.’ 
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What of the threat to the reductive ambitions? Does the size-and-shape-permitting 
clause impose a modal restriction on PR? We can see from above that it needn’t. Although 
the clause says there’s a point where duplication must stop, this is no cause for concern since 
there’s a non-modal way of stating this. Likewise, it’s no concern that the theistic clause has 
a modal translation (i.e. that there’s some divine individual such that duplication of it is 
impossible). All that matters is that some statement of PR be non-modal. As Divers explains: 
 
An analysis cannot be considered objectionably circular just because its construction 
is guided by prior modal opinion about its analysanda. Unless a theorist is in the 
business of stipulating, from scratch as it were, the meaning of a term ‘F’, then in 
order to be warranted in asserting a biconditional that purported to articulate an 
analysis of the concept F, she would have to have some prior beliefs that involved 
the concept F…[I]n constructing GR, a theorist will be guided in her choice of 
postulates by her legitimate desire to have [the GR analysis of modal claims], and 
other explanatory principles, come out true. For example a prior belief that there 
are no necessary connections between existences may guide GR choice of one… 
principle of recombination rather than another. (2002: 110-11)187 
 
Further, given that the principle needs to be extensionally accurate, and given that 
our only way of judging whether it is, is to see whether it matches up with pre-theoretic 
modal opinion, it looks very much like the addition of the theistic clause is considerably less 
objectionable than the addition of the ‘size and shape permitting’ one. The theistic clause 
ensures that PR accords with the theist’s pre-theoretic modal beliefs. However, for anyone 
who was inclined to believe, prior to adopting GR, that there is no maximum possible size 
of a spacetime, PR forces a revision in modal commitments.188 Alternatively, for those who 
were pre-theoretically agnostic on this question, PR forces a belief to be formed where 
previously one was not had. For theists, then, the theistic clause comes at no cost. But the 
same cannot be said for the maximal spacetime clause.189 
   
     4.  Flexibility in Judgements about Essences 
4.1. The Problem 
The above section addressed worries that centred on the content of GR’s worlds. A related 
concern centres on the nature of the counterpart relations which hold between the contents 
of GR’s worlds: it asks whether the nature of de re modal truth under CT is acceptable from 
                                                          
187 See also Lewis (1986a: 154). 
188 And this isn’t the only one. PR likewise entails that (a) there couldn’t have been nothing, and (b) that there 
couldn’t have been disjoint spacetimes. 
189 This isn’t to say that the cost of admitting the maximal size of spacetime clause is so bad as to not be 
permitted. Lewis does accept that there’s a cost here, but he tries to explain (1986a) why it isn’t so bad. 
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a theistic standpoint. We’ve seen that under CT, what it’s true to say about the essential 
nature of an individual depends upon what sort of similarity is relevant to the context at 
hand. To see why this is, recall that one advantage of the GR ontology of possibilia is that 
it enables us to identify properties with sets (classes) of individuals. Redness, for instance, 
is just the class of all red things across modal space. For Lewis, though, there are no 
constraints on class membership: ‘[a]ny class of things, be it ever so gerrymandered and 
miscellaneous and indescribable in thought and language, and be it ever so superfluous in 
characterizing the world, is nevertheless a property.’ (1983b: 346).190 Hence, properties are 
in immense abundance (ibid.).  
For someone accepting the GR theory of modality together with Lewis’ theory of 
properties, there will, then, be innumerably many ways in which any two objects are similar 
(and also dissimilar). Now, since any two individuals will have infinitely many properties in 
common, just which individual in another possible world gets to count as the individual 
overall most similar to a particular individual located here in the actual world is going to be 
metaphysically indeterminate. For, ‘[p]roperties do nothing to capture facts of 
resemblance…[they] carve reality at the joints – and everywhere else as well.’ (ibid.). Imagine 
two different individuals existing in possible world, w*, distinct from the actual world. 
Suppose that one of these is a tap-dancing turtle and that the other is a human being who 
looks, talks, and acts very much like me, and who has an origin quite similar to the one I 
have here in our world. There is nothing in the ontology that can determine whether it is the 
human, rather than the turtle, who is the individual in w* overall most similar to me: I have 
infinitely many properties in common with the turtle, as well as the human. Hence, which 
of these counts as my counterpart in w* will depend upon which respects of similarity we 
decide to take into consideration. As such, any fact of most overall similarity – and therefore 
de re modal truth – is going to be flexible and context-dependent.  
 Lewis, (1986a: 248-63) discusses the advantages to be gained by this feature of the 
counterpart relation, one of which is neatly summarised by Nolan as follows: 
 
One general reason to adopt [CT], independent of the details of [GR], is that it 
permits flexibility in our judgements about essences. In some contexts we are 
inclined to think different sorts of things are essential to a given object. Some people 
are strongly inclined to think that, for example, ducks such as Amanda are essentially 
ducks; others think that it is possible, in the broadest sense, for Amanda to have 
been some other sort of bird, or a robot, or something else very different. Perhaps 
there is a deep disagreement here, or maybe what is going on is that different sorts 
of similarity are relevant in different contexts. Set up a context where much 
similarity is needed and some strong statement of essence seems appropriate; be 
                                                          
190 For an argument against restricted composition see Lewis (1986a: 211-3) 
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more lax, and a duck-shaped robot that acts and thinks like Amanda seems good 
enough to be a possibility for her. This would at least explain why people have such 
different intuitions about what is essential, and why the arguments between 
different sides so often get nowhere. (2005: 68) 
 
The point is that our modal judgements often tend to be what Lewis calls 
‘inconstant’, and the context dependence of the counterpart relation neatly accounts for 
this.191 In addition, CT can offer a solution to the paradoxes of coincidence. A statue can 
survive changes the clay that constitutes it cannot, and likewise the clay that constitutes the 
statue can survive changes the statue cannot. Does this mean that, to preserve Leibniz’ Law, 
we have to accept that we have here not one object but two – a statue, and the clay out of 
which it is made – and that the two are spatially coincident? Lewis thinks not. Utilising CT, 
we can say that there is one object here, but viewed in one way (e.g., considered as a statue) 
certain properties (e.g., similarity of shape and form) are most important, and viewed in 
another way (e.g., considered as a lump of clay), other properties are (e.g., having certain 
material parts as constituents). Accordingly, different de re properties are attributed in 
accordance with what aspects of similarity we deem to be important. ‘[D]ifferent ways of 
referring to this single thing tend to evoke different counterpart relations.’ (Lewis, 1986a: 
257) 
However, while in general these appear to be good features of CT, prima facie at least, 
they do not seem amenable to theism. The classical picture holds that God has an essence 
independently of the way he is conceived, described, or referred to, by us; and this is 
precisely what is now being denied: by this theory, facts about God’s essence are flexible 
and context-dependent. Indeed, one may even be forgiven for thinking that they are, for 
this reason, mind-dependent. For, God’s essential goodness, for example, is owed, in part, to 
our deeming the respect of goodness to be one of primary importance. And that’s certainly 
not something that comports well with classical theism.  
 
4.2. A Potential Solution 
In a number of places (1983b, 1984, and 1986a: 59-69), Lewis insists that any adequate 
systematic philosophy must allow for a distinction between more and less natural properties 
and so accepts that an ‘élite’ number of sparse properties must be distinguished amongst 
his abundant horde. I noted above that natural properties are such that the ‘[s]haring of 
                                                          
191 However, as Woodward (2012: §2.1) points out, context-dependence only gives rise to inconstancy given 
that there are different contexts to deliver different verdicts. Even if the truth-conditions for modal 
judgements are context dependent, modal judgements may nonetheless not be inconstant if it turns out that 
we always happen to be in a context which determines that a relevant de re modal judgement is true (or false). 
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them makes for qualitative similarity, they carve at the joints, they are intrinsic, they are 
highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not entirely miscellaneous, there are 
only just enough of them to characterise things completely and without redundancy.’ 
(1986a: 60). ‘Natural properties would be the ones whose sharing makes for resemblance, 
and the ones relevant to causal powers.’ (1983b: 347). Now, although naturalness would 
come in degrees, some properties would be perfectly natural (1986a: 61). Perfectly natural 
properties, Lewis suggests (1983b, 1986a), could be defined in terms of a primitive relation 
of resemblance. Perfectly natural properties would be those classes, C, such that every 
member of C primitively resembles every other member of C, and nothing, x, that is not a 
member of C primitively resembles every member of C and every member of C primitively 
resembles x.192 Less-than-perfectly-natural properties, or what we might call ‘imperfectly 
natural’ properties, ‘may be somewhat disjunctive or extrinsic, [but] are at least somewhat 
natural in a derivative way, to the extent that they can be reached by not-too-complicated 
chains of definability from the perfectly natural properties.’ (1986a: 61). An example of a 
property quite far up the naturalness scale is being an electron; an example of a property that 
quite low down the naturalness scale is being yellow or once having been smiled at by a cigar-smoking 
squirrel while stood within three feet of a jar of quince jelly.  
This notion of primitive resemblance, and hence of perfectly natural properties, can 
be added to the picture to allay the worry outlined above in §4.1. The presence of perfectly 
natural properties ensures that at least some individuals bear objective, metaphysically determinate, 
relations of perfectly natural – and therefore of most overall perfectly natural – similarity. 
Precisely this line of thought it pursued by Todd Buras (2006), who contends that CT with 
an ontology containing natural properties ensures essentialism; that is, the thesis that some 
things possess modal properties determinately and independently of the way they are 
conceived, described, or referred to (ibid.: 29-30). Buras defines a relation of overall perfectly 
natural similarity as follows: 
 
x is overall perfectly naturally similar to y =df x is perfectly naturally similar to y, and there 
is no thing, z, distinct from x and y, such that z is perfectly naturally similar to y, and 
z shares more perfectly natural properties with y than x. (ibid.: 36) 
 
Buras then uses this relation to define the further relation of being a maximally natural 
counterpart: 
 
                                                          
192 He also suggests (1983b, 1986a: 63-9) that perfectly natural properties (natural classes) could be defined in 
terms of their members’ bearing instantiation relations to sparse immanent universals, or in terms of their 
members possessing certain tropes. 
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x is a maximally natural counterpart of y =df x and y inhabit different possible worlds 
and compared to everything else in y’s world x is overall perfectly naturally similar 
to y. (ibid.: 37) 
 
Given this, if those endorsing GR together with CT accept with Lewis that some 
properties are perfectly natural, then at least some individuals – those which possess at least 
some perfectly natural properties – will enter into maximally natural counterpart relations. 
Importantly, such relations will not be context dependent – will not hold in virtue of our 
taking certain respects of similarity to be more important than others.  
 
[O]verall perfectly natural similarity heeds the differences in properties which 
primitive resemblances introduce. Consequently, it is not indeterminate in any of 
the ways Lewis lists: only perfectly natural similarities count, all perfectly natural 
similarities count equally, no less-than-perfectly natural similarities count at all, and 
a candidate is eliminated only when it shares fewer perfectly natural properties than 
another. Of course, overall perfectly natural similarity admits of ties – as in a case 
where y has exactly three perfectly natural properties, and both x and z share all 
three. In such cases I prefer to say that both x and z are overall perfectly naturally 
similar to y. The important point is that ties do not amount to indeterminacy. Both 
or neither x and z are overall perfectly naturally similar to y independently of how 
we conceive the relata. (Buras, ibid.: 36-7) 
 
Since perfectly natural properties entail an objective, determinate, specification-
independent relation of overall (and hence most overall) perfectly natural similarity, if it could 
be shown that God possesses at least some perfectly natural properties, God could then be 
seen as bearing determinate, objective, mind-independent, overall most perfectly natural 
similarity relations to certain individuals in other possible worlds. Further, if there’s good 
reason to think that the divine-making properties are perfectly natural, then this would allow 
for God’s having an essence in an ontologically robust sense: given TPR, God would bear 
determinate objective relations of maximally natural similarity to at least one (and at most one) 
individual in each possible world; and, importantly, each one of these individuals would 
possess the full set of required divine perfections. 
This way of making CT comport better with theism thus hangs on the answer to 
the question of whether God’s essential properties (i.e., the divine perfections) are perfectly 
natural. To answer this question, we first need to know what naturalness is: what makes a 
property natural? Above I noted some of the ways Lewis characterises the natural 
properties: he says, e.g., that sharing of them makes for qualitative similarity, they are joint-
carving, and that they provide the most concise tools out of which to characterise things 
without redundancy. But one salient thing I omitted is that Lewis also says that the perfectly 
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natural properties are intrinsic. In fact, Lewis takes intrinsic properties to be those that are 
invariant between duplicates (and duplicates to be those individuals that alike in terms of 
natural similarity).193 This is significant. If, as I’ve argued, certain of God’s essential 
properties are extrinsic, then given the correctness of Lewis’s judgement, such properties 
cannot count as perfectly natural. For this strategy to work, then, theists must find some 
grounds to deny that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic.194 
So, why might it be reasonable (independent of our present theistic concerns) to 
deny that all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic? One reason is that, plausibly, the most 
natural properties in our world are the fundamental physical properties, things like mass, 
spin, and charge (see Lewis, 1986a: 60). However, these properties of the ultimate 
constituents of matter are good candidates for being dispositional. Indeed, a number of 
prominent philosophers such as Simon Blackburn (1990), Peter Strawson (1980), Richard 
Holton (1999), and George Molnar (2003) have defended this view; and it wouldn’t be 
entirely unreasonable to think that dispositions are extrinsic. They are, after all, hypothetical 
properties, implying certain facts about what goes on in their bearers’ surroundings.  
However, that dispositions are extrinsic goes much against the philosophical 
orthodoxy: David Armstrong (1973), Hugh Mellor (1974), John Mackie (1977a), Alexander 
Bird (1998), Molnar (2003), and many more, view dispositional properties as intrinsic to 
their bearers. Now, in Chapter One I noted that, at least in most cases, whether an object 
possesses a disposition (at a world) usually depends at least in part on what laws of nature 
hold at that world. Hence, the authors just cited take the view that dispositions are intrinsic 
usually because they are in agreement with Lewis’ claim that ‘if two things (actual or merely 
possible) are exact intrinsic duplicates (and if they are subject to the same laws of nature) 
then they are disposed alike’ (1977: 147). In other words, they (a) take intrinsic properties 
to be those that are invariant between duplicates and (b) take dependence on laws of nature 
to be irrelevant in determining whether a property is intrinsic. This might give no cause for 
concern though. As argued in Chapter One, invariance between duplicates is not a good 
test for intrinsicality; furthermore, since whether all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic 
is the very thing at issue here, to defend against the claim that dispositions are extrinsic by 
pointing out that they are invariant between duplicates (i.e. individuals perfectly alike in 
terms of their natural properties) presupposes the point at hand. Nonetheless, since whether 
dispositions are extrinsic is contentious, theists looking to invoke CT would be on stronger 
                                                          
193 To link this back to the discussion of intrinsicness in Chapter One: for Lewis, loneliness won’t count as an 
intrinsic property since a duplicate of a lonely thing might itself fail to be lonely. 
194 I leave aside the worry that there might not be such things as perfectly natural properties. But for discussion 
of this see Handfield (2009) and Cameron (2008b). 
- 149 - 
 
ground if they could find some other reason to support the claim that not all perfectly 
natural properties are intrinsic.  
Kerry McKenzie and Stephen French (forthcoming) also argue that not all of the 
fundamental physics properties of the actual world are intrinsic, but their basis for this claim 
is not that some such properties are dispositional, but that some such properties are not 
freely recombinable – that they cannot be subject to a principle of recombination, and intrinsic 
properties should be. They explain that 
 
[o]ur [current] most fundamental framework for physics…is quantum field theory 
(QFT). In this framework, the magnitudes of physical properties, such as mass and 
electric charge, can change with the energy scale in a way that is described by the 
renormalization group equation…[and] there is no limit to how high these energy 
scales can grow. It follows that properties can be regarded as fundamental…only if 
they stay…finite in magnitude, in the infinite-energy limit. [It] turns out, 
however…[that this requirement] is satisfied only if the property occurs in a local 
gauge theory containing only a small number of fermion types. For example…the colour 
charge on a quark will behave as a fundamental property if, but only if, (1) there 
exist gluons in addition to quarks, and (2) there are at most 16 distinct types, or 
‘flavours’, of quarks in the theory. Should there be more flavours present, the colour 
charge will diverge in the limit so that it can no longer be regarded as fundamental 
after all. [Hence,]…the fundamental physics properties cannot in general be 
regarded as intrinsic, at least not qua fundamental properties; for the very fundamentality 
of such properties can be sensitive to what exists in addition to any given bearer of 
them, in any world in which they occur…But that each free recombination takes us 
from one manifold of fundamental properties to another…is the central postulate 
of Lewis’ world-building system. (ibid.: 21-22)    
 
 If McKenzie and French are right about this, then theists have independent grounds 
for thinking that not all perfectly natural properties are intrinsic. However, it doesn’t seem 
that the argument can establish its purported conclusion. The relevant modality in play in 
the argument seems to be physical not metaphysical. If so, it wouldn’t violate the letter of 
PR.195 In any case, supposing that the requisite modality were in play, what is, arguably, the 
right conclusion to draw from this is, is not that some fundamental (perfectly natural) 
properties are extrinsic, but rather that what we otherwise thought of as perfectly natural 
properties turn out not to be perfectly natural. Suppose being a father were a perfectly natural 
property. By recombination, we could take a man who is a father out of his actual 
surroundings, place him into a void, and he would no longer be a father. Hence, contra the 
initial supposition, being a father can’t be fundamental. In any case, regardless of what we say 
here, this discussion at least shows that these two theses are deeply at odds with each other. 
                                                          
195 Additionally, one might resist the micro-reductionist picture the point seems to hang on and instead hold 
that fundamental dispositional properties can be had by systems. 
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If some fundamental properties are extrinsic, and if fundamental properties are good 
candidates for being perfectly natural in kind, then that threatens to undermine the Lewisian 
project of generating worlds by recombination.196  
In light of this, it would be much to the theist’s advantage if there was a way to deal 
with the original concern that avoided our needing to take a stance on the thorny issues 
surrounding naturalness and the intrinsicness of dispositions. 
  
4.3. A Better Reply 
Fortunately, there is a way to do so. The original worry can be shown to be based on a 
mistaken piece of reasoning. The original worry was that, under CT, context determines 
which counterpart relations hold (because context settles which respects of similarity are 
most important) and that, as a consequence, de re modal truth is going to be at least partially 
mind-dependent. However, the mind-dependence of de re modal truth is not such a 
consequence. To see why, we should draw a distinction between the truth-maker for a 
particular utterance, u, and the truth-conditions for u. Now, context invariably helps determine 
what we mean by u, and therefore determines what the truth-conditions for u are, but its doing 
so does not make it the case that the truth-maker for u – that in virtue of which the truth-
conditions for u are met – is mind-dependent. As Lewis explains: 
 
[this] is how it is in general with dependence on complex features of context. There 
is a rule of accommodation: what you say makes itself true, if at all possible, by 
creating a context that selects the relevant features so as to make it true. Say that 
France is hexagonal, and you thereby set the standards of precision low, and you 
speak the truth; say that France is not hexagonal…and you set the standards high, 
and again you speak the truth. (1986a: 251-2) 
 
As Lewis says, when it comes to an ordinary statement like France is hexagonal, the 
context in which it’s made will help to fix its truth-condition. But that which fixes its truth-value 
is something objective and mind-independent – something ‘out there’ in reality; namely, the 
shape of France itself. This is precisely how it is with context when it comes to statements of 
de re modality under CT. Context makes salient which relation of similarity we’re most 
                                                          
196 The Lewisian project would, though, only be profoundly undermined if we had serious reason to think that 
all perfectly natural properties are extrinsic, or that so many of them were that recombination could no longer 
give us a large enough modal space to represent each and every possibility. Suppose McKenzie and French 
are right that, e.g., there is a necessary connection between quarks having a certain property and the existence 
of gluons. Then it will not matter so much that we cannot recombine the two. Indeed, we shouldn’t want to: 
in such a case we’d be mistaken that such a possibility would need to be represented (it wouldn’t be a 
possibility). All that matters is that there be other perfectly natural properties that are intrinsic, that can thus 
be recombined, and that the worlds made up of such recombinations gives us a large enough modal space. 
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interested in, but whether there is such a relation has nothing to do with context (is not 
subjective); it is, rather, a matter of what possibilia exist and of what character they have. 
Hence, since it’s the individuals themselves that make for the holding (or not) of a certain 
relation of similarity, R, between them, the fact that context determines that it’s R (rather 
than R1 or R2, or…) which is salient is by the by as far as the mind-dependence of de re truth 
itself is concerned.197 Therefore, since the original worry was motivated partly by a 
confusion as to what role context plays under CT, and partly by a failure to notice the extent 
to which context already does play precisely this role elsewhere in our language, we needn’t 
worry that CT is at odds with the objectivity of God’s essence. 
 
     5.  Irrelevance 
5.1. What the Problem Isn’t  
Aside from concerns about the way counterpart relations are determined, theists may also 
be troubled by the relevance of the counterpart relations themselves. According to this 
view, what it is for God to have (and, likewise, what it is for each God-counterpart to have) 
modal properties (such as necessary existence and essential moral perfection) is for God to 
stand in certain relations to other things in other worlds. It’s the presence of morally 
impeccable God-counterparts (and the absence of morally imperfect God-counterparts) in 
other worlds, which, e.g., make for the truth of the claim that God is essentially good. Yet, 
so the objection might run, what deeds other beings do should be neither here nor there with 
regards to whether God is essentially morally good. Likewise, facts about what it’s possible 
for God to do should owe directly to him, not his counterparts and the deeds that they do. 
This may bring to mind the charge of irrelevance which, in one of contemporary 
philosophy’s most discussed footnotes, Kripke infamously raises against CT. Kripke objects 
that, under this theory,  
 
if we say ‘Humphrey might have won the election…’ we are not talking about 
something that might have happened to Humphrey but to someone else, a 
“counterpart”. Probably, however, Humphrey does not care whether someone else, 
no matter how much resembling him, would have been victorious in another 
possible world. (1972: 45).  
 
However, as many have since responded to the first component of this objection, CT does 
not say that when we say ‘Humphrey might have won’, we are taking about something that 
                                                          
197 That it is crucial to emphasise the distinction between truth conditions and truth making in order to fully 
understand CT has precedence in the literature; see Divers (2007). 
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might have happened to Humphrey’s counterpart. It tells us that when we say ‘Humphrey might 
have won’, we are talking about something that might have happened to Humphrey: he is the 
subject matter of the claim. It’s just that ‘Humphrey might have won’ owes its truth 
Humphrey’s counterpart winning in some other world.198  
 Equally, there’s an easy response to the second component of the objection. As I 
explained in the thesis introduction, it’s simply not at all obvious what the ontological 
ground for modality is. Hence, as Lewis (1986a: 196-7) points out, this objection, if it has 
any bite at all, will count just as much against any other account of what modal truth is 
grounded in. For whatever some theory specifies as the ontological ground for modality, 
the answer at least is not going to be something obvious; were it not, the grounding problem 
would never have arisen! So, of course it will go against pre-theoretical intuition to suppose 
that what we could have done, or what might have befallen us, is a matter of whatever that 
theory tells us. As Lewis explains, it’s equally surprising that some ‘abstract whatnot’ makes 
true, e.g., Sarah could have been a genius. Further, contra what Kripke suggests, it seems that, 
once we learn that some x consists in some y; we do then have reason to care about y, given 
that we care about x. Suppose I come to learn that my feeling anxious consists in there 
being such and such chemical reaction in my brain. It seems that, rather than taking my 
prior indifference towards whether such and such chemical reaction occurs in some part of 
my brain to be evidence against its constituting my anxious feeling, once I learn of the 
equivalence, I certainly would care whether such a chemical reaction is going to occur, given 
that I care about whether I’m subject to such a feeling.       
 
5.2. What the Problem Is 
If the theistic complaint does mirror the first part of Kripke’s objection, then it isn’t a good 
one. However, the objection isn’t that the modal properties of God depend on the modal 
properties of his counterparts; it’s rather that, under CT, the modal properties of God 
depend on the non-modal properties of his counterparts. We’re saying that God has his 
modal properties in virtue of the way some other individuals are, and we shouldn’t be: what 
individuals besides God get up to should be neither here nor there with regards to whether 
God is, e.g., essentially morally good.  
It will be of no use to reply that these are, after all, God’s counterparts; that it’s in 
virtue of the deeds God does that he’s essentially morally perfect, and that it’s because of 
                                                          
198 However two authors sympathetic to Kripke’s objection are Blackburn (1984: 214-5), and Jubien (2009: 
63-7, 73-4), who offers some additional reasons for taking counterparts relations to be inadequate for serving 
their proposed modal purpose. 
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the way God actually is (and acts) that certain morally impeccable beings resemble him closely 
enough to be his counterparts (and less-than-impeccable beings in other worlds do not). 
For, to suppose that what matters here is merely that no-one else crowd out God himself 
from explanations concerning his possession of his modal properties misses the point.199 
Again, the point’s that no other beings should be ‘getting in on the act’: only God himself 
should be featuring in such explanations. It seems intuitively obvious that the claim ‘God 
can destroy Jupiter is grounded in someone else’s destroying Jupiter’ is one which specifies a state of 
affairs that would be deeply at odds with divine aseity.  
 
5.3. Dissolving the Problem 
We saw in Chapter Two §6.2 that what divine aseity can sensibly be seen as involving is 
this: (8) God’s possession of his nature depends on (is grounded in) neither the actual 
presence of any actual thing(s), nor the actual absence of any possible thing(s) distinct from 
God. So, to assess the correctness of the intuition that CT is at odds with theism in the 
respect of divine aseity, we must consider whether CT really violates the requirement in (8).  
Now, there’s a case for thinking that it does. After all, God’s counterparts are possible 
entities; and they need to be present in other worlds in order that that they can bear 
similarity relations to God, since this is what grounds God’s nature. Yet, the thought might 
go, precisely because these counterparts are required to be present elsewhere, they are required 
to be absent from actuality, since it is exactly the counterpart theorist’s view that individuals 
cannot be present in more than one world;200 and this conflicts with (8), which stipulates 
that the nature of an a se being shouldn’t be grounded in the actual absence of any possibilia 
distinct from it. If this line of thought is right, then theists would have here a good reason 
to resist CT: (8) provides some much needed content to the doctrine of divine aseity; given 
the central role this doctrine has to play in the development of classical theism, (8)’s loss 
comes at a significant cost.201 
 However, the move from the claim that y’s being F depends on x’s existing in a non-actual 
world to the further claim that y’s being F depends on x’s being absent from the actual world is 
illegitimate. Take an analogous case. Does the fact that I’m in Leeds depend on the fact that 
I’m not in Reading? Most of us would agree that it doesn’t. My absence from Reading is 
grounded in my presence in Leeds, not vice-versa. Likewise, the GRist who admits CT can 
                                                          
199 This mirrors some of the discussion in Lewis (1979: 127 and 1986a: 196). 
200 Though, of course, individuals may be present at many. 
201 Unless some other way to characterise the independence of the divine nature can be found – one which 
sets it apart from the natures of non-divine individuals whilst not making too-high demands. 
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just take where individuals are in modal space as prior to – and as un-grounded in – their 
absences elsewhere. So, it’s wrong to think that CT involves a conflict with (8). It doesn’t 
say that God’s nature is grounded in the actual absence of certain possible entities distinct 
from God, it just says that it’s grounded in the non-actual presence of possible entities distinct 
from God. Hence, GR’s counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re truths involving God does 
not conflict with aseity. This certainly seems a surprising result, but surprising results are 
not something the philosopher should be unused to. 
 
     6.  The Real Issues with N4 
Above we have seen that some prima facie obvious reasons not to accept N4 as the 
interpretation of N1 – the claim that God exists according to all worlds – can be rebutted. 
In this section, we will see that some more significant objections to N4 can be advanced, 
ones that cannot be so easily dealt with.  
 
6.1. Too Much Luck 
The first real problem for theism under CT is this. Each world depends – in some sense 
left unexplicated – on a different divine being: there is some kind of explanatory relation 
between each divine being and the world it inhabits. By hypothesis, there are no causal 
relations between the parts of different worlds; causal relations are partly what makes for 
world unification, so no divine individual has any causal interaction with any of its other-
worldly counterparts. Yet, somehow, there are no gaps in modal space: for every way our 
world could be, some world, (and exactly one world), really is that way. This just seems to 
be far too much of a coincidence to accept.  
Now, it might be thought that this is a problem for GR independently of theism. 
Isn’t it equally miraculous that, even under atheistic GR, for every way our world could be, 
some world really is that way; that no two worlds are alike;202 and that no world contains 
impossible events such as Sarah’s successfully dividing by zero, nor impossible objects such 
as round squares? The GRist has to accept the existence and natures of the worlds as a 
brute, primitive, feature of reality; otherwise, they’d forfeit their reductive explanation: ‘[t]o 
admit constraints on the number and nature of worlds is to contradict the reductive [GR] 
hypothesis that the existence of worlds is the prior, or more basic, feature of reality and 
modality the posterior, or less basic, feature.’ (Shalkowski, 1994: 675-6). Yet, again, taking 
                                                          
202 While Lewis (1986a: 87) expressed agnosticism about the existence of qualitatively identical worlds, such 
things are an unnecessary posit the theory could do without. 
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what worlds exist and what natures they have as brute leaves us with a state of affairs which 
seems to hold as too big a matter of luck: these worlds whose existence is brute, in a 
miraculous stroke of good fortune, satisfy the principle of re-combination.  
However, even if one does find something objectionable about this aspect of the 
atheistic GR picture, there is certainly something much more unacceptable in the theistic 
case. In the atheistic case, as we’ve seen, the existence and the natures of the worlds is brute 
– unexplained. In the theistic case, though, something explains each corner of modal space. 
But nothing explains why those corners work so well together as they do. It is as if we are 
being asked to imagine a giant super-cosmic jigsaw – a picture divided into many different 
interlocking pieces – with a different divine individual in some way explaining each piece. 
These beings (think of them as independent manufacturers) never interact but, somehow, the 
resultant jigsaw forms not only a coherent picture – each part of it representing just what it 
needs to in order to contribute towards some larger representation – but a complete one too 
(i.e., it has no missing pieces)! This is a story anyone could be forgiven for failing to find at 
all plausible. 
The mysterious good fortune could only be dissolved if we were either able to 
appeal to some modal explanation, which would compromise the reductive project, or if 
we were otherwise able to appeal to some causal explanation, which would also compromise 
the reductive project. For again, it is causal (and spatiotemporal) relatedness which provide 
the non-modal definition of ‘world’.  
Now it is, of course, always open to theists to make an appeal to what we might call 
‘the inevitable mystery of the divine nature’. Maybe some other sui generis metaphysical 
connection guarantees the completeness and coherence of modal reality: how God does 
what he does is bound to be mysterious, isn’t it? Perhaps there’s just no getting away from 
that. If so, then this connection between God and his counterparts may just be one that 
lies, expectedly, beyond the realms of human comprehension. If we did allow for this, then 
putting GR in a theistic context could do the theory a favour: we have here at least a gesture 
towards a solution for what otherwise seems a real problem for GR.   
Should we find this satisfactory though? Insofar as we are invoking one mystery to 
respond to another, we don’t really appear to be dealing with the original mystery at all; we 
seem, rather, to simply be deferring it. Moreover, as a more general point against these kinds 
of responses: we may well wonder why, if we permit the theist to take this line, we are 
engaging with theistic metaphysics at all. If we’re prepared to hold our hands up and plead 
ignorance at any moment, why not do so earlier on, or even from the outset? Given that 
- 156 - 
 
what we we’re looking for here is a theory which can dispel the mystery surrounding 
modality, this response is one we ought to shy away from.  
Nonetheless, the point isn’t decisive. Consider other cases where sui generis 
metaphysical (non-causal) connections are posited; the notion of instantiation which links 
some universal, F, with some particular, a, being one such example. In the face of Bradley’s 
regress (Bradley, 1930) – which asks if F is related by instantiation to a, then what links F, a, and 
instantiation?; and then asks if some further thing, G, links F, a, and instantiation, then what links 
those things (i.e., F, a, instantiation, and G)?; and so on – some maintain that instantiation is a 
‘non-relational tie’ (Strawson, 1959). That is, they take it to be a sui generis link – which binds 
universals and particulars without relating them. C. D. Broad (1933), who calls this tie a 
‘metaphysical glue’, is able to make an analogy with more ordinary adhesives. Just as glue 
just does bind two pieces of paper together – meaning we don’t have to go searching for 
another kind of adhesive to bind the glue and the paper – instantiation just does bind 
universals to particulars (ibid.: 85). Now, this kind of metaphysical glue, insofar as it is sui 
generis, is certainly mysterious. Undoubtedly, we don’t know how it does what it does, but we 
do at least have some grip on this thing, since we at least know what it’s supposed to do. 
Likewise, the sui generis metaphysical connection which is being proposed to hold between 
God and his counterparts is one we can neither fully nor easily understand, but if such 
connections are allowed in other cases (given that we have some grip on the role they are 
supposed to play), shouldn’t this one be permitted too? Perhaps so, but even if we do posit 
this connection, it seems we do so only at a further cost to theism. For, if, as we’re now 
supposing, it is this connection which ensures the completeness and consistency of modal 
space, then the role each God-counterpart has to play is somewhat diminished. Each divine 
being does what it does because that is what the connection demands. In that case, why 
have the divine beings at all? We could just as well make do with the mysterious 
metaphysical connection all on its own.  
  
6.2. Not Enough Knowledge  
That CT requires God and his other-worldly counterparts to reside in isolated worlds 
presents a second significant problem, one which relates to divine omniscience. As 
omniscient, any of these beings can be expected to have knowledge of what goes on in 
other worlds. For each omniscient being can be expected to have modal knowledge, and 
the truth-conditions for modal claims involve (this and) other worlds. However, because 
each world is isolated, God cannot know what other worlds there are – and hence, cannot 
know whether the truth-conditions for modal claims are met – if knowing what worlds 
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there are would require him to have some kind of causal acquaintance with them. Tom 
Richards (1975) raises exactly this objection against Lewisian GR: that if modal truth is what 
this theory says it is, then modal knowledge is ruled out since ‘direct inspection’ of other 
worlds is impossible. 
 But why should we accept that anyone’s knowing what worlds there are would 
require them to have causal acquaintance with them? There are those, such as Lewis, who 
would deny that someone can know that p only if there is some causal connection between 
the knower and the subject matter of p. In Lewis’ view, ‘[c]ausal accounts of knowledge are 
all very well in their place, but if they are put forward as general theories, then mathematics 
refutes them.’ (1986a: 109). His point is that since it’s undeniable that we have mathematical 
knowledge, if it turns out that numbers – the subject matter of our mathematical knowledge 
– are abstract mathematical objects, then it cannot be that mathematical knowledge requires 
causal acquaintance with numbers. Likewise, Lewis takes it that ‘[w]e do not find out by 
observation what possibilities there are…What we do find out by observation is what 
possibilities we are: which worlds may be ours, which of their inhabitants may be ourselves.’ 
(ibid.: 112).  
Lewis (ibid.: 110) anticipates the potential reply that the mathematical and the modal 
cases are sufficiently dissimilar – mathematical objects are abstract, whereas other worlds are 
concrete – and this has consequences for their epistemology. Given that what it takes for us 
to know that some concrete things exist in this world is that we somehow observe them, 
doesn’t it follow that we should likewise have to perceive the concrete denizens of other 
worlds to know that they exist? 
Lewis thinks not. For him, the modal and the mathematical cases are, rather, 
relevantly similar since the facts about possibility, just like the mathematical facts, are 
necessary. We need causal acquaintance with the objects in this world not because they are 
concrete, but because they are contingent. To know whether some objects such as turtles exist 
in this world is just to know whether turtles are spatiotemporally related to us. But it’s 
contingent that turtles are spatiotemporally related to us. Hence, a belief that turtles are actual 
could be wrong. A belief that turtles are possible, by contrast, could not be wrong, because 
it’s necessary that turtles are possible. So, given that the former type of belief could be false, 
a causal link is needed between the object of the belief and the believer to rule out the 
belief’s being true by sheer luck. However, since the latter type of belief could not be false, 
no such causal link is needed. Lewis thinks that we likely form the majority of our modal 
beliefs through imaginative experiments, and by making use of a principle of recombination. 
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The true beliefs formed in this manner suffice for knowledge just because their truth cannot 
be a matter of luck (ibid.: 113-5).  
However, as Pruss objects, the impossibility of being wrong about something does 
not suffice for knowledge. ‘Otherwise, the mathematical cranks who believed that they had 
proofs of Fermat’s Last Theorem would necessarily count as knowing that Fermat’s Last 
Theorem, is true, which is absurd.’ (2011: 121). Further, since conceivability is only a fallible 
guide to possibility, even if we did concur with Lewis that true modal beliefs suffice for 
knowledge, there’s still no guarantee that we aren’t in possession of false modal beliefs. The 
point of having some causal constraint on knowledge is not so much that it ensures that 
the truth of the belief isn’t lucky, but that it ensures that the belief itself is not lucky.  
Supposing that Lewis is right to say that what grounds modal truth need not feature 
in our modal knowledge, we should nonetheless resist the thought that what grounds modal 
truth need not feature as a component of God’s modal knowledge. For, the classical view, 
advocated by Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas has it that divine knowledge has the feature 
of being immediate. These authors took it that the knowledge of a perfect intellect cannot be 
subsequent to anything else it knows: ‘God sees all things together and not successively’ 
(Aquinas, 1273/1947: book I, q. 14, a. 7), and God’s knowledge is not derived through a 
discursive rational, or mediative, process. The idea is that cognitive perfection rules out the 
need to perform deductions (see, e.g., Wierenga (2010) and Mann (2005: 51)). Further, 
God’s knowledge – his knowledge of the world, or of facts about concrete things – is 
traditionally thought to be obtained through some sort of perfect perceptive faculty (one that 
must differ from the perceptive faculties of bodily beings, since God (at least qua non-
incarnate203) is without physical form.204 The God of the Bible is described as one who hears 
our prayers and witnesses our actions. And this empirical knowledge is likewise supposed to 
be immediate: God just directly apprehends reality. The reason for this is that it ensures the 
clearness and distinctness of divine perceptions, which, in turn, ensures divine infallibility. 
One contemporary author advocating this line is William Alston (1986). In Alston’s view, 
‘[i]mmediate awareness of facts is the highest form of knowledge just because it is a direct 
and foolproof way of mirroring the reality to be known…[Hence] [t]he state of [God’s] 
knowledge is constituted by the presence of the fact known.’ (ibid.: 297). Under CT, 
knowledge of other worlds cannot be immediate to the divine intellect in this way.  
  Alston considers his position to be neutral on the question of divine spatio-
temporality. He writes that God ‘could be directly aware of all facts at every moment, or 
                                                          
203 I say this to leave aside complications concerning the trinity. 
204 See, e.g., Borland (2015: §ii.1). 
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aware of all facts timelessly if that is the mode of His existence.’ (ibid.). And he is quoted by 
Gregory Ganssle as asking the following in his response to William Hasker (who argues 
that Alston’s position is not neutral with regards to divine spatiotemporality) in the APA 
Symposium on Alston’s Divine Nature and Human Language: ‘Why suppose that an object of 
direct awareness must be ‘where’ the subject is? Why suppose, more generally, that direct 
awareness requires that subject and object be similar in respect to temporality or lack 
thereof?’ (Ganssle, 1993: 174). Likewise, the counterpart theorist might reply that God 
could have a different kind of awareness of what goes on in other worlds: perhaps God 
manages to directly perceive what goes on in merely possible worlds despite not being 
located there. However, this would be extremely odd, and not to mention ad hoc, under a 
view which construes God as necessarily spatiotemporal. That a God necessarily related to 
spacetime can somehow have direct apprehension – and so knowledge – of the concrete 
goings on it lacks any spatiotemporal relations to, is in the least somewhat incongruous.205 
Might it not be, though, that God could have immediate, pure a priori apprehension 
of, or insight into, the other-worldly facts? Perhaps God knows what other worlds are like 
in the same way that he knows what the product of 6 squared is. There’s good reason to 
resist this suggestion. For, God as omniscient superior intellect can be expected to know p 
by knowing what grounds p for any p that he knows. However, under CT, if God has no 
epistemic access to that which grounds the truth of his belief that p when p reflects some 
other-worldly knowledge, then this is false. Alternatively, if we say that ideal knowledge 
does consist in immediate apprehension of some facts, and that God does know a priori 
what the worldly facts are, then there must be some modal facts independent of the worlds 
to be apprehended a priori; God may then have epistemic access to what grounds the truth 
of p when p is other worldly knowledge, but only at the cost of accepting something which 
is exactly at odds with the GR picture. 
 
 
                                                          
205 It merits mention that there’s also a strong tradition – of which Aquinas is one of the forefathers – of 
denying that God’s knowledge is causally dependent upon anything distinct from him in this way. Aquinas 
claimed that God rather knows about the world by a kind of introspection of his own essence. ‘[God] sees 
himself through His essence; and He sees other things not in themselves, but in Himself: inasmuch as His essence 
contains the similitude of things other than Himself’. (1273/1947: book I, q. 14, a. 6, emphasis added). The 
main motivation for claiming that God’s knowledge of the world cannot even be causally dependent on, e.g., 
the free actions of creatures, is that it’s been thought that this is a prerequisite of maximal independence. An 
a se being’s knowledge that I’m now freely doing A, supposedly, can’t be dependent on my freely doing A. 
However, as argued previously, such a tremendously strong notion of aseity is implausible (and un-motivated). 
Further, not only does such a view ‘[leave] too great a distance between God as he is affirmed theologically 
and God as he is known through Scripture and experience.’ (Hasker, 1988: 391), it also seems that in saying 
that God has immediate knowledge of the world, and that God knows other things through knowing himself, 
one contradicts oneself.  
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6.3. Motivation Undercut  
Third, and this is perhaps one of the most significant worries, N4 undercuts the primary 
reason theists had for adopting GR in the first place. If we cast our minds back to Chapter 
Two, we’ll remember that GR was proposed as a way of remedying a particular problem 
levelled against DI. If God is pictured as Leibniz supposed – actualizing a single world after 
surveying a plethora of possibilities represented in the divine understanding – then 
regardless of whether there is a single best actualizable world or not, problems arise. A view 
whereby all worlds are actualized, rather than mental representations which are for the most 
part uninstantiated, was preferable because this is what enabled the theist to escape through 
its horns. Here though, we’re back to a view whereby God (and each God-counterpart) 
only actualizes only one world. In this respect, adopting N4 seems to leave the theist GRist 
at least in no better position than their DIist rival. 
 There’s a related problem here that some worlds will be axiologically better than 
others. Should one God-counterpart, x, produce (or be in some other sense responsible 
for) an axiologically better world than another such counterpart, y, then y will not be as 
morally perfect as x. Indeed, if even one world differs from the others by having a lower 
axiological status, it results that God is not (and no God-counterpart is) essentially morally 
perfect; according to at least one world, God exhibits a moral defect. This appears to give 
us reason to think that God could not have other-worldly counterparts: how can God be 
essentially good when he has counterparts who will the existence of worlds of a much lower 
axiological status than our own?   
Now, this problem (if it is a problem), is not particular to CT. The problem, more 
generally put, is essentially the same as that mentioned in the Chapter Three: there appear 
to be worlds, w, at which a divine being exists and wills the existence of w even though w 
has a low axiological status. Explaining how this scenario is theistically respectable is a task 
that must be undertaken regardless of how N1 – the claim that God exists at all worlds – is 
interpreted. I said previously that precisely this issue will be dealt with in Chapter Five; so I 
won’t pursue it here. I will note, though, that while I believe a satisfactory answer can be 
given, it cannot be given by those who interpret N1 in terms of N4. How this general 
problem might be dealt with is thus not neutral with regards to how N1 is interpreted.  
 
6.4. Ultimacy Flouted 
In his paper addressing theism’s compatibility with GR, Sheehy argues that CT ‘seems to 
violate too much the sense in which God is unique’ (2006: 319). 
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Certainly, God as traditionally understood is supposed to be unique, for God’s 
uniqueness is explicitly and repeatedly stated in Holy Scriptures. Here are some biblical 
examples: Isaiah 46:5 ‘To whom will you compare me or count me equal?’; Isaiah 46:9: ‘I am 
God, and there is no other. I am God, and there is no one like me’; Deuteronomy 32:39: ‘See 
now that I, I am He, And there is no god besides Me.’ Is Sheehy is also right, though, that 
theism together with N4 is in direct tension with the classical theistic doctrine that God is 
unique? That depends. We need to know whether what the scriptural texts such as the above 
point to, and thus require, is a monotheism whereby only one god actually exists, or whether 
it is one whereby only one god is real. Lewis took himself to be speaking truly when he said 
that he didn’t believe theism to be true, even though he was confident in saying that divine 
beings exist somewhere in modal space. But then again, Lewis was no theist. What would 
committed monotheists be likely to say about monotheism’s compatibility with GR plus N4? 
Would they take God’s merely being unique in the actual world as sufficient for the truth 
of monotheism?206 
To answer this, we first need to ask ourselves why it should matter that God be 
unique. In Chapter One I argued that God must at least be unique in his omnipotence, for 
absurdities arise on the assumption that more than one omnipotent being exists. For 
obvious reasons though, this reasoning shouldn’t tell against the standard CT view. CT does 
not require that multiple omnipotent beings inhabit the same world; so it doesn’t lead to 
the problem that any combination of these beings could have a conflict of will, resulting in 
at least one of them having their intentions thwarted. We have here no reason, then, to find 
the existence of multiple divine beings across modal space objectionable. 
However, one divine attribute which, Sheehy argues, could not be multiply 
instanced is being ultimately responsible for what exists. As Sheehy explains, ‘[w]ithin the tradition 
of classical theism God is [supposed to be] the ultimate source or ground for what there 
is…a single entity is ultimately responsible for what exists.’ (2006: 318). Now, I argued in 
the previous chapter that what should be of primary importance to our conception of the 
divine is not so much that God be the creator of literally all that exists distinct from him, but 
rather that God be the ultimate stopping point for explanation. To reiterate Leftow’s words, what 
matters is that ‘there is no going past this level [i.e. that of God] in any explanation of other 
things’ existence: explanations that reach here, stop here, and [so]…God is the ultimate 
                                                          
206 Aquinas’ denial that God belongs to any genus might is not relevant to the question of God’s uniqueness 
here. For, Aquinas claim derives from his view that (a) God is immaterial, and that (b) individuals within a 
certain genus are individuated, or differentiated, by their material differences (see e.g., Aquinas (1273/1947: 
Book Ia, 3, 5) and Davies (1985: 120-1)). Additionally, even though, under CT, no God-counterpart 
transcends spacetime (each is at least temporally related to some world), there’s no worry about how to 
distinguish them since each one has unique temporal relations.  
- 162 - 
 
explainer of all explained existence…there is no digging deeper than God.’ (2012: 5-6). 
Under CT, God is not the ultimate explainer of all explained existence if we are quantifying 
over unrestrictedly everything. God is, rather, only the ultimate explainer of all explained 
existence if we are quantifying over actuality. Likewise, each God-counterpart is only the 
ultimate stopping point for explanation when we are restricting our attention to the world 
that it inhabits. To say that this lessens our conception of the divine would be something 
of an understatement: far from being something with fundamental explanatory power, God, on 
this view, is merely the ultimate explainer of an infinitesimal portion of concrete reality. So 
here we have a fourth reason N4 is at odds with theism. On the basis of this and the above 
considerations, I conclude that counterpart relations do not make for a suitable mode of 
divine de re representation. 
 
     7.  The Standpoint View 
§6 shows there’s good reason to rule out what was initially identified as option (ii) of the 
possible answers to the question of where God is located with respect to the worlds GR 
posits: God inhabits some worlds but not others. In the previous chapter we saw that what was 
initially identified as option (i): God inhabits all worlds is, despite first appearances, a viable 
option. Option (iii) thus remains to be considered: God inhabits no worlds. This final section 
will examine this remaining alternative. Since Sheehy (2006) contends that it is untenable, 
we’ll begin by assessing the correctness of his estimation.  
 
7.1. Sheehy’s  Argument 
Sheehy’s argument that God cannot be said to not exist in (to not be a part of) any world, 
relies on the assumption that if this were maintained, theists would be unable to give an 
analysis of God’s necessity compatible with GR. For, since, under GR, possible individuals 
are all and only those who are such that the whole of them is part of some world, if God is 
not a part of any world, then God will not be a possible individual.  
However, as Cameron has highlighted, Sheehy has been too quick in dismissing this 
option, for there is a way to account for God’s necessity that doesn’t involve God’s being a 
part of any world. Cameron says: 
 
isn’t the natural thing to say simply that [existence in, or being part of a world is] only 
what it is for a spatio-temporal entity to exist at a world? Isn’t it just obvious that 
the [GRist] will need to say something different about entities that simply aren’t 
located in space and time? (2009: 96) 
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And, as Cameron goes on to note, Lewis does in fact say something different in the case of 
such entities. According to Lewis, there are things – such as pure sets (i.e., sets with no non-
sets as members)  – that aren’t spatiotemporally located.207 However, even though such 
entities do not exist in any world, they nonetheless exist according to every world, because 
there is such a thing as existing from the standpoint of every world. Being a part of a world is thus 
not the only way to exist at a world, as Lewis explains: 
 
[Some] entities…inhabit no particular world but exist alike from the standpoint of 
all worlds, just as they have no location in time and space but exist alike from the 
standpoint of all times and places. (1968: 126) 
Provisionally, my ontology consists of iterative set theory with individuals [and]… 
the part-whole relation applies to individuals, not sets. Then no set is in any world 
in the sense of being a part of it. Numbers, properties, propositions, events – all 
these are sets, and not in any world…Even a sequence of possible individuals all 
from the same world is not, strictly speaking, itself in that world. 
When we evaluate the truth of a quantified sentence, we usually restrict the 
domain and quantify over less than all there is…we will normally omit many things 
not in that world. But we will not omit the numbers, or some of the other sets. Let 
us say that an individual exists from the standpoint of a world iff it belongs to the least 
restricted domain that is normally – modal metaphysics being deemed abnormal – 
appropriate in evaluating the truth at that world of quantifications…[T]his domain 
will include all the individuals in that world; none of the other individuals; and some, 
but not all, of the sets…  
Thus we have three relations: being in a world, i.e. being part of a world; 
being partly in a world…and existing from the standpoint of a world…[T]he principle 
that nothing is in two worlds, applies only to the first of these. (1983c: 40) 
 
So Lewis explicitly accepts that his postulate that no possible individual can be in 
more than one world does not apply to entities which exist from the standpoint of a world. 
There are then two ways for an entity to exist necessarily: one, by being wholly located at 
one world and being counterpart related to an individual in each non-actual world, and two, 
by existing from the standpoint of every world. Theists adopting GR can then say that 
God’s necessity is grounded in the fact that – from whichever world one is at – it is true ‘in 
the least restricted domain of quantification’ that God exists. If so, N1 is interpreted in 
terms of N5 below: 
 
N5:  God exists from the standpoint of every world. 
 
                                                          
207 It’s not always obvious that Lewis does admit these entities though since he also says, e.g., that a pure set 
is ‘one of the most dispensable and suspect of sets’ (1986a: 83). 
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While God (and any other non-spatiotemporal entity) exists from the standpoint of all 
worlds, any spatiotemporal entity will be worldbound, and hence, will be represented as 
existing at other worlds vicariously, by their counterparts.  
 
7.2. Virtues  
N5 has a number of points in its favour. First, unlike N5, it stays true to the original 
motivations for adopting GR. God, numerically the same individual, actualizes all worlds as 
the proposed solution to the dilemma against DI claims. Second, and because of this, N5 
doesn’t give rise to the problem of luck, and there is there no conflict with divine ultimacy: 
God is not the mere stopping point for explanation in an infinitesimal portion of reality; he 
is something with fundamental explanatory power: all worlds will bear explanatory relations to 
God, and this dissolves the mystery as to how modal space, though disjoint, fits together 
so neatly. Third, it respects the classical theistic view that God’s mode of existence is entirely 
other to that of creatures; it can provide some sense to the claims made by theologians such 
as Aquinas (2008: 206) that ‘by his very own existing’ God differs from other, lesser, beings. 
Certainly, these are considerable reasons to prefer N5 to N4. 
 
7.3. Worldly Knowledge  
What about the problem of divine modal knowledge, though? Just as God cannot have 
direct awareness of what goes on in each world under N4, he likewise can’t have direct 
awareness of what goes on in each world under N5; at least, he cannot do so if his doing so 
would require his literally being present in those worlds (and therefore, his being 
spatiotemporally related to them). Indeed, the problem looks even worse under N5: under 
this interpretation, God does not even literally inhabit the actual world!  
The following should be accommodated. Since we are already taking it here that 
God is not spatiotemporally located, it would not, as it would be under N4, be an ad hoc 
move to pick up on Alston’s suggestion that divine direct perception of worldly facts might 
take another mode. The point is that one who believes in an aspatiotemporal God must 
already accept that God has access to what goes on in the world without bearing any 
spatiotemporal relations to it. And since those accepting the classical position of divine 
aspatiotemporality already face the problem of explaining how God knows what goes on in 
the world despite not being located in it, this problem – if it is a problem – is at least not an 
additional one SV forces them to contend with.  
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7.4. Causal Connections  
However, there’s a further problem about causal connections. If the God of N5, though 
existing outside of spacetime, is supposed to bear causal relations to different worlds, then, 
should it turn out that causes must – as is typically supposed – be spatiotemporally related 
to their effects, N5 collapses back into N4. Further, regardless of whether causes must be 
spatiotemporally related to their effects, if God bears causal relations to multiple worlds, 
then since, under GR, causal relations are partly what unifies worlds, N5 is susceptible to 
modal collapse: any two worlds God is causally related to will, after all, not be distinct. 
A quick fix can be made to remedy the latter issue by nuancing the causal isolation 
component. Instead of saying that an individual, w, is a world iff w is a maximal mereological 
sum of spatiotemporally or causally related individuals, we could instead say that w is a world 
iff x is a maximal mereological sum of individuals related by spatiotemporal or 
spatiotemporally dependent relations. Then, we can say that not all causal relations are 
spatiotemporal: some causal relations are such that they can hold between two individuals, 
x and y, only if x and y are spatiotemporally related; some, however, are not. If so, then 
some x’s being causally related to w only suffices to make x a part of w if the causal relation 
linking x to w is of a kind that requires its relata to be spatiotemporally related. Since SV 
denies that God is spatiotemporal, the causal relations God bears will not be of the kind 
that can hold only between spatiotemporally related individuals. Hence, the causal relations 
God bears to different worlds will not give rise to modal collapse.  
 Still, this proposal obviously depends on the falsity of the assumption that causal 
relations are necessarily spatiotemporal. This being so, the response to the latter issue (of 
world collapse) will depend on the viability of the response to the former (the possibility of 
non-spatiotemporal causal relations). Although it’s beyond the scope of this thesis to 
examine whether causation between non-spatiotemporally related individuals might be 
possible,208 the important thing to point out here is that theists with prior commitment to 
the classical position – i.e., to the one whereby God is atemporal – must already accept that 
such a thing is possible. Just as such theists must already take it that God can know what 
goes on in the world without being located in it, they must also already take it that God can 
bear causal relations to the world without being spatiotemporally related to it. In essence 
then, since belief in a non-spatiotemporal God already requires belief in atemporal 
causation, a theist taking this view appears to be well within their rights to make this 
                                                          
208 Little work has been done to make sense of atemporal causation. However, see Jonathan Tallant (2008) 
and Sam Baron and Kristie Miller (2015) for two recent attempts to show that time is not necessary for 
causation given a counterfactual theory of causation. 
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response to the world-collapse problem; those adopting this view would simply be putting 
an existing commitment to good use.209 
 
7.5. Analysing Creatorship Claims  
In the previous chapter we saw that theistic adherents to GRO face a dilemma about what 
to say about God’s causal responsibility to the spatiotemporal regions he exists at. One side 
of the dilemma was that if we do want to say that God is causally responsible for any such 
regions, then these causal claims cannot come out as non-trivially true under the 
counterfactual analysis the theory provides. The same problem did not arise when we asked 
whether God is causally responsible for any of the material objects inhabiting those regions 
because none of those inhabitants exist necessarily. However, now suppose that we want 
to analyse the claim that the God of N5 is causally responsible for each world. An analogous 
problem arises. For there is no world – and ipso facto no closest world – where God does not 
will the existence of any world. Thus, for any claim of the form ‘God is causally responsible 
for such and such world’, its truth will be vacuous too. 
 This worry can be met. Under this version of GR, a world just is a maximal 
mereological sum of its parts. Hence, if we consider the world, w, which has as parts only a 
toad and a toadstool (and the various mereological sums of the parts of these things), there 
is no problem with saying that God is causally responsible for w when we consider that it’s 
sufficient for God’s being causally responsible for w that God be causally responsible for 
the toad and that God be causally responsible for the toadstool. But there is no problem 
with saying that God is causally responsible for the toad, and there is no problem with 
saying that God is causally responsible for the toadstool; for these things are contingent. As 
such, the counterfactual analysis of these claims invoking possible worlds will not have it 
that these claims are only true in a trivial manner. So, since God can be causally responsible 
for any part of any world, and since worlds are nothing over and above the sums of their 
parts, God can be causally responsible for each world: we just need to be careful about how 
the truth of these claims gets cashed out. 
 
7.6. Abstractness  
Despite its potential virtues, Sheehy (2006: 319) finds N5 objectionable for the reason that 
it conflicts with a primary motivation for adopting GR: its ability to enable us to make do 
with one fundamental ontological category. Sheehy’s thought is that, if God is non-
                                                          
209 However, one cost of this view is that it precludes the possibility of reducing the temporal order to the 
causal order; a proposal defended by, e.g., Mellor (1998). 
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spatiotemporal, God will be abstract; but one of the benefits of GR is that it enables us to 
do away with any kind of abstracta; it provides us with the resources to make do solely with 
the category concrete particular. So it would be absurd for theists to countenance an abstract 
entity and at the same time adopt GR. 
GR does indeed replace many forms of abstracta with an ontology of concrete 
possibilia. As we saw in the previous chapter, the theory identifies properties with classes 
of individuals; but it can also identify propositions with classes of worlds (Lewis, 1986a: 57-
59); and laws of nature with patterns of regularity across worlds (Lewis, 1994). However, 
doing away with all abstracta was never an ambition for Lewisian GR (something Sheehy 
himself later concedes (2009: 102)). Indeed, it could not have been, since, for one, Lewis 
explicitly denies that there is any clear distinction between the concrete and the abstract. In 
his view, ‘the supposed distinction between abstract and concrete is in disarray’ (Lewis, 
1986a: 171).  
Yet, even if relinquishing abstracta were an ambition of Lewisian GR, Sheehy’s 
reasoning is still too quick. For, as Lewis says, the abstract/concrete distinction is not a very 
well understood one, and there’s very little agreement amongst the philosophical 
community about how the distinction should be drawn. Susan Hale (1988: 86-87), provides 
a list containing no less than twelve different definitions on offer in the literature. Sheehy 
is only right to assume that God’s being non-spatiotemporal renders God abstract if it’s 
true that all non-spatiotemporal entities are abstract. However, there’s good reason to think 
that this way of understanding, or defining abstractness – what Hale calls the ‘spacetime 
criterion’ is unsatisfactory. Hale argues (ibid.) that the reason this spacetime criterion should 
be rejected is that it commits us to controversial claims about the nature of spacetime.  
Hale’s argument, in extremely condensed form, begins by asking what we mean by 
in when we say an entity is in spacetime. One thing we might mean, says Hale, is that the 
thing is to be located in spacetime. However, most of us would want to say that spacetime 
points are not abstract, and yet, spacetime points are not themselves spatiotemporally 
located: ‘they are locations, not located.’ (ibid.: 89). Another thing we might mean is that the 
thing is spatiotemporally extended. However, spacetime points, being the fundamental event 
locations (if substantivalism is true), are the locations of idealized mass points, and idealized 
mass points are unextended. This means that their locations are unextended, and therefore 
not concrete. Yet, most of us would want to say that spacetime points are concrete. A third 
thing we might mean is that the thing is a part of spacetime. However, unless we are 
advocates of supersubstantivalism (or monistic substantivalism), this would mean that, contra 
our ordinary beliefs, material objects such as dogs, dishes, and dandelions are not, after all, 
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concrete. One final thing we might mean is that an entity is in spacetime just when it is 
either located in spacetime, or is else a part of spacetime; this would avoid the problems with 
the previous characterisations. However, it brings a problem of its own: it commits us to 
dualistic substantivalism. The reason being that this definition classes spacetime regions as 
concrete entities in their own right, and yet, ‘[q]uestions about the nature of spacetime are 
matters of nontrivial debate in the philosophy of physics and ought not to be decided on 
the grounds of obstinate insistence on a particular version of the abstract/concrete 
distinction.’ (ibid.: 99). 
Now, even if we find fault with Hale’s reasoning, the following nonetheless remains 
true. While being non-spatiotemporal may well be a necessary condition for something’s 
counting as abstract, it’s not obviously a sufficient one. Abstracta, as traditionally understood, 
are non-personal beings and don’t enter into causal relations; but God, as traditionally 
understood, is a person and does enter into causal relations. Unlike abstracta, God has a 
range of causal and mental powers: he knows, wills, creates, and loves. Under this construal 
of concreteness, theists who take God as non-spatiotemporal may still claim to have an 
abstracta free ontology. 
 Nonetheless, perhaps Sheehy’s complaint when he says (2009: 103) that allowing an 
abstract God into our ontology undermines GR’s nominalistic spirit is not so much with 
God’s being abstract, but with his being non-spatiotemporal. If so, his complaint is better put 
as follows: admitting a non-spatiotemporal God into our ontology undermines the GR 
ambition of doing away with non-spatiotemporal entities. If that is Sheehy’s complaint 
though, then again, it’s misguided. Relinquishing all non-spatiotemporal entities was no 
more an ambition for Lewisian GR than was relinquishing all abstracta. As we’ve seen, 
Lewis already admits some non-spatiotemporal entities, such as pure sets, into his ontology, 
and also appears to be ‘neutral’ about the existence of universals (see Lewis (1983a) and 
(1986a: 69, 82, 189, and 205)). The primary motivation for GR was, rather, to afford us with 
a non-modal analysis of modal terms, and with an analysis of properties, numbers, and 
propositions. But regardless of whether God is a spatiotemporal being, GR can provide us 
with such analyses.  
In his reply to Cameron, Sheehy complains that the difficulty with SV is in 
explaining 
 
the motivation for including another kind of [non-spatiotemporal] entity. There is 
nothing incoherent in the claim that God exists…from the standpoint of every 
world. Yet it is not clear why the [GRist] would need to appeal to divine existence 
in quantifying over a world or worlds. Of course, this is just what the theist must 
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do if God is to be understood as necessary. Now, though, it is the prior commitment 
to divine existence which is determining the ontological inventory. (2009: 103) 
 
What should we make of this? Sheehy thinks that there will be trouble explaining 
the motivation for including another kind of non-spatiotemporal (in his words, ‘abstract’) 
entity. Why should there be any difficulty? Because, says Sheehy, the GRist would not need to 
appeal to divine existence in quantifying over worlds. So the complaint seems to be that the only 
non-spatiotemporal entities the GRist should admit are those needed in order for them to 
do their philosophical theorising. Since a non-spatiotemporal God is not needed for such 
purposes, admitting a non-spatiotemporal God is under-motivated.  
Now, the sole reason the adherent of GR (or, anyone, for that matter) could have 
for believing in non-divine non-spatiotemporal entities might be their philosophical utility 
(that is, their usefulness in serving up explanations in metaphysics, other areas of 
philosophy, or mathematics).210 However, philosophical utility is not the sole reason one 
could have for positing divine non-spatiotemporal entities.211 As we’ve seen previously, 
theists may have independent theological reasons to accept God as non-spatiotemporal. If 
those reasons are found to be compelling, and if theist GRists thus wish to stay true to the 
classical conception of God, then they will have reason to accept SV; admitting a non-
spatiotemporal God would not be unmotivated. 
Here’s a second reason why Sheehy’s wrong to criticise those adopting N5 for 
letting prior commitment to divine existence determine the ontological inventory: prior 
beliefs already do determine the GRist’s ontological inventory. It’s the GRist’s pre-theoretical 
commitment to the existence of objects, persons, events, and to certain modal facts 
concerning them that leads the GRist to posit such things as other concrete worlds. Now, 
if no sense can be made of God’s being non-spatiotemporal then Sheehy might reply that 
a GR ontology with an aspatiotemporal God stacks up worse against a GR ontology with a 
spatiotemporal God. To do so, however, he’d need to show that the position of divine 




                                                          
210 A claim that may seem plausible given that (a) such entities are not empirically detectable, and (b) certain 
theories recommend renouncing them if other entities can play the very same explanatory role and play it 
better (due to their explanatory power or ontological economy).  
211 Also, there may well be other reasons for thinking belief in God does have philosophical utility. 
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     8.  Conclusion 
This chapter and its predecessor have questioned what theistic proponents of GR should 
say about God’s relation to the worlds it posits. We’ve seen that the account of de re 
representation GR standardly employs – CT – is not theistically acceptable since N4 – its 
analysis of N1 – is not theistically acceptable. However, contra first appearances, N4 does 
not conflict with divine aseity by grounding God’s nature in his relations to other beings; 
nor does the context-dependence of the counterpart relation render facts about God’s 
nature mind-dependent. However, N4 does undermine one significant advantage GR 
otherwise has over DI; it doesn’t respect the thesis of divine ultimacy; its failure to do gives 
rise to the problem of luck; and lastly, it seems to preclude God from possessing the full 
range of knowledge he can be expected to have. Theists who are willing to accept that God 
exists outside of spacetime can, however, accept CT if they limit the CT analysis to de re 
modal claims involving only spatiotemporal beings. That way, God, being non-spatiotemporal, 
can exist from the standpoint of every world as N5 specifies. As well as failing to be 
problematic for the reasons Sheehy cites, N5 also avoids N4’s failings. 
 Chapter Three showed that the TI view of de re representation – which Lewis rejects 
– can be made consistent with GR, resulting in a view called GRO. Possible challenges to 
N3 – GRO’s interpretation of N1 – were rebutted; inter alia, it was shown that N3 does in 
fact respect the aseity thesis, and we can see that, like N5, N3 avoids the problems 
associated with luck, ultimacy, and knowledge of worlds. For here again, we have in reality 
only one divine being, one who is present at every world, but, we should note, who is 
required to be spatiotemporally located. 
I began Chapter Three by noting that since much debate surrounds the question of 
divine spatiotemporality, I’d examine the matter of God’s relation to the worlds GR posits 
without taking a stance on this issue. However, we are now in a position to say this: 
regardless of what commitment one has to the question of divine spatiotemporality, there 
is a theistically acceptable view of how divine de re representation works under GR. Theists 
committed to divine aspatiotemporality can think of God as existing from the standpoint 
of all worlds; theists committed to divine spatiotemporality can think of God as having 
transworld identity. In this case, should it turns out that divine spatiotemporality is 
indefensible, then so much the worse for N3; should it turn out that divine aspatio-
temporality is indefensible, then so much the worse for N5; but we’ll not pursue those 
matters here. The next chapter will instead consider what moral challenges face theistic GR. 
Which responses are available might depend on which account of de re representation is 
adopted. If so, a cumulative case could be made in favour of one of these two views.  
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5 
Moral Challenges to Theistic GR 
 
     1.  Introduction 
It’s not often in philosophy that one finds moral objections to metaphysical theories. GR    
is somewhat anomalous in this respect since three different authors have argued that if we 
accept GR, then we no longer have any reason not to be indifferent about the ethical quality 
of our actions: call this the problem of moral indifference. The first half of this chapter assesses 
each of these arguments and considers whether they prove any more troubling in the 
context of theism. The second half of this chapter examines a moral objection to GR which 
arises only in the context of theism: the modal problem of evil. The aim of this chapter, then, is 
to determine whether theists should reject GR on (these) moral grounds.212 
 
     2. Beedle’s Indifference Objection  
2.1. Advanced Modal Claims  
Lewis (1986a: 126) accepts that ‘the character of the totality of all the worlds is not a 
contingent matter.’ In doing so, he makes what Divers (1999) calls an advanced modal claim. 
Advanced modal claims predicate modal properties of things that are not individuals in any 
ordinary sense. A thing is an individual in an ‘ordinary sense’ if it’s wholly spatiotemporally 
located at some world (hence the totality of worlds not being an individual in this sense). 
While Lewis does not himself tell us how to analyse advanced modal claims, Divers (ibid.) 
proposes a way to interpret such claims such that they can be analysed as true (and this 
proposal doesn’t utilise any more resources than those Lewis provides). Divers calls his 
proposal a ‘redundancy interpretation’ since it tells us that when some proposition, p, 
expresses a transworld state of affairs – a quantificational sentence whose quantifiers are 
not world-restricted – ‘the possibility operator has no semantic effect on the content of 
[p]…It is a semantically vacuous expression on a par with “It is the case that”.’ (ibid.: 229). 
Hence, ‘◊p’ is true iff p, and from this we can derive truth-conditions for other types of 
                                                          
212 There may, of course, be moral objections to (theistic) GR besides those discussed here. 
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advanced modal claims: ‘~◊p’ is true iff ~p; and ‘p & ◊~p’ is true iff p and ~p. ‘Further, ‘□p’ 
is true iff p (essentially because, for any transworld state of affairs, p, there is no truth-maker 
for ~p, and therefore, no truth-maker for ‘◊~p’), thus underwriting Lewis’ contention that 
what is true of logical space could not be otherwise (ibid.: 230). (Hence, when p expresses a 
transworld state of affairs, the truth-conditions for ‘◊p’ and ‘□p’ are identical, and the truth-
conditions for ‘p & ◊~p’ are never met.) 
 
2.2. Beedle’s Argument  
Andrew Beedle (1996) argues that if it’s true that the character of the GR pluriverse could 
not have been otherwise, then GR implies fatalism. This is the thesis that strictly nothing could 
have been otherwise: so the entire history of our world, including what is future as of now, is 
fixed. It may be opaque to us which world we are part of, but which world we are part of, 
says Beedle, is ‘already decided’. In his view, this is not just metaphysically problematic, but 
morally problematic. If our entire world-history is fixed, then any ‘concern about the ethical 
quality of our actions is futile.’ (ibid.: 492). What reason could there be to try and act for the 
good in a fatalistic world?  
 
Concern over a moral decision involves consideration of what action would be most 
virtuous and whether I should choose to perform that action. [But under GR] I do 
not choose a course of action, but wonder which course of action I shall 
take…There is no way in which I can avoid a certain outcome by devoting sufficient 
thought to any decision I make. (ibid.: 493).  
 
The argument below represents Beedle’s reasoning (ibid.: 491-2): 
 
P1.  What conditions the plurality of GR’s worlds satisfies is non-contingent. 
P2. If P1, then what conditions each particular GRist world satisfies is non-
 contingent. 
P3.  The being of every particular GRist world is absolutely necessary.  
P4. It’s futile to want something that couldn’t be otherwise to be a certain way. 
P5. Wanting to act for good rather than bad involves wanting our world, or 
  ourselves, to be a certain way. 
C1. If GR is true, then it’s futile to want to act for good rather than bad.  
 
The conclusion of this argument seems especially problematic in the context of 
theism. It’s extremely hard to see what reason God could have for creating fatalistic worlds 
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in which it’s futile to act for good rather than bad. God as traditionally considered creates 
us so that we can freely relate to him, and to each other, so that we can make morally 
significant choices. On the basis of our God-given freedom, God is supposed to hold us 
accountable for the ethical quality of our actions.213 Heaven and Hell exist in order that the 
scales of justice can be re-balanced post-mortem, ensuring that we’re eventually 
compensated for the kind of earthly life we lead.214 But if Beedle is right and GR makes the 
world fatalistic, then human life cannot have the significance theism supposes it to have 
(nor can Heaven and Hell serve their purported purpose).215 So not only would GR make 
ethical concerns seem futile, it would make the theistic world-view look false. For it’s a key 
part of that world-view that ethical concerns are not futile.  
 
2.3. Beedle’s Mistake  
There are no extant replies to Beedle’s argument. Perhaps this is because those who’ve 
encountered it have seen all too clearly that it’s unsound. P2 is false, and to suppose 
otherwise is to neglect GR’s counterpart-theoretic treatment of de re modal claims involving 
ordinary individuals. As we’ve seen, the redundancy interpretation is appropriate for modal 
claims involving the system of worlds because the system of worlds is not an ordinary 
individual; but individual worlds, and things which are wholly located in individual worlds, 
are ordinary individuals, and this means that the way in which we analyse modal claims 
involving them differs. Under the CT analysis, the character of each particular world is 
contingent simply because each particular world (and its ‘ordinary’ contents) is counterpart-
related to other worlds (and their ordinary contents) which differ from them in various 
respects. A similar response is appropriate under GRO: we can, as McDaniel suggests, give 
a similar CT analysis of the de re modal properties of each world (spacetime), and under a 
TI analysis of the de re modal properties of each world occupant, x, it will turn out that while 
                                                          
213 It’s important to note that some theists have been happy to accept a kind of theological fatalism: this is the 
position that God’s knowledge of the future entails that our future is strictly fixed, and therefore that free will 
is impossible. However, this is a minority position since most theists resist these kinds of arguments. For a 
critical discussion of arguments for theological fatalism see Talbott (1993). For some responses which appeal 
to the claim that God’s past beliefs depend on what happens in the future see, e.g., Merricks (2009; 2011) and 
Westphal (2011). (Though see Fischer and Tognazzini (2014) for a response to Merricks and Westphal.) See 
Rhoda et al. (2006) for a response which denies that there are any future facts for God to know; see Hasker 
(1989) and van Inwagen (2008) for a denial of the claim that God knows any true propositions about future 
free actions. 
214 Within Christianity at least there is some debate over Hell – the possibility of ever-lasting damnation – and 
universalism – the view that everyone is eventually saved by God’s love. However, Hebblethwaite (2005: 121-
5) notes that while Hell does not feature in Christian creeds, it has been the ‘dominant view in Christian 
doctrine down the ages that salvation in and through Christ is effective only for those who…accept God’s 
forgiveness, and open themselves up, in faith, to the Spirit’s work of sanctification.’ However, two notable 
philosophers of religion who do endorse universalism include Hick (1985) and McCord Adams (1993). 
215 Here I’m supposing that morally significant freedom presupposes libertarianism. More on this in §5. 
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the sum-total of x’s world-relativised properties (the way x is relative to all worlds it exists 
at) is non-contingent, relative to a particular world, what is true of x will not be non-
contingent, given that x is different relative to each world. 
 
     3. Adams’ Indifference Objection  
3.1. Adams’ Argument  
A better-known argument for the conclusion that GR permits us to be indifferent about 
our moral decisions (which doesn’t rely on Beedle’s faulty premise) comes from Adams 
(1974). Adams contends that GR can provide no ethically satisfying answer to the question 
of what might be wrong with our actualizing evils. This is so, thinks Adams, since everything 
that could happen really does happen under GR. Any evil that doesn’t occur here ‘will [thus] 
occur in some other possible world anyway’ (ibid.: 195). Put differently: since the sum-total 
of reality could be no different, the sum-total of evil across reality could be no different. Hence, 
we can make no difference to the sum-total of evil that exists; and if this is so, then we’ve got 
no reason not to be indifferent about the ethical quality of our actions. We can represent 
Adams’ reasoning as follows:  
 
P6. If GR is true, nothing anyone can do can make a difference to the sum-total 
  of evil in reality. 
P7. If no-one can make any difference to the sum-total of evil in reality, then 
  we should be indifferent about the ethical quality of our actions.  
C2. Therefore, if GR is true, we should not be concerned with trying to do good 
  and not evil. 
 
3.2. Egocentricity & Deontology  
Here we should question P7. Adams takes ‘our very strong disapproval’ of evil-doings to 
depend on our seeing them as deliberate actualizations of evil; that is, as actions which bring 
about evil states of affairs which would otherwise have never existed (ibid.: 195). It’s wrong 
for me to kick Delilah because, if I do, Delilah suffers some pain she otherwise wouldn’t 
have to endure. Lewis thinks this gets things wrong. For most of us, desires and moral aims 
are egocentric. The nice amongst us don’t want to be a causal source of evil. We care about our 
own virtues: this can also stop us doing evil things (1986a: 127). Certainly, Lewis seems 
right about this. If someone told me that if I didn’t kick Delilah, they would (and suppose 
there was nothing I could do to stop them), my reaction would definitely not be “well I 
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might as well do it then!” More likely (I hope), I’d insist that if someone had to do it, I’d 
rather it not be me! So my disapproval of kicking poor Delilah doesn’t just stem from the 
fact that I don’t want her to suffer, but also from the fact that I don’t want to be the kind 
of person who does that kind of thing. The mere fact that some evil thing is bound to 
happen is far from sufficient for making me indifferent about whether I am its causal source.   
 When considered in the context of theism, Lewis’ response seems particularly 
persuasive. As Lewis points out, P7 presupposes a crude or extreme sort of utilitarianism 
whereby the only reason to aspire to do good and not evil is to increase goodness and minimise 
evil (wherever it occurs). But it’s unlikely that any theist will subscribe to an ethical system of this 
kind. Sure, theists will want to minimise evil to the extent they can; but they will also not 
want any evils to be their evils. Those who are religiously inclined will want to refrain from 
performing actions God would disapprove of, ones which would go against God’s will, 
alienate them from him, or make them less virtuous. As Pruss notes (2011: 99), under 
theism, moral obligations are addressed towards the individual: ‘Thou shall not kill’; ‘Honour 
thy father, and thy mother’, etc., and so, Adams’ argument will not hold much sway. 
 
3.3. Egocentric or Not So Egocentric Concerns?  
Beedle’s (1996) paper contains a second argument, one which attempts to show that Lewis 
contradicts himself in maintaining that our desires and moral concerns are egocentric. Lewis 
claims that what we desire is not that the plurality of worlds satisfy a certain condition, but 
that we ourselves satisfy a certain condition: we want to be a causal source of good and not evil. 
But what is it for a person to be a causal source of something under GR? As we saw in 
Chapter Three §11, GR gives us the resources to analyse causal claims in terms of 
counterfactuals; counterfactuals whose truth-conditions involve states of affairs at other 
possible worlds. Therefore, if we do care about being a causal source of good and not evil, 
then we should care about what conditions the plurality of worlds satisfies. ‘According to 
[GR], causation is a counterfactual and hence ‘multi-world’ affair’ (Beedle, 1996: 491). 
Unavoidably, in wanting ourselves to satisfy a (causal) condition, we are wanting the plurality 
of worlds to satisfy a condition. Yet, as we’ve seen, what conditions the worlds satisfy is non-
contingent, and as Lewis himself admits, to want something non-contingent to be a certain 
way is an irrational – at best idle – want. ‘It is futile to want the entire system of worlds to 
satisfy a condition…You might as well want the number seventeen to be prime, or to be 
even – satisfiable or not satisfiable, your wish is idle either way.’ (1986a: 125). Beedle’s 
argument (1996: 494-5) can be represented like this: 
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P8. We care about being a causal source of good and not evil. 
P9. Whether we are a causal source of good and not evil depends upon what 
  conditions the plurality of worlds satisfies. 
P10. What conditions the plurality of worlds satisfies is non-contingent. 
P11.  It’s futile to want something non-contingent to be a certain way. 
P12.  It’s futile to want the set of worlds to satisfy a condition. 
C3. It’s futile to care about being a causal source of good and not evil. 
 
 Beedle is right that causation is a multi-world affair if causal dependence is analysed 
in terms of what conditions other worlds satisfy. However, while it is non-contingent what 
conditions the plurality of worlds satisfies, it is not non-contingent what worlds are closest to 
us.216 If our world had been different – if we’d acted differently, or if different events had 
unfolded – a different world would have been actual, and so a different set of worlds would 
have been our closest worlds. And since what conditions our closest worlds satisfy is what 
matters for a relation of causal dependence holding at our world, P9 is inaccurate, or at 
least, it over-simplifies matters; so C3 can be resisted. While it’s futile to care what 
conditions the plurality of worlds satisfies, it’s not futile to care what conditions the worlds 
closest to us satisfy. And since whether we are a causal source of good and not evil depends 
on what conditions the worlds closest to us satisfy, it is not futile to care about being a 
causal source of good and not evil. 
 
     4.  Heller’s Indifference Objection  
4.1. Three Cases of Drowning Children  
Mark Heller (2003) doesn’t think that Lewis’ response satisfactorily addresses the real spirit 
of Adams’ complaint, and so attempts to revive Adams’ worry. The real source of the 
complaint, says Heller – what he calls ‘the point’ – is not just that we can’t make a difference 
to the total amount of good and evil unrestrictedly in existence, but that GR forces us ‘to 
consider more people in moral decision making than we ordinarily do consider.’ (ibid.: 3). 
While having to factor more people into one’s moral decision making is not objectionable 
per se, Heller thinks that the way in which GR has us factor more people into our moral 
decisions forces us to deny many ‘obvious’ moral truths, truths which are obvious, not only 
to the (extreme) utilitarian, but also to the deontologist. Indeed, says Heller, there are ‘very 
                                                          
216 Nor is it non-contingent what each world in the set of closest worlds is like; see above. 
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few moral theories for which [this] point will have no consequences’, although the severity 
of the consequences may well vary between different theories (ibid.). 
 To illustrate what consequences he has in mind, Heller asks us to consider three 
different cases featuring drowning children. In the third case Heller discusses, you notice 
that a child is drowning in a nearby lake. You’re capable of saving the child and you do not 
see that any harm would come of you, were you to do so. Would you save the child in such 
a scenario? Of course you would, says Heller. And it’s an ‘obvious moral truth’ that you’d 
be obligated to do so. However, Heller continues, if you know that GR is true, then no moral 
decision will ever be as straightforward as this, and, more importantly, it will no longer be 
the case that you’re obligated to save the child, forcing us to deny the obvious moral truth.  
We can see why Heller thinks this by considering his first and second cases. In these 
cases, just as in the third, you again notice a child drowning in a nearby lake and you realise 
that you could save them without incurring any harm to yourself. However, in the first case, 
you see that a second child is drowning on the opposite side of the lake, and you are aware 
that (a) an adult is stood close enough to that child to save them; that (b) if you do save the 
child nearby to you, you will, by some rigged causal connection, render the adult on the 
opposite side of the lake incapable of saving the child closest to them; that (c) if the adult 
on the opposite side of the lake does succeed in saving the child who is drowning there, 
they will causally inhibit you from saving the child closest to you; and that (d) the other 
adult will save the child closest to them, provided they can do so before you can rescue the 
child closest to you. Neither you, nor the other adult, has any special relation to either child, 
and neither of you can save the child located on the opposite side of the lake. 
 In the second case, you’re aware of a second human child drowning in a lake many 
light-years away from you on a planet called ‘Faarov’, and you know that (e) the child on 
Faarov can be saved by an adult stood nearby, but only if (f) you don’t save the child here 
on Earth. You also know that (g) if the child drowning on Faarov is saved, you cannot save 
the child on Earth; that (h) if the child on Earth is not saved, the one on Faarov will be, 
and that (i) if the one on Faarov isn’t saved, the one on Earth will be. You further know 
that (e) - (i) hold as a matter of non-causal nomological necessity. Again, neither you, nor the 
other adult has any special relation to either child.  
Heller thinks it’s an ‘obvious truth’ that in both the first and second cases you are 
not morally obliged to save the nearby child; you’d be doing absolutely nothing wrong if 
you were simply indifferent between saving them and not. For, in both of these cases, you 
know that, no matter which action you take, one child is guaranteed to be saved, and another 
is guaranteed to drown. Since you’ve no special relationship to either child, you have no 
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objective, morally significant reason to think that the situation in which you save the child closest 
to you is any better than the situation in which the other child is saved instead. Any reasons 
for preferring to save the child closest to you must be purely selfish or subjective ones, such as 
the desire to feel good about yourself for doing so, or the desire to receive praise from 
others (ibid.: 6).  
Heller’s reason for giving us both of these cases, then, is to demonstrate that the 
differences between them have absolutely no bearing on whether we judge you as having 
an obligation to save the drowning child. The fact that in the second case you can’t see the 
second drowning child, and the fact that you aren’t in any way causing them to not be saved 
through any of your possible courses of action is irrelevant, as Heller explains: 
 
there is no more moral significance to knowing that one’s action will be the cause of 
an event E than knowing that one’s action will guarantee E’s inevitability…What is 
morally relevant to the indifference is the known inevitability of one survival and one 
death no matter which choice is made, not the causal relation…(ibid.: 8-9, emphasis 
added.) 
 
 It’s your knowing that each course of action available to you is certain to have exactly 
the same kind of outcome as any other which defeats your moral obligation to pursue any 
particular one of these options (and thus permits you to be indifferent about which one to 
take). What makes this certain is by the by. Once we recognise this, says Heller, we’ll see that 
knowledge of GR’s truth will likewise defeat the moral obligations we otherwise suppose 
ourselves to have. Suppose you’re in a situation like case three and you know that GR is 
true. In this case, you will know that, as a matter of logical or metaphysical necessity – the 
strongest kind of necessity there is – if you do save the drowning child, then another child 
drowning in a different possible world – one who could be saved by one of your counter-
parts – is guaranteed to drown. You also know that, if you don’t save the child nearby to 
you, some child in a different possible world is guaranteed to be saved by one of your 
counterparts. So, just as in cases two and three, you can’t be morally obligated to save the 
child closest to you. The known inevitability of the link between the different outcomes means 
that the choice can never just be whether to save one child or not; it must be whether to let 
one child drown, or to let another child drown (ibid.: 12).217 Further, Heller has picked the 
                                                          
217 How are we to analyse the counterfactuals we’ve been discussing in relation to the moral indifference 
objections? We can’t analyse them in the standard way since standard counterfactual claims involve reference 
only to a single world. For example, under GR plus CT, the counterfactual if my name had been Penelope 
Periwinkles, I would have played a purple pulalu is true iff at the closest world where my closest counterpart is called 
Penelope Periwinkles, that counterpart plays a purple pulalu. Here, we needed only look at one world to see 
whether the antecedent and consequent hold. The counterfactuals we’ve been discussing in relation to the 
moral indifference objections however, require us to look at more than one world, since their antecedents hold 
in a different world to the consequent. Let’s call them, then, transworld counterfactuals. Generally, to determine 
- 179 - 
 
example he does – whether to intervene to help someone who is already drowning – for a 
particular reason: to demonstrate that if you know GR is true, then (contra ordinary moral 
opinion) you are permitted to allow an evil you are not causing. This sidesteps Lewis’ argument 
that even when some evil is guaranteed to happen somewhere, that doesn’t permit you to 
perform it because you might still be morally obligated not to be that evil’s causal source.218 
 
4.2. The ‘Obvious’ Truth  
It’s important to get clear about what the ‘obvious truth’ is that Heller can be claiming GR 
forces us to deny. Heller describes the truth as a ‘moral’ one. However, this seems to get 
things wrong. In cases one and two you’re considered not to have an obligation to save the 
drowning child because you know that there’s an inevitable link between your action and 
that of another. In case three, you aren’t lacking that moral obligation, but that’s because, 
in this plainly-described situation, you aren’t aware that if you do save them, another child is 
certain to drown. To generalise: these cases show that someone is morally obliged to save 
a drowning child unless they know that their doing so would prevent some equal (or greater) good from 
occurring or guarantee some equal (or greater) evil. But the proponent of GR might well accept this 
claim at true. At least, Heller has given us no reason to think that they couldn’t. What 
Heller’s cases do show is this: if you know GR is true, then you cannot be in a case like case 
three. With knowledge of GR, the situation is transformed into a case more like case two. 
(Hence Heller’s remark that the GRist ‘must count Case Three as being in all relevant 
respects like Case Two, which, in all relevant respects is like Case One’ (ibid.: 11).) Your 
moral obligation to save the drowning child is defeated not because the moral facts are 
different, but because the metaphysical facts are different; because any good deed you do 
                                                          
the truth of a counterfactual claim, we need to see if the closest world where the antecedent holds is one 
where the consequent holds. In the case of transworld counterfactuals, though, we need to go to the closest 
world where the antecedent holds and see what’s true from the standpoint of that world. Take the claim if I were to 
refrain from saving the drowning child, my counterpart would rescue that child’s counterpart. Suppose that I do save the 
drowning child so that the antecedent expresses a genuinely counterfactual state of affairs. We need, then, to 
go to the closest world where I refrain from saving the drowning child. Since under CT I’m in this world and 
no other, the closest possible world, call it w2, where I refrain from saving the drowning child is really one 
where I’m represented as doing so vicariously. Let’s use the name ‘Dani’ as a rigid designator for the 
counterpart in w2 who represents me as doing so. At w2, it’s true that my counterpart would rescue the 
drowning child. For, from the standpoint of w2, the relevant counterpart to Dani is me, who here in the actual 
world, gallantly does rescue the drowning child. So we have a truth-condition for this transworld counterfactual 
that is met. See Pruss (2011: 101-5) for a similar explanation. 
218 Heller (2003: 21, fn. 4) remarks that we might think the choice in case two is between letting one child 
drown and killing another, since, arguably, in preventing someone else from saving a child who they otherwise 
would have saved is to actively interfere with a chain of events that would have saved someone’s life. If so, 
we might consider that in case two, you’d be morally obligated to let the nearby child drown. However, if 
preventing someone from saving a drowning child counts as killing a child, then letting the child closet to you 
drown will also count as killing a child since you yourself can count as someone you’ve prevented from saving 
a drowning child.  
- 180 - 
 
ensures that another equally good deed will not occur, which prevents the antecedent 
condition of the conditional obligation from holding.  
 The real crux of the problem then is that with knowledge of GR’s truth, we know 
we are only ever ‘shifting’ bumps in the rug; never getting rid of them completely. And since 
we know that at best we are merely relocating evil, we cannot be under a moral obligation to 
ensure that it doesn’t occur near us: if it has to happen somewhere, then there’s no objective, 
morally significant reason why it shouldn’t be allowed to occur here, rather than some place 
else. Hence, in Heller’s view, what GR ‘gets wrong’ is that we shouldn’t ‘have to consider 
non-actual drowning children as well…The only other drowning child in the story is non-
actual, and non-actual children [shouldn’t] count’ (ibid.: 12, emphasis added). 
 
4.3. Self-Sacrifice & Self -Torture 
Most of us (if we aren’t sadists), don’t actively seek out pain (at least, we don’t seek out 
things that cause us pain for the sake of them causing us pain), and we do whatever we can 
to alleviate pain, should we ever be unfortunate enough to suffer any. However, there’s a 
case for thinking that deliberately suffering pain (self-torture) will actually be quite a heroic 
and praiseworthy thing to do, if we know GR is true.219 The fact that GR forces us to factor 
non-actual sentient beings into our moral decision making means that what might otherwise 
seem not at all like a moral dilemma – whether to try and get pecked in the face by an emu, 
say – will actually turn out to be one, if we know GR is true. For, in such a situation, we 
will know that, if we endure the pain it causes, someone else (one of our other-worldly 
counterparts) is guaranteed to be saved that same suffering. Far from being a crazy thing to 
do then, attempting to get pecked in the face by an emu to now looks quite virtuous. 
As well as transforming our opinions about otherwise-considered morally insignificant 
actions, we may also consider that knowledge of GR will transform our opinions about 
actions which are otherwise consider to be morally impermissible. Take the act of murdering 
someone. From an impersonal perspective, as Pruss explains, this 
 
seems to be a very good thing to do, since by doing [it] I am saving another human 
being – my counterpart – from decay of moral character at great personal cost, and 
I am not increasing the total amount of evil in any way since, although [that person] 
dies, still [their] counterpart would have died had I not murdered [them]. To avoid 
this unsavoury conclusion, Lewis needs to insist that it is not virtue that should be 
my primary moral aim, but my virtue, just as on deontological theories it is my own 
moral duties that it is impermissible for me to violate. (2011: 99) 
                                                          
219 Pruss (2011: 105-6) also makes this point. 
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However, Pruss’ last point seems not to fully respect his previous one. His previous point 
is that in wanting to improve our own virtues, otherwise-considered ‘unsavoury’ acts might be 
judged as quite righteous, if we know that GR is true. By sparing someone else from decay 
of moral character, I do improve my own virtue. 220 Factoring other-worldly individuals into 
our moral decision making thus leads us to two further absurd conclusions: that self-
sacrifice (of one type of virtue) and self-torture improve our moral character. 
 
4.4. Compensatory Behaviour & Freedom  
One might reply to the above worries as follows. “There are infinitely many worlds where 
a counterpart of the nearby-drowning child drowns (unsaved by some other-worldly 
counterpart of me stood nearby), and there are infinitely many worlds where a counterpart 
of the nearby-drowning child is saved (by a counterpart of me stood nearby). Regardless of 
whether I save the nearby-drowning child or not, infinitely many drowning children are 
guaranteed to be saved, and infinitely many drowning children are guaranteed not to be 
saved. Therefore, if I do save the child, I won’t really be ‘guaranteeing’ the drowning of 
some other-worldly child. It’s not as if the ‘quota’ of drowning children will have thereby 
been left un-met.” 
 This reply might be tempting, but it won’t work. If all of my other-worldly 
counterparts took this attitude, then a possibility (the possibility of me not saving the 
drowning child) would be left un-represented in modal space. Therefore, to ensure that 
modal space is complete, there must be a guarantee of ‘compensatory behaviour’ elsewhere 
in the pluriverse, behaviour which balances out what happens elsewhere. This guarantee of 
compensatory behaviour might actually prove quite useful in the context of theism. Perhaps 
the inevitable links between the different courses of action undertaken by an individual and 
their other-worldly counterparts are God’s way of ensuring that, even though we’ve been 
granted free will, the universe has a fixed and positive axiological status. I am free to do 
(and not to do) the bad thing, but God has set things up so that, if I do make the bad choice, 
this does not in any way detract from the goodness the pluriverse has a whole, since 
someone else is guaranteed to make the good choice elsewhere. 
                                                          
220 This kind of reasoning could easily spiral out of control, however. In ensuring that one of my other-worldly 
counterparts doesn’t commit a murder, I save them from decay of moral virtue in one respect, but in doing 
so I deny them the ability to develop another kind of virtue: one that comes with saving another from decay 
of moral virtue. So perhaps the virtuous thing to do is to not deny them the opportunity to develop that 
second kind of virtue. However, if I do not deny them that opportunity, then I do deny them the opportunity 
to develop the virtue that comes with not denying someone the opportunity not to deny someone else the 
opportunity to develop moral virtue, and so on and so forth. 
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 The flip-side of this suggestion, however, is that it brings to the fore another 
significant moral challenge that might be levelled against GR. As Heller (2003: 13-14) 
identifies, these kinds of inevitabilities which hold between actions and events in different 
worlds look to undermine free will. If I and sufficiently many of my other-worldly 
counterparts don’t do the good deed, then, collectively, we non-causally necessitate that one 
of my (our) counterparts does do it. So it seems that this person could not have made the 
bad choice freely: after all, their course of action occurred as a matter of metaphysical necessity. 
However, it could equally well be said that the decision my counterparts make 
metaphysically necessitates my not doing the good deed. If so, then we could just as well 
consider that it was my decision which was un-free. Indeed, since no world has an 
ontologically privileged status, the right thing to say seems to be that none of us take priority 
in determining other-worldly events: not one of us is free. Again, such a consequence proves 
more damaging in the context of theism (given, of course, that the ability to make morally 
significant choices presupposes free will).  
Noting that ‘[t]he free will issue is already a tangled web of concepts’ (ibid.), Heller 
is not himself keen to endorse this line of objection. However, free will is not the only web 
to disentangle if the points of dispute discussed in this sub-section are to be fully explored. 
It’s an additional issue that there’s no settled way to analyse the types of counterfactuals 
needed to support this free-will objection. This is so since the antecedents of such 
counterfactuals involve transworld states of affairs. Supposing, however, that we should 
analyse such counterfactuals by seeing what state of affairs the pluriverse as a whole satisfies, 
the types of counterfactuals needed to support the objection will then (under something 
akin to the standard semantics) be trivially true at best. For, given that the character of the 
plurality of worlds is non-contingent, the antecedent condition of a claim like if none of my 
counterparts hadn’t done the good thing, I wouldn’t have done the bad thing, is never met. While we 
cannot here properly resolve this particular issue, this observation should at least be enough 
to stave off the free-will worry for now. Below I instead consider an alternative response to 
the above worries. 
  
4.5. Caring for Other-Worldly Individuals 
The problems described in §3.1, §4.1, and §4.3 clearly depend on the assumption that 
sentient beings in other possible worlds have just as much moral significance as the 
individuals who are causally and spatiotemporally related to us in this world. In responding 
to the type of argument Adams and Heller give (and in addition to pointing out that our 
wants, desires, and moral aims are egocentric), Lewis asks whether he should ‘lie awake at 
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night bemoaning the evils of other worlds, and…celebrate their joys’ (1986a: 127). This is 
his answer: 
 
I see no reason why I should bemoan the evils and celebrate the joys even of remote 
parts of this world, which I believe in along with everyone else. I suppose the cancer 
patients in the tenth century suffered as much as cancer patients today – ought I to 
spend time bemoaning their suffering?…[T]here are better ways to spend your life 
than in brooding about the futures of perfect strangers, even perfect strangers who 
are counterparts of yourself and those that you love. (ibid.) 
 
 If non-actual individuals shouldn’t factor equally into our moral decision making, 
then a response to Heller’s moral indifference objection, and the arguments from self-
sacrifice and self-torture would be available. However, as Heller notes (2003: 4), if we are 
to be justified in privileging members of a certain group in our moral decision making, this 
must be because the members of that group have some morally significant feature in 
common. It’s important to ask, then, what relevant feature actual individuals have (and non-
actual individuals lack) which justifies our thinking that what befalls non-actuals shouldn’t 
have an equal weighting in our moral decision making. 
Lewis clearly thinks that evil of which we are a causal source is morally significant 
to us in a way that evil of which we are not a causal source is not. However, Heller’s 
argument is persuasive in showing that there is, in fact, nothing special about the causal 
relation which should make us more concerned about evils whose occurrence we might 
cause, than ones whose occurrence we might ensure by some non-causal means. Usually, 
we care about evil of which we are a causal source because we know that our causing some 
evil, e, to happen is a way for us to ensure that e happens, and hence, is a way for us to be 
responsible for e, or to have e depend on us. And most of us don’t want to ensure that any 
evils occur. However, since causal guarantees are not the only guarantees, then, should we 
become aware that certain of our actions or decisions are certain to have some evil as a 
non-causal consequence, then it seems there should be no reason why we wouldn’t be 
equally concerned about making those decisions or undertaking those actions. The simple 
fact that non-actual individuals are causally isolated from us should, therefore, not justify 
failing to factor them (nor our factoring them less-equally) into our moral decision making. 
 Should the fact that non-actuals are spatiotemporally isolated from us justify our failing 
to factor them (or our failing to factor them equally) into our moral decision making? If we 
agree with Lewis’ contention that there’s no reason to bemoan the sufferings of individuals 
in far-flung corners of the actual world, then we might take this as evidence that we already 
consider ourselves to have such a justification. If it’s at all intuitive that the further away 
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someone is in space and/or time from us, the greater the justification there is for not being 
concerned about their joys or sufferings (though Heller (ibid.) finds this suggestion to have 
‘absolutely no plausibility’), then one might think that since non-actuals are not even 
extremely spatiotemporally distant from us, let alone close, we do have such a justification. 
However, if we do have no reason to be immediately concerned about the evils and joys of 
far-flung corners of the actual world, then this seems ultimately reducible to some further 
facts. Plausibly, what explains our seeing no reason to be concerned about the pain suffered 
by tenth-century cancer patients, even though we’re quite sure that their pain was no worse 
than the pain suffered by those in a similar situation right now, is simply that the past is 
over and done; that pain is past and there’s nothing we can do about it. Likewise, suppose 
we discovered that a group of ancient Aztecs somehow built a space-ship and travelled to 
a planet many light-years away, many Earth-years ago, and suppose that we somehow came 
to learn that the current descendants of these people were suffering from a horrible and 
deadly disease. If, upon learning of this, we lacked much concern for their suffering, this 
would probably be because we would know that, being many light-years away, it would be 
beyond our means to help them. Further, we see no point in deliberating over how some 
of our decisions may affect those in the year 4000 since, in most cases, we simply have no 
idea how our current actions might affect them.221 
 My contention, then, is that the above demonstrates that a lack of concern for 
people in far-flung corners of the universe depends on (i) our thinking that our actions have 
no bearing on what befalls them, or (ii) our epistemic position being such that we are not 
aware of how our actions may bear on what befalls them. So lack of spatiotemporal 
proximity to – and lack of causal relation to – other individuals look insufficient for making 
our failing to factoring them (or factoring them unequally) into our moral deliberations 
justified. However, since, by hypothesis, all there is to distinguish actual from non-actual 
individuals in spatiotemporal and causal relatedness, we are then left with no obvious 
feature which could add credibility to the idea that non-actuals have (at least) less moral 
significance. 
Now we cannot, of course, ignore that common sense morality understands us as 
having special obligations to our friends, family, colleagues, and those to whom we’ve made 
promises or commitments. Whether we can explain what grounds these prima facie special 
obligations is a matter very much up for debate, (see, e.g., Jeske (2014) for an overview of 
                                                          
221 Some, but clearly not all. We should, for example, be concerned with how much energy we use and how 
much carbon we produce, since we know this will have an adverse effect on the climate for future generations. 
- 185 - 
 
the relevant issues.),222 however, most party to this debate understand special obligations as 
being grounded in something other than the intrinsic nature of the obligee (Jeske, ibid.: §4). 
Let us grant that we do have such obligations (and that they are moral ones). This, in and 
of itself won’t be helpful to those seeking to defend GR. For clearly we may often find 
ourselves in situations where we are required to make morally significant choices about 
whether to help actual individuals to whom we have no such special duties. Now, special 
duties contrast with natural duties in the sense that natural duties are supposed to be ‘moral 
requirements which apply to all [persons] irrespective of status or of acts performed…owed 
by all persons to all others’ (Simmons, 1979: 13). In other words, they are duties we owe to 
persons qua persons, i.e., because of their intrinsic natures. I contend that what Lewis needs 
to show is not that we have a special duty to actuals, but that we have no natural duty to non-
actuals.  
 Problematically, however, the above considerations (about spatiotemporal and 
causal relations) show that there’s no obvious feature non-actuals might lack such that we 
may have no natural duty to them. Further, it also seems that, in the context of theism, there 
is positive reason to think that we do have natural duties to non-actuals; that non-actuals have 
just as much moral significance as those individuals living in this world to whom we owe 
natural duties. For under theism, all living beings are God’s creatures; and since I have ruled 
out CT as an adequate theory of divine de re representation, under both GR and GRO, all 
living beings, whether actual or not, will be the creatures of the very same God as ours. 
Further, given the theological doctrine of the imago dei,223 all human beings are in some sense 
made in the image of God – again, that very same God. This alone should suffice for taking 
all such beings as having intrinsic value – and the same intrinsic value – under theism. 
Moreover, Christian doctrine in particular teaches that one should love one’s neighbour. 
Clearly, though, ‘one’s neighbour’ is not intended to include merely those who live in close 
proximity to you. Nor is it, as the parable of The Good Samaritan makes clear,224 intended 
to refer only to those who you don’t consider your enemy. ‘One’s neighbour’ is supposed 
to be any member of the human race. For what such religious teachings point us towards 
is an all-embracing solidarity with mankind. See, for example, how Benjamin Milner describes 
the influential French theologian John Calvin as understanding the term: 
 
                                                          
222 Whether the types of special obligations we owe to friends and family are even rightly considered moral 
obligations is also an open question. See, e.g., Cocking and Kennett (2000) for an argument to the effect that 
they are not. 
223 Genesis 1:27, NIV. 
224 Luke 10:25-37, NIV. 
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“The word neighbour”, John Calvin writes “extends discriminately to every man, 
because the whole human race is united by a sacred bond” It is a “sacred bond” 
because we are bound by God “for the purpose of assisting each other”. [It is] the 
divine intention that human society should be regarded as a neighbourhood, 
distinguished above all by mutuality: “No man is born for himself, but mankind is 
knit together with a holy knot. Therefore, unless we are disposed to overthrow the laws 
of nature, let us remember that we must live not for ourselves, but for our 
neighbours.” (Milner, 1970: 36, emphasis added) 
 
Hence, I suggest that theists have strong reason to agree that, if we know GR is true, then 
we are not justified in thinking that we have more of a natural duty to care about those 
‘closer to home’ than those in other worlds, and therefore that the worries of §3.1, §4.1, 
and §4.3 are legitimate. 
 
4.6. How Does GRO Fare?  
Thus far, I’ve been working with the assumption that CT would be the account of de re 
representation for non-divine individuals under GR. However, thus far we haven’t seen any 
reason why theists couldn’t instead adopt TI (and therefore, GRO). How, then, does TI far 
with the problems of self-torture, self-sacrifice, and Heller’s moral indifference objection?  
 If TI is true then there’s no longer any case for thinking that self-sacrifice of virtue 
and self-torture would be righteous things to do. Given that I am not, under this theory, 
represented vicariously at other worlds by numerically distinct individuals, any pain I possibly 
suffer, but do not suffer here, I suffer elsewhere; that is, relative to some other world. To 
deliberately endure some pain here, then, is only to spare myself – not some other individual – 
that same fate at some other world. Likewise, by deliberately performing some otherwise-
considered immoral act, I am not sparing any other person from decay of moral character; I 
am only sparing myself from decay of moral character at some other world. 
 Nonetheless, this only makes apparent that Heller’s moral indifference objection 
will be all the more clear-cut under TI. Since, under this theory, the options we face when 
we are required to make an otherwise-seeming morally significant decision – whether to 
rescue a drowning child, say – are not whether to help one child live and let another child 
drown, but whether to help one child live at this world and let that same child die at another, 
what could possibly obligate us to help the child at this world, rather than at another? The 
non-actual people we’re asked to consider in such cases are identical with the people we 
might actually help here in this world. So if we know GRO is true, then it seems that the 
consequences we would therefore know each course of action to inevitably have really would 
give rise to an indifference about which course of action to pursue. Why such indifference 
- 187 - 
 
should not be permitted is not at all clear. As Pruss (2011: 100) notes, one will know that 
striving hard to improve one’s virtue at this world only results in one not having that virtue 
elsewhere. 
Secondly, even supposing that Lewis’ suggestion that evil of which we are a causal 
source is somehow more important to us, morally speaking, than evil of which we are not 
does hold sway, then it will not hold any sway under GRO. For we cannot avoid outright 
being a causal source of any particular evil we have the option of causing or preventing. At 
best, we can avoid being a causal source of a certain evil at a certain world; but in doing so, 
we will know that we are only inevitably going to be a causal source of (or will fail to prevent) 
that evil at some other. Every individual really does perform every evil action they could 
perform. When we are considering how individuals act across all worlds then, it becomes 
clear that no individual is really any better than any other, morally speaking. For every 
morally significant choice any individual faces at any world, that very same individual makes 
each possible choice at some other world. No-one, then, can be more virtuous than any 
other when we are considering how individuals act across reality as a whole: each of us 
makes all the bad choices we could make, as well as the good ones. How is God to judge 
us in such a scenario? GRO therefore seems to make a real hash of the theistic outlook. 
 Thirdly, it seems that knowledge of GRO licences indifferent about how we treat 
those to whom we owe special obligations. It is, for example, my very family – numerically the 
same individuals who are my parents and siblings in this world – who exist in other worlds 
and undergo different fates there. Given that what happens to my loved ones in distant 
parts of this universe concerns me no less than what happens to them in closer parts of this 
world (I care equally about whether they suffer now, or will in the future, or did so in the 
past;225 and it matters to me little whether they suffer on the other side of the globe rather 
than here), I see no reason why it should matter to me any less what might happen to them 
in far flung corners of the pluriverse. I care about what happens to them simpliciter. 
 
     5.  The Modal Problem of Evil  
5.1. Evil  Abounds 
The fact that every possible evil, both that results from immoral actions (moral evil) and 
that which does not (natural evil), will exist somewhere in the GR pluriverse means that, 
                                                          
225 From the perspective of the present moment I may prefer that the suffering occurred in the past rather 
than now; but it would be irrational of me to consider that it would be any worse, objectively speaking, for 
the suffering to have occurred in the past rather than now. 
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even with the theistic provisos to PR suggested in Chapter Four, there’s still good reason 
to be sceptical about whether the GR pluriverse can accommodate the existence of a 
classical monotheistic deity. For there’s still a guarantee of worlds that contain extremely 
high – perhaps even infinite – amounts of suffering; worlds that contain much more evil 
than good, or perhaps hardly any good at all. Given that much evil exists in this world, 
theists must, of course, accept that God’s existence is compatible with some amounts, 
degrees, and types of, evil. However, across the GR pluriverse, there will exist evils of such 
a level and type that it is even harder for us to make sense of an omnipotent, perfectly good 
and omnipotent deity justifiably allowing them; worlds which are so abject that they far 
overshadow even the worst atrocities of this world. Call worlds which contain far more evil 
than good, or the worst kinds and levels of evil imaginable, ‘evil worlds’. It follows from 
TPR that some possible worlds are evil worlds. Paraphrasing Lewis (1986a: 89) and utilising 
a famous example from Rowe (1979), if there could be a fawn suffering in agony after a 
forest fire for days on end, then there could be two duplicates of that fawn suffering one 
after the other, or seventeen, or 10300, or infinitely many. Worlds containing nothing but 
sentient beings who suffer very terribly and seemingly, pointlessly, will be ten a penny. But 
theistic intuitions seems to militate against the existence of such evil worlds. This, then, is 
the modal problem of evil (‘MPE’).  
MPE spells bad news for theism if (a) there’s more reason to accept TPR’s truth 
than its falsity, and (b) there’s no way to explain how a morally impeccable God might be 
permitted to allow the kinds of evils evil worlds contain to exist.226 This suggests two general 
strategies for response. Theists can insist that there’s more reason to accept the theistic 
intuitions which conflict with the existence of evil worlds than the modal intuitions which 
support TPR. Alternatively, if theists wish to preserve the modal intuitions which underlie 
TPR, they must find some way to explain why God – despite being morally impeccable – 
might permissibly allow the evils of evil worlds to exist.227  
Under the first option, we have to accept that modal space is much smaller than 
theistically untutored modal opinion supposes; God’s existence and nature put constraints 
                                                          
226 As is the line taken by Guleserian (1983). 
227 It would not be satisfactory to respond merely by drawing attention to the fact that God’s existence is an 
infinitely valuable state of affairs. “God is permitted to allow any evil e, to exist at any world, w”, the suggestion 
might run, “for no matter what else might go on at w, God’s existence alone is a guarantee that w contains more 
good than bad.”. Not only does this beg the question: whether there could be a morally impeccable omnipotent 
being existing at an otherwise evil world is precisely the issue; it also seems far from reasonable to suppose 
that ensuring that every world contains more good than evil exhausts the moral requirements placed on God 
(as Laura L. Garcia (1984: 380) rightly notes). Indeed, if this did suffice for divine impeccability, God would 
be impeccable no matter what he did! What drives the problem is that we expect, if God is essentially morally 
perfect, that no world for which God is responsible will contain more contingently existing good than evil. 
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on what’s possible. This line is not without advocates – see, e.g., Thomas V. Morris (1987)228 
– however, there are at least two good reasons to avoid it if possible. First, a willingness to 
accept a depleted modal space at this stage undermines the advantage GR was shown (in 
Chapter Two) to have over DI: avoiding both full and partial modal collapse was precisely 
the reason theists were giving to accept that there is no ontological difference between the 
actual and the merely possible. Secondly, given that theists already face the burden of 
defending against evils which are an undeniable occurrence at the actual world (cf. 
Fitzpatrick, 1981), it would be of much theoretical advantage if an extant and popular 
defence against actual evils could be extended to cover non-actual evils. Before examining 
this latter such approach, I first turn, in §5.2., to briefly consider an alternative. 
 
5.2. Contingent Moral Perfection 
Stephen Davis (1983) and Bruce Reichenbach (1982),229 argue that there’s reason – 
independent of MPE – to think that God cannot be essentially morally impeccable. Their 
argument, in short, is that the concept of an essentially good agent is contradictory: a moral 
agent is one who has the freedom to act in accordance with moral principles; hence, someone 
for whom failing to act in accordance with moral principles is impossibile, is someone for 
whom moral agency is impossible.  
Although, if sound, this argument provides an immediate solution to MPE, it can 
be met with at least three different lines of resistance. Some, such as Morris (1984), forward 
independent reasons for thinking that divine moral perfection – unlike creaturely moral 
perfection – does not consist in the satisfying of duties. Others, such as Garcia (1987), 
maintain that it’s rather the notion of contingent moral perfection that’s incoherent. In Garcia’s 
view, if God fails in his moral obligations at some world, that’s because there is some moral 
defect which ‘precedes’ the decision for which God can be held morally culpable: ‘God 
does not simply damage his character by his action; rather the action springs from his 
character and makes evident what that character is.’ (ibid.: 142-3). Therefore, since it’s 
necessarily contingent that God exhibits moral perfection; it’s necessary that God’s 
character has some modal defect. So God cannot be morally perfect at any world, including 
those at which he’s not morally culpable. Although space won’t permit exploration of these 
responses, I contend that a third is sufficient for resisting Davis/Reichenbach’s suggestion.  
                                                          
228 Guleserian (1983) is critical of Morris’ response and cites reasons for thinking that, on the contrary, the 
way in which we form our modal intuitions about evil worlds make them highly secure, and indeed, more 
secure than those which call them into doubt. See Garcia (1984) for a detailed response to Guleserian. 
229 See also Guleserian (1985). 
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The third alternative involves specifying reasonable grounds for denying that divine 
freedom consists in the ability to do otherwise. To see why such grounds are reasonable, 
recall from Chapter One that there’s good theological reason to think that it’s necessary 
that God creates. If the ability to do otherwise is a prerequisite for free action, then God’s 
decision to create cannot have been free. And while at each world what God does and creates 
may be considered free, what God does and creates simpliciter cannot be. Nonetheless, while 
there may be independent reason to think that divine freedom cannot presuppose 
alternative possibilities, this in itself is not sufficiently helpful. Without some plausible 
account of what divine freedom might otherwise consist in, we will only have escaped one 
problem by introducing another.  
One plausible account has been forwarded by Timothy O’Connor (2008), who 
contends that ‘the core metaphysical feature of freedom is being the ultimate source, or 
originator, of one’s choices, and that being able to do otherwise is for us closely connected 
to this feature.’ (ibid.: 145). What makes the ability to do otherwise a prerequisite for our 
actions having their source ultimately originate in us, says O’Connor, is our ontological 
status as a created, dependent beings. Unlike God, we mere mortal creatures are ‘causally 
conditioned’; we owe our existence to causal factors outside of ourselves. Hence, our 
actions can originate ultimately in us – they have their source properly in us and not something 
else – only if they are not 
 
wholly determined by their character and [antecedent] circumstances. For, if all my 
actions are wholly determined, then if we were to trace my causal history back far 
enough, we would ultimately arrive at external factors that gave rise to me, with my 
particular genetic dispositions. My motives at the time would not be the ultimate 
source of my willings, only the most proximate ones. Thus, only by there being less 
than deterministic connections between external influences and choices – and so 
my having alternative possibilities open to me in the final analysis – is it possible for 
me to be an ultimate source of my activity, concerning which I may truly say, ‘the 
buck stops here’. (ibid.) 
 
 Free will in the human case thus presupposes a range of open or alternative 
possibilities lying before us like a forking path; it’s ‘up to us’ which path we follow. 
However, since God is a maximally independent first cause, there’s no doubt about whether 
he can be the source of his choices and actions. God’s actions and choices reflect his very 
nature and that alone; that’s why divine freedom need not presuppose a range of alternate 
possibilities or paths. It’s by virtue of his ontological status that God can properly be said 
to be the ultimate originator or source of his actions.  
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 Although we can’t here explore this suggestion fully, it merits mention that this 
hypothesis – that to will freely is primarily to have one’s acts and choices ultimately originate 
in oneself – has been defended at length by, e.g., Robert Kane (1996, ch. 5 and 6; 2005, ch. 
11), and hence, has gained credibility outside of the context of the present debate. Further, 
as noted, other considerations about God’s nature mean that the applicability of such an 
account to the divine will is independently motivated. 
 
5.3. Moral Evil  
The mention of free will brings us neatly back to my former suggestion of what may be a 
better strategy for defending against MPE: extending to the case of other-worldly evils an 
extant defence of theism against the existence of this-worldly evils. One of the most popular 
defences against actual evils involves the claim that morally significant free will is of great 
intrinsic and instrumental value. Morally significant free will involves the freedom to 
perform morally significant actions; such actions being those that would either be wrong to 
perform and right to refrain from performing, or right to perform and wrong to refrain 
from performing. Often-cited examples of instrumental goods morally significant free will 
is supposed to support include the goods associated with the building of one’s own moral 
character. Through our abilities to respond freely to suffering in the world and make morally 
significant choices, we can develop our moral characters of our own accord and exhibit 
certain virtues and vices under the watchful eye of God.  
Such instrumental values, it’s argued, can only come about if we have libertarian 
freedom. A person is libertarian-free with respect to ‘a given action, [if they are] free to 
perform that action and free to refrain; no causal laws and antecedent conditions determine 
either that [they] will perform the action, or that [they] will not.’ (Plantinga, 1974a: 166). 
This may be contrasted with the compatibilist notion freedom, according to which a person 
acts freely so long as they could have done otherwise, and this is despite the fact that their 
action may have been determined by previous events, together with deterministic laws. It 
has been carefully and convincingly argued by, inter alia, Kane (1996) and O’Connor (2000) 
however, that the compatibilist view does not provide a satisfactory conception of free will. 
They contest that if determinism were true, agents would not cause their actions in the right 
kind of way needed for free will and moral responsibility; agents would not be the ultimate 
source of their actions in the sense described in §5.2, since their actions would originate in 
sources external to themselves. Taking Kane and O’Connor to be right about this, I suggest 
that libertarian freedom is a precondition for morally significant action, and since morally 
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significant action is an extremely valuable thing, God would thus want to create us so that 
we are libertarian free (which fits nicely with the line of thought above). 
 It is, however, a consequence of our divinely-bestowed morally significant freedom 
that God cannot prevent moral evil from occurring whilst ensuring that each of us always 
does the good. This is no failing on God’s part; it’s a necessary consequence of the nature 
of free will (given libertarianism). However, so the defence runs, the goods of morally 
significant freedom are of such great value that they outweigh any evils which may arise as 
a result. Hence, God is permitted in allowing such evils for the sake of a greater good. 
 While this defence is usually only employed to deal with evils occurring at the actual 
world, it could naturally be extended to defend against other-worldly evils. Consider that, 
under GR (as with any possible world theory), the truth-conditions for claims concerning 
free will involve happenings at other worlds. It turns out, then, that when the free will 
defence is given under GR, events and actions occurring at other worlds (partly) determine 
the axiological status of our world; since these make for the fact that certain goods, such as 
free will, are had in our world. Indeed, for any world whose denizens possess free will, the 
good associated with that free will is possessed in terms of worlds that are not actual from 
the perspective of it. So here is a way the proponent of GR may defend against other-
worldly evils: there must be worlds at which God permits the most horrendous moral evils 
to occur, since this is what facilitates our being free in not performing those evils; and makes 
for certain evil-outweighing goods across the pluriverse. 
  
5.4. Natural Evil  
On the face of it, free will seems unable to justify natural evils. For, these are not caused by 
creatures with morally significant freedom (cf. Plantinga 1974a).230 However, one defence 
against natural evils appeals to free will as a justifying good in an indirect way. According this 
defence – as advocated by, e.g., Swinburne (2004: ch. 11; 2010a, ch.6) – a prerequisite of 
our ability to act effectively in the world and to make morally significant choices is that 
events in the world unfold in a regular way. We must know the correlations between 
different types of actions and events in order to make morally significant choices. For 
example, firing a gun at someone can’t count as a freely formed intention to kill them if I 
don’t know that this action has death or serious injury as a likely consequence. ‘[T]he 
operation of natural laws producing evils gives humans knowledge…of how to bring about 
                                                          
230 Plantinga argues that it’s epistemically possible that natural evils could ultimately turn out to be the results 
of the behaviour of malevolent supernatural beings. However, this claim is not one that has much plausibility; 
it is merely forwarded as an attempt to supress the logical argument from evil. 
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such evils themselves…and if evil is to be a possibility for them they must know how to 
allow it to occur’ (Swinburne, 2010a: 94). What ensures that such regularities hold is natural 
laws. However, these laws have as a consequence that they sometimes give rise to natural 
evils. Such natural evils are nonetheless justified because they are entailed by natural laws: a 
world without natural laws would be a much worse world on account of lacking the goods 
mentioned. Swinburne thinks that natural laws also bear on the good of free will in a second 
way: by giving rise to evil, they provide valuable opportunities for certain emotional and 
morally significant responses. ‘If things always went well with someone, there would be no 
scope for anyone’s deep concern’ (2004: 240). 
 This defence may have some plausibility at this world,231 but it cannot be extended 
to justify natural evils across the board. For undoubtedly there will be worlds at which there 
are creatures who suffer natural evils resulting from natural laws and yet are not in a position 
to be able to respond, in a morally significant way, to that suffering. Take, for example, the 
world where millions of sentient creatures are chained for eternity to the ground so that 
they cannot help themselves, but endure severe burns from a heat blast at hourly intervals.  
A different story about what greater good natural evils may serve will thus need to 
be told by the theist GRist. One such story involves the following principle about natural 
goods: that it’s better have them than to lack them. To see this claim’s plausibility consider an 
example of natural good – that the Sun will rise tomorrow, say, and ask: why is this a natural 
good? The answer, plausibly, is that, if it did not do so, life on Earth would soon perish. 
Now, under GR taken together with the Lewis/Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, the 
counterfactual if the Sun did not rise and shine then life on Earth would perish has a truth-condition 
involving a certain subset of worlds. This claim is true iff the worlds closest to the actual 
world where the Sun doesn’t rise tomorrow are such that all living creatures soon die out 
in a nasty manner. Hence, God is justified in allowing the denizens of the world where the 
Sun fails to rise tomorrow to suffer because this is what he must do if he wishes to create a 
world, w, such that, at w, it’s a natural good that the Sun rises and shines. God’s allowance 
of such evils is done for the sake of certain natural goods. If the worlds closest to the actual 
world where the Sun ceases to shine are, rather, ones where God saves the relevant 
inhabitants by shining a divine planet-warming light, then, the thought might go, the Sun’s 
rising tomorrow doesn’t look like such a natural good after all (or else, its goodness consists 
in something much different from what we ordinarily suppose). Natural evil is thus a 
necessary counterpart of natural good: we can’t have one without the other, and this 
accounts for God’s allowing natural evils across the pluriverse. 
                                                          
231 Though see Tooley (2015: §7.4) for a summary of objections to it. 
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5.5. Objection  
There are no doubt many misgivings one could have about the responses outlined in §5.3 
and §5.4. Amongst other things, one might question whether the goods associated with free 
will are really so valuable that they’d outweigh any potential resulting evil, and we may have 
strong reservations about the suggestion that the value of natural goods must be understood 
counterfactually. However, one clear-cut line of objection against these responses is this: 
the God of GR allows real suffering to occur at other worlds in order to secure certain moral 
and natural goods. The God who represents non-actual possibilities, not by creating other 
universes where merely possible evils genuinely occur, but merely by picturing them in his 
understanding, need not have those sufferings be genuinely endured to secure the same 
goods. The objection here is not that God, under GR, represents other worlds with concrete 
universes when he could have done so differently: we have not the required ontology to 
make for this claim’s truth. Rather, it’s that we have here before us two epistemic 
possibilities – we’re wondering whether an essentially morally perfect deity would necessarily 
represent possibilities as the DIist says, or as the GRist says – and when we consider other-
worldly sufferings, we can be in no doubt that it is the former which wins.  
 
     6.  Conclusion 
Theists looking to adopt a possible world theory face a dilemma. Under theism, any form 
of actualism, and so DI, has modal collapse as a consequence. GR does not have this same 
result, but other-worldly evils present two real problems for it and not DI: (i) regardless of 
what theory of de re representation is adopted, GR(O) transforms the moral decision-
making of a person who has knowledge of its truth in a substantial and problematic way; 
(ii) it encounters MPE. In light of this, I turn, in the final chapter, to consider an alternative 
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6 
Theism & Modal Projectivism 
 
     1.  Introduction 
Modal statements, such as God exists necessarily, and there could have been tap-dancing turtles have 
the appearance, when uttered, of predicating modal properties to objects; they look like 
assertions, and hence look truth-evaluable. We’ve seen that this gives rise to the grounding 
problem for modality: if what we’re doing when we utter such expressions is making truth-
apt assertions, then what are the truth-conditions for those assertions? If we are predicating 
modal properties of things, then what and where are those properties? So far, I’ve examined 
theism’s fit with two different metaphysical accounts which attempt to answer this 
grounding problem – GR and DI – and found both wanting. However, in telling us what 
conditions reality must meet such that modal claims are true (or false), each also qualifies 
as what Simon Blackburn (1987) terms a truth-conditional approach to modality, and hence is 
met by a dilemma which, Blackburn (ibid.) contends, attends any such approach. This 
chapter outlines this dilemma (§2) and introduces Blackburn’s own (1984; 1987) account of 
modality – quasi-realist modal projectivism – which supposedly escapes it (§4). It will be taken 
for granted that the dilemma does have some bite, though some have forwarded reasons 
for thinking otherwise (see e.g., Shalkowski (2008) and Cameron (2010)). For the main part, 
the focus will be on questioning whether Blackburn’s modal projectivism might offer a 
viable account of theistic and non-theistic modal commitments (§6-§8). In light of Le 
Poidevin’s (2012) contention that a related dilemma faces theists in particular (§3), there is 
additional motivation for doing so. 
 
     2.  Blackburn’s Dilemma  
If we ask the proponent of a truth-conditional approach to modality what makes it so that 
some arbitrary proposition p must be the case, the answer will be of the form: ‘□p because 
f’ (where f is some further fact about reality, and ‘because’ expresses that what follows are 
necessary and sufficient conditions for ‘□p’, or that ‘□p’ consists in f, is made true by f, or 
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something of that nature) (Blackburn, 1987: 52).232 As we’ve seen, the possible world 
theorist will tells us that □p iff p is true in all worlds.  
The dilemma Blackburn (ibid.: 53-4) raises against such approaches is this: 
necessarily, f is either necessary or not. In each case though, f does not offer us a satisfactory 
explanation of ‘□p’. For, suppose that f is itself necessary. Citing f as the truth-conditions 
for ‘□p’, does not, in that case, really answer our question of what makes it so that p is 
necessary; it seems, rather, to postpone an answer. For, now we’ll need to ask what makes 
for the necessity of f. A truth-conditional approach will cite some further fact, f1; and f1, 
likewise, must be necessary or else not. If necessary, the question arises again. To avoid 
regress, we must then, at some point be able to cite some further fact, fn, which is not itself 
necessary and which ultimately accounts for the necessity of p. So suppose that f is not 
necessary. In that case, ‘there is strong pressure to feel that the original necessity has not 
been explained or identified, so much as undermined.’ (ibid.: 35, emphasis added). For all we 
have here is an explanation that bottoms out in a fact that is – but does not have – to be the 
case, so p’s necessity looks to have been analysed away. Hence, ‘[i]f neither modal facts nor 
non-modal facts are adequate for a theory of the modal, then on the modest assumption 
that all facts are either modal or non-modal, no truth-conditional theory of the modal is 
adequate.’ (Shalkowski, 2008: 95). (See also Blackburn, 1984: 151-8.) Indeed, Blackburn 
thinks the very same problems face us when we attempt to fully analyse any concept. Hence, 
he also recommends a projectivist approach to the moral domain (1984: 167-96) and to 
truth (ibid.: 235-57).233 
Supposing that Blackburn’s dilemma is sound, where might we go from here? 
Blackburn suggests that all is not lost in terms of giving a theory of modal judgements: the 
dilemma only arises when we try to specify what the truth-conditions are for such claims, and 
it’s possible to give a theory of modality that does not involve doing so. In §4, I outline the 
non-truth-conditional view of modality Blackburn (ibid.: 210-7) offers, before going on to 
evaluate it in the sections that follow. First, though, I turn to consider a second related 
dilemma forwarded by Robin Le Poidevin (2012). Since Le Poidevin contends that this 
dilemma gives theists in particular reason to depart from a truth-conditional approach – 
and to thus adopt a Blackburn-style projectivist account of divine necessity – examining 
how well projectivism fares in the context of theism seems even more pertinent.  
 
                                                          
232 Page references to Blackburn (1987) refer to the reprint in Blackburn (1993a). 
233 However, this isn’t Blackburn’s only reason for resisting alternatives to projectivism (see Blackburn, 1984: 
181-9). 
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     3.  Le Poidevin’s Dilemma  
3.1. The Dilemma Explained 
Le Poidevin’s dilemma (2012: 12-15) goes as follows. Traditionally, God exists is taken to be 
necessarily true (if true at all). But should it be interpreted as being necessary de dicto, or as 
being necessary de re? As we’ve seen, while de dicto necessity is said to be a feature of 
propositions, de re necessity is said to be a feature of non-linguistic objects – things out there 
in the world. Thus, God exists is necessary de dicto when it – the proposition itself – has the feature 
of being necessary, and is necessary de re when God – the individual the proposition refers to – has 
the relevant modal feature. If God exists is necessary de dicto then it will be analytic. For, since 
we’re supposing that it’s the proposition itself which is necessary, some feature of it must be 
responsible for its status as necessary; propositions consist only of meanings, and so, meaning 
must suffice for the proposition’s necessity (and so, truth). Since analytic statements are, 
therefore, ones whose meanings guarantee, suffice for, or fully determine their truth, de dicto 
necessities must be analytic. (Whilst Le Poidevin does not walk us through these steps, I 
assume this is what he had in mind.) However, for the reason that the meanings of analytic 
statements suffice for their truth, God exists, if necessary de dicto, cannot be made true by God 
himself (nor, indeed, could it be made true by any other non-linguistic entity); rather, God 
exists would be necessary simply by virtue of the meaning of the term ‘God’. In that case, 
says Le Poidevin, ‘some version of the ontological argument is sound…But even if there 
were a sound ontological argument, this would not be good news for theism.’ (ibid.: 13). 
The reason being that the conclusion of any ontological argument wouldn’t tell us anything 
substantive about reality, but only about linguistic conventions. And ‘no theist will be prepared 
to say that God exists tells us nothing about the world!’ (ibid.).  
If, however, God exists is necessary de re, meaning that God himself has some feature 
which makes his existence necessary, then we encounter a different problem. For, while we 
might decide that it needn’t be too problematic if de re necessity can’t be analysed – after all, 
everyone’s philosophy must contain some primitives – we do at least face the problem of 
explaining how we could know that God has necessary existence. ‘We do not’ explains Le 
Poidevin, ‘have to be in the grip of a verificationist account of meaning to feel the pull of 
the demand that our account of necessity be epistemically responsible.’ (ibid.: 15). However, 
if God exists is not analytic, then what epistemology can we give of it? What could justify our 
belief that God himself has the relevant modal feature? We can’t directly observe modal 
properties in the world, so no empirical support appears to be available. (This is precisely 
Hume’s point: we may observe constant conjunctions, but we don’t observe necessary 
connections (Hume, 1739/1978: book I, part III, section XIV).) And while physical necessities 
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might be supported by abductive reasoning – for instance, through our feeling the need to 
posit an underlying explanation for regularities in the world – it’s not at all clear what 
empirical observations could support a belief in metaphysical necessities. Further, Le 
Poidevin (ibid.: 16) calls into doubt the likelihood of our obtaining a justified belief in divine 
necessity through any purely a priori means. On the basis of these considerations, Le 
Poidevin, following Blackburn, suggests that theists may do best to look to a non-truth-
conditional approach to modality.  
 
3.2. The Dilemma Examined 
How compelling is Le Poidevin’s dilemma? For one, are all de dicto necessities analytic? The 
statement ‘necessarily, water is H2O’ is necessary de dicto, but it’s not analytic. It’s not part 
of the meaning of water, that water be H2O. As Sider notes, ‘water’ was in usage long before 
anyone knew what the chemical makeup of water was, and the term didn’t change its 
meaning once this knowledge was acquired (2003: 27). In this case though, it wouldn’t be 
unreasonable to take the view that the statement is ultimately necessary de re. Plausibly, the 
de dicto phrase derives its truth from the fact that water itself – taken as a natural kind – has a 
certain modal feature. Hence, one might not be convinced that it offers a genuine counter-
example. Less contentious cases could be cited though: anything which is yellow all over is not 
partly green and the inverse square law of gravitation is false in four-dimensional spaces are both 
necessary de dicto, but being not partly green is not part of the meaning of is yellow all over; nor is 
being incompatible with the inverse square law of gravitation part of the meaning of four-dimensional 
space. If we accept, á la Kripke (1972), that some (de dicto) necessities are a posteriori – then 
some necessities will be discoverable features of the world and, hence, cannot be tied to 
meanings or linguistic rules. (We needn’t look only to a posteriori necessities, though. 
Mathematical propositions are also necessary de dicto and yet not analytic.) But if not all de 
dicto necessities are analytic, then we can’t assume that God exists owes its truth only to its 
meaning solely on the basis that it’s necessary de dicto. 
Perhaps not too much hangs on this point, though. The de re/de dicto distinction was 
just a stepping stone into the analytic/synthetic distinction, so we could bypass the former 
and jump immediately to framing the dilemma in terms of the latter: either God exists is 
analytic, or it isn’t. If it is, then, Le Poidevin will contend, it will only tell us something about 
the meanings of our terms, not the world itself, and that’s something theists won’t accept. 
If it isn’t, God’s necessity seems unknowable. Only analytic and logical truths are knowable 
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a priori,234 and modal properties are, seemingly, not empirically detectable. Hence, God’s 
necessity couldn’t be known a posteriori. (At least, it couldn’t be known a posteriori without 
some kind of divine intervention. It’s entirely possible, of course, that God simply tell us 
that he exists necessarily; but certainly, it would be preferable if our modal epistemology 
did not have to hang on this suggestion.) 
However, while recasting the dilemma in this way avoids one point of controversy, 
another remains. Can we really take for granted that no analytic statement tells us anything 
about the world? Consider, for example, A. J. Ayer’s thesis that analytic propositions are 
knowable a priori for the very reason that ‘they do not make any assertion about the 
empirical world, but simply record our determination to use symbols in a certain fashion’ 
(Ayer, 1936: 31). Sider has recently argued that Ayer is mistaken since 
 
[o]nly statements about pronouncements, for example, statements about conventions 
seem to be made true by our pronouncements…I cannot make it the case that it 
rains [or that it doesn’t] simply by pronouncing…[nor can I] make it the case that p 
or q simply by pronouncement. Therefore, I cannot make it the case that either it 
rains or it doesn’t rain, simply by pronouncement…[So in] what sense do logical 
truths “lack factual content”? ‘It is raining or it is not raining’ concerns the world, 
specifically concerning the matter of rain, and the disjunction says that one or the 
other will hold. (2003: 25) 
 
It’s hard not to agree with Sider on this. Analytic statements at least tell us 
something conditional about the world. Take any classic example of an analytic statement you 
like – all vixens are female foxes, for example. Even if we agree that there’s a sense in which 
the meaning of this statement suffices for its truth, it doesn’t follow that the statement tells 
us nothing about the world. It at least tells us this: if the world contains vixens, then it 
contains females (and foxes). That has all the seeming of something that’s about the world, 
doesn’t it? The sentence tells us of the vixens in the world that they’re female foxes.  
What about the theistic case? Does God exists tell us something about the world? 
On the surface it does. It tells us something about God the individual: that he exists. It also 
tells us that the world’s such that God’s a part of it. Taken as an analytic truth, the sentence 
is, again, more accurately understood as telling us something conditional. If existence is part 
of the meaning of God, then it tells us that any world that contains God is one where God 
exists (or, that if the term ‘God’ refers, or if something satisfies the concept ‘God’, then 
God exists). As such, we may agree that this sentence tells us something about the world, 
                                                          
234 Perhaps with the exception of ‘I am here, now’, as pointed out by Kaplan (1989). Though synthetic (and 
contingent), this is knowable a priori. 
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but nonetheless, we should also accept that what the sentence tells us about the world is 
entirely trivial. So perhaps Le Poidevin’s point could be better phrased like this: God exists 
should tell us something informative about the world; but, if it’s analytic, it will be the exact 
opposite – a mere tautology. That’s why it shouldn’t be taken as analytic. On the other hand, 
if God exists is taken to be a non-analytic necessity, then we face the epistemological 
challenge of answering the question: in virtue of what does God exists express a necessary 
truth, and how we can know it? As a way out of this dilemma, Le Poidevin will suggest, 
theists may do best to look to a non-truth-conditional approach. Let’s turn, then, to 
consider one such approach – Blackburn’s modal projectivism.  
 
     4.  Blackburn’s Account 
4.1. Projectivism 
Blackburn’s ((1984: chapters 5-7) and (1987)) account is a form of modal projectivism; so 
called since it tells us that modality is not something out there in the mind-independent 
world to be perceived and responded to, but something we unconsciously project onto it. 
Under Blackburn’s view, the function of modal discourse is to express non-cognitive attitudes 
and nothing more. It’s in expressing attitudes in the form of modal judgements that we 
project a modal property, or status, onto some non-linguistic object or proposition; and 
since modal judgements are simply expressions of attitudes, ‘attributing necessity to a 
proposition is not making a true or false claim about it’ (Blackburn, 1987: 60). 
To see what attitudes we’re supposed to be expressing through our making of modal 
judgements, we need to understand the causal story Blackburn invokes to explain why it is 
that we modalise. For Blackburn, we commit ourselves to the necessity of some 
proposition, p, when we cannot make sense of p’s falsity and can give no naturalistic 
explanation of this inability. That is, when ‘[w]e cannot see our failure to make anything of 
[the proposition] as the result of a contingent limitation on our own experience, nor of a 
misapprehension making us think that their truth should be open to display in a way in 
which it need not be.’ (1987: 70).235 Expressions of necessity give voice to the sentiment felt 
when a person is in a psychological state of this kind. ‘□p’ has the function of expressing 
the attitude of strong commitment towards p. Saying p is necessary, then, is ‘more like 
adopting a norm, or a policy or a rule that [p] be put ‘in the archives’, above the hurly-burly 
of empirical determination.’ (ibid.: 60). Expressions of possibility, by contrast, give voice to 
                                                          
235 See also Blackburn (1984: 216-7). 
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the sentiment felt when we either can make sense of p’s falsity, or can give a naturalistic 
explanation of our inability to make sense of p’s falsity.  
Why are imaginative blanks on their own insufficient for prompting judgements of 
necessity? Because there are many cases where we have imaginative blanks, but we don’t 
project necessity. Just like ‘A Square’ in E. A. Abbott’s two-dimensional ‘Flatland’, who can 
make no sense of three-dimensional ‘Spaceland’, I can make no sense of the world’s having 
four or more spatial dimensions. Nor can I really get my head around how vast space is, or 
just how small things are at the quantum level. But I don’t take these imaginative failures as 
indicative of the impossibility of these things because I attribute them to my own meagre 
imaginative powers. Likewise, there are things we can ‘freely imagine’ which may well be 
impossible. I can make sense of a world without God, though others can’t: some of us must 
be making sense of an impossible state of affairs (Blackburn, ibid.: 68-9).236 
The idea, then, is that certain aspects of mind-independent modality-free reality 
elicit in us certain subjective feelings which cause us to project modal properties onto the 
world. ‘[W]hat starts life as a non-descriptive psychological state ends up expressed, thought 
about, and considered in propositional form’ (Blackburn, 1993a: 5), giving us the 
appearance that modal facts are there to be discussed. Blackburn considers Hume to be ‘the 
first great projectivist’ (ibid.), as this is precisely Hume’s account of causal necessity. For 
Hume, we respond to what is merely a regular succession of certain events by projecting a 
relation of causal necessity between them, one which isn’t really there. In this way, the mind 
‘spreads itself’ onto the external world (Hume, 1739/1978: 167). Blackburn is extending 
Hume’s account to other types of necessity.  
 
4.2. How Does Projectivism Help?  
Since, under the projectivist view, the function of modal discourse is not to describe mind-
independent facts in a way that is true or false, but to project non-cognitive attitudes, both 
dilemmas are avoided. There is no metaphysical problem of specifying what the truth-
conditions for modal expressions are – nor is there any epistemological worry about how 
we can know whether such truth-conditions are met – if modal expressions are not even in 
the business of describing the way our world is.  
                                                          
236 Shalkowski (1996: 383) is critical of q-projectivism on this point. He takes it to show that, unavoidably, 
modal facts explain conceivability, not vice-versa. If certain imaginings don’t count as genuine conceivabilities, 
‘perhaps because in imagining the scenario I must under-represent the content of [that scenario] to myself, 
then the genuine imagination of [that scenario] is ruled out because [that scenario] is impossible.’ I think this 
criticism is perfectly legitimate, but I leave it aside for the sake of pursuing my own objections below.  
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 It’s important, then, that if the dilemma is to be escaped in this way, modal 
expressions must express attitudes without reporting them. As Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 
(1998) note, if modal discourse ‘expressed beliefs that the attitudes were present – 
then…they would automatically be true or false. They would be true just when the beliefs 
they expressed were true, just when the attitudes they reported obtained.’ (ibid.: 240).237 
 
4.3. The Embedding Problem 
One of the principal problems for standard expressivist accounts, which stems from Peter 
Geach (1965), is sometimes referred to as the embedding problem, since it’s one of explaining 
what modal expressions mean when they are embedded in semantically more complex 
expressions, such as conditionals and propositional attitude reports. Blackburn calls these 
‘unasserted contexts’ (1984: 190). Asserted contexts, by contrast, are ones where it seems 
that a modal predicate is being asserted as applying to a given thing, as when, e.g., someone 
utters p is necessary. In this case the expressivist says the utterance expresses a certain state 
of mind: one which cannot make sense of ~p. However, the relevant attitude is missing 
when the same expression features in, e.g., is p necessary? Thus, since ‘[i]n unasserted contexts 
no attitude, etc. is evinced when the sentence is uttered’, even though ‘the meaning is the 
same as in direct contexts when such an attitude is evinced; …this (variable) feature does 
not give the (constant) meaning.’ (ibid.: 191). 
Relatedly, consider the following argument:  
 
P1. If it’s necessary that p, then it’s possible that p.  
P2. It’s necessary that p.  
C1. Therefore, it’s possible that p.  
 
As Geach (1965) explains, if an argument such as this is to be logically valid, then it mustn’t 
equivocate. The expression forming the antecedent of P1 must mean the very same thing 
as the expression occurring in P2, otherwise, the argument won’t take a modus ponens form. 
But when someone utters the antecedent of P1 they’re not expressing the same modal 
attitude (i.e., commitment) towards p; in this context, it’s necessary that p has a purely 
representative function. According to the projectivist, however, the same string of words 
occurring in P does express an attitude. So the projectivist needs to explain how modal 
                                                          
237 Indeed, Jackson and Pettit (ibid.) argue that expressionism falls short here: it can’t avoid the consequence 
that beliefs are reported when modal expressions are made.  
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statements can be found in what otherwise appear to be formally valid arguments.238 Indeed, 
they need to explain how sentences of modal discourse can enter into logical relations at 
all, since attitudes, unlike propositions, are not standardly taken to be capable of doing so.239 
 
4.4. Quasi-Realism 
To avoid these problems, Blackburn recommends a quasi-realist form of projectivism 
(hereafter, q-projectivism). The theory is anti-realist insofar as it’s a type of non-cognitivism. 
It continues to deny that modal expressions have the function they outwardly appear to 
have, i.e., that of describing, in a truth-evaluable way, some part of mind-independent reality. 
However, the theory is realist in that it maintains that we are nonetheless justified in our 
practice of treating modal claims as the realist does – that is, as having truth-conditions. 
Hence, Blackburn refers to q-projectivism as ‘the enterprise of showing that…even on anti-
realist grounds there is nothing improper, nothing “diseased” in projected predicates.’ (ibid.: 
171). Unlike other forms of non-cognitivism – which may have it that, in the absence of 
any distinctive range of facts in virtue of which modal judgements are truth-evaluable, our 
speaking as if there are is erroneous240 – the q-projectivist hopes to offer an explanation (or 
‘genealogy’) of why we convey our attitudes in this way, one which shows such a practice 
to be perfectly legitimate. There’s a subtlety here that’s easily missed, as Bob Hale explains:  
  
the “no error” claim cannot be the claim that when we project, we are not in error 
if we think that there are moral facts, properties, etc. – it must be the claim that we 
are not in error if we [think] as if, as well as talk as if, there were moral facts, etc., 
even though there are none. (1986: 71) 
 
That’s the crucial point to understanding the realist component of q-projectivism.  
Blackburn points out that to view the sentential connectives (‘and’, ‘or’, ‘if… 
then…’) as simply playing the role of truth functions is too restrictive. In many cases, they 
link utterances such as Turn that music off! and Finish that thesis!, which don’t express beliefs 
or anything capable of truth-value (ibid.: 191-2). Once aware of this – i.e. that these terms 
already serve the wider function of linking commitments more generally, where 
‘commitment’ is taken as a notion that includes beliefs as well as attitudes (ibid.) – we can 
                                                          
238 However, Hare (1970) and, later, Gibbard (1992), object that an analogous problem looms even when we 
consider conditionals which don’t express non-cognitive attitudes: even in these cases, no belief in the 
antecedent is endorsed a conditional is stated. 
239 That the same expression must not shift its meaning when it occurs in embedded contexts, Geach refers 
to as the Frege Point: ‘A thought may have just the same content whether you assent to its truth or not; a 
proposition may occur in discourse now asserted, now unasserted, and yet be recognizably the same 
proposition’ (Geach, 1965: 449); hence this also being known as the Frege-Geach problem. 
240 See Mackie (1977b) for a famous articulation of such a position regarding moral discourse. 
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begin to give an account of what function modal expressions have when they occur in 
unasserted contexts. In Blackburn’s view, the featuring of modal idioms in such contexts 
‘merely proves us to have adopted a form of expression adequate to our needs.’ (ibid.: 195). 
That need, according to Blackburn, is that of working out the implications of our commitments, and 
the form of expression is one which can be understood in a projectivist-friendly way. 
Blackburn explains what we’re ‘up to’ when we use conditionals involving projected 
attitudes by focussing on ethical rather than modal judgements: 
 
A moral sensibility…is defined by a function from input of belief to output of attitude. 
Now not all such sensibilities are admirable…it is extremely important for us to 
rank sensibilities, and to endorse some and reject others…amongst the features of 
sensibilities which matter are, of course, not only the actual attitudes which are the 
output, but the interactions between them. For instance, a sensibility which pairs an 
attitude of disapproval towards telling lies, and an attitude of calm or approval 
towards getting your little brother to tell lies, would not meet my endorsement. I 
can only admire people who would reject the second action as strongly as they 
would reject the first…The conditional form shows me expressing this endorse-
ment. (ibid.: 192) 
 
This genealogy is supplemented with a semantic theory (ibid.: 193-6). We’re asked 
to imagine a language, Eex, containing two operators – H! for ‘hooray!’, and B! for ‘boo!’ – 
which attach to expressions to signal approval and disproval felt towards actions or 
propositions. We’d expect the speakers of this language to want some way of expressing 
the structure of the above described sensibilities. ‘They would need a notation with which 
to endorse or reject various couplings of attitudes, or couplings of beliefs and attitudes.’ 
(ibid.: 193-4). Suppose this language uses the semicolon to signify that one attitude is 
coupled with another – so ‘A1;A2’ denotes attitude A1’s being held with attitude A2 – and 
puts expressions within bars |…| to signify that what’s contained within them is being 
referred to. This would enable speakers of Eex to express second-order attitudes. For example, 
H!(|B!(lying)|) would express the moral attitude of approval towards holding the moral 
attitude of disapproval towards lying. 
We can see how an analogous story would go in the modal case. We could have an 
operator, L!, to express the commitment felt towards some p which accompanies 
expressions of necessity (and which is explained by a ‘blank imaginability’ concerning ~p). 
The operator M! could express the attitude that accompanies expressions of possibility 
(which is belied by an imaginative ability). Using these operators, the problematic 
conditionals described in §4.3 can be reinterpreted as expressing higher-order modal 
attitudes (see the reformulated argument below). For example, P1 can be seen as expressing 
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a certain commitment, one which is explained by an inability to make sense of an ability to 
make sense of p while at the same time being unable to make sense of ~p: 
 
P3. L!(|L!(p)|;|M!(p)|)  
P4. L!(p)  
C2. M!(p) 
 
What explains the legitimacy of the above inference pattern is not formal consistency, but 
attitudinal consistency. We have here what we might call a ‘logic of attitudes’. If one is 
committed to p as P4 expresses, then, should one possess the modal attitude expressed in 
P3, one should not fail to have the modal attitude that accompanies the sincerely voicing 
of the expression It’s possible that p (C2). Otherwise, one would have a ‘clash of attitudes’ or 
 
a fractured sensibility which cannot be an object of [commitment]. The ‘cannot’ 
here follows not…because such a sensibility must be out of line with the [modal] 
facts it is trying to describe, but because such a sensibility cannot fulfil the practical 
purposes for which we [commit to] things…In short, Eex needs to become an 
instrument in serious, reflective, evaluative practice, able to express concern for 
improvements, clashes, implications, and coherence of attitudes. Now one way of 
doing this is to become like ordinary English. That is, it would invent a predicate 
answering to the attitude, and treat commitments as if they were judgements, and 
then use all the natural devices for debating truth…This is what is meant by ‘projecting’ 
attitudes onto the world. (ibid.: 195) 
 
In short, conditionals and (apparently valid) arguments in which projected attitudes 
feature are explained in terms of attitudinal appropriateness (see McLeod, 2001: 89).241 
Further, the function of the connectives is to ‘operate on two or more commitments to 
form a sentence the acceptability of which depends on the acceptability of its components 
in a way specified by the acceptance table (whatever that is) for that connective’ (Brighouse, 
1990: 229). It’s in their ability to offer a more sophisticated account of the function and 
content of expressive discourse that the q-projectivist considers themselves (unlike the 
standard anti-realist expressivist) capable of meeting Geach’s challenge. And it’s in their 
giving a genealogy of modal judgements – explaining what causes us to express them in 
truth-conditional form – that they hope to show us as having earned the right to continue 
doing so whilst avoiding the metaphysical commitments and epistemological challenges 
associated with realism.  
                                                          
241 It’s imperative, then, that attitudinal consistency be explainable without appeal to logical consistency. Hale 
(1986: 73-4) suggests adapting the account so as to do so. I am, however, sceptical of the prospects of doing 
so successfully.  
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Indeed, Blackburn (ibid.: 197-202) goes as far as to claim that the q-projectivist can 
develop a notion of modal truth, one defined not in terms of the external world’s meeting 
any conditions, but in terms of a modal expression, m’s, belonging to ‘the best possible set 
of attitudes’, M*. Blackburn takes such a set to be ‘the limiting set which would result from 
taking all possible opportunities for improvement of attitude’ (ibid.: 198). In other words, 
we’d have a truth property constructed not in terms of truth-conditions, but in terms of 
what we might call correctness of expressability conditions. Correct modal judgements are the 
ones expressive of our best modal attitudes. 
 Before proceeding, it’s worth clearing up one potential source of confusion with 
Blackburn’s proposal, one which informs the dilemma Lewis (2005) raises against it. Lewis 
objects that if the q-projectivist about modality wants to (earn the right to) say everything 
the realist does, then their position collapses into realism. However, if they insist their 
position is not straight-forward realism, then they must be ‘making believe’ that realism is 
true, and in that case, their position collapses into modal fictionalism.  
Lewis is wrong about this. Like the q-projectivist, the modal fictionalist does deny 
that there are modal facts or properties, and does accept that it’s nonetheless useful to speak 
as if there are such things. However, they recommend prefixing modal assertions with a 
fictional operator; a claim of the form ‘□p’ will not be true per se, but true in the fiction of modal 
discourse; we should say: according to the modal fiction, ‘□p’ is true. And the q-projectivist is not 
‘making believe’ that sentences of modal discourse are true in this way. Rather, they take us 
to be seriously committed to what we express when we make modal judgements (Blackburn, 
1993a: 157). Moreover, they think we’re justified in treating these (un-prefixed) modal 
expressions as true, and, as Carrie Jenkins (2006) rightly notes, unlike the realist, they deny 
that we assert anything when we voice modal commitments; so modal expressions have a 
different content under q-projectivism from what they have under realism:   
 
The fictionalist differs from the realist in adopting the realist account of what 
[modal] sentences mean in her mouth, but dissenting from those sentences (same 
content, different attitude). Whereas the [q-projectivist] differs from the realist in 
adopting a different account of what those sentences mean in his mouth, while 
continuing to accept those sentences (different content, same – or at least similar – 
attitude). (ibid.: 317)242, 243 
 
 
                                                          
242 This is slightly misleading. Fictionalism denies that once prefixed modal assertions have the semantic structure 
the realist thinks they have. 
243 See Blackburn (2005) for his own response to Lewis. 
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     5.  A Q-Projectivist Account of Divine Necessity  
Le Poidevin (2012) argues that theistic modal contentions can be understood in projectivist 
terms. For example, God exists necessarily can be understood as expressing commitment 
towards God’s existence. In the more perspicuous language of Eex, it says ‘L!(God exists)’ 
and would be uttered (sincerely) by those in the psychological state of being unable to make 
sense of God’s non-existence and being unable to see this inability as a mere contingent 
fact about their particular psychological make-up. However, it’s one thing to make this 
suggestion, it’s another to provide a convincing account of why theists might find 
themselves in this situation. Le Poidevin thinks such an account can be given, suggesting 
that information gathered in psychological studies concerning our methods of 
counterfactual thinking can (a) explain why theists might experience the imaginative blocks 
that would underlie their modal contentions and (b) give further detail to the account 
Blackburn sketches more generally. 
 
5.1. Psychological details  
When we’re engaged in counterfactual thinking, we imagine certain aspects of the past being 
different, whilst keeping others constant (Le Poidevin, ibid.: 19). However, Le Poidevin 
explains that psychological studies show that which aspects to keep constant is not an 
entirely arbitrary matter. There are four general biases we exhibit when we wonder how 
some series of events might have gone differently (ibid.: 19-21). First, we are generally less 
willing to contemplate situations involving a big departure from reality. Second, as a 
psychological study from Byrne et al. (2000) shows, we have a general tendency to alter 
events that occurred more recently, as opposed to later, in time. So, when we wonder how 
a particular series of events might have gone differently, we’re likely to hold fixed the events 
which occur earlier in the series and to see what follows from those, together with some 
alteration made to events occurring later in the series. The phenomenon is easily witnessed 
on BBC’s ‘Match of the Day’.244 In almost any post-match interview with the managers 
from two competing teams, A and B, where A were 1-0 up until B equalised towards the 
end of the match, B’s manager will express delight and A’s manager will express annoyance. 
While A’s manager will lament that if only they hadn’t ‘let one in’, they’d have won the 
match, manager will consider themselves lucky merely to have drawn. Yet, it’s equally true 
of both teams that they could have won if they hadn’t conceded a goal, demonstrating the 
tendency to hold fixed the goal scored earlier, merely because it was.  
                                                          
244 A good source for psychological insight if ever there was one. 
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Third, a study from Girotto et al. (1991) shows that we have a tendency to alter 
events in the series that were (seemingly) under the control of relevant individuals involved 
at the time. This suggests that we have an easier time imagining how people might have 
acted differently, than we do imagining how particular natural events (that is, ones not 
involving the conscious actions of agents) might have gone otherwise. Fourthly, a study 
from Walsh and Byrne (2005) shows that ‘people are more likely to contemplate alternatives 
to actual events where the actual event was morally or socially unacceptable, than ones 
where the counterfactual alternative involves the unacceptable’ (ibid., 20). From these four 
general tendencies, Le Poidevin makes a further over-arching generalisation: our counterfactual 
thinking is quite conservative. 
 
[W]e make relatively modest changes to the past in contemplating a counterfactual 
alternative. The reason is not hard to find: the more divergent the counterfactual 
situation from the one that actually obtained, the harder it is to work out the 
consequences. (ibid.: 20-1) 
 
It’s clear that the first general tendency shows our counterfactual thinking to involve 
us making the least revisionary adjustments possible; but we can see that the others do so 
as well. For example, if, in our imagining a counterfactual scenario involving a certain series 
of events, we imagine an event occurring earlier rather than later in the series being 
otherwise, we’ll need to give much more thought to what we ought to say when specifying 
the consequent: the earlier the alteration, the more time there is for things to go differently 
as a consequence; the more opportunity there is for change. It’s much easier to think about 
what might have happened if I hadn’t come into university today, than it is to wonder what 
would be happening right now if I’d skipped off school on the same day in 1995. Likewise, 
it’s easier for us to imagine events involving actions going differently, since our actions are 
events we invariably consider to be under our control, and hence, are ones we likely find 
easier envisioning consequences of. Lastly, it puts something of a strain on our imaginative 
capacities to contemplate ourselves (and others) acting contrary to our moral principles, 
since these are principles to which we are strongly committed. 
 
5.2. Explaining Theistic Contentions 
How might the details gained from these psychological studies help explain the imaginative 
blocks which would, given q-projectivism, underlie theistic modal contentions, and 
legitimise the forms in which they’re expressed?  
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For reasons of space, I’ll focus mainly on the claim of divine necessity, but similar 
explanations should follow mutatis mutandis for others. Le Poidevin begins by asking us to 
contemplate the theistic conception of God apart from any of the distinctly modal 
components it’s normally said to contain. Under such a conception, God is the source of 
all being and all positive value, is extremely good, and is in possession of much knowledge. 
However, says Le Poidevin, when we’re viewing God in this de-modalised way, we find 
ourselves quite unable to contemplate counterfactual scenarios involving God’s non-
existence. For whether we take these counterfactuals as historical ones or not – that is, 
whether we take them as describing what might have happened if something had been 
different in time – we are unable to properly engage in genuine counterfactual thinking.  
Suppose a theist takes a counterfactual which involves God’s non-existence in its 
antecedent as a historical one. This person will, in this case, need to say something of the 
form: If God hadn’t existed, then… – but how should they fill in the blank? As noted, normally, 
when we engage in historical counterfactual thinking, we hold as fixed the events which 
occurred prior to the event we are (counterfactually) supposing not to have taken place. 
But, says Le Poidevin, if one is in possession of a firm belief that God is the source of all 
being (or something of that nature), then there is nothing – no event, no existent, no state 
of affairs – to hold fixed: ‘there is no state of affairs prior to God’s existence, against which 
we can cast the antecedent of the counterfactual If God did not exist, then…(ibid.: 22). 
 
So the proposition that God might not have existed is, for the committed theist, 
curiously empty: it suggests no very definite situation that we could examine. That 
does not mean that theists are incapable of contemplating it, but rather that they 
can make little of it, precisely because so much is bound up with God’s existence. 
(ibid.) 
 
Even if we take the counterfactual as ahistorical (as we would if we were to 
contemplate what would be the case if the product of 6 squared was not 36), how exactly 
the theist may fill in the consequent is no less mysterious. To see what would follow from 
a certain state of affairs, S’s, failing to be the case, we need to be able to conceptualize some 
larger state of affairs, T, from which S could be subtracted in imagination, in order to see 
what follows from T-minus-S. So whether S is temporal is besides the point: there is no 
larger state of affairs from which to subtract God’s existence – that’s why the theist is unable 
to contemplate God’s non-existence and is thus unable to see what follows from it.  
Given that the above described psychological studies show that we’re generally 
disposed to be quite conservative in our counterfactual thinking, the trouble theists 
encounter in contemplating counterfactuals with atheistic antecedents is made doubly acute. 
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We want to hold fixed as much as possible, but there is nothing to hold fixed in these cases. 
Further, ‘we prefer not to contemplate too many violations of moral order. But for any 
theist who views God as the source of goodness, no violation of the moral order could 
match that of the absence of God, for there would then be no moral order.’ (ibid., 23). So, 
Le Poidevin’s projectivist explanation of theistic modal claims amounts to this: the more 
we can hold fixed in – and the more conservative we can be in – our counterfactual thinking, 
the easier it is for us to engage in such thinking. But, for theists contemplating counter-
factuals whose antecedents involve God’s non-existence, there is nothing to hold fixed. So 
the general rule that we should make the most conservative or modest changes to the 
counterfactual scenario under consideration is violated in the most extreme way possible. 
This is why theists hold the strongest kind of commitment towards the claim God exists and 
subsequently give voice to it by means of the modal expression necessarily, God exists. It is 
also, under the proposed account, how they earn the right to express this commitment in a 
truth-conditional form.  
The proposal is undoubtedly an ingenious one. But does its understanding of modal 
commitments, and in particular, the modal commitments of classical theism, stand up to 
philosophical scrutiny?  
 
     6.  The Nature of Conceivability 
6.1. The Problem 
A first worry arises when we reflect more carefully on the psychological state, or attitude, 
which is supposedly expressed when a person projects modal properties. Take the case of 
necessity. Such a person is (i) unable to make anything of a certain proposition, p, and is (ii) 
unable to tell a naturalistic story in which they are able to make something of p; they find the 
former inability resistant to naturalistic explanation. It’s crucial that we be able to spell out 
these components in a way that respects the antirealist commitments of the account. 
Whether such a thing could be done, however, is not at all clear. 
 The problem arises, of course, because both components seem to involve elements 
q-projectivism eliminates. Beginning with (i), as Blackburn’s own wording (quoted above) 
makes explicit, something modal seems to be going on here: a person who projects necessity 
is such that they cannot make sense of some p. There is an inability to conceive of something. 
Most naturally, we’d say that what it is for some state of affairs, S, to be inconceivable to 
some person, x, is for it not to be possible that x conceive of S holding. Yet, projectivists deny 
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that there really is any modality in the world in any ontologically robust sense; modal facts 
and properties supposedly play no role in the forming of modal commitments.  
 Part (ii) is problematic for the reason that it involves describing the relevant subject 
as making modal judgements. The person is supposed not only judge that (a) something for 
them is not possible (i.e., their making sense of ~p) but also that (b) this is not just a mere 
contingent limitation on their own experience (in the cases where possibility is projected onto 
~p even though there is an inability to conceive of ~p, they’re supposed to judge that the 
inability is contingent). Hence, they are supposed to make a judgement about the modal 
status of their own mental state. This is greatly incongruous with the account, of course, 
because q-projectivism denies that there are any modal beliefs as such: modal discourse has 
no representative function. Rather than judging things as necessary or contingent, we just 
express (in propositional form) non-cognitive attitudes towards a modal-free reality. Here 
though, someone is described not only as seeing themselves as having a blank unimaginability, 
but also as seeing it as one that couldn’t be explained by means of a naturalistic story, and 
thus, as non-contingent in some relevant sense. In a footnote to his review of Blackburn’s 
Essays in Quasi-Realism, Gideon Rosen expresses the same concern: the mental state 
 
seem[s] to involve, at the very least, the speaker’s judgement that a certain fact about 
himself is non-contingent. An expressivist who was skeptical about the representational 
credentials of modal words would presumably balk at this specification. That Blackburn is 
undeterred by this patent circularity leads me to wonder whether I fully understand 
the rules of the game. (1998: 402-3, fn. 7, emphasis added) 
 
6.2. A Failed Response  
For these tensions to be resolved, there must be some way of explaining the psychological 
states underlying modal attitudes in terms not off-limits to q-projectivists. Someone who, 
for example, projects necessity onto God can’t be described as being really unable to make 
something of God’s non-existence (we can postulate no real ‘can’t conceive of…’), nor can 
they be described as being really unable to find a naturalistic explanation for this inability (it’s 
not that their imaginative inability really is resistant to any naturalistic explanation the subject 
can think of): these modal-sounding states of affairs need explaining in purely natural, 
categorical terms.  
 The subject, x, will have to be re-described as (perhaps persistently) just plain not 
making sense of God’s non-existence. This avoids the objection that x possesses – and judges 
themselves as having – a modal property. But now we need to deal with x’s supposedly 
recognising themselves as having this occurrent (perhaps recurrent) imaginative blank, and 
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judging it as (in some sense) non-contingent. At this point, the q-projectivist might say that 
the modal language used here is not be taken too literally: it just provides a convenient – 
albeit loose and inaccurate – shorthand for something ultimately explainable in the normal 
projectivist terms. A proper description of the state in projectivist vocabulary just happens 
to be considerably more convoluted, as can be seen by working through this suggestion. 
Sticking with cases where necessity is projected onto God, the first level description 
is this: x has an imaginative blank concerning ~God exists – call this imaginative blank ‘B1’ 
– and x sees B1 as in some sense non-contingent. What this really means is that x has B1 
and has a further imaginative blank – call it ‘B2’ – when they try to make sense of scenarios 
in which either they themselves or others are better placed to make sense of ~God exists. 
This is all well and good so far as it goes, but the explanation must continue. For, by the q-
projectivist’s own lights, an imaginative blank on its own is not enough to give rise to 
(justified) judgements of necessity: as we’ve seen, in cases where necessity is projected, 
imaginative blanks have to be seen by their subjects in a certain way. For convenience, the 
q-projectivist might describe x as seeing B2 as in some sense non-contingent, but what they 
should really say, if they want to speak more accurately, is that x has a further imaginative 
blank – ‘B3’ – concerning scenarios where x is, or others are, better placed to make sense 
of cases where they or others can make sense of sense being made of ~God exists. But now 
B3 needs to be seen in a certain way. Since, by the q-projectivist’s lights, mere imaginative 
blanks are not sufficient to give rise to judgements of necessity. For convenience, x might 
be described as judging B3 as being in some sense non-contingent, but what we should say 
if, we are to speak more accurately, is that x has a further imaginative blank – ‘B4’ – 
concerning scenarios where x is, or others are, better placed to make sense of cases where 
they or others can make sense of sense being made of sense being made of ~God exists. But 
now B4 needs to be seen in a certain way. Thus, it becomes clear that, if a thorough-going 
non-cognitivist treatment is to be given to the mental states projected through modal 
judgements, q-projectivists will be forced to embark on a regress. 
It’s customary, when regresses arise, to point out that some regresses are benign. A 
supporter of Blackburn may claim that here is such a case. “Of course,” they might say, “we 
encounter a regress once we articulate what it is for a person to be in such a psychological 
state. However, a person in possession of this kind of projected modal attitude need not be 
reflecting on their own mental state, nor need they be reflecting on what it is for them to 
be in it. There is no psychological problem with the account because the regress here 
uncovered has no adverse effect on the person experiencing this state.”  
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It’s true that a regress arises once we properly articulate what the relevant mental 
states amount to, and that someone in possession of those states needn’t be actively 
reflecting on what it is for them to be in them. But this doesn’t dissolve the problem. The 
point is that, for any individual, x, in possession of the type of mental state, M, projected 
through judgements of necessity, M must be underpinned by x’s actively experiencing 
infinitely many failed imaginings. M involves x’s failure to make sense of some p; this consists of 
x’s failure to make sense of their making sense of p; and so on: at each stage, there’s a 
description of the form ‘x is not making sense of…’ The problem, of course, is that such a 
picture is completely psychologically implausible.245 
 
6.3. Commitment 
Another key aspect of the account we should push the q-projectivist for an explanation of 
is the notion of commitment. Commitments are most intuitively understood counter-
factually: I have a commitment to p just when I would maintain p in certain counterfactual 
scenarios. Thus characterised, these states also seem modal. So it seems that this can’t be 
how commitments should be understood. On the other hand, though, it’s hard to see how 
such states can underpin Blackburn’s logic of attitudes if they aren’t modal. Being committed 
to p puts me in a position whereby I would have a clash of attitudes, were I to reject p. Rosen 
(1998: 392-3) makes a similar point concerning the attitude of commitment underlying 
moral assertions. In his view, the state of being committed puts one in a kind of normative 
condition: one of ‘conditional obligation’. If someone is committed to p, then one should, or 
is obliged to, reject ~p. At the very least then, q-projectivists have some further work to do. 
For whether these attitudes can be explicated in full conformity with notions their account 
permits remains to be seen.  
  
     7. Mind-Dependence 
A second type of worry concerns the fact that q-projectivism seems to do intolerable 
violence to our common-sense conception of modal facts as mind-independent. For the 
fact is that the theory understands modal judgements – and the truth thereof – in terms of 
expressed non-cognitive attitudes. Yet, that modal truth doesn’t depend on our sentiments is 
a view that seems unshakable (rape isn’t wrong because of the way we happen to form 
                                                          
245 It’s not open to q-projectivists to respond that x doesn’t need to have infinitely many actually occurrent 
imaginative blanks; it just needs to be that x would fail to make sense of each of the meta-scenarios, were they 
to entertain them (just as I have the inability to perform complex mathematical equations despite not actually 
attempting to perform them). For this involves an appeal to dispositions; insofar as such things only seem to be 
understandable in modal terms, invoking them forces a retreat towards realism. 
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attitudes about it). It’s also one that, as we saw in Chapter Four, does not sit well with 
classical theism. Nonetheless, it’s one the theory seemingly forces us to deny.  
 
7.1. The Internal Stance 
Blackburn is well aware of this potential source of hostility towards his account and tries to 
respond to it in a number of places, e.g., (1984: §6.6), (1998: 311-20), and (2006: §3). 
Discussing q-projectivism’s application to the moral realm, Blackburn argues that the q-
projectivist treatment of unasserted contexts shows the view to be perfectly consistent with 
mind-independence. Take a claim like (M1): ‘if we’d had different sentiments, kicking dogs 
wouldn’t have been wrong’. Blackburn thinks that to assess this claim, we’d have to ask 
what someone could be ‘up to’ in uttering it. On his above described ‘commitment 
theoretic’ understanding of conditionals,246 they’d be expressing a higher-order moral 
attitude of approval towards a sensibility whereby information about human sentiments is 
allowed to dictate a person’s attitudes towards kicking dogs (1984: 218). In Blackburn’s 
view, these conditionals express substantive moral claims, so we should view such claims 
from the standpoint of the person engaged in moralizing. 
 Blackburn continues to say that when claims like (M1) are assessed ‘in the standard 
way’, they turn out to be false. For ‘nice people do not endorse such a sensibility’ (ibid.). 
Imagining situations in which kicking dogs is thought of as fine only conjures feelings of 
strong disapproval. ‘What makes it wrong to kick dogs is cruelty or pain to the animal. That 
input should yield disapproval and indignation as the output. (ibid.).’ So our standards for 
disapproving of this action don’t track our attitudes towards it. This is what contrasting 
claims of mind-independence make salient. ‘Kicking dogs would’ve been wrong regardless 
of our sentiments’, effectively signals rejection towards the sensibility the contrasting 
counterfactual (M1) expresses, conveying that it’s morally defective.  
 
So we should not say or think that were our sentiments to alter or disappear, moral 
facts would do so as well. This would be endorsing the…the wrong kinds of 
sensibility, and it will be part of good moralizing not to do that.’ (ibid.: 219, fn. 21). 
 
And while this answer involves 
 
assessing the scenario in the light of things one thinks and feels about such 
matters[,]…that is no objection, since there is no other mode of assessment 
possible. One cannot pass a verdict without using those parts of one’s mind that 
enable one to pass a verdict. (2006: 154) 
                                                          
246 This terminology is due to Hale (2002). 
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Let’s extend Blackburn’s response to the modal case. Take (M2): ‘if our sentiments 
had been different God exists would have been contingent’. This will be taken as expressing 
a higher-order modal attitude because (M2)’s consequent involves a modal claim. To 
sincerely utter (M2) is to express commitment towards God exists being contingent in some 
imagined scenario where our sentiments differ. Yet, by the objector’s own lights, people don’t 
have such sentiments; we express attitudes of rejection towards these kinds of sensibilities, 
and rightly so: 
 
if someone so organizes his beliefs and the way he makes inferences that he cannot 
let the presence of a tree in suitable sunshine suffice to give him confidence that 
there is a shadow, but needs information about whether people think one way or 
another, he is in a mess. He will fail to be confident in truths about the actual world 
when he should be. (1984: 218) 
 
In short then, Blackburn’s insistence that q-projectivists needn’t deny any of the common-
sense commitments about the way modal (and moral) truth arises is underpinned by the 
thought that claims like (M1) and (M2) are assessable only from a standpoint internal to the 
relevant practice. And when assessed from these standpoints, we see that these conditionals 
express attitudes excluded by best sets thereof, entitling us to reject them as false. 
 Neil Sinclair (2008: §2) suggests that what distracts us from seeing that q-
projectivism doesn’t make modal truth mind-dependent is our having in mind a particular 
(realist-biased) way of understanding the common-sense intuition that moral truth doesn’t 
depend on us. The issue of mind-dependence, he urges, really hangs on the question, not 
of whether the distribution of moral properties is mind-dependent, but whether the correct conditions 
for the application of moral predicates is mind-dependent. It is then an additional question 
whether moral predicates ascribe properties or express attitudes. It’s my recognition of 
some natural property had by the thing judged – not awareness of certain attitudes – which 
makes the application of a modal predicate appropriate. Under realism, it’s also my 
recognition of some property of the thing judged which makes the application of a moral 
predicate appropriate; it’s just that that, in the realist case, the property will be a distinctively 
moral one. So in both cases some mind-independent feature makes the application of a certain 
moral predicate appropriate.   
 Suppose this tactic for responding to the mind-dependence issue is correct with 
regards to morality (though there may well be reasons to doubt it), will an analogous 
response work in the modal case? The first issue is that the modal and the moral cases are 
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not perfectly analogous. In the moral case, some apprehended feature of the thing judged 
suffices for an attitude of moral disproval or approval’s being appropriate. In the modal 
case, however, some apprehended feature of the thing judged, together with some apprehension 
of the property of the subject’s own mental state is supposed to do the relevant work. Here the 
objection in §6.1 becomes relevant. Suppose, though, that Blackburn can find some way to 
articulate the mental blocks which underlie cases of modal projection in non-modal terms. 
Although some categorical feature of the mental state will then feature in the application 
conditions for the modal predicate, the fact still remains that some feature of a mental state 
contributes towards the conditions for correct assertion having been met. Doesn’t that 
make modal truth mind-dependent? In a way, but not in a way that’s problematic to the 
account. Modal truth would in this case be mind-dependent only in the harmless sense that 
the existence of minds is mind dependent. The second issue, which is one of specifying 
what the relevant ‘ordinary feature of things’ responded to might be in cases of modal 
projections, is more worrying. We might allow for the relevant features in cases of modal 
projections to be varied (just as harmfulness won’t work for all cases of appropriate moral 
disproval), however, it is, in the least, not at all easy to see what the relevant feature(s) could 
be. What categorical properties do, say, contingent things have such that we judge them as 
contingent? The q-projectivist owes us an explanation here. Whether one can be given, I 
leave to one side; below we’ll see that, even if it can, mind-dependence remains a problem. 
 
7.2. The External Stance 
In other areas it seems legitimate to object that an ‘internal assessment’ of a mind-
dependence claim would be misguided. Nick Zangwill (1994: 209-11) takes mathematics to 
be one such case: the product of 6 squared would have been 36 no matter what our sentiments isn’t a 
mathematical truth. Further, Stig Alstrup Rasmussen (1985) argues that even in the moral 
case, the fact that claims like (M1) can be given an internal reading is beside the point. More 
generalised mind-dependence claims such as (M3): ‘had our sentiments been different, the 
moral truth would have been different’ cannot be given an internal reading because their 
consequents make no substantive moral claim (ibid.: 187). However, the modal case is 
disanalogous in these respects. (M2) and others like it – even ones expressing more 
generalised claims – do express modal claims. So these points don’t show that Blackburn 
fails to be justified in giving modal mind-(in)dependence claims an internal reading, even if 
such readings may be inappropriate in other domains.  
Nonetheless, there is, as Zangwill also notes, ‘something unsettling about the 
internal reading technique…something about it strikes one as…a bit of a cheat’ (ibid.: 211). 
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The dissatisfaction stems from the fact that ‘something…is being given with one hand (the 
participant’s) and taken away with the other (the theorist’s).’ (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2006: 
199). For as Blackburn acknowledges, his theory has it that modal properties are ‘the 
children of our sentiments in the sense that the full explanation of what we do when we 
[modalise] cites only the natural properties of things and our natural reactions to them.’ 
(1984: 219, fn 21). D’Arms and Jacobson don’t consider this point to be decisive against 
Blackburn; I think they’re wrong about this. 
  The point of this objection is that, if (a) the sense in which modal truth does depend 
on our sentiments – the one acknowledged by Blackburn above – is only articulable from 
an internal standpoint; and (b) assessment of the counterfactuals representative of this sense 
reveals them to be false, then q-projectivism must, by its own lights, be false. For the 
internal reading has it that viewing modal truth as mind-dependent involves adopting a 
modally defective attitude. Considering the moral case, Rasmussen expresses similar 
sentiments when he says that, likewise, Blackburn’s internal reading has it that  
 
it is immoral to regard moral truth as mind-dependent. Not only does such an 
accusation seem absurd: the rejoinder is immediate that if so, perhaps no nice 
people should endorse [q-projectivism], since, for all Blackburn shows to the 
contrary, that doctrine does make moral truth mind-dependent. (ibid.: 187)  
 
On this basis, q-projectivism seems to be ‘propounded from a point of view for which that 
account does not provide’ (Rasmussen, ibid.: 190). Blackburn must, therefore, allow a 
reading of claims such as (M2) – ones where modal sentiments are directed towards the 
practice of modalising – which permits them to be assessed from an external standpoint.   
 Jenkins (2005) draws a distinction between (a) what it takes for something to be the 
case, and (b) what it is for something to be the case. The former notion concerns the 
standards for correct assertion. Specifying what it takes for p to be the case involves 
specifying sufficient conditions for p to be correctly judged as true. The latter concerns 
‘what the standards are standards for’, i.e., what their function is, or what they track. 
Specifying what it is for p to be the case is a matter of specifying what it is for something to 
meet those standards. To help elucidate this notion, Jenkins gives an example: what it takes 
for Blackadder to be funny is for him to put some underwear on his head and shove some 
pencils up his nose. This action is sufficient for our finding Blackadder funny. What it is for 
Blackadder to be funny, however, is for him to provoke certain responses from us, e.g., to 
make us laugh; it’s more a matter of what funniness consists in. With this distinction drawn, 
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we can, suggests Jenkins, see that Blackburn considers the task of rebutting worries about 
mind-dependence to be one of answering the following kind of question:  
 
(1): Is it part of what it takes for some p to be necessary that we have an  
  attitude of commitment towards it? 
 
Blackburn thinks he can give the right kind of answer to this question because it’s one that 
can be answered internal to the practice of modalising. ‘What it takes’ questions concern 
conditions for correct assertion, and modal discourse involves our applying modal 
predicates to things. Since the conditions which govern such applications do not involve 
our attitudes being a certain way, the answer to (1) is ‘no’. 
 However, there’s a different kind of question we can ask which can’t be answered 
internal to the practice of modalising. Suppose we ask 
 
(2):  Is it part of what it is for some p to be necessary that we have an attitude 
  of commitment towards it? 
 
As Jenkins explains247 (ibid.: 207), in asking this question, we don’t seem to be asking what 
the standards for accepting p as necessary are, nor do we seem to be asking whether those 
standards are met. What we’re asking is: what’s the nature of p’s being necessary? Pointing out 
that certain features of the thing judged prompt our application of the predicate ‘…is 
necessary’ will not answer this question; this just tells us what it takes to be necessary, and 
we want to know what it is to be necessary. (2) is a question about the nature of modality. 
It is thus one that has to be answered from the external standpoint of a person theorising 
about modality. Suppose we ask Blackburn that question. Then, says Jenkins – and I think 
we should agree with her on this – his answer will have to be ‘yes’. While Blackburn might, 
then, say that it’s no part of what it takes for some p to be necessary that our attitudes be a 
certain way, he cannot say (without rejecting his own position) that it’s no part of what it is 
for some p to be necessary that our attitudes be a certain way. His view thus makes modal 
truth essentially mind-dependent: mind-dependent by nature. 
Sinclair (2009: 835) responds to Jenkins that a supporter of Blackburn is under no 
obligation to answer the ‘essential mind-dependence question’ (i.e., (2)). ‘It is not the quasi-
realist’s task to provide expressivist-friendly interpretation of everything the realist says…in 
characterising their position.’ I think this quite misses the point. It is in articulating their 
                                                          
247 Jenkins focusses on moral discourse, but I take the point to be equally legitimate in the modal case. 
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view that the q-projectivist unavoidably provides an answer to this question. So Blackburn 
faces a dilemma: deny himself an external standpoint (the one of the modal metaphysician) 
from which to articulate his view, or accept a positive answer to (2). 
 
7.3. The Reflective Modal Practitioner 
Suppose x accepts Blackburn’s position regarding modality and thus accepts a thorough-
going projectivist account of the attitudinal content of modal expressions. Now suppose 
they sincerely express that God exists necessarily. Q-projectivism says that in uttering these 
words, x expresses that they are strongly committed to God’s existence; so they must (if they 
speak sincerely), feel strongly committed to God’s existence. By hypothesis, however, x 
accepts q-projectivism, x thus recognises that their commitment towards God’s existence is 
but a consequence of their having (at least) two imaginative blanks: one concerning God’s 
non-existence, the other concerning situations in which someone lacks this blank. (If I’m 
right about the way in which these blanks must be understood, they must also recognise 
that their finding God’s non-existence appropriately inconceivable is a matter of their 
finding their finding God’s existence appropriately conceivable, appropriately 
inconceivable, and so on.) Can x then maintain their feeling of strong commitment towards 
God’s existence? It’s hard to see how they could. What seems most plausible is that, on 
reflection, once x sees what their commitment really amounts to – namely, a description of 
the very mental state that supports such a commitment – their sentiment towards God’s 
existence will, in all likelihood, lose its force. The reflective q-projectivist thus looks to be 
unable to make sincere modal expressions. This is an extremely significant problem for the 
account: acceptance of modal projectivism seems to preclude projectivists from maintaining 
the commitments modal verbs would enable them to express. In this sense, the position, 
once knowingly accepted, looks self-defeating. 
This particular worry is especially pressing in the context of theism. Being theist 
involves being strongly committed to certain doctrines – including those which are 
traditionally expressed in modal terms. If accepting the Blackburn/Le Poidevin position on 
what those commitments amount to prevents a person from committing, to a relevant 
degree, to the theistic claims modal verbs might otherwise attach, then it seems that theists 
qua theists cannot accept this position. Now, it does not follow from this that theism is 
incompatible with projectivism per se: it may well be true that the God of classical theism 
exists and that the Blackburn/Le Poidevin model accurately captures what theistic modal 
commitments amount to or mean. It may also be true that a person can be theist while the 
Blackburn/Le Poidevin model is correct. However, what does follow is that one cannot 
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knowingly accept this model whilst endorsing the commitments of theism. Once aware of what 
those commitments amount to, maintaining those commitments looks impossible. 
  
     8. Modality from the Outset 
A third worry concerns the Le Poidevin/Blackburn account of the source of divine necessity 
(i.e., its genealogy). Recall, the account requires that the theist begins with a non-modal 
conception of God.248 The modalised concept of God is arrived at only because theists 
(having such a non-modal concept in mind) subsequently find themselves unable to engage 
in a certain type of counterfactual thinking. How plausible is it, though, that the conception 
which underlies this inability – the one which supposedly prevents the theist from 
entertaining certain suppositions – is non-modal?  
Crucial to a person’s inability to ‘make something of’ God’s non-existence is their 
viewing God as being something like the source of all being, or, in Le Poidevin’s words, the 
‘creator of all things, and (in some way yet to be articulated) the basis of all goodness.’ (2012: 
21). However, these conceptions themselves only seem understandable in modal terms. As 
we’ve seen, it’s characteristic of our understanding of causal relations that if event c (or 
agent a) caused event e, then had e not occurred (or had a not existed), e would not have 
occurred: there’s a strong and close connection between causation and counterfactual 
dependence. However, this connection is unintelligible if causation is not itself something 
modal. So there are good grounds for maintaining that the theist’s notion of God as creator 
requires them to conceptualise God in some modal way from the outset. That is, it presupposes 
that they judge God as being linked with the world via some modal relation. So the 
Blackburn/Le Poidevin position on the source of God’s necessity seems to, as a matter of 
actual psychological fact, get things wrong: the mental state underlying such projections 
presupposes some modal thoughts about God. 
 Although the popular Lewis/Stalker semantics for counterfactual dependence 
relations assigns counterfactuals non-modal truth-conditions, this should not derail the 
objection. Even if one assigns counterfactual statements such truth-conditions, the mental 
state of the person entertaining a causal claim is still one in which that person is thinking a 
modally-descriptive thought, something of the form ‘if this hadn’t have happened, then that 
wouldn’t have happened’. It is unlikely in the extreme that what someone has in mind when 
they are thinking that God is the source of being, or goodness, is not a counterfactual 
                                                          
248 Here we needn’t read ‘begins’ and ‘arrived at’ as having a temporal sense. There may only be a conceptual 
priority of the non-modal to the modal concept of God.  
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thought along these lines, but something deeper – something as sophisticated as what Lewis 
and Stalnaker would have us say about closeness relations between different worlds!  
The issue, again, is that q-projectivism denies modal discourse has a representative 
function. We don’t judge things as being necessary or contingent; we just have certain 
sentiments towards non-modal propositions and non-linguistic entities. The non-cognitivist 
programme must therefore be extended to counterfactual and causal discourse: causal and 
counterfactual relations must also be projections of non-cognitive attitudes. Following the 
Blackburn/Le Poidevin account, the story would go something like this: the theist can make 
nothing of the world existing without God (and cannot assign a naturalistic explanation to 
this), and they project this inconceivability onto the world by saying ‘God created the world’ 
or ‘God is the source of being’ and so on. Now though, some account is needed of why 
such a person experiences an imaginative blank when it comes to contemplating the world 
existing without God. The theist must have some non-modal thought in mind – one whose 
falsity they can make nothing of – which underlies the relevant inconceivability. Yet, now 
it is us who experience an imaginative blank when we try to think of what such thought 
could be. What is left of the concept of God, once we strip it of its causal and modal 
content? With such a pared-down notion, all we appear able to say is that there’s a very 
good personal being who possesses much knowledge.249 But with only that to work with, 
we have no good explanation for why someone would only experience imaginative blanks 
when attempting to conceive of a world without such a being. If causal properties and 
relations of dependence are merely projected onto the world as a means of expressing non-
cognitive attitudes, then the Blackburn/Le Poidevin account of the source of divine 
necessity can’t get off the ground. 
Further, if the claims that God is the cause of the world’s existence, or the ground 
of all goodness also require a modal understanding, then there’s the additional problem that 
these classical theistic commitments will also be undermined once the Blackburn/Le 
Poidevin is accepted. Once a person acknowledges that ‘all there is’ to these claims is some 
suitable inconceivability, continued commitment to them looks unsustainable, given that 
commitment to a proposition seems to require that one at least not see reason for one’s 
commitment as a mere feature of one’s self.  
 
 
                                                          
249 And such a being’s goodness would have to be conceived of as consisting only in their actually doing good 
deeds (or in their actually possessing good virtues). 
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     9.  Conclusion 
Supplemented with the additional details Le Poidevin provides, Blackburn’s q-projectivism 
provides an interesting alternative to truth-conditional accounts of both theistic and non-
theistic modal commitments. But for all its novelty and ingenuity, the view faces at least 
three serious objections. First, there’s no clear way in which the mental states which underlie 
modal projections can be properly understood in non-modal terms. Second, q-projectivism 
cannot, due to the answer it gives to the ‘essential mind-dependence’ question, be knowingly 
endorsed whilst maintaining theistic commitments. Third, for the account to work, some 
non-modal conception of God must plausibly underpin theistic modal attitudes. Whether 
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Conclusion 
The goal of this project was to go some way in answering the question of which 
metaphysical account of modality might best fit with classical theism. Chapters Two to Six 
explored three different theories, each of which aspires to eliminate modality from the 
ontological bedrock of reality. The original motivation for examining such theories is exactly 
what motivates us to look for an account of modality at all: unlike categorical truth, with 
modal truth it’s hard to see what part of reality might ground it, and this makes it prima facie 
mysterious. Chapter One examined no such theory but instead questioned whether God’s 
nature is intrinsic. The purpose of this was two-fold: (1) to demonstrate that a traditionally 
orthodox understanding of divine aseity leads classical theism to paradox, but that this can 
be overcome by adopting DI, thus providing a hitherto unnoticed motivation for adopting 
this distinctively theistic modal theory; (2) to lay some important groundwork for the 
discussions in subsequent parts of the thesis. Divine aseity is one of the key, but least 
explored, components of classical theism. To understand whether different modal theories 
might respect it, it was important to first determine what it might amount to, and hence, to 
see what it might require of – and how it might relate to – other aspects of the divine nature. 
The discussion cumulated at the end of Chapter Two, where I provided a new interpretation 
of this doctrine, and explained how it can provide a solution to other metaphysical problems 
associated with God’s nature. 
 While DI has garnered recent support, it has not been explicated in any real detail; 
nor has any attempt been made to determine whether it can provide a fully reductive analysis 
of modality. Chapter Two has gone some way in plugging this gap and has hopefully showed 
that DI has at least a not implausible claim on its ability to do so. Despite what might be 
said in favour of DI, however, an extended argument showed that DI is untenable when 
coupled with the classical theistic doctrine of PB. This failing of DI pointed us towards the 
following: that theists wanting to endorse a possible world account of modality may do 
better to adopt a view, such as GR, whereby God in some sense actualizes all worlds.  
 Chapters Three and Four explored further new territory by examining which of CT, 
TI, or SV may be the best account of divine de re representation under GR. It was 
determined that, regardless of one’s take on the question of divine spatiotemporally, a 
theistically acceptable account of divine de re representation is available. Those committed 
to divine timelessness can adopt SV, and those committed to divine temporality can adopt 
TI (requiring the adoption of GRO). CT was shown to be a non-viable account of divine 
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de re representation for four reasons: (i) it introduces a problem of luck; (ii) it fails to respect 
divine omniscience; (iii) it fails to respect divine ultimacy; and (iv) it’s incongruous with the 
original motivation for rejecting DI in favour of GR. However, while this metaphysical 
issue can be resolved, theistic GR encounters moral challenges of its own, and Chapter Five 
showed that these cannot be easily resolved. These such challenges stem from the single 
fact that merely possible evils – and merely possible individuals – are, on this view, no less 
real than those here in the actual world. Not only does this lead to a modalised problem of 
evil (one for which the examined defences seem insufficient), it also transforms the moral 
decision-making of a person who has knowledge of GR in a substantial and problematic 
way – problematic, that is, especially in the context of theism. Further, it does not well-
accommodate God’s perceived role as moral judge. 
The failings of DI and GR led us to consider an entirely different kind of account: 
Blackburn’s q-projectivism. Supplemented with the additional details Le Poidevin provides, 
this theory provides an interesting alternative to truth-conditional accounts of both theistic 
and non-theistic modal commitments. But for all its novelty and ingenuity, the view faces 
three serious objections. (i) there’s no clear way in which the mental states supposedly 
underlying modal projections can be properly understood in non-modal terms; (ii) q-
projectivism cannot, due to the answer it gives to the ‘essential mind-dependence’ question, 
be knowingly endorsed whilst maintaining theistic commitments; and this makes the 
account self-defeating. (iii) the account needs some non-modal conception of God to 
plausibly underpin certain modal attitudes, and it’s doubtful that one could do so. 
In sum, we’ve seen that uncovering a theistically acceptable account of modality is 
no easy task. The substantive moral and metaphysical commitments of classical theism 
make an already difficult philosophical undertaking – answering modality’s grounding 
problem – considerably more burdensome. Although a viable account has not been 
uncovered here, this thesis has covered important new ground in exploring (for the first 
time in any real detail) the credentials of DI, and examining how well GR and q-projectivism 
fare under theism. In addition to casting light on the relevant merits and demerits of these 
theories, it has further shown that continued exploration of this topic – examining how well 
other kinds of modal theory fare in the context of theism – is a worthy and important 
endeavour. Questioning theism’s fit with accounts which don’t aim to eliminate modality 
from the fundamental level, I suggest, would be one such project for further valuable work. 
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